# OPINION: Zelensky absent from Gdańsk — the UPA, the heroes, and the Polish-Ukrainian wound

> The Ukraine Recovery Conference 2026 in Gdańsk on June 25–26 was meant to be one of the high points of international support for Ukraine. Billions of euros disbursed, defense contracts signed, industrial partnerships sealed. And yet, one absence dominated the event: that of Volodymyr Zelensky, president of the country the conference was held to benefit.

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Note
- Published: 2026-06-29
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/billet-zelensky-absent-de-gdansk-l-upa-les-heros-et-la-blessure-polono-ukrainien

## Key takeaways

- Zelensky skipped the June 25–26, 2026 Gdańsk conference, sending Prime Minister Yulia Svyrydenko, after naming a special forces unit after the "Heroes of the UPA."
- Polish President Karol Nawrocki stripped Zelensky of the Order of the White Eagle and cancelled his own participation.
- Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski called the decoration decision "inappropriate," while Jarosław Kaczyński demanded blocking Ukraine's EU accession talks.
- The author argues the UPA dispute is tied to Volhynia, which the Polish Parliament called a crime of genocidal character in 2023, and that Russia benefits from the friction.
- The author says Zelensky made a diplomatic mistake, Nawrocki's response was disproportionate, and a bilateral historical commission could help.

## Introduction: The empty chair that says too much

### A notable absentee in the conference room

The **Ukraine Recovery Conference 2026** in **Gdańsk** on **June 25–26** was meant to be one of the high points of international support for **Ukraine**. Billions of euros disbursed, defense contracts signed, industrial partnerships sealed. And yet, one absence dominated the event: that of **Volodymyr Zelensky**, president of the country the conference was held to benefit.

**Zelensky** did not come to **Gdańsk**. He sent Prime Minister **Yulia Svyrydenko** in his place. And the reason for his absence — a diplomatic crisis with **Poland**, the host country of the conference — illustrates one of the most painful and complex tensions within the camp that claims to support **Ukraine**: the Polish-Ukrainian relationship, freighted with history and fractured by a name, that of the **UPA**.

### The spark: a unit named after the "heroes of the UPA"

**Zelensky** named a Ukrainian special forces unit after the "Heroes of the **UPA**" — the **Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists** and the **Ukrainian Insurgent Army** (**UPA**), which fought for Ukrainian independence during and after **World War II**. For **Ukrainians**, the **UPA** is a symbol of national resistance. For **Poles**, it is associated with crimes against the Polish population in **Volhynia** and **Eastern Galicia** in **1943–1944** — a bloody page of history that **Warsaw** has not forgotten and cannot, politically, ignore.

In response, Polish President **Karol Nawrocki** decided to strip **Zelensky** of the **Order of the White Eagle**, Poland's highest distinction. And he canceled his own participation in the **Gdańsk** conference. This double symbolic boycott — the Ukrainian president and the Polish president both absent from a conference meant to celebrate their solidarity — is a damaging image at the very moment **Ukraine** most needs the unity of its supporters.

*Zelensky's absence from Gdańsk made more noise than his presence would have. That is the mark of a silent crisis between two nations that have every interest in staying close — but whose histories, memories, and political ambitions continue to create friction. This opinion piece is an attempt to understand its nature, without naivety and without catastrophism.*

*I understand Polish sensitivity about the UPA. I also understand Ukraine's need to honor its own resistance fighters. But timing and context matter in diplomacy. Naming a unit after the UPA in the middle of a war, when every friction with Poland weakens the coalition supporting Ukraine, is a political mistake — even if it is a sovereign right. A truth can be both true and ill-timed at the same time.*

## The memory war — a toxic inheritance

### Volhynia: an atrocity that never died

The events of **Volhynia** in **1943–1944** — qualified by the **Polish Parliament** as a crime of **genocidal character** in a **2023** resolution — remain one of the most open wounds in the Polish-Ukrainian relationship. Tens of thousands of Polish civilians were killed by **UPA** units in a context of intercommunal violence of exceptional brutality. This history is taboo, contested, instrumentalized on both sides — but it is real, and it weighs on every diplomatic interaction between **Warsaw** and **Kyiv**.

