# COMMENTARY: The FCC bans Huawei, ZTE and Hikvision — America finally closes the door on Trojan horses

> On June 26, 2026, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) of the United States voted to ban the importation of all equipment from

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Commentary
- Published: 2026-07-01
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/commentaire-la-fcc-bannit-huawei-zte-et-hikvision-l-amerique-ferme-enfin-la-port

## Introduction: June 26, 2026 — a decision that closes a strategic gap

### The FCC and its historic vote

On **June 26, 2026**, the **Federal Communications Commission (FCC)** of the **United States** voted to ban the importation of all equipment from companies on its **Covered List**. This decision closes a critical legal gap: until now, the list prohibited new equipment but allowed the sale of **older models**, creating a loophole that the affected companies and their distributors were actively exploiting. From now on, the ban is total and applies to all models, old and new.

The companies targeted by this ban are: **Huawei**, **ZTE**, **Hikvision**, **Kaspersky**, **DJI**, **Autel Robotics**, and **TP-Link**. All are identified as presenting **unacceptable risks to U.S. national security**. The **FCC**'s decision is analyzed in detail in a report by the **Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD)** published on **June 30, 2026**. This vote is not a symbolic gesture — it is an operational measure with concrete consequences for American technology supply chains.

### Why selling old models was a real problem

The gap that the **June 26, 2026** decision closes deserves an explanation. Previous restrictions targeted **new installations** of **Covered List** equipment in American networks. But **older models** of **Huawei**, **ZTE**, and similar equipment could still be sold — notably to small rural telecommunications operators who could not afford more expensive alternatives. These operators had therefore continued deploying potentially compromised equipment in regions sometimes located near sensitive military or government installations.

This scenario is not hypothetical. The **FCC** documented cases of **Huawei** equipment installed in American rural networks near **military bases** and **Department of Defense sites**. The capacity of this equipment to intercept communications or transmit data to servers in **China** was assessed by U.S. intelligence agencies as a **real and documented threat**.

*I comment on this decision with a mixture of satisfaction and frustration. Satisfaction because it finally closes an obvious gap that every security analyst had been denouncing for years. Frustration because it took until 2026 — while equipment continued to be installed in sensitive networks. Better late than never, but the delay carries a cost.*

## Volt Typhoon and the cyberattacks that precipitated the decision

### The Volt Typhoon group and its American targets

The **FCC** explicitly cites **repeated Chinese cyberattacks** against American networks to justify its **June 26, 2026** decision. Among the most documented threats: the hacking group **Volt Typhoon**, linked to the **PLA**, which has been identified as pre-positioned in **American critical infrastructure** — electrical grids, water systems, communications — with a presumed objective of potential sabotage in the event of conflict. This is not ordinary cybercrime: it is military preparation for massive disruption operations.

American cybersecurity agencies — **CISA**, **NSA**, and the **FBI** — published joint alerts on **Volt Typhoon** in **2023** and **2024**, describing how the group had infiltrated critical infrastructure networks and maintained a discreet presence in them for extended periods. **Huawei** and **ZTE** equipment in rural networks could theoretically facilitate these operations by providing additional access points for attackers.

### The threat to submarine cables carrying financial data

The **FCC** also cites the threat of **sabotage of submarine cables** carrying sensitive financial data. This dimension is less publicized than cyberattacks, but its strategic scope is considerable. **Submarine cables** carry more than **95%** of intercontinental digital communications, including global financial transactions representing trillions of dollars daily. Their sabotage or disruption would constitute an economic weapon of extraordinary power.

Recent incidents — including suspicious cable cuts in the **Baltic Sea** attributed to Russian operations — have made this long-theoretical risk concrete. In the Indo-Pacific context, where **China** has a rapidly growing navy and documented submarine capabilities, the protection of critical submarine cables is a first-order national security issue for democracies.

*The threat to submarine cables is probably the least understood aspect by the general public in this network security story. We live in a global digital economy whose physical infrastructure rests on cables crossing largely unmonitored ocean floors. The vulnerability is real, documented, and underestimated in public debate.*

## Huawei, ZTE, Hikvision: why these specific companies

### Documented links with the Chinese security apparatus

**Huawei**, the largest telecommunications company in **China** and one of the largest in the world, has been the subject of documented national security concerns for more than a decade. Reports from American and British parliamentary committees established links between **Huawei**'s corporate structure, the **Chinese Communist Party**, and Chinese military intelligence services. China's **2017 National Intelligence Law** obliges Chinese companies to cooperate with intelligence agencies on request — creating a legal obligation that **Huawei** has never been able or willing to contradict convincingly before Western parliamentary hearings.

