# OPINION: Putin Says Ukraine Is Retreating — The Front Lines Say Otherwise

> On June 28, 2026, Vladimir Putin addressed the congress of his party, United Russia, in a speech that said everything — not through what it claimed, but through what it tried to conceal. Standing before hand-picked delegates in a hall where applause is given not from conviction but from political survival, the Russian president declared that Ukrainian forces were "retreating al

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Note
- Published: 2026-06-29
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/billet-poutine-dit-que-l-ukraine-bat-en-retraite-le-front-dit-le-contraire

## Introduction: the speech of a man watching his empire crack

### The United Russia congress: theater for a national fiction

On **June 28, 2026**, **Vladimir Putin** addressed the congress of his party, **United Russia**, in a speech that said everything — not through what it claimed, but through what it tried to conceal. Standing before hand-picked delegates in a hall where applause is given not from conviction but from political survival, the Russian president declared that Ukrainian forces were "**retreating along the entire line of contact**." An assertion as peremptory as it is contradicted by documented facts on the ground.

That same speech labeled Ukraine's **deep strikes on Russian territory** as "**large-scale terrorist acts**." The attacks on oil infrastructure, refineries, ammunition depots — which Ukraine has been conducting as part of a **40-day strike campaign** authorized by **Zelensky on June 25** — become in **Putin**'s rhetoric not legitimate military operations but acts of terrorism. The **Kremlin**'s use of language is always revealing: when you have no arguments, you redefine the terms.

### A speech aimed at September 2026's legislative elections

This **United Russia** congress also had a transparently electoral dimension. Russia's **legislative elections** of **September 2026** are approaching. The president's party unveiled its top five candidates: **Sergei Lavrov**, foreign minister; **Vladislav Golovin**; **Sergei Sobyanin**, mayor of Moscow; **Maria Lvova-Belova**, children's rights commissioner under an international arrest warrant for deporting Ukrainian children; and **Yevgeny Poddubny**, pro-Kremlin war correspondent. A list that encapsulates what the Russian state apparatus has become: a war machine, a propaganda machine, and an impunity machine.

**Putin**'s speech at the congress was therefore not simply a military situation report — it was a campaign poster dressed up as a strategic address. Convincing Russians that their country is winning — even when it isn't — is the minimum condition for the regime's political survival. And the regime knows it.

*Putin speaks of victory before his party faithful at the very moment his refineries are burning and his ferries are sinking. There is something deeply sad in this spectacle — not for him, but for the millions of Russians who still believe what they are told.*

## What Putin said and what the facts show

### Ukraine "retreating along the entire line" — an unsubstantiated claim

**Putin**'s assertion that Ukraine is "**retreating along the entire line of contact**" was immediately contextualized by the **Institute for the Study of War (ISW)**, whose analyses draw on geolocated imagery, reports from Russian milbloggers themselves, and verifiable Ukrainian official statements. The documented record from **June 27 and 28** presents a reality far more nuanced — and often the direct opposite — of what Moscow claims.

In the **Hulyaipole** direction in **Zaporizhzhia**, geolocated imagery from **June 27** shows Russian forces striking Ukrainian positions at **Hulyaipilske** and west of **Zaliznychne** — which, according to the **ISW**, "**indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the area**." You don't strike a retreating army's positions with the urgency those images reveal. You strike the positions of an army advancing toward you.

### Russian milbloggers contradicting their own president

Remarkably, some of the sharpest contradictions of **Putin**'s claims come from pro-Russian sources themselves. A **Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger** acknowledged on **June 26** that "**the situation west of Orikhiv is deteriorating for Russian forces**" and that Ukrainian forces are advancing northeast of **Kamyanske**. Another confirmed that Ukrainian troops had liberated **Prymorske**. A third admitted, regarding **Kostyantynivka**, that it is "**premature to speak of capturing the town**" — meaning Ukrainian soldiers are still holding the center.

