# COMMENTARY: North Korean Coal Thrives in the Shadows — When the UN Looks Away

> 50,000 to 80,000 people condemned to work in mines because they were born into the wrong family at the wrong moment in history — and that coal ends up in the hold of ships that circumvent sanctions wi

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Commentary
- Published: 2026-07-02
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/commentaire-le-charbon-nord-coreen-prospere-dans-l-ombre-quand-l-onu-regarde-ail

## Introduction: the blind spot of international monitoring

### An illicit trade that rebounds when the watchdog leaves

On **June 29, 2026**, **Reuters** published the findings of a report by the **North Korea Human Rights Alliance (NKHR)**, in partnership with the British research group **Data Desk**: the **sanctioned coal** trade of **North Korea** has rebounded significantly since the **United Nations Independent Panel of Experts** charged with monitoring North Korean sanctions stopped operating. The cause of that dissolution? A **Russian veto** at the **UN Security Council in March 2024**. The result? A monitoring vacuum that **Pyongyang** is filling with remarkable efficiency and near-total impunity.

The data is precise. Large vessels visible in the five main **North Korean ports** jumped from **783 in 2019** to **3,756 in 2025** — an increase of **380%**. At the port of **Nampo** alone, the main coal export gateway, vessel detections went from **554 in 2019** to more than **3,000 last year**. All of this under a **UN** sanctions regime that formally prohibits coal exports since **2017**. Formally only.

### The network structure — China, Russia, and North Korea hand in hand

It is not **North Korea** alone that runs this system. It is the producer; **China** is the main buyer and intermediary; **Russia** eliminated the international monitoring mechanism that could have constrained it. This triangle of converging interests operates like an ordinary **commercial partnership** dressed up as a **UN sanctions violation**. The distinction between the two interests neither **Beijing** nor **Moscow** nor **Pyongyang**.

Sanctioned vessels have been found docking in foreign ports — up to **25 visits last year**, compared to **4 in 2019**. The trade is conducted almost entirely by companies linked to **North Korea's Ministry of National Defense**. Revenues flow directly to the military and security agencies. The mines are worked by **political prisoners**, **unpaid soldiers**, and descendants of **South Korean prisoners of war** who never returned home after the **1950–1953** war. **Between 50,000 and 80,000 people** are estimated to be condemned to mine labor by a system of **hereditary castes**.

## The Russian veto that killed monitoring — a calculated act

### March 2024: Russia protects its ally by destroying the control mechanism

In **March 2024**, **Russia** vetoed the renewal of the mandate of the **UN Expert Panel** charged with monitoring sanctions against **North Korea**. This panel, composed of independent experts, was one of the few international mechanisms capable of systematically documenting **North Korean sanctions violations** — ship-to-ship transfers, transit ports, falsified cargo manifests, shell companies. By blocking its renewal, **Moscow** turned off the light in the room.

The timing of this veto is not coincidental. Since **2022**, **Russia** had developed a growing dependence on North Korean ammunition and missiles to fuel its war in **Ukraine**. **North Korea** was delivering artillery shells by the millions, **KN-23** ballistic missiles. In exchange, **Moscow** was offering diplomatic protection at the **Security Council** — including this crucial veto. It is an exchange of services between **authoritarian regimes** that no longer even disguises itself as multilateral policy.

### Russian courtiers in Pyongyang: fuel, fertilizer, construction

The exchange does not stop at weapons. On **June 26, 2026**, a large Russian commercial delegation from **Siberia** arrived in **North Korea** with offers of **fuel, fertilizers, agricultural products**, and construction services. Five companies from the **Irkutsk region** — the **East Siberian Chamber of Commerce** announced it publicly — held business meetings with North Korean counterparts. This is **documented economic complicity**, presented without shame as normal commercial relations.

This Russo-North Korean commercial partnership is the logical counterpart of the military partnership: **Russia** supplies **North Korea** with what its isolated economy needs — energy resources, agricultural technologies, construction expertise — in exchange for ammunition for its war in **Ukraine** and diplomatic protection at the **Security Council**. It is a mutual aid system between **pariah states** that thrives precisely because the international monitoring mechanisms have been dismantled.

