# OPINION: Is Trump abandoning us? The fear haunting NATO's eastern flank

> In the diplomatic corridors of Tallinn, Riga, Warsaw, and Vilnius, there is a question everyone asks in private and no one wants to put officially on the record: is Donald Trump going to actually defend the Baltic states if Russia attacks? The Guardian lifted the veil on June 27, 2026: several NATO leaders fear they can "no longer count on American help if Russia attacks." That

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Note
- Published: 2026-06-28
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/billet-trump-nous-lache-t-il-la-peur-qui-hante-le-flanc-est-de-l-otan

## Introduction: The question nobody wants to ask out loud

### The fear lurking beneath official communiqués

In the diplomatic corridors of **Tallinn**, **Riga**, **Warsaw**, and **Vilnius**, there is a question everyone asks in private and no one wants to put officially on the record: is **Donald Trump** going to actually defend the Baltic states if **Russia** attacks? **The Guardian** lifted the veil on **June 27, 2026**: several **NATO** leaders fear they can "no longer count on American help if **Russia** attacks." That sentence, published in a major reference publication, says it all.

The fear is not irrational. **Pete Hegseth**, the American Secretary of Defense, announced a **6-month review** of United States presence and contributions in **Europe**. **Trump** has repeatedly stated he would not defend allies who were not paying their "fair share." And even if the American administration officially maintains its commitment to **Article 5**, the deliberately cultivated ambiguity creates genuine uncertainty on the alliance's **eastern flank**.

### What Hegseth's review really means

A **"6-month review"** of American presence in **Europe** is not a withdrawal decision — it is a pressure tool. By announcing this review, **Hegseth** sends a message to the allies: if you do not spend more, we will reduce our presence. This is the same logic as **Trump**'s first term, but applied with greater institutional precision.

*I will be direct: the fear on NATO's eastern flank is not paranoia. It is a rational assessment of an ally whose behavior is unpredictable. And in the domain of security, an ally's unpredictability is as dangerous as a declared enemy's hostility.*

## The eastern flank: where the fear is most visceral

### The Baltics: a few hundred kilometers from disaster

**Estonia**, **Latvia**, and **Lithuania** share land borders with **Russia** or its exclave of **Kaliningrad**. Their combined area is smaller than **Poland**. Their combined population barely exceeds **6 million**. And they carry collective memories of **Soviet occupation** that make any naivety about the Russian threat impossible.

For these countries, **NATO** — and Article 5 in particular — is not a foreign policy abstraction. It is the existential guarantee of their independence. **Latvia** warned on **June 22, 2026** that **Russia** is preparing hybrid attacks on the eastern flank. **Russia** has been conducting strike exercises from **Kaliningrad** with **Su-24M** bombers and **Su-30SM2** fighters since **June 21, 2026**. These are not routine exercises — they are messages.

### Poland: the shield that is reinforcing itself

**Poland** has chosen a different response to the fear of American disengagement: it spends. With a defense budget approaching **4% of GDP**, an army undergoing massive rearmament, and an American military presence on its soil it actively cultivates, **Poland** is betting on deterrence through demonstration of force. It is a costly bet — but a coherent one.

Polish reasoning is straightforward: if the **United States** is willing to defend allies who invest seriously in their own defense, **Poland** must be unquestionably in that category. This is buying credibility with **Washington** through budgetary effort — a strategy never guaranteed under the **Trump** administration, but more convincing than doing nothing.

*Poland pays for its security with its taxes, its industry, and the conviction that nobody will truly defend it if it does not defend itself first. That is a lesson history taught it in the most brutal possible way. I do not criticize this logic — I admire it, even if it was born of pain.*

## The Russian hybrid threat on the eastern flank

### Beyond conventional war: the specter of provocation

**The Guardian** of **June 26, 2026** and **Fox News** of **June 22** reported warnings that **Russia** is preparing "provocations" in the **Baltic states** or **Poland**. These provocations are not necessarily direct military attacks — **Russia** knows that striking a **NATO** member directly would trigger Article 5. They take subtler forms: border incidents, destabilization operations, cyberattacks, information manipulation, tensions around Russian-speaking minorities.

