# OPINION: Zelensky reaches out, Putin spits: the diplomacy of contempt

> Volodymyr Zelensky has said he wants peace. He has said it hundreds of times, since the start of the large-scale war in February 2022. He proposed a ten-point formula, grounded in international law, including the withdrawal of Russian troops, the release of prisoners, and genuine security guarantees. He participated in peace conferences, accepted mediations, met with intermedia

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Note
- Published: 2026-06-28
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/billet-zelensky-tend-la-main-poutine-crache-la-diplomatie-du-mepris

## Introduction: Two men, two visions of what "peace" means

### A Ukrainian offer that Moscow rejects before even reading it

**Volodymyr Zelensky** has said he wants peace. He has said it hundreds of times, since the start of the large-scale war in **February 2022**. He proposed a ten-point formula, grounded in **international law**, including the withdrawal of Russian troops, the release of prisoners, and genuine security guarantees. He participated in peace conferences, accepted mediations, met with intermediaries. He reached out his hand.

And **Vladimir Putin** spat. Not metaphorically — concretely, in his actions. In **June 2026**, his declarations about the **Istanbul 2022** agreements as a basis for "negotiation" — analyzed by **ISW** and **Meduza** — represent no opening whatsoever. They repeat the same maximalist demands of **2022**: neutralization of **Ukraine**, forced disarmament, recognition of illegal territorial conquests. This is not an outstretched hand. It is a door slammed shut with condescension.

### The diplomacy of contempt: a calculated tactic

I call it "the diplomacy of contempt." **Russia** regularly repeats that it is "ready to negotiate," that the doors are open, that **Ukraine** only needs to come. But the conditions imposed are such that they make negotiation impossible for any sovereign and self-respecting party. It is a technique: appear open while ensuring the other party cannot accept your terms.

The result is twofold. Domestically, **Putin** can present himself as the misunderstood peacemaker that **Ukraine** and the **West** refuse to hear. Externally, especially toward non-aligned countries he seeks to court, he maintains a facade of diplomatic goodwill. It is a posture built for a specific audience, not for genuine negotiation. Analyzing it as such is the first step toward not falling for it.

*Putin's diplomacy of contempt frustrates me deeply — not because it works on me, but because it works on part of Western public opinion. Every time Putin says "I want peace," there are columnists, politicians, intellectuals who nod and say "you see, he is reaching out." No. He is calculating. He is testing. He is buying time. That is not the same thing.*

## What Zelensky actually proposed

### The Ukrainian peace formula: ten points of law

The peace formula presented by **Zelensky** includes: **radiological and nuclear safety** (targeting the **Zaporizhzhia** plant), **food security**, **energy security**, **the release of all prisoners and deportees**, **the restoration of Ukraine's territorial integrity** within its **1991** borders, **the withdrawal of Russian forces**, **the cessation of hostilities**, **justice** through an international tribunal, **de-escalation measures**, and a **confirmation of the war's end**.

These ten points are grounded in recognized principles of international law. They do not demand the humiliation of **Russia**. They demand respect for the law. That **Russia** return to its internationally recognized borders, that prisoners be freed, that crimes be judged. This is not Ukrainian maximalism. It is basic international law.

### Peace conferences: Zelensky reaching out

**Ukraine** has organized and participated in several peace conferences since **2022**. These initiatives aimed to build international consensus around the fundamental principles of a just peace. **Russia** was invited — and refused to participate. It prefers direct bilateral "negotiation," on its own terms, with no regard for international law and no witnesses.

This Russian refusal of multilateral forums is revealing. **Moscow** knows that in an international forum respectful of law, its positions are indefensible. It cannot argue the annexation of territory by force before the **UN**. It cannot justify the detention conditions of Ukrainian prisoners before the **International Criminal Court**. So it avoids those forums and prefers "negotiations" where it can impose its terms unilaterally.

*Zelensky running from conference to conference, Putin refusing to attend — and some still have the audacity to ask "but who really wants peace?" It is dizzying. The one who reaches out is accused of rigidity, and the one who slams the door is presented as the "pragmatist." The inverted logic of Russian propaganda still works far too well in the West.*

## The June 26 prisoner exchange: the only transaction that works

### 160 returned while diplomacy remains deadlocked

While the grand peace negotiations are at a complete standstill, one humanitarian channel is functioning. On **June 26, 2026**, **160 Ukrainian soldiers and civilians** returned home as part of the **76th exchange**, according to the **Kyiv Independent**. Mediation was provided by the **United Arab Emirates**. **Zelensky** announced that **1,596 Ukrainians** have returned since the start of **2026** and more than **9,500** since **2022**, according to **Interfax-Ukraine**.

