# COLUMN: $90 billion more, the real price of fear

> Since 2024, NATO's European allies have raised their defense spending by roughly $90 billion in constant 2021 prices, an increase that reaches $139 billion in nominal terms for 2025 alone, according to data reported by…

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Column
- Published: 2026-07-20
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/column-90-billion-more-the-real-price-of-fear

## Key takeaways

- Forbes data cited in the column: European allies raised defense spending by about $90 billion in constant 2021 prices since 2024, and by $139 billion in nominal terms in 2025 alone, roughly a 20% jump.
- The NATO summit in Ankara on July 7 and 8, 2026 confirmed a collective goal of 5% of GDP on defense by 2035.
- Reuters figures cited: Lithuania at 5.33% of GDP in 2026, and five allies expected to exceed 3.5%.
- The withdrawal of German Eurofighter jets from Poland on March 24, 2026, per Euronews, is presented as a contradiction with rising budgets.
- The PURL mechanism mobilized over $6 billion by June 2026, financing 75% of Patriot interceptors for Ukraine, per NATO.

## Introduction

Since **2024**, **NATO's** European allies have raised their defense spending by roughly **$90 billion** in constant 2021 prices, an increase that reaches **$139 billion** in nominal terms for 2025 alone, according to data reported by **Forbes**. *Ninety billion dollars is not a figure you carve into a victory statement; it is the price you agree to pay once you have understood, too late, that you underestimated a neighbor.*

This **column** revisits what these numbers really tell us: not a sudden generosity from European capitals, but a budget correction forced by years of underinvestment, accelerated by the war in **Ukraine** and confirmed collectively at the **NATO** summit in **Ankara** on July 7 and 8, 2026.

This column takes a stance that treats the scale of this budget effort seriously, without giving in either to the self-congratulation of official statements or to the easy cynicism of claiming these numbers will change nothing.

## Ninety billion, a figure that deserves explaining

### An increase measured in constant prices, not nominal illusions

The **$90 billion** figure corresponds to an increase measured in **constant 2021 prices**, a method that neutralizes the effect of **inflation** and allows real budget efforts to be compared year over year, rather than being impressed by artificially inflated nominal numbers. *An inflation-adjusted figure is a figure that does not cheat; that alone is, in itself, a form of respect toward readers.*

This **column** treats this methodological detail as essential to understanding the real scale of the effort made by European allies since 2024, beyond the political communication that often accompanies these announcements.

### What this figure represents concretely on the ground

Ninety billion dollars represents, concretely, thousands of **weapons systems**, tens of thousands of **industrial jobs**, and a deep reorganization of European military **production chains**, an effort that is not limited to an abstract budget line in a **NATO** annual report.

This **column** treats this concrete materiality as the best way to understand what this sum really represents, rather than treating it as a mere political symbol disconnected from the ground.

## $139 billion in nominal terms, the year everything accelerated

### A 20% increase in a single year

In nominal terms, European allies raised their defense spending by **$139 billion** in **2025** alone, an increase of roughly **20%** compared with the previous year, according to **Forbes**. *A twenty percent increase in a single year is not a budget adjustment; it is the kind of turn you only take when you are afraid, genuinely afraid.*

This **column** treats this 2025 acceleration as the pivotal moment when budget intentions displayed for several years finally translated into concrete, verifiable figures.

### What drove this acceleration

This 2025 budget acceleration is not explained by a single isolated factor, but by the convergence of several years of documented war in **Ukraine**, repeated incidents on **NATO's eastern flank**, and growing political pressure to honor the Alliance's collective budget commitments.

This **column** does not claim to isolate a single factor among these multiple causes, but treats their convergence as the most plausible explanation for this sudden acceleration.

## Ankara, the summit that turned a trend into a formal commitment

### Five percent of GDP by 2035, now a collective goal

The **NATO** summit in **Ankara**, on July 7 and 8, 2026, confirmed the collective goal of raising defense spending to **5% of GDP** by **2035**, according to **Forbes**, turning an already-underway budget trend into a formal commitment binding on all Alliance members. *A figure that was once just a trend becomes, once signed collectively, a promise someone can one day hold you to.*

This **column** treats this formalization as an important symbolic turning point, even though it does not, on its own, guarantee that every member country will actually meet this target in the years ahead.

### Lithuania, already beyond the target set for 2035

**Lithuania**, at **5.33% of GDP** devoted to defense in 2026 according to **Reuters**, already exceeds the collective target set for 2035, showing that some Baltic states anticipated, nearly a decade early, a budget trajectory other allies are only now beginning to consider.

This **column** treats this gap between countries as one of the most revealing elements in this matter: the collective 5% target masks very unequal national realities depending on geographic proximity to the documented threat.

## The countries pulling the average up

### Five allies already above 3.5% of GDP in 2026

According to **Reuters**, on July 7, 2026, **five NATO members** are expected to exceed **3.5% of GDP** in defense spending this year, a narrow group that, in effect, carries a disproportionate share of the Alliance's collective displayed effort. *Five countries already above 3.5% while others are still debating the trajectory is not a balanced average; it is an effort carried by a committed minority.*

This **column** treats this concentration of budget effort as a reality the Alliance's collective statements tend to smooth over, without always explicitly naming the real gaps between member countries.