For Polish nationalists — including **Nawrocki**, elected on a nationalist right platform in **2025** — recognizing the **UPA** as "heroes" is politically unacceptable. It is a domestic red line that even a war context with **Russia** cannot erase. **Zelensky**'s decision to name a unit in honor of the **UPA** struck this red line with a force that Ukrainian diplomacy had visibly not anticipated.

### The reactions from both capitals

The reactions were revealing of the fault lines at play. Polish Foreign Minister **Radek Sikorski** — representing the more pro-European and pro-Ukrainian wing of the Polish coalition government — judged **Nawrocki**'s decision to strip the decoration "inappropriate." He thus distanced the government from the president's position, illustrating the internal Polish tensions over managing the relationship with **Ukraine**.

On the Polish far right, **Jarosław Kaczyński** (**PiS**) seized the opportunity to demand the blocking of **Ukraine**'s **EU** accession negotiations — a position that perfectly illustrates the toxicity of the political instrumentalization of this memorial crisis. Using the victims of **Volhynia** to block the accession of a country at war with **Russia** is a cynical political maneuver that deserves to be named clearly.

*Kaczyński demanding the blocking of Ukrainian EU accession negotiations because of the UPA — this is what it means to instrumentalize the memory of victims for current political ends. This does not honor the Polish dead of Volhynia. It uses them as a weapon in a power game that disgraces them.*

## The impact on the coalition supporting Ukraine

### A friction that weakens at the worst moment

The Polish-Ukrainian crisis comes at a particularly sensitive moment. **Poland** is one of the pillars of the policy of support for **Ukraine** within the **EU** and **NATO** — it dedicates more than **4%** of its **GDP** to defense, participates in the **E5** format, hosts thousands of Ukrainian refugees, and manages part of the weapons logistics flows into **Ukraine**. A deterioration of the bilateral relationship has direct implications for the coherence and effectiveness of this support.

**Russia** watches these tensions with satisfaction. **Moscow** has long sought to exploit the memorial and historical divisions among the peoples of **Central and Eastern Europe** — and particularly between **Poland** and **Ukraine**. This **UPA** crisis is precisely the kind of opportunity that Russian information services seek to amplify and deepen. Any friction between **Warsaw** and **Kyiv** is a gift to **Moscow**.

### Poles take to the streets — a worrying signal

According to analyses published by **Euromaidan Press**, the memorial quarrel over the **UPA** has spilled into Polish streets, with demonstrations and intercommunal tensions between Poles and Ukrainian nationals residing in **Poland** — whose number is estimated at more than one million since **2022**. These demonstrations are not representative of the majority of the Polish population, but they illustrate the destabilization potential that this crisis carries.

**Poland** has welcomed with remarkable generosity more than one million Ukrainian refugees since **2022**. This hospitality, which had a real economic and social cost, was broadly supported by the Polish population. A deterioration of the bilateral relationship risks affecting this solidarity — to the detriment of Ukrainians who have made **Poland** their new home.

*Poland has been hosting more than a million Ukrainians since 2022 with a generosity that commands respect. This hospitality must not be taken for granted. It rests on a political and human solidarity that can be fragile when instrumentalized memorial tensions arise. Zelensky should know this — and act accordingly.*

## Memory as a weapon: the danger of history wars in wartime

### Why memorial conflicts are particularly dangerous in 2026

In normal times — that is, in the absence of an ongoing existential war — memorial conflicts between neighboring nations can be managed with measured diplomatic patience: historians' commissions, joint declarations, and gradual reconciliation processes. In wartime, this temporal luxury does not exist. Every memorial crisis is immediately exploited by adversaries and domestic political rivals.

