# COMMENTARY: The IAEA demands strong guarantees: trust is not enough

> On June 26, 2026, speaking to journalists in Tokyo, the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Rafael Grossi, said words that should not have needed saying. "A very strong verification system must be put in place" to monitor Iran's nuclear programme, he declared. "The government of Iran has stated quite clearly that developing nuclear weapons is not

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Commentary
- Published: 2026-06-28
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/commentaire-l-aiea-reclame-des-garanties-fortes-la-confiance-ne-suffit-pas

## Introduction: Grossi's words, and their weight

### The IAEA Director General takes a stand

On **June 26, 2026**, speaking to journalists in **Tokyo**, the Director General of the **International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)**, **Rafael Grossi**, said words that should not have needed saying. "A very strong verification system must be put in place" to monitor Iran's nuclear programme, he declared. "The government of **Iran** has stated quite clearly that developing nuclear weapons is not their intention. But of course, intentions are not enough."

That statement is remarkable in its simplicity. The man who leads the international organization tasked with verifying that states honour their nuclear commitments is saying: we need to verify — not to trust. That is the very foundation of international non-proliferation law. And yet, this minimum requirement sits at the heart of a standoff that may well define the outcome of the US-Iranian negotiations in the weeks ahead.

### The memorandum of understanding and its gaps

The preliminary agreement signed between the **United States** and **Iran** on **June 14, 2026** contains, according to **Grossi**, an explicit provision on **IAEA** oversight of Iranian nuclear activities. The text of the **MoU**, of which a **14-point version** was made public by **Tehran**, mentions this oversight. **Grossi** is categorical: "The memorandum of understanding established with the **United States** explicitly stipulates that nuclear activities concerning nuclear materials and facilities will be supervised by the **IAEA**."

But here is the problem: **Iran** contests that reading. Iranian Deputy Minister **Kazem Gharabadi** responded publicly that access by **UN** inspectors to targeted nuclear sites would be "exclusively evaluated and resolved in the context of a final deal" with the **United States**. In other words: no final deal, no inspectors. That is not the same thing as what **Grossi** understood from the text.

*Two contradictory readings of the same text — that is the story of every diplomatic agreement that ends up collapsing. Grossi says it is written in. Iran says it depends on something else. That is not a detail — it is a fundamental fracture in the deal.*

## The IAEA and Iran: a documented history of violations

### A damning quarterly report

The **IAEA**'s quarterly report published in **June 2026** — even before the **MoU** was signed — continued to declare **Iran** in violation of its obligations under the **Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)**. The agency maintains that **Iran** has not provided accurate and complete information on its nuclear activities, has restricted inspector access to certain sites, and has not cooperated fully with ongoing investigations into traces of nuclear material detected at undeclared sites.

A draft resolution at the **IAEA**, backed by the **United States** and European members — **France**, **Germany**, **United Kingdom** (**E3**) — demanded that **Iran** provide "accurate information on nuclear material accounting" and grant inspectors "without delay" access to all relevant installations. That text was tabled at the start of **June 2026**, before the deal was signed — signalling the deep frustration of the **IAEA**'s Western members at Iran's continued obstruction.

### The bombed sites: grey zones in the verification picture

The complexity of the situation also stems from the fact that the US and Israeli strikes of **February 2026** damaged — and in some cases partially destroyed — Iranian nuclear sites, notably the enrichment facilities at **Natanz** and **Fordow**. This physical destruction complicates verification: what remains to be inspected in bombed tunnels and centrifuge halls? What nuclear materials were dispersed? Where does the programme actually stand after the strikes?

For the **IAEA**, this uncertainty is precisely why inspections are urgent and necessary. Without access to the sites — even damaged ones — it is impossible to draw up an accurate assessment of the state of Iran's nuclear programme. And without that assessment, any discussion of the "guarantees" **Iran** is offering is fundamentally hollow.

*You cannot guarantee what you cannot measure. Without inspector access to the bombed sites, the IAEA is speaking into a void — and the US-Iranian deal rests on promises whose substance no one can verify. That is a foundational problem, not a technical detail.*

## Iran's position: nuclear negotiation as bargaining chip

### Iran that ties everything to everything

Iran's negotiating strategy throughout this crisis has been consistent: link every nuclear concession to a concrete economic or diplomatic counterpart. From **Tehran**'s perspective, this is not irrational — **Iran** learned from the experience of the **2015 JCPOA**, in which it made significant nuclear concessions only to see the agreement abandoned unilaterally by **Trump** in **2018**. Iran's distrust of Washington is therefore structural and historically grounded.

