# COLUMN: Kupyansk Under Pressure — Radkivka Falls, the Ukrainian Bridgehead Holds

> On June 22, 2026, a Russian source linked to the West Forces Group announced the capture of Radkivka, a village located north of Kupyansk in Kharkiv oblast. It was not a complete surprise — geolocated footage published on June 20 and 22 already showed Ukrainian forces striking Russian positions in northern Kupyansk and Kurylivka, following what the Institute for the Study of Wa

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Column
- Published: 2026-06-29
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/chronique-kupyansk-sous-pression-radkivka-tombe-le-bridgehead-ukrainien-resiste

## Introduction: Radkivka, a name that rings like an alarm

### A town we thought we held

On **June 22, 2026**, a Russian source linked to the **West Forces Group** announced the capture of **Radkivka**, a village located north of **Kupyansk** in **Kharkiv** oblast. It was not a complete surprise — geolocated footage published on **June 20 and 22** already showed Ukrainian forces striking Russian positions in northern **Kupyansk** and **Kurylivka**, following what the **Institute for the Study of War (ISW)** describes as **Russian infiltration missions**.

But behind this village name that most Western readers have never heard of, something larger is playing out: the survival of the **Ukrainian bridgehead** east of the **Oskil River**, that defensive line protecting **Kupyansk** from potential encirclement. The central question remains: how far can Russian forces advance before the line gives way?

### The Ukrainian spokesman sounds the alarm

Colonel **Viktor Trehubov**, spokesman for Ukraine's Joint Forces, confirmed that the **Kupyansk** direction constitutes the **second most active sector of the front**, just behind **Lyman**. Russian troops are actively trying to reduce the Ukrainian bridgehead on the left bank of the **Oskil**, while simultaneously increasing pressure toward **Kozacha Lopan** from the border settlement of **Hraniv**.

According to **RBC Ukraine**, the Russians are multiplying their attempts to expand their zone of control east of **Sumy**, even though Ukrainian defenders continue to hold the settlements. This is not a breakthrough — it is a war of attrition fought with a teaspoon. And it is precisely this style of combat that grinds defenders down.

*I have said it before and I will say it again: the war in Ukraine is fought across dozens of villages whose names no one knows. Radkivka is not a symbol in itself — it is a cog in an implacable attrition machine. And when the cogs fail one by one, the Ukrainian machine eventually seizes up.*

## The geography of danger: understanding the Oskil bridgehead

### A defensive corridor under constant pressure

The **Oskil River** has served for months as a natural line of demarcation between Ukrainian and Russian forces in the **Kupyansk** region. The **Ukrainian bridgehead** — that foothold on the left (eastern) bank of the river — is essential for maintaining defensive depth and preventing Russian forces from approaching the city of **Kupyansk** directly from the east and northeast.

The **ISW** has documented for months Russia's attempts to eliminate this bridgehead by intensifying assault operations on the left bank of the **Oskil**. The capture of **Radkivka** follows this same logic: reduce Ukrainian maneuver space, compress the pocket, and force a retreat or surrender of advanced positions.

### Glide bombs against drones and logistics

The **ISW** notes that Russian forces have intensified their **FAB-500 glide bomb** strikes against Ukrainian drone operators and logistics corridors in the **Kupyansk** direction. Geolocated images published on **June 19** show Russian **FAB-500** strikes hitting a suspected Ukrainian drone control point at **Monachynivka** (northwest of Kupyansk). On **June 20**, four more glide bombs targeted a bridge on the **H-20 Kupyansk-Chuhuiv** road west of **Hrushivka**.

The logic is clear: by cutting Ukraine's ability to surveil and strike via drones, and by degrading logistics bridges, **Russia** seeks to weaken Ukrainian resistance ahead of ground assaults. It is a local area-denial strategy applied at a tactical scale of just a few square kilometers.

