# COLUMN: One more year — the EU extends its sanctions against Russia through July 2027

> Economic sanctions do not win wars on their own. But they deprive the adversary of resources, complicate its military imports, and impose a political cost on those who would lift them. In the war of a

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Column
- Published: 2026-07-02
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/chronique-un-an-de-plus-l-ue-reconduit-ses-sanctions-contre-la-russie-jusqu-en-j

## Introduction: The sanctions machinery that holds

### June 25, 2026: an unsurprising vote — but an important one

On **June 25, 2026**, the **Council of the European Union** renewed its economic restrictive measures against the **Russian Federation** for **12 additional months**, through **July 31, 2027**. The decision follows the conclusions of the **European Council of June 18–19, 2026**. It is grounded in **Decision (CFSP) 2026/1437**. This is not a new policy — it is the renewal of a mechanism already in place since **2014**, considerably strengthened since the full-scale invasion of **February 2022**.

The very predictability of this vote does not make it trivial. In a continent where some **EU** member states have governments increasingly hostile to sanctions — where the pressure of pro-**Putin** nationalist parties is felt in several capitals — maintaining the required unanimity to renew these measures represents real political effort, however quiet. Every renewal is a silent diplomatic victory for **Ukraine**.

### What the sanctions cover: an enormous scope

The renewed measures cover a considerable scope: **trade**, **finance**, **energy**, **dual-use technologies**. Specific measures include: a ban on importing **seaborne crude oil** and certain Russian petroleum products; a ban on transactions with several financial institutions and cryptocurrency service providers in **Russia**; and the suspension of broadcasting activities for several pro-**Kremlin** disinformation outlets. More than **€210 billion in assets** of the **Russian Central Bank** remain frozen, the bulk held at **Euroclear** in **Brussels**.

The legal framework is also equipped with anti-circumvention mechanisms — provisions allowing the **EU** to sanction third countries or companies that help **Russia** evade restrictions. This is an important tool in a world where Russian trade flows are rerouting through intermediary countries such as the **United Arab Emirates**, **Turkey**, or certain **Central Asian** republics.

## The effectiveness debate: what we actually know

### What the numbers say

The question of sanctions' effectiveness against **Russia** has been one of the most debated since **2022**. Advocates point to Russia's economic slowdown, the ruble's depreciation, **Moscow's** growing dependence on its sovereign reserves, and difficulties sourcing electronic components for its defense industry. Skeptics note that the Russian economy held up better than expected, that oil prices remained high enough to fund the war, and that circumvention flows partially offset direct losses.

The truth probably lies between the two. Sanctions have not collapsed the Russian economy or stopped the war. But they have complicated and slowed the Russian war machine, notably its ability to source the high-technology electronic components needed to manufacture missiles and military electronics. **Ukraine** has exploited this difficulty by precisely targeting communications systems that **Russia** struggles to repair or replace quickly.

### The oil case: effective but insufficient

The ban on importing seaborne Russian crude oil is one of the most concretely documented sanctions. It has led **Russia** to develop a **"shadow fleet"** of aging tankers transporting its oil to alternative buyers in **Asia** and the **Middle East**. This system creates additional logistics costs for **Russia**, depresses the price at which it can sell its oil, and makes it dependent on clients with their own interests in negotiating prices aggressively.

The question of the **oil price cap** — a complementary measure supported by **G7** countries — has shown mixed results. **Moscow** managed to maintain oil export volumes, but at reduced prices. According to available estimates, **Russia** loses tens of billions of dollars in oil revenue each year compared to what it would have collected without sanctions. Those billions are missing from the war effort's financing.

## The political question: can sanctions still be lifted?

### The required unanimity and its fragilities

The **EU's** economic sanctions against **Russia** require the unanimity of all **27 member states** to be maintained — every renewal requires each country's agreement. This is a delicate balance in a **European Union** where positions on **Russia** diverge. **Orbán's Hungary** has regularly expressed reservations and negotiated exemptions. Political parties in **Italy**, **Slovakia**, and **Austria** have ideological or economic ties to **Moscow**.

So far, despite these tensions, unanimity has held. Partly because the conditions for lifting sanctions are explicitly tied to the end of Russian aggression and respect for international law — conditions **Moscow** categorically refuses to meet. Partly also because the pressure from Baltic, Polish, and Nordic states — the most committed members against **Russia** — is sufficient to maintain consensus.

### The risk of sanctions fatigue

Fatigue is a real risk. Four years after the start of the full-scale invasion, some European economies have absorbed significant costs linked to the break with Russian hydrocarbons. **Germany**, which depended heavily on Russian gas via **Nord Stream**, had to rapidly reorient toward other sources. This transition had a real economic cost — even though dependence on **Moscow** is now considerably reduced, which represents a long-term strategic gain.

The risk is that populist governments will use this economic cost as an argument to progressively weaken the sanctions — not by formally lifting them, which would be politically difficult, but by multiplying exemptions, narrowing the scope of measures, or delaying strengthening decisions. This gradual drift is more dangerous than frontal opposition, precisely because it is less visible.