But that distrust cannot translate into a refusal of independent verification. **Grossi** put it plainly: "Inspections are going to happen. It is not a question of if, but of when." That assertion rests on his reading of the **MoU** — but **Tehran** contests it. If the **60 days** of the technical negotiation phase run out without that dispute being resolved, the deal itself will be compromised.

### Iran's sovereignty argument

**Iran** has also advanced the sovereignty argument: **IAEA** inspections would constitute a violation of its national sovereignty. That argument is rejected by the international community — **Iran** is a signatory to the **NPT** and has therefore voluntarily subscribed to the **IAEA** inspection regime. Sovereignty cannot be invoked to escape contractual obligations freely assumed. But this rhetorical argument will be deployed domestically by the regime's hardest-line factions to resist any concession.

The situation echoes, mutatis mutandis, the rhetoric of "sovereign claims" that **Russia** uses to justify its refusal to submit to the norms of international law. In both cases, the invocation of sovereignty is a political tool designed to paralyse international accountability mechanisms. Western democracies must be clear: sovereignty does not protect against freely contracted obligations.

*Sovereignty is a right. Treaties are obligations. These two realities do not contradict each other — they complement each other. Iran cannot invoke one to escape the other. That principle is at the very core of the international order we want to defend.*

## The "breakout time" question: the heart of the nuclear issue

### What is nuclear breakout time?

The concept of "**breakout time**" — the time needed to produce enough highly enriched uranium for a nuclear weapon — is central to the **IAEA**'s concerns and those of American negotiators. Before the **February 2026** strikes, **Iran** had accumulated enough uranium enriched to **60%** to approach weapons-grade threshold. The strikes potentially destroyed part of those stockpiles and enrichment capacity — but "potentially" is not "certainly."

Without inspector access, no one can say with certainty what the current state of Iran's programme is. That is precisely what the **IAEA** is seeking to assess — and it is precisely what **Iran** is pushing to a later date. That delay is not trivial: every week without inspections is a week during which reconstitution activities could theoretically proceed unmonitored.

### The Board of Governors resolution and its implications

The resolution tabled at the **IAEA** by the **United States**, **France**, the **United Kingdom**, and **Germany** in **June 2026** demanded that **Iran** provide accurate information on its nuclear materials and grant immediate access to inspectors. This resolution comes in a context where the **IAEA** has repeatedly declared that **Iran** had produced uranium enriched to **60%** in violation of its commitments — a concentration with no practical use outside a weapons programme.

If **Iran** refuses to meet the verification demands during the ongoing negotiations, the members of the **IAEA** Board of Governors will face a choice between two options: accept a deal without solid verification — which would be a historic mistake — or reject the deal and return to confrontation. Neither option is satisfactory. The pressure on negotiators to secure concrete guarantees is therefore immense.

*A nuclear deal without robust verification is a fire alarm without a smoke detector. It gives the impression of security, but when it actually matters, it doesn't protect anyone. The IAEA knows this. Europeans know this. The question is whether Washington is willing to hear it clearly enough to avoid repeating the mistakes of 2015.*

## Historical precedents: what history teaches us

### The 2015 JCPOA: lessons from an imperfect agreement

The **Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)** signed in **2015** was a significant diplomatic achievement: **Iran** agreed to reduce its enriched uranium stockpile, limit its enrichment capacity, and host **IAEA** inspectors with enhanced access. In exchange, sanctions were partially lifted. For several years, the mechanism worked — the **IAEA** confirmed multiple times that **Iran** was respecting its commitments.

But two major flaws had undermined the **JCPOA** in the long run. First, the agreement did not cover Iran's ballistic missile programme or the regional activities of the **Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps**. Second, it was contingent on American political goodwill — a condition **Trump** destroyed by withdrawing unilaterally in **2018**. These two flaws have fed Iran's current distrust, and they raise the question: how do you build a **2026** agreement that can survive the next American administration?

### Iraq 2003 and the lesson of insufficient inspection

Recent Middle Eastern history also offers the opposite example: a military intervention based on faulty intelligence about weapons of mass destruction that proved catastrophic — the invasion of **Iraq** in **2003**. If insufficient verification can lead to dangerous tolerance of a real nuclear programme, a rush based on unverified information can lead to an unjustified war. This dual risk illustrates the importance of independent, rigorous, and continuous verification — which is exactly what the **IAEA** represents.

These precedents reinforce **Grossi**'s conviction that inspections cannot be deferred until "after a final deal." In the world of non-proliferation, time is critical. Every additional delay without verification is an additional opportunity for undeclared activities to continue unmonitored. That is a reality **Tehran** knows perfectly well — and it is precisely why certain Iranian factions keep pushing to defer inspections.