These exchanges continue because they serve minimal interests on both sides. Not because **Putin** had a humanitarian revelation. Not because **Russia** respects international prisoner law. But because it also recovers its own soldiers, maintains a semblance of international respectability on specific humanitarian questions, and keeps Ukrainian prisoners in stock as bargaining chips for future cycles.

### Paradox: transactional where it is strategically neutral

There is a fascinating paradox in the fact that **Russia** and **Ukraine** can be transactional on prisoners, yet completely deadlocked on political questions. This paradox illustrates a reality of conflict psychology: states at war can cooperate on issues whose strategic stakes are limited or equivalent for both parties, while being unable to agree on questions that touch their vital interests.

This is not an opening toward peace. It is a feature of prolonged warfare. Understanding it as such allows it to be usefully exploited — accelerating exchanges, expanding the categories of eligible prisoners, improving detention conditions — without being misled about what it means for the political prospects of the conflict.

*Humanitarian exchanges are the only transaction that works between Kyiv and Moscow. That is very little and enormous at the same time. Very little because it settles nothing fundamental. Enormous because these are real human lives returning home. I refuse to underestimate that concrete reality in the name of analytical maximalism. But I also refuse to make it more than it is.*

## Russian proposals: a catalogue of non-negotiables

### Istanbul 2022: demanding the moon and calling it peace

The **Istanbul** agreements of **2022**, in their Russian version, contained demands that amounted to unilateral disarmament of **Ukraine** and recognition of Russian territorial conquests. **Putin** presents the return to those terms as an "opening" — it is in reality a reaffirmation of his original war objectives, as confirmed by **ISW** in its report of **June 23, 2026**. These terms have not changed one iota. Only the label has changed.

This rhetorical recycling is effective because it exploits the fatigue of Western public opinion. After more than four years of war, many are ready to believe that any "diplomatic" formulation represents progress. The reality is that Russian demands are as maximalist today as they were in **2022**. Fatigue must not turn into amnesia.

### Russian "security guarantees": a bad joke

**Putin** speaks of "mutual security guarantees" in his proposals. These would be guarantees that **Ukraine** would not threaten **Russia** — as if **Ukraine** posed a threat to **Russia**. This inversion of reality is so blatant it would almost be comic, if it did not carry such dramatic consequences. It is **Russia** that invaded **Ukraine**. Twice in eight years. The threat in this conflict runs in one very clear direction.

Demanding "security guarantees" from **Ukraine** is demanding that the victim guarantee the safety of its aggressor. It is an inversion of law that must be named for what it is: a rhetorical construct in service of domination. The **West** that would accept this conceptual framework would be complicit in a logic of submission.

*"Security guarantees" that Ukraine would have to give Russia — really? Putin is asking his victim to protect him from himself. This is the height of diplomatic cynicism. And yet Western voices repeat this framing without blinking. Every time I hear it, I wonder whether some analysts actually read what they are commenting on.*

## The West facing the Russian rhetorical challenge

### How not to be trapped by Moscow's vocabulary

The first line of defense against Russian contempt diplomacy is lexical. We must refuse to use the **Kremlin**'s vocabulary without deconstructing it. "Negotiation" on the basis of **Istanbul** terms is not a negotiation — it is an ultimatum. "Ground realities" is not a neutral geographic observation — it is a claim of conquest by force. "Russian security interests" is not a legitimate concern — it is a dressing for imperialism.

Western governments, media, and intellectuals must hold themselves to this lexical discipline. Not out of ideology, but out of intellectual honesty. Calling things by their proper name is the foundation of analytical clarity. And analytical clarity is the foundation of a coherent foreign policy. When you call capitulation a "negotiation," you begin to believe it is a reasonable solution.

### Trump as a variable: the temptation of the quick deal

The **Trump** administration has shown a preference for fast and spectacular "deals" over complex and durable solutions. This inclination, in the Ukrainian context, creates a risk: the temptation to present as a "diplomatic success" an agreement that would accept the essential Russian terms in exchange for a temporary cessation of fighting.

