# COMMENTARY: Tens of billions in contracts — Ankara, where defense became industry

> On June 25, 2026, during a conversation at the Atlantic Council, Mark Rutte, NATO Secretary General, announced that the Ankara summit on July 7 and 8, 2026 would see the announcement of «tens of billions» in new defense contracts. The figure is deliberately imprecise — large enough to impress, vague enough to stay flexible. But it says something fundamental about what NATO has

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Commentary
- Published: 2026-06-28
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/commentaire-dizaines-de-milliards-en-contrats-ankara-la-defense-devenue-industri

## Introduction: When collective security is negotiated in revenue figures

### Rutte announces Ankara's industrial windfall

On **June 25, 2026**, during a conversation at the **Atlantic Council**, **Mark Rutte**, **NATO** Secretary General, announced that the **Ankara** summit on **July 7 and 8, 2026** would see the announcement of «**tens of billions**» in new defense contracts. The figure is deliberately imprecise — large enough to impress, vague enough to stay flexible. But it says something fundamental about what **NATO** has become: an alliance where collective security and industrial dynamics are intimately intertwined.

These contracts do not fall from the sky. They are the result of months of negotiations between governments and defense industries, of accumulated pressure since the Ukrainian invasion of **2022**, and of a collective recognition that ammunition and equipment stockpiles are dangerously insufficient for high-intensity conflict in **Europe**. The **Ankara** summit is the opportunity to formalize and publicize what is already under negotiation.

### The context: $1.2 trillion spent over ten years

**Mark Rutte** recalled that European allies and **Canada** collectively spent **$1.2 trillion more** between **2016 and 2026** — a remarkable figure that illustrates the scale of rearmament already accomplished. And yet it is still not enough. The gaps in ammunition, air defense capabilities, armored vehicles, and cyber defense remain considerable.

*$1.2 trillion over ten years: that is substantial in absolute terms. But it is also the sign that Europe long refused to see. Had this money been spent more steadily since the 1990s, we might be better prepared today. The catch-up is real — but it is happening under duress, and duress costs more.*

## The geography of the windfall: who sells what to whom

### The major industrial beneficiaries of the Ankara contracts

The «**tens of billions**» announced by **Rutte** will be distributed across several sectors and industries. **Air defense** systems — **Patriot**, **NASAMS**, **IRIS-T** — top the list. **Artillery** and **155mm ammunition** constitute another major segment, with the goal of quadrupling production capacity. Armored vehicles, command and control systems, and cyber defense technologies complete the picture.

Europe's major defense industries — **Rheinmetall** (Germany), **BAE Systems** (United Kingdom), **Thales** and **MBDA** (France), **Leonardo** (Italy) — are positioned to capture a large share of these contracts. The Americans — **Raytheon**, **Lockheed Martin**, **Northrop Grumman** — remain indispensable players on the most sophisticated systems.

### The European preference: a political and industrial choice

A deeper debate runs through the discussion on these contracts: should they buy American or develop European industrial capabilities? Buying American is often faster and guarantees proven interoperable standards. But it creates a technological and industrial dependency on an ally whose reliability is currently in question.

Developing European capabilities takes longer and costs more in the short term. But it creates a sovereign industrial base that makes **Europe** less vulnerable to American political whims. The **Ankara** summit will be a test of the balance between these two logics — and an indicator of the true depth of European commitment to its strategic autonomy.

*Buy American or develop European: that is the industrial debate that says everything about the political debate. Those who buy American believe Trump won't truly abandon NATO. Those who invest in European industry are betting the opposite. And in that bet, the billions spent are also a political vote.*

## The European defense industry: a brutal awakening

### From defensive deindustrialization to remilitarization

The thirty years following the end of the **Cold War** were decades of **defensive deindustrialization** across **Europe**. Arsenals closed, production lines were reduced or shut down, defense research and development staffs shrank. The «**peace dividend**» was real — but it weakened an industrial base that is now proving insufficient to meet the needs of the war in **Ukraine**.