*Iraq 2003 taught us the danger of acting without evidence. The IAEA reminds us of the danger of not verifying. These two lessons do not cancel each other out — they add up. In both cases, the answer is the same: independent, rigorous verification, without political compromise.*

## What democracies must demand

### Non-negotiable minimum conditions

If Western democracies — **United States**, **France**, **United Kingdom**, **Germany** — want an agreement with **Iran** to be genuinely lasting, they must insist on a number of non-negotiable minimum conditions. First, immediate and unconditional **IAEA** inspector access to nuclear sites — including those damaged by strikes. Second, a continuous and enhanced verification mechanism, including snap inspections. Third, automatic "snapback" sanctions protocols in the event of a confirmed violation — a mechanism that existed in the **JCPOA** but was insufficiently used.

These conditions are not punitive — they are the minimum necessary for the deal to have real substance rather than merely symbolic value. Without them, the **June 2026** agreement risks resembling a pause in the confrontation rather than a lasting transformation of relations between the **West** and **Iran**.

### Europe's role in the weeks ahead

**Europe** has a particular role to play in this critical phase. As members of the **IAEA** Board of Governors and parties to nuclear negotiations with **Iran** for over twenty years, **Paris**, **Berlin**, and **London** possess a technical expertise and diplomatic credibility that **Washington** alone does not have. **Europe** must use that leverage to insist on robust verification guarantees — even if it complicates the negotiating timeline, even if it irritates **Tehran**, and even if it puts **Washington** in an uncomfortable position.

This is precisely the role of guardian of international norms that **Europe** must assume — not to obstruct the **United States**, but to ensure that whatever deal emerges will be solid, verifiable, and durable. A rushed nuclear deal with Iran will prove far more dangerous in the long run than no deal accompanied by clear guarantees.

*Europe holding firm on Iran nuclear verification, even when Trump would rather move fast — that is the right role for Europeans. Not against America. With it. To make sure the deal that comes out is not a repeat of the mistakes of 2015.*

## The major powers' positions: who actually wants to verify Iran?

### Washington between nuclear ambition and political compromise

The agreement signed by the **United States** with **Iran** in **June 2026** is a compromise that reflects the limits of what **Washington** was prepared to demand. **JD Vance** presented the deal as a diplomatic success — and on some points, it is. **IAEA** inspector access to previously closed sites, the reduction of certain enriched uranium stockpiles, commitments on centrifuge transparency: these are real advances over the previous status quo.

But several independent nuclear experts point out that Iran's commitments fall short of what the **original 2015 JCPOA** had obtained — and that deal was itself criticized for being insufficient. The question of "**breakout time**" — the time needed for **Iran** to produce enough fissile material for a weapon — remains at the centre of debate. Recent estimates put it at between **one and three weeks**, a horizon that experts consider dangerously short for an effective diplomatic or military response.

### Moscow, Beijing, and Tehran: the triangle of resistance to inspections

**Russia** and **China** have systematically weakened the pressure mechanisms on **Iran** within the **UN Security Council**. Their repeated vetoes on resolutions aimed at strengthening sanctions and verification mechanisms have allowed **Tehran** to navigate the blind spots of the international system. This tacit — and sometimes explicit — support partly explains why **Iran** has been able to advance its nuclear capabilities as far as it has despite Western pressure.

For **Moscow**, an **Iran** that is nucleariy advanced but not officially armed is the ideal scenario: it keeps pressure on the **United States** and their regional allies, consumes Western diplomatic resources, and creates a zone of instability that diverts attention from **Ukraine**. For **Beijing**, an economically integrated but geopolitically disruptive **Iran** offers both an energy partner and a tool for pressuring US policy in the **Middle East**. These cynical calculations do not disappear with a US-Iranian deal.

*Russia and China have used Iran as a chess piece in their broader strategy of destabilizing the Western order. Understanding that is understanding why nuclear deals with Tehran must always be accompanied by mechanisms that do not depend on the goodwill of Moscow or Beijing to function.*

## Regional consequences: Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the arms race

### Israel facing the deal: between official pragmatism and deep scepticism

**Israel** reacted to the US-Iran deal with its characteristic blend of official pragmatism and profound scepticism. The **Netanyahu** government welcomed the elements of the deal concerning **IAEA** inspections, while expressing doubts about their adequacy and binding character. For **Tel Aviv**, the experience of previous agreements with **Iran** — notably the **JCPOA** that **Trump** abandoned in 2018 precisely at Israel's request — left deep scars on the trust extended to any diplomatic framework with **Tehran**.