This is what is known as **hybrid warfare** — a combination of military and non-military instruments designed to create pressure, instability, and uncertainty without crossing the thresholds that would trigger a collective military response. **Russia** practiced this in **Ukraine** as early as **2014**. It is practicing it now on **NATO**'s eastern border.

### Kaliningrad: the exclave as a permanent threat

Russia's **Kaliningrad** exclave, wedged between **Lithuania** and **Poland**, has long been a splinter in **NATO**'s flank. It houses Russian troops, **Iskander** missile systems capable of striking anywhere in **Central Europe**, and now low-altitude bombing exercises with **Su-24M** aircraft. These exercises, documented on **June 21, 2026**, are not routine training — they are rehearsals of attack scenarios.

The **Suwalki Gap** — the land corridor between **Poland** and **Lithuania** separating **Belarus** from **Kaliningrad** — remains the most-cited geographic vulnerability by **NATO** military planners. Severing that corridor would be a surgical strike against the territorial coherence of the alliance in **Eastern Europe**. And every exercise from **Kaliningrad** is a rehearsal of that possibility.

*Kaliningrad: a Russian exclave inside NATO, armed to the teeth, training to strike its neighbors. If a non-Russian country did the same thing at its borders, we would speak of preparation for aggression. Russia does it, and some in the West still speak of "provocations" and "gestures." The semantics of strategic naivety exasperate me.*

## Article 5 under Trump's pressure

### What Article 5 actually guarantees

**Article 5** of the North Atlantic Treaty stipulates that an attack on one member is considered an attack on all. But it leaves each member to determine the appropriate response. In theory, an attacked ally might receive only verbal declarations of support. In practice, Article 5 has always been interpreted as a collective military guarantee — but that interpretation depends on the political will of the most powerful members.

Under **Trump**, that political will is ambiguous. The American president has repeatedly stated he would not protect allies who were not paying their "fair share." This conditionality — unprecedented in alliance history — creates uncertainty about what **Article 5** is actually worth for a country like **Estonia** or **Latvia** if **Trump** judges their contribution insufficient.

### The European response: building autonomy to avoid dependence

Faced with this uncertainty, the rational response of the **eastern flank** countries is twofold: pay more to satisfy American demands, and simultaneously build sufficient military capabilities to defend themselves without American help in the short term. This is the logic behind **5%** — not only to please **Washington**, but to build genuine **strategic autonomy**.

**Poland** exemplifies this dual logic. It spends heavily, it buys American (which satisfies **Trump**), and it is building an army capable of credible defense on its own territory. It is costly. It is the only rational response to American ambiguity.

*There is something profoundly sad about the fact that NATO's most faithful allies — the Baltics, Poland — must plan their survival by factoring in the scenario where their principal ally does not come. That is the direct consequence of Trump's policy. And that consequence deserves to be named clearly, without euphemism.*

## What the Ankara summit can — and cannot — resolve

### Possible Ankara commitments on the eastern flank

The **Ankara** summit can produce concrete decisions to reassure the eastern flank. Announcement of reinforced troop rotations. Deployment of additional air defense systems in the Baltic states. Larger-scale military exercises. And above all, a reaffirmation of **Article 5** precise and binding enough to limit the space of ambiguity available to the American administration.

Some allies also hope **Ankara** will signal a permanent reinforcement — not rotations — of **NATO** troops on the eastern flank. The distinction is significant: a rotation means troops come and go, creating intermittent presence. A permanent presence means that in the event of a Russian attack, alliance soldiers are immediately on the spot — with all the implications that carries for deterrence.

### What Ankara cannot do: restore trust in Trump

The **Ankara** summit can make military and budgetary decisions. But it cannot change the nature of the **Trump** administration. Eastern flank allies' distrust of **Washington** will not be resolved by a communiqué — however well drafted. It will only be resolved by years of reliable, predictable American behavior.

