# COLUMN: Washington erases names from the SDN list in silence — while Ukraine bleeds

> On June 24, 2026, the OFAC — the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the US Treasury — removed from its list

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Column
- Published: 2026-07-01
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/chronique-washington-efface-des-noms-de-la-liste-sdn-en-silence-pendant-que-l-uk

## Introduction: deletions without explanation, questions without answers

### June 24, 2026: a lightened SDN list in silence

On **June 24, 2026**, the **OFAC** — the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the **US Treasury** — removed from its list of designated persons and entities (**SDN**) **seven Russian nationals**, two Russian oil tankers, and two Turkish companies. Among those removed: **Ivan Potanin**, son of **Vladimir Potanin**, the oligarch who controls **Norilsk Nickel**, and several executives of the sanctioned banks **Novikombank**, **Sovcombank**, and **Bank Otkritie**. The **US Treasury** provided **no public explanation** for these deletions. Zero press release. Zero press conference. The entities in question simply disappeared from the list.

Then, on **July 1, 2026**, the **United States** lifted sanctions on **four Indian companies** sanctioned for providing financial assistance to the Russian government. This decision came "following sustained dialogue between **Washington** and **New Delhi**," according to Ukrainian sanctions monitoring services. Here again: no official statement from the **White House**, no Treasury press release. It was the site **Euromaidan Press**, not the American government, that revealed these removals to the public. This information asymmetry between a **Ukrainian NGO** and the government of the world's largest democracy says something important about the transparency of American sanctions policy.

### The silent deletions: a pattern that accumulates

**June 24** is not an isolated episode. It is part of a **documented pattern** of unexplained deletions over several months. The previous December, companies accused of supplying the Russian military had been removed without explanation. With each wave, the **Treasury** repeated to **RFE/RL** that these deletions did not reflect "a change in general policy." But the deletions continue. And their cumulative effect — each removed entity regaining access to international financial markets — is real, even if each individual deletion is presented as technical. The question is not whether each individual deletion has a justification. It is why these justifications are never shared publicly.

**Ukraine** is not fooled. Sanctions Commissioner **Vladyslav Vlasyuk** tracks these movements with a precision that commands respect. It is he who publicly confirms what **Washington** does not say. And Ukrainian monitoring services have been, on several occasions, more responsive and more transparent about American sanctions decisions than the American government itself. This situation — which should embarrass **Washington** — seems barely to concern it.

*A Ukrainian monitoring agency informing the world about the US Treasury's own sanctions decisions. This is not irony — it is the summary of a nonexistent transparency policy. And Ukraine, which bears the direct consequences of these decisions, deserves better.*

## The removed entities: who are they and what do they represent?

### Ivan Potanin and the banks: the financial network of the war

**Ivan Potanin** is no marginal figure. He is the son of **Vladimir Potanin**, president of **Norilsk Nickel**, one of **Russia's** wealthiest oligarchs and a close associate of the **Kremlin**. **Norilsk Nickel** is a major producer of **nickel, palladium and copper** — strategic materials for the global military and electronics industries. The designation of **Ivan Potanin** was intended to increase the personal cost for those close to **Putin's** regime. His removal from the list, without explanation, reduces that cost. And in the logic of sanctions, reducing the cost without demanding a concession weakens the leverage.

The executives of **Novikombank**, **Sovcombank**, and **Bank Otkritie** represent another dimension. These sanctioned banks play a role in financing the Russian war economy — **Novikombank** in particular is known for its ties to the military-industrial complex. Removing their executives from the SDN list without verifiable concessions opens potential circumvention channels: persons once again authorised to interact with American counterparties can facilitate transactions that the entities themselves cannot directly carry out. This may not be the intention. But it is the potential effect.

### IDA Asansor and the oil tankers: circumvention facilitated

The Turkish company **IDA Asansor** — an elevator manufacturer — had been sanctioned for circumventing sanctions and supplying goods to the Russian defence industry. That **Washington** would remove such a company from the SDN list, without announcing that it has ceased its problematic activities, without conditions or concessions, sends a signal to other Turkish, Indian, or Chinese companies looking for Russian markets: American sanctions on third-party facilitators are reversible. They depend on the politics of the moment, not on transparent and permanent criteria. This message, if it registers in boardrooms in **Istanbul**, **Mumbai**, or **Shenzhen**, is disastrous for the effectiveness of the sanctions regime.