**Russia** has developed over decades an expertise in activating memorial conflicts in **Central and Eastern Europe**. Its information services maintain networks that amplify nationalist rhetoric, feed historical grievances, and seek to widen divisions between allies. The **UPA** crisis is exactly the kind of subject these networks seek to exploit.

### The shared responsibility to de-escalate

The responsibility for this crisis is not unilateral. **Zelensky** made a political choice that was predictably explosive in the bilateral context. But **Nawrocki**'s reaction — stripping a decoration from a head of state at war with **Russia**, boycotting a reconstruction conference, letting **Kaczyński** talk about blocking accession negotiations — is disproportionate and counterproductive. Both parties have the responsibility to find a path to de-escalation.

The most positive signal came from **Sikorski**, who maintained a pro-Ukrainian position and judged **Nawrocki**'s decision "inappropriate." This word, coming from a Polish foreign minister directed at a Polish president of the same period, illustrates internal Polish tensions — and hints at a possibility of crisis management if the right political will mobilizes.

*I think Zelensky — who is an exceptionally skilled communicator — should have anticipated the Polish reaction. In a war for the survival of his country, every ally counts. Falling out with Poland over a military unit name is paying a disproportionate diplomatic price for a domestic symbolic gain. This is not the first mistake of this type — let us hope it is the last.*

## Svyrydenko in Zelensky's place: a delegation that limits the damage

### A competent Prime Minister in a difficult role

**Yulia Svyrydenko**, Prime Minister of **Ukraine**, led the Ukrainian delegation in **Gdańsk** in **Zelensky**'s absence. She signed the agreements, participated in the discussions, and represented her country competently. Her presence avoided the worst scenario — a minimal Ukrainian delegation that would have signaled Ukrainian disengagement from the event.

But there is no point in being deluded: **Zelensky**'s absence had a political significance that **Svyrydenko**'s presence could not erase. The **Gdańsk** conference was precisely the type of event where the personal presence of a head of state — and one as symbolically powerful as **Zelensky** — would have had a considerable diplomatic and media impact. His absence left a void in the political narrative of the conference.

### The Ukrainian paradox: absent from Gdańsk, yet ever-present on the information front

In his public communications around **June 25–26**, **Zelensky** maintained an intense media presence — announcing the **SBU**'s **40-day campaign**, confirming strikes on Russian refineries, commenting on the progress of military operations. Politically, his message was clear: war takes priority over conference diplomacy.

This is an understandable positioning — and one consistent with his image as a fully committed wartime leader. But it comes at a cost: it leaves some partners with the feeling that **Ukraine** expects their help without always prioritizing the bilateral relationships that make it possible. Diplomacy, even in wartime, cannot be entirely subordinated to military operations.

*Zelensky is a remarkable wartime leader. He is also, sometimes, an imperfect diplomat. These two realities coexist. And in the current phase of the war, the diplomatic dimension — maintaining the cohesion of the support coalition — is at least as important as military decisions. The two empty chairs in Gdańsk — his and Nawrocki's — are a warning.*

## Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation: possible, necessary, urgent

### The historical framework exists — it must be reactivated

The Polish-Ukrainian relationship has known moments of sincere reconciliation before this crisis. Joint declarations on **Volhynia**, shared memorial ceremonies, historians' commissions — real efforts have been made. They can be reactivated. But they require political will on both sides — and particularly from the leaders who have the power to de-escalate.

**Poland** and **Ukraine** are bound by common geography, common threats, a common future in the **European Union**, and potentially in **NATO**. These structural ties are stronger than memorial disputes. But they do not activate themselves — they require leaders who choose to value them rather than sacrifice them on the altar of short-term domestic political gains.

### What Russia hopes for and what the West must avoid

The scenario the **West** fears — and **Moscow** hopes for — is a lasting deterioration of the Polish-Ukrainian relationship that would weaken Polish support for **Ukraine**, divide the Western coalition, and send **Putin** a signal of opportunity. This scenario is not inevitable. But it requires that the leaders concerned — **Zelensky**, **Nawrocki**, **Tusk**, **Sikorski** — demonstrate the same strategic lucidity they apply to the military war.