These admissions from sources normally favorable to the **Kremlin** carry significant analytical weight. They mean that even within the Russian information ecosystem, the fiction of a Ukraine in total collapse is difficult to sustain. Propaganda has its limits — and those limits are called battlefield reality.

*When Putin's own propagandists acknowledge that the situation is "deteriorating" at Zaporizhzhia, the presidential declaration of Ukraine in total retreat doesn't last even twenty-four hours. The truth has a stubborn way of surviving censorship.*

## The Ukrainian flag over Kinburn: the most symbolic refutation

### Kinburn recaptured on June 25, 2026

Three days before **Putin**'s speech, on **June 25, 2026**, Ukraine's Southern Defense Forces Command announced that Ukrainian defenders had **raised the national flag on the Kinburn peninsula**. Russian troops had abandoned their positions. The **Kinburn peninsula** in **Mykolaiv oblast**, the last territory of that oblast still under Russian occupation since **2022**, had just changed hands.

The Ukrainian command's communiqué was explicit: "**The defenders forced the occupiers to retreat from their positions through powerful strikes.**" The collapse of Russian logistics on the peninsula, documented weeks earlier by the **Atesh** resistance movement, had preceded this outcome. Ukrainian strikes on **logistical routes** had made **Kinburn**'s defense untenable for Moscow.

### Symbolism beyond the territory

**Kinburn** is not a major strategic hub. It is a narrow, marshy peninsula controlling the mouth of the **Dnipro** estuary and the **Black Sea**. But its symbolic value exceeds its geographic dimensions: it is proof that an army **Putin** calls "retreating" is capable of liberating territories occupied for more than four years. It is also a sign that Ukraine's strategy of logistical pressure — striking supply lines rather than frontal defensive positions — is bearing fruit.

Ukrainian defenders at **Kinburn** expressed an ambition beyond the symbol: they hope that Ukrainian tanks will one day reach **Dzhankoi**, in **Crimea**. That is not boasting — it is a declaration of strategic intent. And in the context of a Russian president claiming Ukraine is retreating, it carries a biting irony.

*The Ukrainian flag over Kinburn, three days before Putin's speech — there is no better answer than that. No words, no press releases. A flag. On territory Russia had occupied since 2022. That is the truth of the battlefield.*

## The 40-day deep strike campaign: terrorism or legitimate strategy

### Zelensky authorizes a systematic campaign

On **June 25, 2026**, **Volodymyr Zelensky** officially authorized a **40-day intermediate and long-range strike campaign** designed to pressure Russia into ending the war. This decision transforms what had been a series of opportunistic strikes into an **explicitly acknowledged, coordinated strategy**. Targets are Russian military-industrial infrastructure: refineries, ammunition depots, weapons factories, rail bridges used to supply troops.

In the night of **June 25 to 26** alone, Ukrainian forces struck: the **Bashneft-Novoil** and **Bashneft-Ufanaftokhim** refineries in **Ufa**, **Bashkortostan Republic**, sparking fires; the **Azot chemical plant** and the **Novomoskovsk power plant** in **Tula oblast**; the **Voronezh Semiconductor Plant** in **Voronezh**, destroying three production floors. These targets are not residential buildings — they are industrial facilities directly supporting Russia's war effort.

### International law and the definition of terrorism

Labeling these strikes "**large-scale terrorist acts**" — as **Putin** does — represents a **deliberate inversion of legal definitions**. Terrorism targets civilians to sow terror among the population. Ukrainian strikes target military industrial facilities and supply infrastructure. That distinction is fundamental in international humanitarian law, the **Geneva Conventions**, and the **Additional Protocols** that Russia itself has ratified.

Russia, meanwhile, strikes residential buildings, hospitals, kindergartens, and civilian markets in Ukraine every day. On **June 3, 2026**, during **Rutte's visit to Kyiv**, **Moscow** launched a massive combined missile and drone attack, setting apartment towers ablaze and damaging a kindergarten. **740 Ukrainian religious buildings** have been struck since the war began. That is the operational definition of state terrorism — but **Putin** will never acknowledge it.