The two removed tankers — the **Vyacheslav Arshinov** and the **Gennady Egorov** — were linked to the **Russian State Transport Company**. Their removal from the list facilitates their access to ports, insurance, and financial markets. In a context where the Russian **shadow fleet** already operates massively on the margins of sanctions, adding two more vessels to the column of authorised entities does not radically change the picture — but it contributes to the impression that the sanctions regime is a flexible instrument rather than a rigid framework.

*Removing IDA Asansor from the SDN list without conditions means telling sanctions circumventors the world over that punishment is temporary. That is the opposite of a deterrent effect. And in a war that has lasted more than 1,500 days, missed deterrent effects accumulate.*

## The geopolitical context: the diplomacy of the post-Iran deal

### Trump, Iran, and the commercial alliances to consolidate

These deletions do not emerge in a vacuum. They fit the diplomatic logic of the post **US-Iran agreement** of **June 17, 2026**. **Donald Trump** is seeking to consolidate commercial alliances in a context of normalising tensions with **Tehran** — a process that involves recalibrating relations with countries like **Turkey** and **India**, essential actors in the region. The lifting of sanctions on Indian companies and Turkish firms can be read as a gesture of goodwill toward these partners — a signal that **Washington** is prepared to use the SDN list as a bargaining chip in regional diplomacy.

This reading, if correct, is troubling for **Ukraine**. It means that sanctions against **Russia** — a tool designed to punish aggression and fund Ukrainian resistance — are becoming an adjustment variable in a broader foreign policy that does not necessarily have **Ukraine** as its main priority. **Trump** has always had a holistic view of foreign policy: **Ukraine** is a piece on the chessboard, not the primary objective. And when pieces are moved for other reasons — Iranian deal, commercial alliances, oil price balance — **Ukraine** bears the consequences.

### Lost coherence: sanctioning Rosneft while freeing its intermediaries

The internal contradiction of American policy is particularly striking in the sequence of **June 17–24, 2026**. On **June 17**, sanctions on Russian oil are reactivated — targeting **Rosneft** and **Lukoil** directly. On **June 24**, **Washington** removes from the SDN list individuals and entities linked to the financial networks feeding the Russian war economy. On one hand, the main tap is closed. On the other, a few secondary pipes are reopened. This may not be coordinated in this way internally — sanctions decisions involve multiple agencies and may not be coherent between them. But the cumulative effect, seen from **Kyiv** or **Brussels**, is that of an incoherent policy.

This incoherence is not only a practical problem of sanctions effectiveness. It is a credibility problem. The credibility of a sanctions regime rests on the certainty that rules are applied consistently and predictably. If companies and individuals know that designation can be lifted without conditions, at any moment, for opaque diplomatic reasons, they calculate accordingly. And their calculation will be: the risk of remaining in the Russian network is manageable, temporary, negotiable. That calculation is the opposite of the intended deterrent effect.

*Sanctioning with the right hand, unsanctioning with the left. Washington's incoherence is not a bureaucratic accident — it is a structural feature of a policy that does not have Ukraine as its absolute priority. And that takes courage to say.*

## What Kyiv monitors — and what it demands

### The Ukrainian watch: Vlasyuk and his teams

Ukrainian resilience in the sanctions domain is one of the least commented phenomena of this war. The office of Commissioner **Vlasyuk** monitors every modification to the SDN list, every movement in the **OFAC** registers, every variation in Russian oil flows. This real-time monitoring has become an international reference point — journalists, researchers, governments consult Ukrainian analyses to understand what is happening in the machinery of American sanctions. It is a remarkable reversal: **Ukraine**, under bombardment, has become a world centre of expertise on sanctions against its own invader.

This expertise has immediate practical value: it allows **Kyiv** to publicly document American decisions that **Washington** does not communicate, creating indirect transparency pressure on the American government. When **Vlasyuk's** office confirms the reactivation of oil sanctions before any official American announcement, it implicitly forces **Washington** to acknowledge the decision. This use of transparency as a tool of diplomatic pressure is subtle but effective.