Managing alliance relationships is a skill as crucial as managing battles. The **Gdańsk** conference was a reminder that **Ukraine** and **Poland** need each other — and that this mutual dependency imposes responsibilities on both sides. The memorial wound is real. It must not become a diplomatic ulcer.

*I sincerely hope this crisis will be resolved. Because Poland and Ukraine together are a considerable force in European security. And separated, weakened by memorial quarrels, they are two vulnerabilities that Moscow will know how to exploit. The history of Volhynia deserves serious treatment — in a historical and diplomatic framework, not under the pressure of missiles.*

## The substance of the dispute: historical memory and domestic politics

### The UPA question and the memory of Volhynia

At the heart of the Polish-Ukrainian tension lies a historical wound that neither time nor war has healed: the **Volhynia atrocities** of 1943–1945, perpetrated by the **Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists** (OUN) and the **Ukrainian Insurgent Army** (UPA) against Polish populations in western Ukraine. These events, which cost the lives of tens of thousands of Poles according to historians, remain a subject of extreme sensitivity in Poland. Warsaw has for years demanded full and complete acknowledgment of these acts by Ukraine — a demand that Kyiv has always treated with caution to avoid internal nationalist tensions.

This historical question has a direct **contemporary political dimension**: in Poland, newly elected President **Karol Nawrocki** used the UPA dispute as justification for hostile diplomatic gestures toward Ukraine, going as far as demanding that Ukraine's EU accession be blocked. Foreign Minister Sikorski described this position as **inappropriate**. But nationalist pressure in Poland on this subject is real, and any Ukrainian leader must navigate these political waters carefully.

### Why the alliance remains indispensable despite the friction

Despite these tensions, the **strategic Polish-Ukrainian relationship** remains one of the most important on the continent. Poland is the main transit corridor for Western military aid to Ukraine. It hosts the largest number of Ukrainian refugees in Europe. It has delivered billions of euros in military equipment to Kyiv. Its political support in European institutions and at NATO is essential to maintaining pressure on Russia. Neither nation can afford a lasting deterioration of this relationship.

The way out runs through **separating memorial policy from strategic cooperation**. Warsaw can demand serious historical discussions without conditioning its military support for Ukraine on symbolic concessions. Kyiv can engage in these historical discussions without perceiving them as an attack on its national identity. This narrow path is tight but navigable. Both countries have traveled it before. They will need to find it again — because their common enemies have not changed.

*Using the memory of Volhynia's victims to block Ukrainian EU accession — this is a political indecency. These victims deserve dignified commemoration, not to be used as bargaining chips in electoral calculations. Poland has produced heroes of resistance and solidarity. It has also, at times, produced this other temptation: using history as a weapon. That temptation must be refused.*

## Memorial politics as a tool of domestic politics in Poland

### Nawrocki and the strategy of historical grievances

The use by newly elected Polish President **Karol Nawrocki** of the **UPA and Volhynia question** as a domestic political tool reflects a well-documented political dynamic: populist leaders find in historical grievances a way to **activate their nationalist electoral base** without having to propose concrete policies. Nawrocki pushed this play to the point of demanding that **Ukraine's EU accession be blocked** — a position that Foreign Minister Sikorski described as inappropriate. This division within the Polish conservative camp is revealing of internal tensions over Ukrainian policy.

Polish memorial politics is not solely political manipulation. The historical wounds of Volhynia are real and deep. Polish families whose ancestors were killed in 1943–1945 have the right to demand **worthy recognition and commemoration**. The problem arises when these legitimate claims are instrumentalized in an active war context to **condition military support** on symbolic concessions. It is this instrumentalizing drift that Ukraine's partners are watching with concern.