## The €210 billion at Euroclear: the dormant weapon

### The frozen Russian assets as leverage

One of the most significant aspects of the sanctions regime is the freeze of **€210 billion in assets** of the **Russian Central Bank**, the bulk held at **Euroclear** in **Brussels**. These funds have been immobilized since **February 2022**. They generate interest — estimated at several billion euros per year — part of which has been redirected toward Ukraine's reconstruction and military support.

The question of confiscating these assets — not just the interest, but the principal itself — is one of the most complex legal and political debates of the war. Proponents argue that using these **€210 billion** directly to finance Ukraine's reconstruction would be both just and practical. Opponents raise legal risks, diplomatic concerns, and threats to international financial stability — notably the possibility that other states might withdraw their reserves from **Europe**, fearing a confiscation precedent.

### The interest used, the principal waiting

For now, the pragmatic solution has prevailed: the interest on frozen Russian assets is being used, but the principal remains immobilized. This compromise position allows the **EU** to partially fund **Ukraine** without crossing the legal Rubicon of confiscation. But as the war continues and reconstruction needs accumulate, pressure for more direct use of these **€210 billion** will intensify.

This debate is not only economic or legal. It is deeply political: using assets confiscated from **Russia** to rebuild **Ukraine** would send an unmistakably clear message about the **West's** values and resolve. It would say to **Putin**: not only do we support **Ukraine**, we are using your own wealth to erase the damage you caused.

## Sanctions as foreign policy tool: limits and lessons

### What sanctions cannot do

I must honestly acknowledge this: economic sanctions have structural limits. They have not stopped the war. They have not triggered a Russian economic collapse nor a sufficient internal opposition movement to change **Putin's** policy. The history of international sanctions — against **Iran**, **North Korea**, Cuba, or other regimes — shows that authoritarian regimes can adapt, at least in the short term, to external economic pressure, notably by passing costs onto their populations.

**Putin's Russia** did the same. It reduced imports, developed domestic substitutes in certain sectors, redirected exports toward **Asia**, and used remaining oil revenues to fund the war effort at the expense of social spending. This is not a comfortable adaptation — but it keeps the war machine running.

### What sanctions still accomplish

And yet sanctions remain an indispensable tool for several reasons. First, they deny **Russia** access to critical military technologies — semiconductors, optical systems, electronic components — that it cannot easily produce domestically. This deprivation has real effects on the quality and volume of its weapons production. Ukrainian strikes on sophisticated communications systems exploit precisely Russia's difficulty in repairing and replacing them.

Second, sanctions send a political signal to other countries that might contemplate similar aggressions. The international community has shown it is prepared to impose significant economic costs on aggressors. This deterrence signal, however imperfect, has value extending well beyond the Russian case alone.

## The 16th package and the evolution of the sanctions regime

### What the 16th package introduced

The **June 25, 2026** renewal does not occur in a vacuum. It is part of a trajectory of progressive reinforcement since **2022**. The **16th sanctions package** adopted in **February 2026** was a significant step: it extended measures to **shadow fleet operators**, tightened restrictions on **dual-use goods exports**, and added targeted sanctions against **Chinese and Iranian companies** involved in circumventing trade restrictions. It is no longer only **Russia** being targeted — it is also its supply networks.

This continuous reinforcement sends an important signal: the **EU** is not merely maintaining existing sanctions, it is adapting them to new realities on the ground. **Russia** has progressively organized to circumvent restrictions — through intermediaries, shell companies, and alternative trade routes. The **EU** responds by plugging these gaps, even if the cat-and-mouse game between sanctions and circumvention has no predictable end.

### Secondary sanctions: a still-timid frontier

The question of **secondary sanctions** — meaning sanctions imposed on third-country companies and states that help **Russia** evade restrictions — is one of the most delicate. The **United States** has used this tool more aggressively than the **EU**, notably against Chinese banks and **Central Asian** companies. The **European Union** has been more cautious, fearing blowback on its own trade and diplomatic relationships with third parties.

But pressure is building. Several member states, notably the **Baltic countries** and **Poland**, are pushing for firmer use of secondary sanctions. They argue that the overall regime's effectiveness depends on the ability to cut circumvention routes — and that this requires more direct action against intermediaries facilitating Russian access to international markets. This internal **EU** debate will be central to defining the **17th package**, expected in the coming months.

## The European Union as geopolitical actor: the Ukrainian lesson

### What the war has changed in European doctrine

There is a deeper lesson in the **June 25, 2026** vote: the war in **Ukraine** has transformed the **European Union** into a full geopolitical actor, beyond its original economic vocation. Before **2022**, the idea that the **EU** would coordinate **weapons deliveries** to a country at war, freeze **€210 billion** in sovereign assets of a third state, and impose massive sectoral sanctions on one of the world's largest economies would have seemed unrealistic. Four years later, all of that has become the norm.