*What the Russians are doing with FAB-500s at Kupyansk is exactly what any military strategist would do: blind the enemy before striking. The problem is that the Ukrainians know exactly what is happening — and keep holding. That is not blind heroism; it is discipline.*

## Infiltration as doctrine: the Radkivka method

### Small groups as urban scouts

The Russian tactical approach in the **Kupyansk** direction is not that of massive armored charges — it is patient infiltration. For months, small Russian groups of **two to nine soldiers** have been penetrating urban areas, often at night, using abandoned pipelines, rubber boats on the **Oskil**, or simply exploiting blind spots in Ukrainian defenses.

On **June 22, 2026**, geolocated images again showed two Russian soldiers infiltrating the center of **Radkivka** — before the Russian source claimed total capture of the village. This micro-infiltration is followed by consolidation: small groups hold strategic points until reinforcements arrive or until they are eliminated by the Ukrainians.

### The Ukrainian response: striking infiltration at its source

Ukrainian forces have adapted their response to this tactic. Images published on **June 20 and 22** show Ukrainian strikes on Russian positions in northern **Kupyansk** and northern **Kurylivka** — executed **after** detected Russian infiltration missions. The response is reactive, but coordinated: detect, locate, neutralize.

Colonel **Viktor Trehubov** stressed that Russian forces are suffering significant losses in this direction despite their repeated attempts. On **June 28, 2026**, the **Ukrainian General Staff** recorded only **3 Russian attacks** in the Kupyansk direction on the day of June 27, all directed at the village of **Novoplatonivka** — a sign that tactical intensity fluctuates from hour to hour.

*What strikes me most about this infiltration war is the raw courage required to cross a river at night in a rubber dinghy, knowing that Ukrainian drones patrol both banks. Those Russian soldiers — conscripts or volunteers — are expendable pawns in a war machine that assigns them no value whatsoever.*

## Kupyansk in the broader context of the summer 2026 front

### The second hottest sector according to Trehubov

Colonel **Trehubov**'s statement is key to understanding Ukrainian defensive priorities in the summer of 2026: **Kupyansk** is the **second most active sector**, trailing only **Lyman**. This ranking reflects a brutal front-line reality — the Russians are concentrating their efforts along a handful of specific directions, seeking a breakthrough wherever defenses are most worn down.

Of the **241 engagements** recorded by the **Ukrainian General Staff** in the 24 hours of **June 27, 2026**, the **Lyman** front logged **16 Russian breakthrough attempts**, **Huliaipole** recorded **29**, and **Kostyantynivka** saw **21**. These figures illustrate the overall pressure: the Russian army strikes simultaneously along a dozen directions, hunting for the weakest link.

### Russia attempts to expand its control east of Sumy

Alongside the pressure on **Kupyansk**, **Russia** is attempting to widen its zone of control east of the **Sumy** region, according to **RBC Ukraine**. Ukrainian defenders are holding the settlements for now, but the proliferation of active fronts places enormous logistical and human pressure on Ukrainian forces already engaged across numerous axes.

**President Zelensky** declared that Russian troops had attempted offensives in **12 directions** but had lost the initiative nearly everywhere — noting that slow advances occur only in two or three zones where **Russia** has concentrated enormous amounts of personnel and equipment. **Kupyansk** is one of those zones.

*Zelensky is right to speak of Russia losing the initiative — but let us not drown in optimism. Losing the global initiative does not mean losing the capacity to advance locally. And at Kupyansk, locally, the Russians are moving forward.*

## The long view: Radkivka in the memory of the conflict

### A name that recurs since 2023

For observers who have followed this conflict from the start, **Radkivka** is no newcomer to war bulletins. The village appears in **ISW** reports dating back to **January 2026**, when Russian forces were already pushing toward **Radkivka** from north of **Kupyansk**. In **September 2025**, it was one of three villages — along with **Kindrashivka** and **Holubivka** — identified as the strategic triangle upon which the security of the Ukrainian bridgehead depended.