**ZTE** has already faced U.S. sanctions for violating export regulations toward **Iran** and **North Korea**. **Hikvision**, the world's largest surveillance camera manufacturer, was implicated in supplying surveillance systems used in the detention camps of **Xinjiang**, where the **UN** documented serious human rights violations against the Uyghur population.

### Kaspersky, DJI, and TP-Link: the diversity of threats

The inclusion of **Kaspersky** — a Russian cybersecurity company — on the **Covered List** is a reminder that threats do not come only from **China**. **Kaspersky**'s antivirus and security software has access to the systems it protects — access that Russian intelligence services could theoretically exploit through legal obligations similar to those of **China**. In **2017**, the U.S. government had already banned **Kaspersky** from government devices. The **June 26, 2026** decision extends this approach to the civilian market.

**DJI** and **Autel Robotics**, drone manufacturers, present specific risks: their devices transmit location data and imagery to servers, some of which are located in **China**. **DJI** drones were used by American police officers and firefighters, potentially collecting data on sensitive infrastructure transmissible to Chinese servers. **TP-Link**, a consumer router manufacturer, was the subject of investigations for vulnerabilities in its firmware potentially exploitable by state actors.

*The list of banned companies illustrates something policymakers sometimes struggle to state clearly: the threat does not come from a single malicious company, but from an entire technology ecosystem whose data governance rules do not meet democratic standards. The FCC's decision is a systemic response to a systemic problem.*

## Implications for American companies and consumers

### The transition cost for small rural operators

The **FCC**'s **June 26, 2026** decision is not without cost for the American economy. **Small rural telecommunications operators** that had deployed **Huawei** or **ZTE** equipment for cost reasons face significant **rip-and-replace** expenditures. A federal funding program — the **FCC's Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Reimbursement Program** — exists to help these operators, but its resources are limited and do not cover all documented needs.

This transition cost is real and deserves to be acknowledged honestly. National security decisions have economic costs that end beneficiaries do not always see directly — they are distributed in phone tariffs, federal funding, and infrastructure costs. The political acceptability of these costs is easier to maintain when the avoided risks are clearly communicated to the public.

### Drones, cameras, and routers: a replacement market to build

The ban on **DJI**, **Hikvision**, and **TP-Link** equipment creates a market space for alternatives produced by companies not belonging to countries on the **Covered List**. American drone manufacturers like **Skydio**, European camera manufacturers, and router producers based in allied countries will benefit from this opening. The **FCC**'s decision is therefore also an indirect industrial policy — it supports the development of sovereign technological alternatives without direct subsidies.

This process takes time. Alternatives are not always immediately available at the same performance level and price as the banned Chinese products. That is precisely why decisions of this type must be made early — when alternative supply chains can still be built progressively, without the pressure of an immediate crisis.

*I want to be direct about something: the Chinese technology products targeted by the FCC's decision are often technically excellent and inexpensive. It is not their quality that is the problem — it is their data governance architecture and the legal obligations their manufacturers face under Chinese law. Conflating a security critique with a quality critique would be dishonest.*

## Europe and the delayed response to Huawei

### The American decision versus European hesitation

The **European Union** treated the **Huawei** question in **5G** networks with a caution that often bordered on complacency. The **EU's 5G Toolbox**, published in **2020**, recommended that member states restrict or exclude **high-risk suppliers** from their sensitive 5G infrastructure — without imposing a formal ban. Countries like **Germany** were slow to make firm decisions, partly under the pressure of the telecom operator lobby that had already deployed **Huawei** equipment.

The American decision of **June 26, 2026** puts additional pressure on European governments that have not yet taken comparable measures. In the context of global technological rivalry and growing concerns about critical network security, maintaining **Huawei** equipment in sensitive networks becomes increasingly difficult to defend politically — especially after such a symbolically powerful decision by the **U.S. Congress** and the **FCC**.

### The United Kingdom as a positive precedent

The **United Kingdom** made the decision in **2020** to completely exclude **Huawei** from its **5G** networks by **2027** — after years of debate and hesitation. This decision, difficult economically and diplomatically, demonstrated that a major European democracy could impose firm restrictions on **Huawei** without the diplomatic and economic consequences being catastrophic. Sino-British relations deteriorated, but the **United Kingdom** demonstrated its capacity to make firm national security decisions when the evidence demanded it.