In the meantime, **eastern flank** countries do what they can: they spend, they train, they build their defenses. And they hope that at the critical moment, the alliance will hold. That is a lot of hope for a region whose history is populated by moments when guarantees were violated.

*I want to say something that diplomats cannot say: Trump is not a reliable ally. He is predictably unpredictable — which is the worst case for an alliance built on mutual certainty. The Baltics know this. They spend anyway, they stay allied anyway. Because they have no choice. And that is a burden that should never have been imposed on them.*

## Alternatives to NATO: do they really exist?

### European defense as a complement, not a replacement

The question of "**European defense**" regularly resurfaces as an alternative or complement to **NATO**. The idea: European countries building collective defense capability sufficient to protect themselves without the United States. That is a valid objective — but it faces considerable obstacles: national sovereignties difficult to reconcile, capability disparities, differing strategic interests among countries.

What is realistic in the near term is a reinforcement of intra-European bilateral and multilateral cooperation that **complements** **NATO** without replacing it. **France** and **Germany**, **Poland** and the Nordic countries, the Baltic states among themselves: partnerships that create additional capabilities without depending entirely on **Washington**.

### France's nuclear response: a taboo becoming less taboo

In European strategic circles, a discussion once reserved for experts has broadened: could **French nuclear deterrence** play a role in the security of **Eastern Europe**? **France** possesses nuclear weapons in the name of its national sovereignty and its own deterrence. Under certain conditions, this capability could constitute a partial substitute **European nuclear umbrella** to that of the United States.

This discussion is far from being settled politically. But the fact that it is taking place illustrates the scale of the changes under way in European strategic thinking. American uncertainty is forcing **Europe** to think through alternatives it refused to contemplate just a few years ago.

*French nuclear deterrence at the service of Europe: that is an idea Paris has been advancing cautiously for years and that its partners received with skepticism. Today, with Trump playing ambiguity on Article 5, the idea seems less far-fetched. That is a sign that something has fundamentally changed in the old continent's strategic thinking.*

## The structural outlook: what the alliance must build

### Beyond Ankara's immediate decisions

The **Ankara** summit matters. But it is only one step in a deeper transformation of Western defense. The decisions made there — budget commitments, defense contracts, eastern flank reinforcements — must be part of a long-term vision, not crisis management. **NATO** needs a strategic direction for the next ten years, not just the next ten months.

That strategic direction means answering difficult questions: how to maintain alliance coherence in the face of American unpredictability? How to balance **Ukraine**'s immediate needs and long-term investments in the defense industrial base? How to build credible deterrence against multiple simultaneous threats? These questions will not find definitive answers at **Ankara** — but the summit can lay the foundations of a process that progressively addresses them.

### The role of each ally in the collective transformation

Transforming **NATO** into a 21st-century alliance is a collective responsibility requiring every member to carry its share. The large countries — **France**, **Germany**, **United Kingdom** — must take budgetary and political leadership. The smaller countries of the **eastern flank** must keep setting the example of maximum commitment. And the United States must decide whether it wants to be a reliable partner or an unpredictable actor.

These individual choices, multiplied by the **32 members** of the alliance, collectively define **NATO**'s trajectory. The **Ankara** summit is the opportunity to reinforce the coherence of these individual choices around a shared vision — carried by **Rutte** and backed by the most committed members.

*European strategic autonomy is not a luxury — it is the obligatory response to American unpredictability. And paradoxically, Trump is forcing us to do what we should have done since 1991: take responsibility for our own defense.*

## The historical responsibility of leaders gathered in Ankara

### What the stakes demand of those who decide

The heads of state and government gathering in **Ankara** on **July 7 and 8, 2026** carry a historical responsibility that no speech drafted by their diplomats can erase. They are meeting at the moment when **Europe** is more vulnerable than at any point since the end of the **Cold War**. And their decisions — or absence of decisions — will have lasting consequences.

History judges leaders not on their intentions but on their actions. **Churchill** is celebrated because he acted when others hesitated. **Chamberlain** is criticized because he yielded when he should have held firm. The question the **Ankara** summit poses is simple: which leaders do those gathered want to be in the history books? Those who stood firm against **Putin**, or those who temporized until it was too late?