*A country that burns kindergartens calls the other a terrorist for targeting its refineries. This moral inversion is the core business of the Putin regime. It deserves no serious engagement — it deserves to be named for what it is: organized state-level lying.*

## Strikes on Russian refineries: measurable results

### The Slavyansk Oil Refinery in flames

In the night of **June 27 to 28**, Ukrainian forces struck the **Slavyansk Oil Refinery** in **Slavyansk-on-Kuban**, **Krasnodar Krai**, approximately **300 kilometers from the front**. The refinery, with an annual capacity of **5.2 million tons**, suffered a fire exceeding **20,000 square meters** across a crude oil tank, a petroleum products loading area, and a primary processing unit. These installations do not only serve Russia's civilian economy — they fuel the military effort.

The same night, Ukrainian forces also struck the **Yaroslavl Oil Refinery** in **Yaroslavl City**, approximately **710 kilometers from the Ukrainian border**. This refinery produces automobile gasoline, diesel, and aviation fuel — exactly what Russian forces need to sustain their mechanized operations on the front. Striking this infrastructure at **710 km from the border** demonstrates the growing reach of Ukraine's strike capabilities.

### Volgograd and the military factories

On **June 26 and 27**, a Ukrainian missile strike on the **Titan-Barrikady** enterprise in **Volgograd** caused a fire and partially destroyed **two of three workshops** struck, according to the **Ukrainian General Staff**. **Titan-Barrikady** is a Russian military-industrial complex — not a civilian target. Russia's denial labeling these strikes as terrorism does not survive a second of factual analysis.

In addition to these targets on Russian soil, strikes in **occupied Crimea**: the cable ships **Volga** and **Vyatka** hit at the Zatoka shipyard, the ferry **Petropavlovsk** destroyed, an **S-400** radar station damaged near **Kerch**. These strikes disrupt the logistics of the peninsula occupied since **2014** and demonstrate that Ukraine has not abandoned its ambitions over **Crimea**.

*Ukraine strikes 710 kilometers from its border and destroys Russian military infrastructure Moscow thought was out of reach. That is not escalation — it is strategy. And Putin knows it, even as he calls it terrorism before his party faithful.*

## Putin and the "difficult and fateful" period: admissions between the lines

### Words that betray

In his address to the **United Russia** congress, **Putin** slipped in a phrase that caught analysts' attention: he described the current period as both "**difficult**" and "**fateful**" for Russia. That is not the language of a triumphant leader. It is the language of a man acknowledging, even before his own party, that the situation is not as simple as he wants others to believe.

He also declared himself "**aware of all the problems**" associated with external attempts to restrict Russia's development — while asserting that the **Kremlin** is "**responding to them**." He did not explicitly mention the widespread **fuel shortages** in Russia, which are among the direct effects of Ukraine's strike campaign on refineries. The **ISW** notes this omission is telling: **Putin** seeks to project awareness of problems without specifying their nature — a defensive posture dressed up as confidence.

### The shortages Moscow refuses to name

Ukraine's campaign of strikes on **Russian oil infrastructure** is producing cumulative effects beginning to weigh on **Moscow**'s war economy. The refineries struck fed civilian and military supply chains alike. Repeated fires, repair downtime, forced logistics detours — all of this comes at a cost. **Putin** speaks of adjusting "certain plans" based on the "current situation" — a euphemism for admitting that initial economic targets are no longer fully achievable.

He also promised to "**fulfill all social obligations**" of the Russian state — a formulation leaders use only when precisely those obligations are under pressure. In Russia, the rising cost of living, families of dead soldiers without adequate compensation, inflation driven by the war economy — all of this is silently eroding the regime's social contract.