The awakening since **2022** has been brutal but real. **Rheinmetall** has announced massive expansions of its shell and armored vehicle production capacity. New ammunition factories are opening in **Poland**, **Germany**, and **Scandinavia**. Government orders provide the long-term visibility needed to justify these investments. But rebuilding a robust defense industry takes years — and the needs are immediate.

### The bottleneck of propellants and shells

The most concrete example of the industrial gaps inherited from the post-**Cold War** era is that of **155mm artillery shells**. **Ukraine** consumes ammunition at a pace that **NATO** stockpiles cannot compensate for. General **Stringer** referred on **June 26, 2026** to the objective of **quadrupling production capacity**. This implies massive investments in factories, equipment, and training — and time.

This bottleneck illustrates the central challenge of remilitarization: the **defense industry** cannot shift from peacetime to wartime production in a matter of weeks. It needs firm multi-year orders, a specialized workforce, and capital investment. The contracts announced at **Ankara** have precisely this role — to provide these commitments and accelerate this scale-up.

*Quadrupling shell production: that is the image that has haunted me since I read that figure. We disarmed so thoroughly after 1991 that it will take us years to reach the production level needed for a war we are already watching. This is the story of a West that believed war belonged to the past. The bill has arrived.*

## The transformation of the NATO-industry relationship

### From occasional buyer to strategic partner

The relationship between **NATO** member governments and their defense industries has fundamentally changed since **2022**. Before, governments procured equipment on slow cycles, with complex tenders and multi-year delivery timelines. Today, the relationship is more direct, more urgent, and more cooperative.

**NATO**-wide pooled procurement mechanisms have been established for critical munitions — enabling economies of scale and long-term commitments that justify industrial investment. The **European Union** has created common financing instruments for the defense industry. These institutional innovations are transforming the European defensive industrial landscape.

### The risks: dependency, corruption, and opacity

The surge in defense spending carries risks that deserve to be named. **Corruption risks** are real in large public procurement markets under pressure to move fast. The risks of **excessive dependency** on certain suppliers — particularly American ones for sensitive technologies — can create new vulnerabilities. And the **opacity** of some defense contracts makes democratic oversight difficult.

These risks do not justify slowing the necessary rearmament. But they justify carrying it out with robust governance mechanisms — independent audits, parliamentary oversight, maximum transparency on the use of public funds. Rearmament conducted in haste is an opportunity for those who wish to exploit it.

*The billions flowing into the defense industry also attract less virtuous actors: brokers, lobbyists, politicians with conflicts of interest. I am not saying every defense contract is corrupt — far from it. But I am saying that sums this large demand oversight just as large. National defense is not a blank check.*

## The impact on national economies: opportunity and constraint

### The countries that benefit from remilitarization

The increase in defense spending is not universally experienced as a burden. For countries that have maintained a **competitive defense industry**, it is a significant economic opportunity. **Poland**, which is developing a domestic industry alongside foreign purchases, is seeing jobs and capabilities created on its territory. **Germany**, with **Rheinmetall** as its flagship, is in the same dynamic. **France**, with its integrated military-industrial complex, as well.

Defense contracts create skilled jobs, stimulate technological research, and generate exports. **Poland** has become in a few years one of the most dynamic arms markets in the world — and it is reaping real economic benefits from that, not just costs.

### The countries that struggle to convert effort into national capacity

For countries without a developed defense industry, increasing spending means primarily buying abroad — creating capital outflows with no local industrial returns. The small Baltic states, for example, spend proportionally a great deal but lack the critical mass to develop autonomous defense industries.

For these countries, the priority is acquiring the most critical capabilities — air defense, artillery, ammunition — regardless of national origin. Their security takes precedence over industrial optimization. But this raises questions about the coherence of a model where some **NATO** members produce and others buy — and where producers have a structural interest in maintaining high defense spending.