### What Ukraine demands: standards, not exceptions

Ukraine's demand on sanctions is articulated with precision. **Kyiv** is not asking **Washington** to keep entities on the SDN list in perpetuity. It is asking that removals be based on clear and public criteria: evidence of behavioural change, cooperation with investigations into violations, documented cessation of problematic activities. And it asks that these criteria be publicly announced, so that decisions are subject to a minimum of democratic scrutiny. These demands are not revolutionary. They are the minimum expected of a sanctions policy that claims to be serious.

In this context, the lifting of sanctions on four Indian companies on **July 1, 2026** is symptomatic. These companies had been sanctioned for providing financial assistance to the Russian government. Have they ceased those activities? Is the decision conditional? Are there commitments on their part? The official answer is: silence. And that silence, for **Ukraine**, is a partial betrayal of an architecture it counted on seeing strengthened, not loosened.

*Kyiv monitors the SDN list better than Washington announces its own changes to it. This role reversal says everything: Ukraine is the party that bears the direct consequences of every modification. That is precisely why its expertise deserves to be taken seriously by its allies.*

## The lesson for the global sanctions order

### When norms become negotiable, sanctions lose their bite

The effectiveness of sanctions rests on a simple mechanism: targeted actors calculate that the cost of sanctioned behaviour exceeds the benefit. This calculation holds as long as sanctions are predictable, transparent, and consistent. When they begin to be perceived as negotiable — removable through diplomatic channels, modifiable according to the needs of the moment — the calculation changes. Rational actors, whether Russian oligarchs, banks, or third-party facilitating companies, adapt their behaviour accordingly: they avoid the most grossly visible conduct, but maintain their activities in the grey zones that silent deletions have created.

This phenomenon is not unique to sanctions against **Russia**. It has been observed in sanctions against **Iran**, against **North Korea**, against **Venezuela**. But in the Russian case, the stakes are particularly high: every dollar of financing that **Moscow** loses or gains can translate into real military results on a front where every tonne of munitions counts. The silent erosion of sanctions, even marginal, has a human cost. And that cost is paid, as always, by people who are not in the boardrooms where these decisions are made.

### G7 solidarity facing divergent pressures

The G7 sanctions regime against **Russia** has demonstrated remarkable solidity since 2022 — despite Hungarian resistance in **Europe**, despite **Trump's** ambivalences, despite economic pressures on member states. This solidity is not guaranteed: it is negotiated, defended, and actively maintained with each sanctions package. The silent deletions from the American SDN list test this solidity. They do not break it — but they erode it. And a gradually eroded solidarity is, in the long run, as fragile as no solidarity at all.

**France**, **Germany**, the **United Kingdom**, and other allies have a responsibility here: not to let the deletions pass without at least questioning their justification. Allied silence in the face of American SDN deletions is as problematic as allied silence in the face of Turkish repression in **Ankara**. In both cases, the message sent is: we accept. We do not ask for explanations. And this message, repeated often enough, becomes an authorisation.

*The G7 built a remarkable sanctions regime against all odds. It would be a shame to let it erode through an accumulation of silent deletions. The robustness of a system is also measured by what it refuses to tolerate within itself.*

## Indian sanctions: the trap of strategic partnership

### Washington between New Delhi and Kyiv: an impossible balance

The lifting of sanctions on **four Indian companies** on **July 1, 2026** illustrates a structural dilemma in American policy: how to maintain economic pressure on **Russia** while preserving the strategic partnership with **India**, a key actor in competition with **China**? **India** is the largest buyer of Russian oil after **China**. It refused to condemn the Russian invasion of **Ukraine** at the **United Nations**. And it continues to maintain significant commercial and military relations with **Moscow**. In this context, sanctioning Indian companies for their assistance to the Russian government invariably creates diplomatic tensions that **Washington** does not want to manage indefinitely.

The lifting of these sanctions after "sustained dialogue" illustrates what diplomats call **third-party sanctions fatigue**. Sanctioning allied or partner countries for their trade with countries that are themselves sanctioned is politically and legally complex. These secondary sanctions exist in the American arsenal — but they are used sparingly against strategic partners. And this sparing use carries a cost: it sends the signal that important third parties can afford to help **Russia** without lasting consequences.