### How to move beyond the dispute without erasing it

The lasting path runs through **a bilateral Polish-Ukrainian historical commission**, a body that can address these questions with the academic rigor and political sensitivity they deserve — separately from urgent military and diplomatic negotiations. This commission should have the mandate to work on documentation, commemoration, and recognition — without conditioning strategic cooperation on its results. This is a model that other pairs of nations have used successfully to manage their difficult historical legacies.

Ukraine and Poland both have an interest in a solid relationship that transcends domestic political crises in each country. **Zelensky** and the **Tusk** government share this long-term vision. The tensions around Gdańsk are real but surmountable. And history — if both countries make the right choices — will remember that they overcame their historical differences to build together a safer Europe. That is the stakes of this relationship. And it deserves not to be sacrificed to short-term political calculations.

## Conclusion: Gdańsk despite everything — what was achieved beyond the absences

### What was accomplished despite the crisis

Despite the two empty chairs — **Zelensky**'s and **Nawrocki**'s — the **Gdańsk** conference produced tangible results. **€3.2 billion** disbursed. **€343 million** in defense technology guarantees signed. **€10 billion** in total commitments announced. Industrial partnerships concluded. That is real, and it matters.

The conference did not fail. It was less symbolically powerful than it could have been. And this gap between what was possible and what was achieved — symbolically — is precisely the cost of the Polish-Ukrainian crisis. A real cost, but not irreparable. Not yet.

### The columnist's note: do not let the past destroy the future

This opinion piece ends with an appeal. An appeal to **Zelensky**: find a de-escalation gesture that respects Polish sensitivity without sacrificing Ukrainian memory. An appeal to **Nawrocki**: your country has every interest in **Ukraine**'s victory — do not sacrifice that interest for internal political gains. An appeal to both peoples: your relationship is too important, too structural, too tied to the common future of **Central Europe**, to be sacrificed on the altar of unresolved memorial quarrels.

**Ukraine** is fighting for its existence. **Poland** is supporting it with remarkable generosity. This solidarity is a precious asset. Take care of it.

*Crises between allies are normal in lasting alliances. What matters is how they are managed. Poland and Ukraine have too many strategic reasons to support each other to let historical and political disagreements compromise a relationship that protects both countries. Zelensky was not in Gdańsk. But Ukraine was there, represented by its money, its interests, and its needs. And Poland showed up. That is what counts.*

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

### Sources

This article draws on verified journalistic sources published between **June 23 and 26, 2026**. I have no diplomatic sources within the Polish or Ukrainian governments.

## Sources

### Primary sources

- [Euronews — No Zelenskyy in Gdansk: recovery forum tests Warsaw–Kyiv ties — 2026-06-25](https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2026/06/25/no-zelenskyy-in-gdansk-can-ukraines-recovery-forum-ease-warsawkyiv-tensions)

- [Ukrainska Pravda — Polish foreign minister calls decision to strip Zelenskyy of honour 'inappropriate' — 2026-06-26](https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2026/06/26/8041306/)

### Secondary sources

- [Euromaidan Press — Poland and Ukraine's memory war has spilled into the streets. Its consequences might be disastrous — 2026-06-23](https://euromaidanpress.com/2026/06/23/poland-ukraine-memory-war-upa/)

- [The Guardian — Volodymyr Zelenskyy to skip postwar conference amid tensions with Poland — 2026-06-23](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/jun/23/volodymyr-zelenskyy-skip-postwar-conference-tensions-with-poland)

- [Al Jazeera — Ukraine's recovery to be deliberated in Poland amid Kyiv-Warsaw spat — 2026-06-24](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/6/24/ukraines-recovery-to-be-deliberated-in-poland-amid-kyiv-warsaw-spat)

- [Euromaidan Press — Rebuilding Ukraine while it burns — what URC 2026 actually delivered — 2026-06-28](https://euromaidanpress.com/2026/06/28/rebuilding-ukraine-while-it-burns-calling-it-progress-what-ukraine-recovery-conference-2026-actually-delivered/)

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Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/billet-zelensky-absent-de-gdansk-l-upa-les-heros-et-la-blessure-polono-ukrainien