### Ukraine as the measure of Western credibility

The way **NATO** treats **Ukraine** is the most direct measure of its credibility. A country fighting with heroism for more than two years, striking Russian refineries at **1,300 km**, liberating its prisoners exchange after exchange: that country deserves the unconditional support of the alliance. Not out of sentiment, but because **Ukraine** is Europe's first line of defense.

If **NATO** abandons **Ukraine** — or if it lets American hesitation erode its support — the message sent to every other actor in the world will be devastating. Conversely, a firm and continuous commitment to **Ukraine** demonstrates that the alliance is serious, that its guarantees are worth something, and that **Putin** will not win through attrition.

*Soldiers patrolling the eastern flank, defense budgets tripling: these are difficult decisions to explain to voters accustomed to peace. But the leaders who fail to make them will have war to explain instead.*

## Conclusion: Fear is a warning, not a fatality

### What eastern flank fear says about the state of the alliance

The fear that **NATO** leaders can "no longer count on the United States" is a serious alarm signal about the state of the alliance. It reveals a **trust fracture** between **Washington** and its most exposed allies that summit communiqués struggle to paper over. This fracture is the most precious strategic gift that **Trump** has given to **Putin** — perhaps without realizing it.

But fear is also a driver. It pushes **eastern flank** countries to spend, to arm, to develop stronger regional partnerships. It pushes **Europe** to think through its strategic autonomy with a seriousness it lacked before **2022**. In that sense, fear is a useful warning — provided the right lessons are drawn before it is too late.

### What NATO must do at Ankara to address legitimate fears

The **Ankara** summit cannot resolve the **Trump** problem. But it can deliver a response to it: concrete commitments to reinforce the **eastern flank** that make the alliance's defense credible independent of the **White House**'s moods. More troops on the ground. More air defense systems. More exercises. And a reaffirmation of **Article 5** that even **Trump** would struggle to contest publicly.

That is a lot to ask of a summit. But the situation demands it. **NATO**'s **eastern flank** deserves a response commensurate with the real threat — not with what is politically comfortable.

*The fear on the eastern flank is real, legitimate, and documented. My answer to that fear: demand. Demand real guarantees, permanent troops, honored budgets. Ukraine taught us that fear can be transformed into resistance.*

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

## Sources

### Primary sources

- [The Guardian — NATO leaders fear they can no longer rely on US — June 27, 2026](https://www.theguardian.com/world/ng-interactive/2026/jun/27/nato-leaders-fear-they-can-no-longer-rely-on-us-help-if-russia-attacks-trump-eastern-europe)

- [The Guardian — Russia prepares provocation in Baltic States or Poland — June 26, 2026](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/jun/26/russia-provocation-baltic-states-poland)

- [Fox News — Russia preparing hybrid attacks on NATO's eastern flank — June 22, 2026](https://www.foxnews.com/world/russia-preparing-hybrid-attacks-natos-eastern-flank-intelligence-warns)

- [Army Recognition — Russia rehearses Baltic strike operations from Kaliningrad — June 21, 2026](https://www.armyrecognition.com/news/aerospace-news/2026/russia-rehearses-baltic-strike-operations-from-kaliningrad-with-su-24m-bombers-and-su-30sm2-fighters)

### Secondary sources

- [NATO/Rutte — Atlantic Council — June 25, 2026](https://www.nato.int/en/news-and-events/events/transcripts/2026/06/25/atlantic-council-front-page-conversation-with-nato-secretary-general-mark-rutte)

- [European Parliament — Briefing on the Ankara summit — June 26, 2026](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2026/789355/EPRS_BRI(2026)789355_EN.pdf)

- [Gdansk Declaration — June 25, 2026](https://regeringen.se/rattsliga-dokument/sveriges-internationella-overenskommelser/2026/06/joint-declaration-from-leaders-meeting-in-Gdansk/)

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Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/billet-trump-nous-lache-t-il-la-peur-qui-hante-le-flanc-est-de-l-otan