This transformation is not only functional — it is identity-defining. The **European Union** is affirming, through these repeated decisions, that it is capable of acting collectively in the face of an existential threat to its security model. Internal contradictions persist — **Budapest** continues to negotiate exemptions, some capitals maintain economic ties with **Moscow** — but the center of gravity has shifted. The **Europe** of sanctions is no longer the **Europe** of **strategic naivety**.

### What economic solidarity means for collective security

The renewal of sanctions is also a message to Ukraine's allies who doubt the staying power of European support. The **United States** under **Trump** oscillates between support and distancing. **China** and **Russia** are betting on Western fatigue. In this context, every vote to renew sanctions is a demonstration of durability — a signal that European solidarity is not a short-term emotional posture but a structured, renewable policy.

For **Kyiv**, this matters as much as weapons deliveries. The conviction that **Europe** will hold — economically, diplomatically, politically — is a morale factor in a war of attrition where duration is often the decisive parameter. Every renewal of sanctions is a message in plain language: **Ukraine** is not alone, and it will not be alone tomorrow either.

## The annual renewal window: a weapon or a weakness?

### Why the annual renewal is a problem

The **EU's** economic sanctions against **Russia** are renewed on an annual basis — the **June 25, 2026** decision extending through **July 31, 2027**. This annual cycle is a structural weakness: it creates each year a negotiation window in which the least committed member states can exert pressure for exemptions or softening in exchange for their vote.

Voices in the **European Parliament** and in several capitals have proposed moving to a mechanism of automatically renewable sanctions unless an explicit vote is cast to lift them — reversing the burden of proof. This reform would have the advantage of reducing annual political pressure and signaling that sanctions are a matter of principle, not a conjunctural decision. It has not yet come to fruition, but the debate is very real.

### What the annual renewal means for Ukraine

For **Ukraine**, the annual renewal cycle is a source of uncertainty. Every year, Ukrainian officials must apply diplomatic pressure to ensure unanimity is maintained. Every year, the most hesitant partners must be reconvinced. This expenditure of diplomatic energy is an indirect cost of the current structure — a cost borne by a government team already overloaded by the demands of war.

The **June 25, 2026** decision — which marks a shift from a six-month to an annual cycle — is in fact only limited progress. It reduces the frequency of negotiations but does not eliminate the fundamental uncertainty. **Ukraine** will need this economic support well beyond **July 2027** — whether or not the war is over.

## Conclusion: hold the economic line, hold the political line

### Renewal as an act of solidarity

The **June 25, 2026** vote is not spectacular. There was no dramatic press conference, no new measures announced with fanfare. It is a technical, bureaucratic, predictable vote. And that is precisely why it deserves to be recognized: European solidarity with **Ukraine** is also embodied in these quiet, repeated, obstinate decisions. Every renewal is a "no" said to **Putin** — a no to the idea that the war will exhaust the **West** before it exhausts **Russia**.

The **EU's** position is clear: it will maintain existing measures and is prepared to adopt additional ones as long as the **Russian Federation** continues its illegal actions and violations of international law, including the prohibition on the use of force. That formulation is a political promise. Honoring it is a question of credibility for the entire European project.

### What Ukraine expects from Europe

**Ukraine** needs **Europe** to hold its economic line — not only today, but five years from now, ten years from now. Rebuilding the country will require decades. Western financial support must be durable, not conjunctural. And sanctions, as long as **Russia** has not been held accountable for its aggression, must remain in place — not as punishment, but as a minimum condition for respecting international law.

The column I sign here is not the most dramatic of this batch. But sometimes, real resistance is not in drone strikes on **Moscow** or in **Zelensky's** speeches. It is in the **June 25, 2026** decision of the **EU Council** that says: we are here, we are holding, and we will hold.

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

## Sources

### Primary sources

- [Euromaidan Press — Daily Review Ukraine — June-July 2026](https://euromaidanpress.com/category/ukraine/daily-review/)

- [Ukrpravda — EU extends Russia sanctions — June 26, 2026](https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2026/06/26/8041163/)

- [EU Sanctions Newsletter — June 2026 — June 2026](https://eusanctions.substack.com/p/june-2026)

### Secondary sources

- [Sofia Globe — EU ministers extend economic sanctions for a further year — June 26, 2026](https://sofiaglobe.com/2026/06/26/russias-war-of-aggression-against-ukraine-eu-ministers-extend-economic-sanctions-for-a-further-year/)

- [Cambios Legales — EU Sanctions Russia 2026, Decision CFSP 2026/1437 — July 2026](https://cambioslegales.es/en/blog/eu-sanctions-russia-2026-decision-cfsp-2026-1437)

- [Euronews — Friction points in new EU sanctions against Russia — June 26, 2026](https://www.euronews.com/2026/06/26/oil-cod-kirill-friction-points-emerge-in-new-eu-sanctions-against-russia)

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Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/chronique-un-an-de-plus-l-ue-reconduit-ses-sanctions-contre-la-russie-jusqu-en-j