In **September 2025**, the commander of the **Achilles Regiment**, **Yuriy Fedorenko**, explained that Russian attempts to cross the **Oskil** in the **Radkivka** area by boats and rafts succeeded roughly **two times out of ten**. Six months later, Russian persistence appears to have shifted the balance of power in this particular village.

### The December 2025 liberation and the return of pressure

The winter of **2025–2026** saw Ukrainian forces recapture part of the ground lost around **Kupyansk**. The **ISW** documented the liberation of at least **183 square kilometers** between **December 11 and 25, 2025**, in a countermovement that stabilized Ukrainian control over the city. But that stabilization was fragile, and by spring **2026**, Russian pressure had resumed.

The cycles of recapture and loss in this area illustrate a fundamental truth: in a war of attrition, tactical gains are reversible. **Radkivka** has changed hands multiple times in less than a year. That is not an anomaly — it is the norm in this type of conflict.

*Every time I read that the Ukrainians have "recovered" a village, I hold back my enthusiasm. Maps change week to week in this war. What matters is the trend over six months, not six days. And over six months, Russian pressure at Kupyansk is a reality that cannot be ignored.*

## FAB-500s and the drone war: the ground-level air duel

### Russian glide bombs are redrawing the battlefield

Russia's intensive use of **FAB-500** glide bombs in the **Kupyansk** direction represents a significant tactical evolution. These munitions — guided by GLONASS and potentially by artificial vision systems — allow Russian aircraft to strike from a safe standoff distance while maintaining sufficient precision to destroy key infrastructure: bridges, control points, buildings occupied by drone operators.

The **June 20** strike on the **H-20** road bridge is particularly revealing: by targeting Ukrainian logistics on that axis, Russian forces seek to slow troop rotations and resupply runs that allow the Ukrainians to maintain their bridgehead. It is a textbook application of aerial interdiction, applied at a scale of just a few kilometers.

### The Ukrainian response through FPV drones

In response to Russian **FAB-500s**, Ukrainian forces rely heavily on their **FPV drones** to neutralize infiltration groups and strike consolidated positions. Images published on **June 20 and 22** show Ukrainian drone strikes on Russian positions in northern **Kupyansk** and **Kurylivka** — an asymmetric response capability that partially offsets Russia's numerical superiority.

The challenge for **Ukraine** is keeping this drone stream operational even as Russian strikes specifically target operators and their equipment. This war within the war — Russians targeting drone operators, Ukrainians targeting infiltrators — defines the daily texture of combat in this direction.

*Drones are often discussed as a clean, precise military revolution. The reality is less glamorous: young men sitting in front of screens in basements or makeshift shelters, piloting craft that expose them to counter-strikes. Technology does not change the brutality — it relocates it.*

## Kurylivka: the southeastern flank under parallel pressure

### A secondary axis that could become primary

Beyond **Radkivka** to the north, Russian forces are also maintaining pressure on **Kurylivka**, southeast of **Kupyansk**. This settlement has been the site of repeated Ukrainian strikes in June **2026**, following documented Russian infiltration missions. The geography is significant: **Kurylivka** sits on approach routes toward **Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi**, the railway junction that forms a crucial logistics hub.

If Russian forces succeeded in advancing simultaneously from the north toward **Radkivka** and from the southeast toward **Kurylivka**, they would be in a position to dangerously compress the Ukrainian logistics corridor. This is precisely the scenario the Ukrainian command is trying to prevent by maintaining active defensive strikes along both axes.

### The role of Novovasylivka in the Russian maneuver

Russian milbloggers reported on **June 20** Russian advances at **Novovasylivka** (northeast of Kupyansk), in addition to **Radkivka**. These advances to the northeast create dual pressure on the Ukrainian flank — forcing defenders to spread their limited resources across multiple simultaneous contact points.