## China as the central buyer and the false Russian origin labeling

### North Korean coal circulates via China with falsified documents

**China** is the economic engine of this illicit trade. It is simultaneously the main direct buyer of **North Korean coal** and the main provider of the sanctions-evasion architecture — shell companies, vessel ownership transfers, transit ports. Sanctioned vessels that cannot dock directly in Chinese ports transit through intermediaries — sometimes in international waters, sometimes via third-party ports.

**South Korea's National Intelligence Service** estimates that **North Korea** shipped approximately **1.5 million metric tons** of coal last year — a figure the **NKHR** describes as an **"absolute minimum."** An average bulk carrier transports approximately **39,000 tons**, representing fewer than **40 shipments per year**. Vessel detection figures at North Korean ports suggest that actual volumes are much higher. According to data cited by South Korean lawmaker **Yoo Yong-won**, some of this coal is being resold with a **forged Russian origin** — allowing the market to expand to countries that would avoid North Korean coal but accept Russian.

### China's economic interest in maintaining this trade

**China** has direct economic interests in the perpetuation of this illicit trade. North Korean coal, delivered cheaply, fuels Chinese industries with **low-cost energy**. The transit companies that facilitate the exchanges — vessels flying flags of convenience, shell companies in lax jurisdictions — generate revenues for operators linked to Chinese interests. And politically, keeping **North Korea** economically viable serves **Beijing**'s strategic interest in having a stable buffer state on its border.

This convergence of economic and strategic interests explains why **Beijing** does not genuinely enforce the sanctions it nonetheless voted for at the **UN Security Council**. **China** is a signatory to the North Korean coal resolutions since **2017** — and simultaneously the main facilitator of their violation. This is **documented diplomatic hypocrisy**, now unchecked thanks to the Russian veto that eliminated the independent monitoring experts.

## Forced labor in the mines — the invisible human cost

### A system of hereditary slavery feeding a state economy

Behind the vessel statistics and tonnage figures lies a human reality that accounting reports tend to erase. The North Korean mines whose coal transits illegally are operated by some of the world's most vulnerable categories of workers. **Political prisoners**, whose crime can be as mundane as having owned a Bible or having attempted to flee the country. **Unpaid soldiers** assigned to mine work as punishment or compulsory labor. And, perhaps most revolting, **descendants of South Korean prisoners of war** — entire families condemned to the mines forever because their ancestor did not come home after **1953**.

The **NKHR** report draws on **22 interviews** with former prisoners, North Koreans who managed to escape the country, and former officials. This human testimony gives flesh to the numbers. These accounts describe working conditions that rival the darkest pages of global industrial history — and that end with coal being loaded onto ships that circumvent sanctions to supply markets in **China** and beyond.

### The money flowing back to Kim Jong-un's military and security complex

The revenues generated by this sanctioned trade do not benefit the miners. They go directly to the **North Korean Ministry of National Defense** that controls the entire mining sector, and from there to the **military and security agencies** that manage the camps and maintain the regime. It is an autarkic economic circuit in which forced labor generates foreign currency revenues that finance the **ballistic missile program** and the armaments that **Kim Jong-un** sells to **Putin**.

This circuit is directly relevant to the war in **Ukraine**. The North Korean **KN-23** missiles striking Ukrainian cities are partly financed by coal revenues extracted by forced laborers, shipped via sanctions-circumventing vessels, purchased by Chinese intermediaries, with the complicity of the **Russian UN veto**. This is a **documented causal chain** connecting the victims of **Kyiv** to the political prisoners in North Korean mines.

## The international response — between verbal condemnations and structural inaction

### Why sanctions do not work without a monitoring mechanism

The dissolution of the **UN Expert Panel** has exposed a truth the architects of the sanctions system may have underestimated: **sanctions only work if someone monitors them**. Without independent experts capable of documenting violations, identifying vessels, tracing trade flows, and publicly naming the states and companies circumventing the rules, sanctions become statements of principle with no real deterrent effect.

This structural reality goes beyond the North Korean case alone. It applies to the entire **international sanctions regime**: against **Russia**, against **Iran**, against other targeted regimes. Wherever monitoring mechanisms are weakened or eliminated by the vetoes of permanent **Security Council** members, the sanctions regime is hollowed out. The Russian veto against North Korean monitoring is a show of force that anticipates the obstacles **Moscow** and **Beijing** could create against the monitoring of their own violations.