### Diplomatic pressure as a substitute for sanctions

The "sustained dialogue" between **Washington** and **New Delhi** mentioned in Ukrainian reports is an implicit acknowledgement that sanctions were used as a negotiating lever rather than a punitive measure. This is a known practice — the sanction as a step in a dialogue, not an irrevocable verdict. It can produce results: if **New Delhi** gave commitments on reducing its purchases of Russian oil or its links with sanctioned Russian companies, the lifting was justified. But no commitment was publicly announced. No condition was made transparent. And that is precisely the problem.

**Ukraine** observes this game with a clear-eyed bitterness. It knows that **Washington** cannot afford to antagonise **New Delhi** at a time when competition with **China** is the number one priority of American foreign policy. It knows that its own interests come after this larger strategic calculation. And it says so — not out loud, not officially, but in its technical reports, in its transparency demands, in the vigilance of **Vlasyuk**.

*Washington cannot avoid antagonising New Delhi and please Kyiv at the same time. This dilemma is real and I do not minimise it. But resolving it in opacity, without public explanation, without transparent criteria, is choosing diplomatic convenience over democratic legitimacy. That choice carries a price.*

## What should change: recommendations from a frustrated columnist

### Mandatory transparency as a minimal standard

I am not a policymaker. I am a columnist. But I have opinions, and I stand by them. Here is what I believe should change in American sanctions policy against **Russia**. **First**: any deletion from the SDN list concerning an entity designated in connection with the war in **Ukraine** should be accompanied by a minimal public explanation. Not a novel — but a paragraph. What behaviour has changed? What condition has been met? What guarantee has been obtained? This transparency would not compromise national security. It would strengthen the credibility of the sanctions regime.

**Second**: diplomatically motivated removals — such as the lifting of sanctions on Indian companies in the context of the agreement with **India** — should be accompanied by verifiable commitments from the companies concerned. If an Indian company helped **Russia** circumvent sanctions, its rehabilitation should involve an audit of its practices, not an opaque diplomatic negotiation. This standard exists in other regulatory contexts — competition law, integrity agreements in public procurement. It can be applied to sanctions.

### Ukraine as a partner, not a passive beneficiary

The most important lesson from Ukraine's management of sanctions may be this: **Ukraine** should be formally associated with decisions to modify the SDN list that directly concern it. Not as the final decision-maker — American foreign policy remains an American prerogative — but as a systematic consultant, whose input is solicited and documented. **Vlasyuk's** office has expertise that American agencies do not. It would be strategic waste not to use it.

This formal association is not utopian. It could take the form of a prior consultation mechanism on SDN list modifications related to the Ukrainian conflict — with a response period, a bilateral exchange forum, and an obligation to justify decisions in case of disagreement. This mechanism would strengthen both the quality of American decisions and **Kyiv's** confidence in its ally. In a war that has lasted more than four years, that confidence is worth something.

*Ukraine deserves to be consulted before Washington erases names from a list that was built, in part, to protect it. This is a matter of respect — and in relations between allies, respect is also a form of strategy.*

## The concrete impact: from an erased name to circulating money

### What removing a name changes operationally

When **OFAC** removes an entity from the SDN list, the immediate consequences are concrete. Frozen assets are released. Corresponding bank accounts become accessible again. American companies and their subsidiaries can once again transact with the entity. Maritime insurers can cover the relevant vessels. In the case of individuals like **Ivan Potanin**, this means that financial operations previously impossible become conceivable again. The exact amount of released assets is not public — but for executives of **Norilsk Nickel** and sanctioned banks, it is probably not negligible.

The network effect may be even more significant. In the world of sanctions, the SDN list has a signal value far beyond the formal restrictions it imposes. Companies and financial institutions worldwide use this list as a reference for their internal compliance policies — a practice known as "de-risking." When an entity disappears from the list, these institutions revise their own risk assessments. The removal of **Ivan Potanin** from the SDN list can thus open doors in Swiss banks, London investment funds, or Asian stock exchanges that had adopted precautionary restrictions going beyond strict legal requirements.