The **ISW** notes that Russian forces conducted **limited infiltrations** in the northern and northeastern parts of **Kupyansk**, but that these infiltrations do not constitute stabilized advances. The nuance matters: infiltrating a village does not mean controlling it durably. The difference between an infiltration and a capture depends on the ability to consolidate and hold under Ukrainian counterattacks.

*The information war around Kupyansk is just as intense as the military one. Russian milbloggers announce captures that the ISW does not confirm, while Ukraine downplays what it concedes. In that space of uncertainty, doubt always favors the stronger — and right now, north of Kupyansk, the stronger force on the offensive is Russia.*

## Trehubov and the doctrine of calculated transparency

### A spokesman facing the obligation to tell the truth

Colonel **Viktor Trehubov** has become one of the most reliable voices from the Ukrainian command regarding the **Kupyansk** direction. His communication stands out for its relative transparency about difficulties — acknowledging that **Kupyansk** is the second most active sector is no small concession in a war where information is itself a weapon.

In **May 2026**, **Trehubov** had already publicly declared that the situation on the **Oskil** bridgehead was "difficult" but that Ukrainian forces were holding. This continuity in messaging — difficult but tenable — is itself strategic information: it signals to Western partners that the line is not at risk of immediate collapse, without denying the reality of the difficulties.

### The sector ranking: a piece of strategic information

Ranking **Kupyansk** as the second most active sector, behind **Lyman**, is a deliberate communications decision. It draws attention to a sector that receives less media coverage than others — **Kostyantynivka**, **Pokrovsk** — while signaling that support needs are real.

Among the **241 engagements** on **June 27**, the **Lyman** direction was involved in **16 Russian assaults**, and the **Sumy/Slobozhanshchyna** direction in **15 attacks**. **Kupyansk**, with **3 attacks** specifically that day, might appear less intense — but quiet days will alternate with days of massive assaults. Pressure is not constant; it is cyclical.

*I admire the precision with which Trehubov weighs his words. In another war, with another state, this communication would be propaganda. Here, it is military pedagogy: explaining to the world why this unknown village deserves concern. It is a different form of courage — but courage nonetheless.*

## The human cost of pressure on the bridgehead

### Losses on both sides in anonymity

No precise casualty figures are available for the **Kupyansk** direction in June **2026** — Ukrainian data is classified and Russian figures are notoriously inaccurate by common knowledge. But observed patterns allow for an estimate: in a zone where Russian forces conduct daily infiltrations and suffer drone strikes in return, casualties are continuous on both sides.

What makes the war at **Kupyansk** distinctive is that urban and peri-urban combat generates disproportionate losses for the attacker. The Russians send reconnaissance groups that are eliminated by FPV drones before even reaching their objectives. This high sacrifice rate is consistent with current Russian doctrine: using poorly trained conscripts as expendable scouts.

### Civilians held hostage by the front

Thousands of civilians still reside in settlements near the front in the **Kupyansk** region. In **January 2025**, the head of the **Kupyansk** district military administration, **Andriy Kanashevych**, reported that approximately **1,660 residents** of **Kurylivka**, **Kindrashivka**, and neighboring communities remained on the left bank of the **Oskil**. Evacuation operations continue but run up against Russian drones and artillery striking evacuation routes.

Every **FAB-500** strike on a logistics bridge is not only an attack on Ukrainian military capacity — it also undermines the ability of civilians to flee combat zones. This dual tactical and humanitarian dimension is deliberate within Russian strategy: making life unbearable to force Ukrainian civilians to accept their fate.

*We never truly measure the courage it takes to remain in a city under bombs when you are not a soldier. These civilians who refuse to leave — sometimes because they have nowhere to go, sometimes because they refuse to abandon their home — are also actors in this war. Their presence forces both armies to account for the human stakes. Or should force them to.*

## Russian pressure across Kharkiv: a regional context

### Governor Syniehubov and the regional reality

The Russian offensive in the **Kupyansk** direction is part of broader pressure across the entire **Kharkiv** oblast. Regional governor **Oleh Syniehubov** documented in the weeks preceding **June 22** Russian strikes against residential areas — strikes that killed or wounded several people with no apparent military rationale.