**Trump** is, in my reading, a "necessary evil" for the **West**. He has rough negotiating skills that can in some contexts produce results. But his impatience for quick fixes and his limited grasp of Ukrainian geopolitical complexity make him vulnerable to this type of manipulation. **Europe** must ensure that any American diplomatic initiative remains anchored in non-negotiable principles.

*Trump potentially botching a Ukrainian "deal" to extract a domestic political benefit — that is the nightmare scenario many European capitals dread. It is not inevitable. But Europe needs to be strong and united enough that even Trump understands a bad Ukrainian deal would have consequences for him too. That is why European unity is absolutely vital right now.*

## What Zelensky deserves in return for his outstretched hand

### Unambiguous Western support

**Zelensky** has reached out for peace. He proposed a just formula, grounded in law. He participated in conferences, accepted mediations. And meanwhile, his country is being bombed. His energy infrastructure is targeted every winter. His civilians are dying. His soldiers fight with insufficient means. What he deserves in return for this posture is unambiguous Western support — not exhortations to "make concessions."

The concessions must not come from the victim. They must come from the aggressor. As long as **Putin** maintains his maximalist demands, there is nothing to negotiate. And the **West** that pressures **Zelensky** to "show flexibility" is complicit in the diplomacy of contempt — even involuntarily, even with the best intentions.

### Weapons, sanctions, and a clear vision

What **Ukraine** needs, in this context of total diplomatic deadlock, is three things: **weapons** to continue resisting militarily, **sanctions** to continue driving up the economic cost for **Russia**, and a **clear vision** from the **West** of what it considers a just and non-negotiable peace. These three elements are interdependent and mutually reinforcing.

The **21st sanctions package** is part of that equation. The oil embargo pushed by the **Baltic states** is another part. Continued military support — particularly in air defense and long-range strike systems — is a third. And clear diplomacy that refuses the vocabulary of disguised capitulation is the fourth. This is not a difficult program to understand. It requires will.

*Zelensky is not asking for the moon. He is asking the West to help him not lose a just war. He is asking for weapons, sanctions, and clarity. That is not excessive. It is not heroic — it is the minimum that democracies claiming to be founded on law must do when that law is attacked this frontally.*

## Europe after Trump: a dependency to reduce urgently

### European security dependence on the United States: a structural problem

The opinion piece I am writing on Putin's contempt diplomacy cannot sidestep the **Trump** variable and its implications for **Europe**. The **Trump** administration has multiplied ambiguous signals about its commitment to European security. Defense Secretary **Hegseth** launched a six-month review of American military presence in **Europe**, with the implicit threat of reductions, according to **The Guardian** of **June 27, 2026**. This real threat compels **Europe** to accelerate its strategic autonomy.

But that autonomy is not built in a few months. It requires massive and sustained investment in defense capabilities, European arms industries capable of producing at the necessary scale, and operational coordination between national armies. **NATO**, under the leadership of **Mark Rutte**, is pushing allies to spend **5% of their GDP** on defense. That threshold, which seemed impossible just five years ago, is now presented as urgent ahead of the **Ankara** summit on **July 7–8, 2026**.

### Ukraine as a strategic investment for Europe

In this context of potential revision of American commitment, support for **Ukraine** takes on an even more strategic dimension for **Europe**. A victorious or at least undefeated **Ukraine** is a bulwark against Russian pressure on the eastern borders of the **EU**. It is also a demonstration that **Europe** can ensure its own security without depending entirely on the **United States**.

Aid to **Ukraine** is therefore not a costly act of altruism — it is a strategic investment in European security. Every euro spent helping **Ukraine** resist **Russia** is a euro that will not need to be spent defending **Poland**, the **Baltic states**, or **Finland** five years from now. This logic must be hammered home in European capitals that still hesitate to increase their support.

*Trump as a necessary evil for the West — I have used that phrase often. What the Hegseth review of American presence in Europe reveals is that European dependence on that "necessary evil" is itself a problem. Europe must build the capacity to act even if Americans are not there. Not against the United States — but without needing their permission at every decision.*

## The coalition supporting Ukraine: maintaining pressure until a just peace

### 76 nations: the coalition supporting Ukraine

More than **76 nations** support **Ukraine** in various forms — armaments, financial aid, sanctions against **Russia**, shelter for refugees. This coalition, built since **2022**, is the broadest coalition of support for a state under aggression since the end of the **Cold War**. It demonstrates that international solidarity in the face of Russian aggression is real, even if sometimes slow and hesitant.

