# Zelensky Left Out of NATO's Plenary Summit in Ankara > Introduction: a separate place, once again - Author: Maxime Marquette - Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co) - Section: Note - Published: 2026-07-03 - Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/billet-zelensky-ecarte-du-sommet-plenier-de-lotan-a-ankara ## Key takeaways - NATO confirmed, via Secretary General Mark Rutte, that Zelensky will get a separate program with bilateral meetings instead of sitting in the plenary of the 32 leaders. - Some diplomats, cited by Euronews, say the choice aims to keep the summit manageable rather than marginalize Kyiv. - No high-level NATO-Ukraine Council meeting is currently scheduled on the Ankara agenda. - Hungary and other capitals have historically favored a more measured approach to Ukraine's integration, according to the article. - The author argues that symbolic consistency matters nearly as much as arms deliveries and urges a permanent inclusion protocol. ## Introduction: a separate place, once again ### A format repeated summit after summit NATO has confirmed that **Volodymyr Zelensky** will not take part in the plenary session bringing together the Alliance's **32 leaders** at the **Ankara** summit, set for **July 7 and 8, 2026**, according to **Caliber.az**. The Ukrainian president will get a separate program instead, punctuated by bilateral meetings, exactly reproducing the format already used at the **The Hague** summit in 2025. This decision, confirmed by Secretary General **Mark Rutte**, illustrates a continuity in the cautious handling of Ukraine's presence within the Alliance's collective bodies, a caution that, in my view, speaks volumes about internal tensions still present among some members. ### What this means concretely for **Kyiv** Concretely, **Zelensky** will not sit at the same table as the 32 heads of state and government during plenary discussions on the Alliance's strategic future. He will have to make do with limited access, negotiated case by case, to press Ukraine's demands regarding **arms deliveries** and **security** guarantees. This protocol detail is not trivial in a context where **Ukraine** desperately needs to stay at the center of allied attention, as other international crises, from the Iran file to Taiwan, compete for Washington's attention. ## The Hague precedent, an already contested format ### A repetition that raises questions about the Alliance's strategy In 2025, the **The Hague** summit had already used this same restricted format, drawing criticism from observers who saw it as an ambiguous signal sent to **Moscow**. Repeating this formula in **Ankara**, with no notable change, suggests the Alliance did not see fit to boost Ukrainian visibility despite the ongoing worsening of the conflict on the ground. Some diplomats cited by **Euronews** explain this choice as a desire to keep the summit format manageable, without necessarily intending to marginalize **Kyiv**, but the symbolic effect, in my view, remains hard to ignore. ### No high-level **NATO-Ukraine** Council meeting Notably, unlike some previous summits, no high-level meeting of the **NATO-Ukraine Council** is currently scheduled on Ankara's agenda. This body, created to allow consultations between **Kyiv** and its allies on equal footing, seems to have lost visibility over successive summits. This absence could reflect competing diplomatic priorities, notably managing tensions with **Russia** around possible peace negotiations, a file on which several Western capitals are, in my view, proceeding with excessive caution. ## The real stakes behind this restricted format ### The question of Ukrainian **membership** still unresolved This restricted format inevitably points back to the broader question of **Ukraine's** future **membership** in **NATO**, a file that remains blocked by the reluctance of several Western allies, wary of the risk of direct confrontation with **Vladimir Putin's Russia**. Until this underlying question is settled, formats for Ukrainian participation in summits will likely remain uncomfortable compromises, neither fully inclusive nor openly exclusionary. ### Ankara's packed agenda The summit will also have to address the military spending commitments of the Alliance's **32 members**, following criticism from U.S. Secretary of War **Pete Hegseth** at the Brussels ministerial. This heavy agenda partly explains, according to some diplomats, the desire to keep a tighter plenary format. But this technical explanation does not erase the discomfort felt in Kyiv over protocol treatment that seems to repeat summit after summit without any genuinely new strategic justification. ## Ukraine's response to this partial sidelining ### Kyiv chooses pragmatism over public confrontation Despite the implicit disappointment this format may cause, **Volodymyr Zelensky's** government has chosen not to turn it into a public point of friction with its Western allies. This diplomatic restraint reflects a consistent strategy since the start of the war: prioritizing concrete results on **arms deliveries** over protocol battles. This **pragmatic approach**, which I deeply respect, illustrates Zelensky's political courage, as he prefers swallowing diplomatic slights rather than risking weakening already fragile Western support on other fronts. ### Bilateral meetings, a partial but real compensation The separate program planned for **Zelensky** in **Ankara** is expected to include several bilateral meetings with key leaders, notably those of countries most committed to military support for Ukraine. These exchanges, though less visible in the media than plenary participation, often deliver concrete commitments more quickly. This may be Kyiv's real **calculation**: preferring the quiet effectiveness of **one-on-one meetings** over the admittedly more flattering symbolism of a seat at the plenary table of 32. ## The role of close allies in this hybrid format ### **Poland**, the Baltic states, and the **United Kingdom** in quiet support Several of the allies most committed to supporting **Ukraine**, notably **Poland**, the Baltic states, and the **United Kingdom**, have been pushing behind the scenes for a more visible Ukrainian presence at Alliance summits. Their influence, though real, remains insufficient to change the overall format collectively adopted by the **32 members**. This **dynamic** reveals a persistent rift between countries most geographically exposed to the Russian threat and those favoring a more pronounced diplomatic caution toward **Moscow**, notably out of fear of direct **escalation**. ### The weight of Hungarian caution and a few other capitals Conversely, certain capitals, including **Budapest**, have historically pushed for a more measured approach to Ukraine's integration into Alliance structures, citing risks of **escalation** with **Russia**. This internal divergence complicates any consensus on a more inclusive format for Kyiv's participation. The result of these **internal tensions** plays out, summit after summit, as cautious compromises that rarely fully satisfy either advocates of accelerated integration or proponents of maximum caution toward **Moscow**. ## What Moscow takes from this kind of diplomatic signal ### The **Kremlin** scrutinizes every protocol nuance It would be naive to think the **Kremlin** is not closely following these protocol subtleties. Every sign of Western caution toward integrating **Ukraine** into allied structures is interpreted in Moscow as confirmation that the door remains, deep down, still ajar for a possible negotiation that excludes Kyiv's NATO aspirations. This reading, even if partly rooted in **Russian propaganda**, rests on real factual elements: the restricted format applied to Zelensky across several consecutive summits objectively feeds this kind of narrative within the Russian diplomatic apparatus. ### Why symbolic consistency matters as much as arms deliveries I remain convinced that the Alliance's symbolic consistency toward **Ukraine** matters almost as much as concrete **arms deliveries**. A clear and consistent inclusion format would send a far stronger message of determination to **Vladimir Putin** than a succession of cautious protocol compromises. It is this **consistency**, more than any occasional speech, that will ultimately determine the long-term credibility of Western commitment to Ukraine's **defense**. ## The Ankara summit in the broader 2026 context ### A pivotal year for European **security** architecture This **Ankara** summit comes at a particularly loaded moment for **NATO**: American criticism over burden-sharing, tensions around the Iran file, and persistent uncertainty over the outcome of the conflict in **Ukraine**. The format reserved for Zelensky thus fits into a climate where every protocol decision carries amplified political weight. The **32 members** will also need to confirm their **trajectories** toward the **5% of GDP** defense spending target, a file likely to dominate media attention at the expense of more symbolic questions concerning Ukrainian participation. ### The risk of Ukraine becoming a secondary topic My main worry remains that the war in **Ukraine**, after more than three years, risks gradually slipping into secondary-file status on NATO's agenda, overshadowed by internal budget priorities or by other, more recent geopolitical crises, like those touching Iran or Taiwan. This **drift in attention**, if confirmed, would be a quiet victory for Moscow, which is banking precisely on the fading of Western interest in hopes of freezing the conflict to its advantage on the ground. ## What the Alliance should do to fix this imbalance ### Toward a more systematic inclusion format Rather than endlessly repeating this restricted format, **NATO** would benefit from establishing a clear, permanent protocol guaranteeing **Ukraine** a consistent symbolic place at every future summit, regardless of the shifting diplomatic sensitivities of certain members. Such a gesture, simple in protocol terms but symbolically powerful, would send a far stronger message of consistency to Moscow than any final communiqué carefully negotiated among 32 delegations. ### The urgency of lasting institutional clarity This institutional clarity would benefit **Kyiv**, which could plan its **diplomacy** with greater certainty, as much as the Alliance as a whole, which would gain credibility against authoritarian adversaries closely watching the slightest Western hesitation. It is this institutional consistency, more than the seating chart at any particular summit, that should guide the priorities of allied leaders gathered in Ankara. ## Conclusion: form must not eclipse substance ### What this format reveals about the state of **Western solidarity** This restricted format, however symbolically frustrating, must not overshadow the essential point: military and financial solidarity with Ukraine remains the true barometer of Western commitment, far more than the seating chart at a diplomatic summit. The real test of Ankara will lie in the concrete commitments announced on arms deliveries and **defense** production, not in the protocol format reserved for the Ukrainian president. ### A symbol that should push toward more consistency Still, this kind of protocol detail, repeated summit after summit, sends a signal that neither Kyiv nor its most fervent supporters should completely ignore. **Western solidarity** must show up as much in symbols as in actions, or risk feeding the most pessimistic interpretations in Moscow. **By Maxime Marquette, columnist** ## Columnist's transparency note ### Editorial stance I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies. I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events. ### Method and sources This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here. **Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies. **Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations. When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**. ### Nature of the analysis The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted. My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors. This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text. ## Sources ### Primary sources - [Caliber.az — NATO confirms restricted format for Zelenskyy at Ankara summit — June 17, 2026](https://caliber.az/en/post/nato-confirms-restricted-format-for-zelenskyy-at-ankara-summit) ### Secondary sources - [Euronews — Ukraine's President Zelenskyy invited to NATO summit in Ankara, Rutte confirms — May 22, 2026](https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2026/05/22/ukraines-president-zelenskyy-invited-to-nato-summit-in-ankara-rutte-confirms) - [News Front — Zelenskyy to take part in a separate meeting of NATO leaders, Rutte confirms — June 17, 2026](https://en.news-front.su/2026/06/17/zelenskyy-to-take-part-in-a-separate-meeting-of-nato-leaders-rutte/) - [Atlantic Council — NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte on the Ankara Summit Agenda — June 26, 2026](https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/event/nato-secretary-general-mark-rutte-on-the-ankara-summit-agenda/) - [BBC News — Hegseth renews Nato criticism and says US will review presence in Europe — June 18, 2026](https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c3vy5l62622o) - [Reuters — Hegseth blasts NATO members, announces review of US forces in Europe — June 18, 2026](https://www.reuters.com/world/hegseth-blasts-nato-members-announces-review-us-forces-europe-2026-06-18/) --- Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/billet-zelensky-ecarte-du-sommet-plenier-de-lotan-a-ankara