### What democracies could do — and choose not to

Western democracies are not without recourse. **Secondary sanctions** — threatening exclusion from the American financial system of entities that facilitate trade with sanctioned **North Korea** — have been used with some success in the past. A coalition of like-minded countries could also create an **alternative monitoring mechanism** to the paralyzed UN mechanism — an independent body outside the **UN**, financed by democracies, with a mandate to monitor and publish violations.

These options exist. They are not priorities on the diplomatic agendas of Western capitals that have other urgent crises — and that is precisely what **Moscow, Beijing**, and **Pyongyang** are counting on. The overload of the Western diplomatic agenda is itself a **strategy of attrition**. While the **West** simultaneously manages the war in **Ukraine**, tensions with **China**, the Iranian threat, and domestic crises, North Korea's illicit trade thrives in complete tranquility.

## The interconnection with the war in Ukraine and global security

### North Korea's illicit trade directly finances Putin's arsenal

The connection between **North Korea**'s sanctioned coal trade and the war in **Ukraine** is not theoretical. **Pyongyang** has delivered millions of artillery shells and ballistic missiles to **Russia** since **2022**. These deliveries constitute in-kind aid in exchange for which **Russia** offers diplomatic protection (the **UN veto**), foreign currency revenues (arms purchases), and now direct commercial offers — fuel, fertilizers, construction. The North Korean economy, made more viable by these exchanges, can continue producing the ammunition that **Putin** is consuming at a pace his own factories can no longer match alone.

This is a system of **cross-financing between autocrats**: North Korean coal generating foreign currency, enabling arms production, delivered to Russia, which offers protection and resources, reinforcing the North Korean regime's economic viability. Breaking this circuit — by restoring effective sanctions monitoring — is not only a humanitarian imperative for the forced mine laborers. It is a strategic necessity for limiting **Russia**'s ability to rearm through its proxies.

### The signal this impunity sends to the rest of the world

The impunity with which **North Korea** has been circumventing sanctions since the monitoring mechanism was eliminated sends a signal to the entire international community: the **UN Security Council**, in its current form, can be **neutralized by the veto of a single permanent member**. This reality is not new — but it is being increasingly and functionally exploited by authoritarian regimes that sit precisely within the institution designed to constrain them.

**Security Council** reform — debated for decades — remains blocked. Democracies accommodate this blockage by developing alternative mechanisms. But these mechanisms remain insufficient to replace the authority and formal legitimacy of the UN system. This is a **structural limit** that autocrats know and exploit — and that democracies have not yet resolved.

## Secondary sanctions — the weapon the West does not dare fully use

### A powerful financial lever, underused by political calculation

**American secondary sanctions** represent the most effective tool the **West** has to constrain the actors facilitating illicit trade with **North Korea**. By excluding from the international financial system any company or bank dealing with sanctioned North Korean entities, these sanctions can strike where diplomatic declarations have no effect. The precedents exist: between **2017 and 2019**, under the Trump administration, a series of secondary sanctions had temporarily reduced the volume of North Korean trade with **China**.

But application of these sanctions is intermittent and politically calibrated. Striking the Chinese banks and companies that facilitate North Korean coal trade risks aggravating **commercial tensions with Beijing** — a calculation that successive administrations have judged too costly in the context of trade negotiations, tensions in the **Taiwan Strait**, and technological competition. This priority choice is legitimate; but it has a direct cost on the effectiveness of North Korean sanctions.

### Building a monitoring system outside the UN

If the **UN Security Council** is structurally paralyzed by the Russian veto on North Korean monitoring issues, the logical response is to build a monitoring mechanism outside the UN framework. Precedents exist: the **Financial Action Task Force (FATF)** operates independently of the **UN** and holds real authority over member states on illicit financing. A similar mechanism, specialized in monitoring North Korean sanctions, could be funded and mandated by a coalition of democracies — **United States, European Union, Japan, South Korea, Australia, United Kingdom**.

This is not a perfect solution. Such a mechanism would not have the formal authority of the **UN** or its universal legitimacy. But it could document violations, name offenders, recommend secondary sanctions, and build a public registry of actors facilitating illicit trade. **Coercive transparency** — forcing actors to operate under public scrutiny — has demonstrated its effectiveness in other regulatory domains. It would remain insufficient without the political will to apply consequences. But it would be better than the current void.