Israel's doctrine on Iran is clear: the **Jewish state** cannot allow **Iran** to reach military nuclear capability, regardless of formal diplomatic guarantees. That non-negotiable red line explains why sabotage operations attributed to **Israel** against Iranian nuclear facilities — and against scientists — continued even during phases of diplomacy. For **Jerusalem**, deterrence also passes through unilateral actions that multilateral agreements cannot replace.

### The question of regional proliferation: a real and documented risk

The most troubling paradox in the Iranian nuclear situation is what experts call the "**proliferation cascade**." If **Iran** achieves military nuclear capability — even implicit, even unacknowledged — several countries in the region could seek to develop their own capabilities as a counterweight. **Saudi Arabia** has explicitly stated, through Crown Prince **Mohammed bin Salman** himself, that it would pursue nuclear weapons if **Iran** developed them. The **Crown Prince** made that statement publicly in 2018 — it remains current.

**Turkey**, **Egypt**, and the **United Arab Emirates** have all developed civilian nuclear energy programmes — a step that can be compatible with latent military ambitions. The **IAEA** monitors these programmes, but the tension between the sovereign right to civilian nuclear energy and the risks of proliferation is a structural constant of the non-proliferation regime. A **Middle East** in which multiple states possess military nuclear capabilities would be one of the most dangerous configurations in contemporary history — and insufficient Iranian guarantees bring us closer to that scenario.

*When the Saudi Crown Prince says publicly that his country will follow Iran if it crosses the nuclear threshold, that is not rhetorical posturing. It is a doctrine. And if that domino falls, the non-proliferation regime — already weakened — may not survive. That is the ultimate stake in these negotiations over IAEA guarantees.*

## Conclusion: trust is built, not declared

### What Grossi is really telling us

When **Rafael Grossi** declares that "intentions are not enough," he is not putting **Iran** on trial for bad faith. He is restating a fundamental principle of nuclear diplomacy: trust cannot replace verification. That principle was enshrined in the **NPT** precisely because a government's intentions can change, leaders come and go, and circumstances evolve. What endures is international law and the verification mechanisms that give it teeth.

### The stakes for global non-proliferation

What plays out in the **next 60 days** of negotiations goes beyond the Iranian file alone. If a deal is concluded without robust verification, it will send a signal to other states that see a nuclear programme as an insurance policy: that Western democracies can be brought to accept insufficient guarantees when economic pressure is strong enough. That is a catastrophic precedent for global non-proliferation. The **IAEA** is demanding strong guarantees. It is right. The world must listen.

*IAEA guarantees are only worth what the great powers are willing to let them be worth. As long as Russia and China have an interest in a nucleariy ambiguous Iran, verification mechanisms will be porous safeguards. That is not a reason to give up — it is a reason to build mechanisms that withstand vetoes and cynical calculations. Trust is not declared. It is built act by act, inspection by inspection, verification by verification.*

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

## Sources

### Primary sources

- [Al Jazeera — IAEA demands a "very strong" verification system for Iran's nuclear programme — June 26, 2026](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/6/26/iaea-demands-strong-verification-of-irans-nuclear-programme)

- [Al Jazeera — UN nuclear chief says Iran inspections "are going to happen" — June 24, 2026](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/6/24/un-nuclear-chief-says-iran-inspections-will-happen-tehran-says-after-deal)

- [Euronews — IAEA chief: nuclear inspections in Iran are going to happen — June 24, 2026](https://www.euronews.com/2026/06/24/iaea-chief-says-nuclear-inspections-of-irans-enrichment-sites-going-to-happen-despite-tehr)

- [Washington Times — Vance says Iran agreed to nuclear inspectors, hails "good foundation" for final deal — June 22, 2026](https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2026/jun/22/jd-vance-says-iran-agreed-allow-nuclear-inspectors-country-hails-good/)

### Secondary sources

- [FDD — Analysis of IAEA Iran verification and monitoring and NPT safeguards reports — June 2026](https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2026/06/09/analysis-of-iaea-iran-verification-and-monitoring-and-npt-safeguards-reports-june-2026/)

- [UK FCDO — NPT safeguards agreement with Iran: resolution to the IAEA Board of Governors — June 2026](https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/npt-safeguards-agreement-with-iran-resolution-to-the-iaea-board-of-governors-june-2026)

- [NPR — IAEA chief says inspectors will visit Iranian nuclear sites — June 24, 2026](https://www.npr.org/2026/06/24/g-s1-129770/iran-nuclear-inspection)

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Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/commentaire-l-aiea-reclame-des-garanties-fortes-la-confiance-ne-suffit-pas