*The defense industry as an economic engine: that is a reality many economists prefer to ignore because it does not fit neatly into clean models. But thousands of jobs in shell production in Poland or Germany are also a political reality that ties governments to the continuation of rearmament. Saying so is not cynical. It is factual.*

## The symbolic dimension: Ankara as a signal to the world

### What the contracts tell Putin

The «**tens of billions**» in contracts announced at **Ankara** are also a message to **Vladimir Putin**. The message says: the **West** is not disarming. It is not being discouraged. It is investing in its military capabilities with a determination that contrasts with the **Kremlin**'s hopes of seeing Western support erode under the weight of time and fatigue.

**Putin** bet on duration. He thought Western democracies, with their short electoral cycles and volatile public opinions, would not support **Ukraine** long enough. The **Ankara** contracts, if they materialize, contradict that bet. They signal that the **West** is building a defense industrial base for a generation, not just a few years.

### The message to Xi Jinping and others

Beyond **Russia**, the **Ankara** contracts send a message to other actors. To **Beijing**, which is watching the degree of Western resolve against Russia to calibrate its own behavior toward **Taiwan**. To **Tehran**, which monitors the coherence of the Western bloc. To **Pyongyang**, which has tied its fate to **Moscow**'s and depends on the Ukrainian precedent.

The demonstration that the **West** can mobilize tens of billions in defense contracts and quadruple its ammunition production is not only a message to **Russia**. It is a show of strength toward a geopolitical environment that is broadly more hostile than it was ten years ago.

*Xi Jinping is watching Ankara closely. He notes the contracts, the commitments, the degree of Western seriousness. And he adjusts his own calculations regarding Taiwan accordingly. That is why the Ankara summit is not merely a European event — it is a global signal about the West's willingness to defend its interests.*

## Transparency in spending: a democratic imperative

### The structural dimension of the stakes

Beyond the immediate decisions of the **Ankara** summit, there is a structural dimension to the current challenge that military analysts regularly highlight: Western collective security rests on a combination of **political will**, **actual military capabilities**, and **strategic coherence**. These three elements are simultaneously under strain — which makes this moment more critical than usual.

The decisions made at **Ankara** in July **2026** will be set against a backdrop where every signal sent to **Moscow**, to **Beijing**, and to allies counts twice over. The credibility of the alliance is a public good built over time and destroyed quickly. The responsibility of those gathering at **Beştepe** is therefore considerable.

### The actors who will shape the decisions

The outcome of the **Ankara** summit will depend on a few key players: **Rutte** to maintain the coherence of the alliance's agenda, the leaders of the **eastern flank** to press the urgency of their concerns, and the **Trump** administration to define how far it pushes its demands without breaking what it claims to want to strengthen. Each has distinct interests — and the negotiation between those interests will define the outcome.

**Ukraine** is not directly at the table — but it is present in every conversation. Its **40 days of strikes**, its enemy refineries in flames, its soldiers holding the front: all of this is the invisible backdrop to every decision that will be made at **Ankara**.

*Billions in defense contracts announced with great fanfare: good. But these billions are public money. And public money deserves transparency, governance, and democratic oversight that military urgency should not sweep aside. Rearmament without accountability is an open door to corruption.*

## Ukraine as the primary beneficiary of the Ankara contracts

### The external pressure that forces decisions

Beyond the internal dynamics of the alliance, the **Ankara** summit is taking place in a global geopolitical context that extends beyond the European theater alone. **China** is watching **NATO** and calibrating its own behavior toward **Taiwan** based on what it sees. **Iran** is negotiating with the **United States** while maintaining its partnerships with **Moscow**. **North Korea** is supplying ammunition to **Russia** and developing its own military capabilities.