Russian forces had not advanced beyond the northern outskirts of **Kozacha Lopan** since late **April 2026**, according to the **ISW** — a sign that Ukrainian defenses in northern **Kharkiv** are holding. But the pressure is constant, and every successful strike in this area sends a signal to the civilian population: you are not safe, even far from the direct front lines.

### Kozacha Lopan and the diversionary strategy

A source analyzing the Russian **North Forces Group** reported to the **ISW** that Russian forces regularly send small numbers of soldiers to attack **Kozacha Lopan** in order to "create the impression of constant combat" in the area — a tactical diversion designed to pin Ukrainian reserves that could otherwise be repositioned toward more critical zones.

This diversionary tactic is sophisticated in design: it requires no real advance, only sufficient activity to prevent the Ukrainian command from reassigning the units defending that sector. In a war where human reserves are precious on both sides, this economy of threat is a form of asymmetric warfare accessible even to a numerically superior army.

*Russia plays on multiple boards simultaneously: it attacks for real at Kupyansk, simulates a threat at Kozacha Lopan, and bombs civilians everywhere. It is a strategy of attention and resource dispersal that works because Ukraine must respond on all fronts at once. That is precisely where Western support is truly indispensable — not as a symbol, but as concrete capability.*

## Western partners facing the reality of Kupyansk

### Material support that must adapt to ground-level needs

The **Kupyansk** direction illustrates a major challenge for **Ukraine**'s partners: delivering not only spectacular weapons systems like **F-16s** or long-range missiles, but also the munitions, drones, and spare parts needed to wage a daily war of attrition. Russian **FAB-500s** demand specific countermeasures — counter-drone systems, early-detection radar, and enough **NASAMS** or **Patriot** systems to cover rear areas.

Both the **Biden** administration and the **Trump** administration have provided significant weapons deliveries to **Ukraine**, but the flow is never fast enough for the needs of the **Kupyansk** front. Every week of delay in delivering counter-drone systems translates concretely into Ukrainian drone operators left vulnerable to Russian retaliatory strikes.

### NATO and the question of tactical red lines

The **Kupyansk** zone also raises the question of use-of-force authorizations for Western weapons. **ATACMS** missiles have been cleared to strike targets inside **Russia**, but employment conditions remain complex. The ability to strike Russian airfields from which planes take off to drop **FAB-500s** could potentially be a game-changer for the defense of **Kupyansk** — but it requires the kind of political coordination that the **Trump** administration approves with its characteristic slowness on these matters.

For now, Ukrainian defenders at **Kupyansk** must rely on their own resources and existing deliveries. That is not insufficient to hold — but it is potentially insufficient to retake **Radkivka** and stabilize the **Oskil** bridgehead.

*Trump is a necessary evil for Ukraine — I stand by that. But "necessary" does not mean "sufficient." Washington's tolerance for Ukrainian strikes on Russian territory has changed something fundamental in the balance. What is missing now is delivery speed. The West's bureaucratic sluggishness is killing Ukrainian soldiers. That is a truth no one wants to state plainly.*

## The ISW as compass: what the assessments tell us

### A cautious confirmation of the Russian advance

The **Institute for the Study of War** confirms in its assessment of **June 22, 2026** that Russian forces had **recently advanced** in northern **Kupyansk**, based on a declaration from a source linked to the Russian **West Forces Group** indicating the capture of **Radkivka**. The ISW takes care to note that this declaration comes from a single source — a mark of the epistemological caution that distinguishes serious analysis from propaganda.

That caution is all the more important given that Russian milbloggers have a long tradition of exaggerating advances to sustain domestic morale. The statement on **Radkivka** is consistent with available geolocated imagery and with the infiltration pattern documented over months — which is why the **ISW** takes it seriously without elevating it to absolute certainty.