## The democratic paradox — knowing without acting

### When transparency is not enough to trigger action

The **NKHR and Data Desk** report, published in late June **2026**, is not the first documentation of North Korean illicit trade. Similar reports were produced by the **UN Expert Panel** for years before its dissolution. The **C4ADS**, the **Royal United Services Institute**, teams of investigative journalists have documented the transit networks, ghost ships, and shell companies. The factual record is solid. The reality of the illicit trade is not in question. It is the political response that is missing.

This paradox is characteristic of a certain mode of democratic functioning in the face of distant, complex problems that are difficult to narrativize for the general public. **North Korea** is geographically remote. Its victims — prisoners in mines — have no voice. Its effects — the strengthening of **Putin**'s arsenal — are indirect and require a long explanatory chain to be made salient. This lack of salience is not innocence — it is a structure of inaction that benefits the offenders.

### The responsibility of media and public opinion

Media covering the North Korean file — including **Reuters, NK News, The Guardian**, and specialized think tanks — are doing essential work of documentation and visibility. But coverage remains fragmented, drowned in a news flow dominated by active wars, economic crises, and domestic political upheaval. The result is a **collective attention deficit** that serves **Kim Jong-un**'s regime and its illicit commercial partners.

Western public opinion, when informed, has shown that it can exert real pressure on governments to adopt more constraining policies. The secondary sanctions against **Russia** after **2022** are proof: what seemed unthinkable became official policy within weeks under combined pressure from public opinion, media, and civil society. The same mechanism could apply to North Korean sanctions — provided the file is made sufficiently visible and comprehensible to the citizens who vote.

## Conclusion: the shadow cast by an invisible trade over global security

### Naming complicity for what it is

The **NKHR** report and the **Reuters** investigation published in late June **2026** have brought to light a reality diplomats prefer to manage in the shadows: **North Korea**'s sanctioned coal trade is thriving, and it is doing so with the documented complicity of **Russia** (diplomatic protection), **China** (purchase and transit), and the partial indifference of democracies (inaction on secondary sanctions). This complicity is not neutral — it feeds a regime that keeps its own citizens in conditions of forced labor and sells weapons to a country that bombs Ukrainian cities.

I do not pretend the solution is simple. Geopolitical tensions with **China** and **Russia** are real, and the aggressive application of secondary sanctions carries economic risks. But between geopolitical complexity and passive complicity, there is a space that democracies have not yet fully occupied. This commentary does not claim to have all the answers — it simply demands that the questions be posed with the **clarity they deserve**.

### What rebuilding credible monitoring requires

The immediate and documented priority is to rebuild a **North Korean sanctions monitoring mechanism** that does not depend on the consensus of permanent **Security Council** members. This could take the form of an agreement among like-minded democracies — **EU, United States, South Korea, Japan, Australia** — to create an independent monitoring body, with a mandate to publish violations and recommend secondary sanctions. This is not a replacement of the **UN** — it is a complement to a UN architecture that has shown its limits.

North Korean coal trade is a small piece in a broader geopolitical picture. But it illustrates how **authoritarian regimes** systematically exploit the flaws in the international order to finance their military adventures and keep their populations in servitude. Closing these gaps — one by one, patiently, with the technical competence and political will required — is one of the structural challenges of the decade.

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

## Sources

### Primary sources

- [Reuters — North Korea's sanctioned coal trade rebounds as UN monitoring lapses — June 29, 2026](https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/north-koreas-sanctioned-coal-trade-rebounds-un-monitoring-lapses-rights-group-2026-06-29/)

- [Ground News / NK News — Russian companies court North Korea with fuel, fertilizer and construction bids — June 26, 2026](https://ground.news/article/russian-companies-court-north-korea-with-fuel-fertilizer-and-construction-bids)

- [Kyiv Independent — Context on North Korean deliveries to Russia — July 2026](https://kyivindependent.com)

### Secondary sources

- [United24 Media — Context on South Korea and regional security — 2026](https://united24media.com/tags/south-korea)

- [Interfax Ukraine — Diplomatic and sanctions context — 2026](https://en.interfax.com.ua)

- Militarnyi — Context on North Korean armaments used in Ukraine — 2026

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Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/commentaire-le-charbon-nord-coreen-prospere-dans-l-ombre-quand-l-onu-regarde-ail