This multi-threat context is precisely what justifies the **5% of GDP** objective: **NATO** is not facing a single localized threat, but an arc of instability stretching from **Moscow** to **Pyongyang** via **Tehran**. The alliance must therefore prepare for a more dangerous world on several fronts simultaneously — which makes budgetary under-preparation all the more serious.

### The long-term consequences of Ankara's decisions

Future historians will look back at the **Ankara** summit as a moment of choice. In one scenario, the alliance decided there to rearm seriously, to support **Ukraine** through to a just peace, and to build a robust deterrent against the multiple threats that are accumulating. In another, it produced communiqués and deferred the hard decisions for later.

These two scenarios have very different consequences for European security in the decades ahead. The first builds peace through strength. The second invites predators to test the limits. And the choice between them is made at **Ankara**, in **July 2026**, by men and women in politics who bear a historic responsibility.

*Behind all these billions in defense contracts, there are Ukrainian soldiers waiting for ammunition, air defense systems, armored vehicles. Those soldiers are who I think about when I read the Ankara announcements. The contracts signed must become weapons delivered. And quickly.*

## Conclusion: Defense as a collective investment in the future

### Spending together to survive separately

The «**tens of billions**» in contracts at the **Ankara** summit represent a profound transformation in the way Western democracies think about collective security. Defense is no longer an expense managed at the bare minimum — it is a strategic investment in the survival of a model of society. This paradigm shift, painful in budgetary terms, is necessary.

Let us be clear: these contracts do not guarantee victory in **Ukraine**, nor lasting peace in **Europe**. They create the conditions for credible defense and robust deterrence. Peace, in the end, is built with weapons strong enough that no one wants to face them.

### The promise the industry must keep

The «**tens of billions**» announced by **Rutte** are only promises as long as contracts are not signed, factories not opened, shells not produced. The history of Western defense since **2022** is dotted with delivery promises that fell behind schedule — the tanks, the missiles, the F-16s. The **Ankara** summit must mark the beginning of execution, not the production of yet another announcement.

**Rutte** knows this. The allies know it. And **Zelensky**, whose army needs these munitions on the ground, knows it better than anyone.

*Tens of billions announced at Ankara. The real question will be asked in six months: how much was actually spent? How many systems delivered to Ukraine? How many production lines opened? That is where we will see whether the alliance was serious or merely rhetorical.*

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

## Sources

### Primary sources

- [NATO/Rutte — Atlantic Council, tens of billions, +20%, $1.2T — June 25, 2026](https://www.nato.int/en/news-and-events/events/transcripts/2026/06/25/atlantic-council-front-page-conversation-with-nato-secretary-general-mark-rutte)

- [US News/Reuters — Rutte says billions in new defense contracts — June 25, 2026](https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2026-06-25/natos-rutte-says-billions-in-new-defense-contracts-will-be-announced-at-summit)

- [Post-Gazette/AP — NATO summit Turkey, quadrupling 155mm shells — June 26, 2026](https://www.post-gazette.com/news/world/2026/06/26/nato-summit-turkey-defense-spending/stories/202606260037)

### Secondary sources

- [European Parliament — Ankara summit briefing — June 26, 2026](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2026/789355/EPRS_BRI(2026)789355_EN.pdf)

- [The Guardian — NATO leaders fear US disengagement — June 27, 2026](https://www.theguardian.com/world/ng-interactive/2026/jun/27/nato-leaders-fear-they-can-no-longer-rely-on-us-help-if-russia-attacks-trump-eastern-europe)

- [Brookings — A rebalancing NATO gathers in Ankara — June 24, 2026](https://www.brookings.edu/events/a-rebalancing-nato-gathers-in-ankara/)

- [Gdansk Declaration — 5% GDP, eastern flank — June 25, 2026](https://regeringen.se/rattsliga-dokument/sveriges-internationella-overenskommelser/2026/06/joint-declaration-from-leaders-meeting-in-Gdansk/)

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Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/commentaire-dizaines-de-milliards-en-contrats-ankara-la-defense-devenue-industri