Keeping this coalition united is one of the most important diplomatic challenges for **Kyiv**. Interests diverge, fatigue sets in, elections change governments. **Zelensky** spends part of his time rallying and reconsolidating this coalition — in **Brussels**, in **Washington**, in multilateral forums. It is constant, exhausting, indispensable work.

### The Global South: a diplomatic front that cannot be neglected

One of the weaknesses of the coalition supporting **Ukraine** is its largely Western character. Countries of the **Global South** — **India**, **Brazil**, **South Africa**, and many others — maintain official neutrality, refuse to sanction **Russia**, and abstain on **UN** votes. This relative neutrality benefits **Russia** by reducing global diplomatic pressure.

Ukrainian diplomacy is investing increasingly in these relationships with the **Global South**. Economic arguments — the Russian war disrupts global grain exports and threatens global food security — resonate differently from abstract geopolitical arguments. Broadening the coalition supporting **Ukraine** beyond the Western world is a long-term strategic priority that **Kyiv** cannot afford to neglect.

*The Global South maintaining its neutrality in the Ukrainian conflict — that is a reality the West must address without condescension. These countries have their own readings of the conflict, their own interests, their own historical grievances toward the West. Convincing them requires arguments that speak to their interests, not moral lectures. Zelensky has understood this. The West must understand it too.*

## Conclusion: The outstretched hand deserves a handshake, not a spit

### Naming the diplomacy of contempt for what it is

Putin's "**diplomacy of contempt**" is not diplomacy. It is a strategy of waiting, of induced fatigue, of progressive capitulation disguised as dialogue. It relies on the hope that the **West** will eventually tire, will want peace at any price, and will accept terms that **Kyiv** cannot sign without betraying its citizens.

The response to this strategy is to name it clearly, to refuse its vocabulary, and to support **Zelensky** in his posture as a negotiator grounded in law. Not because it is convenient. But because it is right. And because the peace that would emerge from a Ukrainian capitulation would be a catastrophe for the entire international order that democracies have built.

### True peace: grounded in law, not in force

A genuine peace in **Ukraine** is possible. It requires **Russia** to return to positions compatible with international law. That will not happen spontaneously. It will happen if the pressure — military, economic, diplomatic — becomes strong enough that **Putin**'s calculus changes. This is long, costly, uncomfortable work. But it is the only path to a peace that does not set up the next war.

**Zelensky** is reaching out. The right response from the **West** is to take his hand — not to ask him to lower his arms.

*Zelensky reaches out and the West must take that hand. Not because it is comfortable. Not because it costs nothing. But because the alternative — letting Putin win, or win enough to impose his terms — is incomparably more costly for Europe, for the world order, and for the generations that follow. That is the long-term calculation some leaders still refuse to make.*

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

## Sources

### Primary sources

- [ISW — Putin/Lavrov positions reaffirm 2022 war aims — June 23, 2026](https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-23-2026/)

- [Meduza — Putin says Russia ready to negotiate on the basis of Istanbul 2022 agreements — June 23, 2026](https://meduza.io/en/news/2026/06/23/putin-says-russia-ready-to-negotiate-with-ukraine-on-the-basis-of-the-istanbul-agreements-of-2022)

- [Kyiv Independent — 160 Ukrainian POWs released, Zelensky announces — June 26, 2026](https://kyivindependent.com/160-ukrainian-pows-released-from-russian-captivity-in-latest-exchange-zelensky-says/)

- [Interfax-Ukraine — 1,596 Ukrainians have returned since the start of 2026 — June 26, 2026](https://en.interfax.com.ua/news/general/1180132.html)

### Secondary sources

- [Pravda Ukraine — Putin: ready for talks based on Istanbul terms and ground realities — June 23, 2026](https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2026/06/23/8040766/)

- [RBC-Ukraine — Ukraine and Russia complete the 160-for-160 exchange — June 26, 2026](https://newsukraine.rbc.ua/news/ukraine-and-russia-complete-third-phase-of-1782478036.html)

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Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/billet-zelensky-tend-la-main-poutine-crache-la-diplomatie-du-mepris