This British precedent, combined with the American decision of **June 26, 2026**, should accelerate similar decisions in European countries that have not yet acted. Coordination among allies is crucial here: a **Europe** in which some countries maintain **Covered List** equipment in their sensitive networks represents a weak link in the collective security of the **Atlantic Alliance**.

*The slowness of some European governments to act on Huawei has always seemed to me revealing of a confusion between short-term economic interests and long-term collective security. Telecommunications companies that had deployed Huawei equipment did not want to pay the transition cost. Governments accepted putting these private interests ahead of national security. It is a revealing choice.*

## What the FDD says in its June 30 analysis

### The arguments of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies

The **Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD)**, in its **June 30, 2026** analysis, welcomes the **FCC**'s decision while highlighting its limits. The analysis notes that the decision closes a real gap — the sale of old models was a problematic inconsistency. But it also points to several implementation challenges: transition timelines for operators dependent on this equipment, risks of circumvention via third countries, and the need to coordinate this decision with allied policies to avoid supply chain leakage.

The **FDD** is an American conservative think tank whose positions on **China** are consistently hawkish. Its analyses on technology security deserve to be read with this lens in mind — they may overweight risks and underweight the economic costs of certain measures. But on the specific question of the **Covered List**, the documented facts generally confirm the concerns it raises.

### Unresolved issues after the decision

The **June 26, 2026** decision does not solve all the problems. It does not cover equipment already installed in American networks — its replacement remains a long and costly process. It does not apply to equipment produced in third countries by subsidiary companies of these groups. It does not automatically coordinate the American response with that of European and Asian allies, creating potential asymmetries in collective security. These real gaps do not invalidate the decision — they indicate the necessary next steps.

In particular, the risk of circumvention via third countries deserves special attention. **Huawei**-affiliated entities previously attempted to circumvent American restrictions by producing equipment through subsidiaries in countries not covered by the restrictions. The vigilance of the American export control agencies on this point is a prerequisite for the long-term effectiveness of the decision.

*Think tanks like the FDD play a useful role in documenting threats — but their recommendations must be assessed taking their institutional biases into account. In this specific case, I share their general conclusion on the necessity of the ban while acknowledging the real economic costs their analyses tend to minimize. Security policy is not free.*

## The response to the Russian and Iranian cyber threat

### A decision that goes beyond China alone

The **FCC** included on its **Covered List** companies associated not only with **China**, but also with other states presenting risks to U.S. national security. The inclusion of **Kaspersky** — a Russian cybersecurity company — responds to concerns comparable to those raised for Chinese companies: legal obligations toward an authoritarian state that could demand cooperation with its intelligence services. In **2017**, the U.S. government had already banned **Kaspersky** from government devices. The **June 26, 2026** decision extends this approach to the civilian market.

Cyberattacks against **water systems**, **electricity**, and **telecommunications** attributed to state actors — primarily Russian, Chinese, and Iranian — all share one thing: they exploit vulnerabilities in equipment deployed in critical networks. The **FCC**'s decision aims to reduce the attack surface by eliminating equipment whose potential vulnerabilities are tied to their governance rather than their technical architecture alone.

### The specific risk to water systems and civilian infrastructure

Recent reports, including one published by **Dark Reading** in **2026**, specifically documented how **Iran**, **Russia**, and **China** target American **water distribution systems**. These attacks — including compromises of **SCADA** systems controlling pumps and drinking water chemical treatment — represent a direct threat to public health. Comparable incidents have targeted healthcare facilities, dams, and traffic management systems.

The connection between these cyberattacks and **Covered List** equipment is not always direct — not all attacks pass through **Huawei** or **ZTE** equipment. But this equipment can provide initial access points to networks that are then laterally explored to reach critical systems. That is why eliminating these potential entry points remains a national security priority, even when the specific causal chain cannot always be publicly documented.

*The security of water systems is an attack vector that few ordinary citizens associate with geopolitical rivalry with China or Russia. And yet, sophisticated attackers target precisely the most fundamental systems — those whose disruption would cause immediate civilian panic. The FCC's decision is part of a defense of civilian infrastructure that goes far beyond telecommunications.*

## Conclusion: a necessary decision, but only a beginning

### What the FCC's decision actually accomplishes

The **FCC**'s **June 26, 2026** decision accomplishes something real and important: it eliminates a glaring inconsistency in American network security policy. It sends a clear signal to equipment manufacturers that the **United States** takes seriously the risks posed by companies subject to the Chinese intelligence law. It creates a precedent that allies can cite to justify their own similar decisions. These accomplishments are real and deserve to be recognized.