### Mapping as an instrument of understanding

The real-time cartographic work carried out by organizations like the **ISW** or **Deep State Map** is indispensable for tracking the evolution of a war where front lines shift by a few hundred meters per week. For **Radkivka**, geolocating combat footage published on **June 20 and 22** confirmed that Russian forces were operating inside the village — information that neither the Ukrainian nor the Russian command had communicated directly.

This transparency forced by geolocated imagery transforms the war into a near-real-time documented spectacle, unprecedented in military history. For supporters of **Ukraine**, it is an accountability tool: when a village falls, everyone sees it. There is no longer any space for denial.

*The war in Ukraine is the first major conflict of the era of open geolocation. Every image posted on Telegram can be pinned to a map within hours. This transparency is an advantage for truth — and a problem for those who lie, on both sides. The ISW makes use of it in a way that should be standard practice in war journalism.*

## Radkivka after the capture: what comes next?

### Consolidate or push toward Kupyansk?

Once **Radkivka** is taken, Russian forces theoretically have two options: consolidate their position in the village and use it as a base for further infiltration operations toward the center of **Kupyansk**, or attempt an immediate push south to cut Ukrainian lines. The first option is more likely in the short term — Russian forces need to stabilize the village before using it as a foothold.

Historically in this conflict, captures of small villages like **Radkivka** are rarely followed by spectacular advances within 48 hours. Ukrainian counterattacks are systematic and well documented. The question is whether **Ukraine** has the human reserves and materiel needed to launch an effective counterattack on **Radkivka** without weakening other front sectors.

### The Oskil bridgehead: tenable or not?

The fundamental question remains the long-term viability of the **Ukrainian bridgehead** east of the **Oskil**. If Russian forces manage to compress the corridor enough to make rotations and resupply impossible, the Ukrainian units holding that bridgehead will be forced to withdraw to the right bank. That scenario is not imminent, but it is no longer purely theoretical.

In **May 2026**, Colonel **Trehubov** declared that the bridgehead was holding despite difficult operational conditions. A month later, the Russian capture of **Radkivka** shows that those difficulties have only increased. Ukrainian resistance has withstood far more intense Russian offensives — but every centimeter lost at **Radkivka** brings the front closer to the banks of the **Oskil**.

*I reject easy alarmism, but I also reject comfortable denial. Radkivka is not the fall of Kupyansk — but it is one more step in the direction of the bad scenario. What Ukraine does in the coming weeks, with the weapons it has or will receive, will determine whether this step remains isolated or whether more follow.*

## FAB-500 guided munitions: the weapon reshaping tactical balances

### The glide bomb as a Russian force multiplier

The **FAB-500** glide bomb — a Soviet-era **500 kg** aerial bomb converted into a guided munition by adding a wing and navigation kit — has become one of the most feared weapons by Ukrainian defenders on the **Kharkiv** front. Dropped by an **Su-34** from a safe altitude and standoff distance beyond the range of Ukrainian **MANPADS**, it can destroy light fortifications and defensive positions with improving accuracy. Its unit cost is low compared to cruise missiles — and **Russia** now produces them by the hundreds each month.

On the **Kupyansk** axis, **FAB-500s** have played a critical role in weakening Ukrainian defensive positions before ground assaults. Reinforced buildings used as firing positions, buried logistics nodes, observation posts — anything that resists small arms and drones can be pulverized by a **FAB-500**. This asymmetry between Russian air strike power and Ukrainian ground defensive capabilities is one of the most persistent challenges of the war in **2026**.