### What this concentration reveals about the Alliance's solidarity

This concentration of budget effort among a narrow group of countries, often the ones geographically closest to the documented threat, raises a fundamental question about **real solidarity** within **NATO**, beyond the collective commitments displayed at summits.

This **column** treats this question as central to understanding the internal tensions that accompany, in practice, the implementation of the 5% of GDP target set collectively in Ankara.

## The contrast with Germany's Eurofighter withdrawal

### A paradox hard to ignore

This figure of **$139 billion** in nominal increase in 2025 contrasts with the withdrawal, on March 24, 2026, of German **Eurofighter** jets from their base in **Poland**, according to **Euronews**, a withdrawal that happened during the same period when Baltic defense ministers were demanding a strengthened **eastern flank**. *You cannot spend more money and withdraw aircraft at the same time without someone, eventually, noticing the contradiction.*

This **column** does not claim these two facts stem from the same decision-making logic, but it refuses to treat them as two entirely independent matters.

### What this contrast says about the gap between money and capability

This contrast illustrates a broader lesson: increased **defense budgets** do not automatically, or immediately, translate into an equivalent increase in **operational capability** deployed on the ground, a gap this column considers essential to name clearly.

This **column** treats this gap as one of the most important lessons of this period, beyond the sheer spectacular figure of the $90 billion in additional spending.

## PURL, proof that money can become real munitions

### Six billion dollars mobilized in ten months

The **PURL** mechanism, launched by the **Netherlands** in September 2025, had mobilized more than **$6 billion** by June 2026 according to **NATO**, financing **75% of the Patriot interceptors** delivered to **Ukraine**. This column treats this mechanism as the most tangible proof that money announced collectively can actually turn into munitions delivered on the ground. *PURL is living proof that ninety billion dollars is not condemned to remain a line in a ledger; it can become an interceptor that shoots down a missile.*

This **column** treats this contrast between PURL and the German withdrawal as proof that turning money into capability depends less on overall budget volume than on precise implementation choices.

### Twenty-one allies and two partners engaged in this mechanism

The participation of **21 allies and two partners** in the **PURL** mechanism, according to **NATO** data updated on July 13, 2026, shows a broad collective buy-in that contrasts with the concentration of budget effort observed for national defense spending alone.

This **column** treats this broad participation as an encouraging sign, even though it does not, on its own, guarantee this mechanism's continuity beyond 2026.

## The Baltic drone wall, another billion for detection

### A project directly tied to the documented fear of incidents

The **Baltic drone wall** project, estimated at roughly **one billion euros** according to **Defence Ukraine**, concretely illustrates how part of this regional budget effort translates into **detection** projects responding directly to **drone incidents** documented since early 2026. *One billion euros to watch a sky is the concrete price of a fear that, this time, rests on real incidents rather than hypotheses.*

This **column** treats this project as one example among others of how the overall budget increase breaks down into concrete regional initiatives, each with its own timeline and its own uncertainties.

### Full capability pushed back to late 2027

The system's **full capability** is not expected before the end of **2027**, a delay that reminds us that increased budgets do not produce instant operational results, even when funds are actually committed and projects launched.

This **column** treats this delay as a useful reminder for those legitimately impatient for quick results after the announcement of impressive budget figures.

## What these figures do not say

### No guarantee of future political consistency

None of these figures, neither the $90 billion in constant prices nor the $139 billion in nominal terms for 2025, guarantees the **political consistency** of European governments in the years after 2026, in the face of possible shifts in majority or internal budget priorities. *A figure voted this year promises nothing for next year; defense budgets, like all political promises, get revised.*

This **column** treats this uncertainty as the most important limit to keep in mind against the enthusiasm these record figures can legitimately generate.

### The gap between budget commitment and operational effectiveness

These figures also say nothing about the real **operational effectiveness** of the equipment purchased with these additional budgets, a question distinct from the sheer financial volume committed by European governments since 2024.

This **column** treats this distinction between budget volume and real effectiveness as essential to avoid confusing the scale of a financial effort with a guarantee of its operational success.

## What these figures nevertheless say, sincerely

### A break with decades of documented underinvestment

Despite these limits, this **column** holds that these figures mark a real break with decades of documented **underinvestment** in European defense, a break that would probably not have happened without the direct pressure exerted by the war in **Ukraine** since 2022. *It took a war at Europe's doorstep for defense budgets to stop being a theoretical subject at academic conferences.*

This **column** treats this break as sincere, even though it was born of fear rather than a long-term strategic vision anticipated before the crisis.

### A lesson Europe did not choose to learn, but learned anyway

This **column** finally holds that this budget lesson, however costly and late, has indeed been learned by European governments, a lesson that could, if it holds over time, durably change the continent's defense posture.

This **column** does not claim to know whether this lesson will still be learned past 2035, but treats its actual learning as an already-established fact based on the figures cited.