What it does not accomplish: it does not resolve the question of equipment already deployed. It does not automatically coordinate a coherent allied response. It does not solve the broader problem of Western technological dependence on components manufactured in **China** in segments not covered by the **Covered List**. Those are the next challenges on the list.

### The urgency of a coordinated allied response

The American decision of **June 26, 2026** must be the beginning of allied coordination, not an isolated unilateral action. **NATO** members, **Five Eyes** partners, the **Quad**, and other U.S. technology allies all have an interest in harmonizing their equipment control policies in their critical networks. A collective security chain is only as strong as its weakest link — and as long as some allies maintain **Covered List** equipment in their infrastructure, collective protection remains incomplete.

The **Five Eyes**, which just coordinated a public alert on Chinese espionage via **LinkedIn**, have the existing structure to also coordinate their network equipment security policies. This coordination — technical, political, and diplomatic — is an investment in collective security whose long-term returns far exceed its cost.

*I close this commentary with a simple conviction: the FCC's June 26, 2026 decision is a good one. It is overdue, incomplete, and requires coordinated follow-through. But it is good. In a geopolitical world where courageous national security decisions are often deferred for economic and diplomatic reasons, recognizing when the right decisions are made is just as important as pointing out their limits.*

## Assessment and outlook

### A set of decisions sketching a coherent strategy

The **FCC**'s **June 26, 2026** decision is part of a broader picture: export controls on chips, surveillance of Chinese embassies, warnings about espionage via **LinkedIn**, sanctions against Japanese entities by **Beijing**. These apparently disparate elements sketch a global technological and security competition of which network equipment is only one front among several.

The **United States**, despite its internal contradictions and hesitations, is progressively building a technology security architecture that takes the rivalry with **China** seriously. This architecture is incomplete, sometimes incoherent, and often lagging behind the pace of threats — but it exists and it is advancing. That is more than **Europe** can claim as a whole.

### What Europe must do now

The **FCC**'s **June 26, 2026** decision is an implicit call to **Europe**: align with these standards or accept being the weak link in Atlantic collective security. Countries like **Germany**, **Italy**, and others that have not yet made firm decisions on **Huawei** and comparable equipment must accelerate their processes. The window for coordinated action with the American partner is open — it will not remain so indefinitely.

**Europe**'s technological dependence on **China** in critical sectors is a strategic risk that the **Old Continent** can no longer afford to minimize. Decisions like the **FCC**'s of **June 26, 2026** are incentives to act — but also warnings about the growing cost of inaction.

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

*The Europe I admire — the Europe of the rule of law, human rights, and democracy — needs to develop a strategic backbone in the technological competition with China. Good intentions are no longer enough. Values must be defended through concrete decisions, real investments, and solid allied coordination. The FCC's decision should serve as a model and a catalyst.*

## Sources

### Primary sources

- [FDD — FCC introduces new bans on Chinese-produced equipment linked to cyber risks — June 30, 2026](https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2026/06/30/fcc-introduces-new-bans-on-chinese-produced-equipment-linked-to-cyber-risks/)

- [Dark Reading — Iran, Russia, China target water systems for sabotage — 2026](https://www.darkreading.com/ics-ot-security/iran-russia-china-target-water-systems-sabotage)

- [The Star Malaysia — U.S. hearing warns Chinese economic espionage now targets AI — June 28, 2026](https://www.thestar.com.my/aseanplus/aseanplus-news/2026/06/28/us-hearing-warns-chinese-economic-espionage-now-targets-ai)

### Secondary sources

- [Cyber Warrior — Strategic cyber threat intelligence — June 2026](https://cyberwarrior76.substack.com/p/strategic-cyber-threat-intelligence-e4b)

- [Politico — U.S. House hones in on China — June 25, 2026](https://www.politico.com/newsletters/politico-influence/2026/06/25/house-hones-in-on-china-00976645)

- [Biometric Update — New spying threats force rethink of biometric identity checks — June 2026](https://www.biometricupdate.com/202606/new-spying-threats-force-rethink-of-biometric-identity-checks)

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Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/commentaire-la-fcc-bannit-huawei-zte-et-hikvision-l-amerique-ferme-enfin-la-port