### Six list deletions that amount to 6% of system erosion

Each individual deletion seems minor. But when they are counted — in June 2026, dozens of names connected to the war in **Ukraine** were removed in successive waves — the cumulative effect becomes significant. The sanctions regime is a system: its effectiveness depends on its coherence and its breadth. If names are regularly removed without explanation or concession, the surface of constraint exerted on the Russian war economy is progressively reduced. These deletions may seem insignificant in isolation. Combined, they constitute a real erosion.

This is exactly what Ukrainian monitoring services are documenting: not the spectacular collapse of the sanctions regime, but its progressive, discreet, cumulative erosion. This erosion is the scenario **Putin** always counted on — not a brutal rupture of Western solidarity, but an accumulated fatigue that eventually renders sanctions symbolic rather than biting. Every silent deletion contributes to this scenario. And every silent deletion deserves to be named.

*Erosion is not collapse. It is worse: it is the slow digestion of what should have remained intact. Putin understood that democracies grow weary. Every name erased without explanation gives him a little more reason to be right.*

## Conclusion: erased names, a question posed

### The SDN list as a barometer of Western conviction

The **SDN** list is not only an economic instrument. It is a barometer of Western conviction regarding its own policy on **Ukraine**. Every entry represents a decision: we believe this entity contributes to Russian aggression, and we exclude it from our economic system. Every deletion represents the reverse decision: we have changed our mind, or circumstances have changed, or something else has taken over. These decisions should be public, justified, and open to scrutiny. They are not. And as long as they are not, the SDN list will remain what it is becoming: a flexible instrument rather than a rigid framework.

In **June–July 2026**, while Ukrainian soldiers were dying on the front lines of the **Zaporizhzhia** and **Kherson regions**, **OFAC** was quietly erasing names from its blacklist. There is no direct causal link between these two facts. But there is a moral link: sanctions are one of the tools that democracies use to reduce **Putin's** capacity to wage this war. Weakening them without explanation, even marginally, even silently, is to contribute to its prolongation. And that contribution deserved to be named.

### What I take away from this column

I take away that the sanctions war is as important as the trench war — and that it is waged largely behind the scenes, far from cameras, in the columns of the SDN list and the **OFAC** registers. I take away that **Ukraine** is, in this fight, both the most vigilant actor and the least consulted. And I take away that transparency — this democratic minimum we demand of governments on their most ordinary decisions — is too often absent from the most extraordinary decisions, those that touch on war and peace.

The names erased from the SDN list on **June 24, 2026** may not make tomorrow's headlines. But they deserved at least a column.

***Washington's** silence on its own sanctions decisions is itself a political decision. And that decision, every week, tells **Kyiv**: you matter, but not as much as the other calculations. Ukraine deserves an ally that says so differently.*

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

## Sources

### Primary sources

- [Euromaidan Press — Washington just removed seven more Russians, two ships, and two Turkish firms from its sanctions blacklist — June 25, 2026](https://euromaidanpress.com/2026/06/25/washington-just-removed-seven-more-russians-two-ships-and-two-turkish-firms-from-its-sanctions-blacklist/)

- [Patrika — US lifts sanctions on four Indian companies over Russia aid allegations — July 1, 2026](https://www.patrika.com/en/world-news/us-lifts-sanctions-four-indian-companies-russia-aid-allegations-20711955)

- [Femida UA — The United States lifted sanctions on Russian citizens, Russian vessels and Turkish companies — June 2026](https://femida.ua/en/news/the-united-states-lifted-sanctions-on-russian-citizens-russian-vessels-and-turkish-companies/)

### Secondary sources

- [United24 Media — US removes sanctions on seven Russians, two Turkish companies and two vessels — June 2026](https://united24media.com/world/us-removes-sanctions-on-seven-russians-two-turkish-companies-and-two-vessels-20147)

- [RBC Ukraine — US resumes sanctions against Russian oil — June 26, 2026](https://newsukraine.rbc.ua/news/us-resumes-sanctions-against-russian-oil-1782485691.html)

- [Euronews — Temperatures rise over sanctions against Russia — June 26, 2026](https://www.euronews.com/2026/06/26/newsletter-temperatures-rise-over-sanctions-against-russia)

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Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/chronique-washington-efface-des-noms-de-la-liste-sdn-en-silence-pendant-que-l-uk