### The Ukrainian response — anti-drone and air defense warfare

Ukraine's response to the **FAB-500** threat is twofold. On one hand, improving short- and medium-range air defense systems to intercept **Su-34s** before they reach their release points — systems like **NASAMS** and **IRIS-T**, though never in sufficient numbers. On the other, degrading Russian airfields themselves — striking runways, fuel depots, and hangars housing **Su-34s** hundreds of kilometers inside Russian territory. This second response — deep strikes on Russian airfields — represents the most promising strategy but also the one most dependent on the long-range weapons allies are willing to deliver.

On the **Kupyansk** axis specifically, Ukrainian defenses have been reinforced with **electronic jamming** systems targeting data links on Russian observation drones — reducing their precision and their ability to guide **FAB-500** strikes. This invisible electronic warfare, waged in parallel with ground combat, is a rarely covered but strategically crucial aspect of the battle for **Kupyansk**.

*FAB-500s. Not a glamorous acronym. Not cutting-edge technology. It is a 500 kg Soviet bomb fitted with some fins. And it threatens to destroy defensive lines that Ukrainian soldiers spent months building. That is the brutality of this war: low-cost ingenuity against high-cost courage.*

## Conclusion: Kupyansk holds, but for how long?

### A resistance whose cost must be acknowledged

Ukrainian resistance in the **Kupyansk** direction is real, documented, and worthy of deep admiration. Ukrainian forces have held this line against a numerically superior army equipped with **FAB-500 glide bombs**, drones, and an attrition logic the Kremlin is willing to sustain for years. Holding **Kupyansk** in June **2026**, despite the loss of **Radkivka**, is itself a tactical victory within the frame of a war of attrition.

But that victory will only last if it is sustained by a continuous flow of munitions, counter-drone defense systems, and replacement personnel for units exhausted by months of intense combat. Western support is not a luxury for **Kupyansk** — it is the precondition for the survival of the **Oskil** bridgehead.

### The future of a city that refuses to fall twice

Liberated in **September 2022** during the great Ukrainian counteroffensive, **Kupyansk** carries the memory of what it lived through under Russian occupation. Its residents — those who have not fled — and its defenders know what a second fall would mean. That knowledge is, paradoxically, a military resource: it feeds a resistance that no **ISW** report can quantify.

**Radkivka** has fallen. **Kupyansk** holds. And between those two realities lies the daily lives of men and women who, every morning, choose to keep defending what they consider their home. This column belongs to them.

*Kupyansk holds. Radkivka has fallen. And somewhere between those two realities stands Ukraine — a country that refuses to disappear, paying the price of its resistance in lives and ruins, and fighting on. I have no words adequate to the honor that deserves. So I write. Again and again. So that these names — Kupyansk, Radkivka, Oskil — are not forgotten.*

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

## Sources

### Primary sources

- [ISW — Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 22, 2026 — June 23, 2026](https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-22-2026/)

- [RBC Ukraine — Russia pushes to expand control east of Ukraine's Sumy region — June 26, 2026](https://newsukraine.rbc.ua/news/russia-pushes-to-expand-control-east-of-ukraine-1782477252.html)

- [Ukrainska Pravda — Battlefield sees 241 clashes over past day – Ukraine's General Staff — June 28, 2026](https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2026/06/28/8041443/)

### Secondary sources

- [ISW — Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 20, 2026 — June 20, 2026](https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-20-2026/)

- [Ukrinform — Russia's plan in Kupiansk fails, but fighting on left bank of Oskil River continues — Trehubov — May 12, 2026](https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-ato/4122585-russias-plan-in-kupiansk-fails-but-fighting-on-left-bank-of-oskil-river-continues-trehubov.html)

- [Kyiv Independent — With a web of drones and infiltrating infantry, Russian troops overrun Kupiansk — October 28, 2025](https://kyivindependent.com/russian-troops-back-in-central-kupiansk-kharkiv-oblasts-once-liberated-city/)

- [ISW — Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 23, 2026 — April 23, 2026](https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-23-2026/)

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Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/chronique-kupyansk-sous-pression-radkivka-tombe-le-bridgehead-ukrainien-resiste