## The comparison with North American budget effort

### A European dynamic distinct from that of the United States

This **column** does not have, in the sources consulted for this batch, a precise numerical comparison between this European increase of **$90 billion** and the parallel evolution of the **United States'** defense budget over the same period. *Comparing without solid data would betray the rigor this column has held to from the start; better to name the absence than to improvise it.*

This **column** explicitly flags this comparative limit rather than suggesting a **convergence** or **divergence** across the Atlantic not documented by the sources available for this specific matter.

### Why this comparison would matter for the Alliance's future

A rigorous comparison between European and North American budget effort would help assess whether the **5% of GDP** target set in **Ankara** really brings European allies closer to a more balanced sharing of the defense burden within **NATO**, a major strategic question this column cannot settle without additional data.

This **column** treats this question as a project for future analysis, distinct from the sole European budget finding documented here.

## What European public opinion thinks of this effort

### Political support still unevenly measured

This **column** does not have precise, country-by-country public opinion data allowing an assessment of the real level of popular support for these defense budget increases among the European citizens affected by these choices. *A budget that grows without the clear support of the citizens who fund it remains, politically, a fragile bet.*

This **column** treats this absence of opinion data as a significant limit for assessing the real **political durability** of this budget effort, beyond the official commitments of governments alone.

### What sustaining this effort will require from European leaders

Sustaining this budget effort through **2035** will require, from European leaders, **continuous outreach** to their voters, in a context where other internal budget priorities could, at any moment, compete with defense spending.

This **column** treats this outreach requirement as one of the most underestimated political challenges of the budget trajectory announced in Ankara. *A defense budget that holds for ten years is never just a matter of figures; it is a matter of political patience, the rarest resource of all.*

## What upcoming summits will need to confirm

### An annual checkpoint to verify the trajectory

This **column** holds that the **budget trajectory** announced in **Ankara** will need to be verified at **upcoming NATO summits**, each year bringing its own **credibility** test for the **European governments** committed to this effort. A target set for 2035 is checked one year at a time, not all at once at the end of the decade.

This **column** treats this **annual tracking** as the only rigorous way to measure whether the **commitment** made collectively really translates, year after year, into **verifiable figures** rather than **repeated promises**.

### The risk of a mid-course budget slowdown

This **column** also flags the **risk** of a **budget slowdown** midway through this trajectory toward 2035, a risk documented by the repeated **budget history** of numerous **collective commitments** made in the past within the **Alliance**.

This **column** treats this risk as a matter of **caution**, without being able to state it as a **certainty** specific to the current trajectory under way since 2024.

## The provisional verdict these figures impose

### A real effort, but still only halfway proven

This **column**, in summary, holds that the European budget effort documented since **2024** constitutes a **real change**, but one that remains, **halfway** to its full **operational proof**, as long as matters like the **German withdrawal** or the **delays** in the Baltic drone wall remain unresolved.

This **column** treats this **provisional verdict** as the most honest one possible at this stage, neither **premature celebration** nor **cynical dismissal** of a budget effort that is, by all other measures, genuinely under way.

## Conclusion

The **$90 billion** increase in European defense spending since **2024**, including **$139 billion** in nominal terms for 2025 alone according to **Forbes**, tells a story of forced budget correction, confirmed collectively in **Ankara** through the **5% of GDP** target by 2035. These figures, corroborated by several distinct sources, form a solid factual base for this **column**.

This **column** does not claim that this **money** alone guarantees the **continent's security**: the **German withdrawal** of the Eurofighters and the **uncertainties** weighing on projects like the **Baltic drone wall** remind us that money is only a **necessary condition**, never a sufficient one. *Ninety billion dollars is not a victory; it is the price of a lesson learned too slowly.*

This column treats this finding as its final conclusion, giving in neither to self-congratulation nor to cynicism. *You do not celebrate the price you pay for having been afraid too late; you note it, you remember it, and you watch whether, this time, the money actually keeps its promise.*

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

## Sources

### Primary sources

- [NATO — The 5% of GDP commitment](https://www.nato.int/en/what-we-do/introduction-to-nato/defence-expenditures-and-natos-5-commitment)

- [Reuters — Five allies above 3.5% of GDP, July 7, 2026](https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/five-nato-members-seen-spend-over-35-gdp-core-defence-this-year-alliance-2026-07-07/)

### Secondary sources

- [Forbes — Stakes of the Ankara summit, July 1, 2026](https://www.forbes.com/sites/marktemnycky/2026/07/01/what-defense-leaders-will-discuss-at-the-2026-nato-summit/)

- [Euronews — Eurofighter withdrawal, March 24, 2026](https://www.euronews.com/2026/03/24/nato-eastern-flank-germany-withdraws-eurofighters-from-poland)

- [Defence Ukraine — The Baltic drone wall](https://www.defenceukraine.com/en/insights/baltic-drone-spillover-nato-drone-wall/)

- [Latvia's Ministry of Defense — Joint declaration, March 27, 2026](https://www.mod.gov.lv/en/news/joint-statement-ministers-defence-baltic-countries-drone-incidents)

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Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/column-90-billion-more-the-real-price-of-fear