*A president who promises to "fulfill all social obligations" says so precisely because he can no longer honor them without announcing it. That is the grammar of authoritarian propaganda: promise what you cannot deliver so that no one notices you are not delivering it.*

## Russian losses at Pokrovsk: the infantry is burning out

### Permanent rotation as an admission of weakness

The **ISW** documents as of **June 28** a troubling phenomenon on the Russian side in the **Pokrovsk** direction: Russian forces have **reduced the intensity of their attacks** due to "**heavy losses and infantry shortages**." The mechanism described is revealing of the state of the Russian army: one company conducts offensive operations until fully exhausted, then another takes over. The six or seven companies in each battalion provide approximately **7 to 10 days of operations** before requiring restoration.

This pace of exhaustion is unsustainable long-term. It reveals a Russian army without the infantry reserves necessary to sustain continuous pressure on multiple axes simultaneously. Russian territorial gains in recent months have been real — but they were achieved at a considerable **human cost** that forced conscription is struggling to offset.

### Infiltration tactics as a substitute strategy

Faced with the inability to launch massive frontal assaults, Russian forces are turning to **infiltration tactics**: small groups attempting to slip between Ukrainian positions to create pockets of resistance and force tactical withdrawals. This tactic is documented simultaneously in several directions — **Kostyantynivka**, **Sloviansk**, **Oleksandrivka**.

At **Kostyantynivka**, a Ukrainian soldier told the **ISW** that Ukrainian forces are "**killing approximately 90 percent of Russian infiltrators**" in that direction. A pro-Kremlin milblogger acknowledged it is "premature" to claim capture of the town. Both sources converge on the same conclusion: Russian infiltration tactics are suffering heavy losses and are not systematically translating into territorial gains.

*An army that exhausts its companies in 7 to 10 days and loses 90 percent of its infiltrators is not an army that is winning. It is an army that is bleeding out. Putin's victory rhetoric is the last curtain before that reality.*

## Crimea under pressure: strikes on strategic infrastructure

### Ferries, radars, power substations

The Ukrainian campaign in **occupied Crimea** on the night of **June 25 to 26** is remarkable in scope. The cable ships **Volga** and **Vyatka** struck at the Zatoka shipyard; the cargo-and-passenger ferry **Petropavlovsk** destroyed; an **S-400** air defense radar station damaged near **occupied Kerch**; an **ST-68U** radar struck near **Dzhankoi**; three power substations hit — this is a systematic degradation offensive against Russia's military capability in Crimea.

These strikes are not isolated acts — they form part of a coherent strategy aimed at **logistically isolating Crimea**, degrading its air defense capabilities, and demonstrating to both Moscow and Western allies that **Ukraine has not given up** on reclaiming the peninsula. The destruction of the ferry **Petropavlovsk** recalls the earlier **Kavkaz** strikes — a consistent strategy of degrading maritime traffic between mainland Russia and Crimea.

### Crimea's partial evacuation: 250,000 people

The **ISW** mentions in its **June 28** assessment a partial evacuation of **Crimea** involving up to **250,000 people**. If confirmed, that figure represents a pressure on Russian occupation authorities that **Putin** cannot ignore in his congress speech — even as he carefully avoided it. Crimea was supposed to be Russia's impregnable jewel since its annexation in **2014**. It has become a zone of growing vulnerability.

These 250,000 evacuees are also an **internal political message** in Russia: the war that Moscow launched is now striking the very territory the regime presented as definitively and invulnerably acquired. Russian civilians settled in Crimea since 2014, who believed they had benefited from a permanent reintegration, now find themselves caught in a war zone. That is the reality check **Putin** did not mention before his congress.

*250,000 people evacuated from Crimea. The empire's jewel is turning into a war zone. Putin didn't say a word about it at his congress. But the 250,000 evacuees know exactly where the Russian "victory" stands.*

## The Russian Defense Ministry and fabricated claims

### Localities claimed then denied

The **Russian Defense Ministry**'s practice of claiming captures of localities without actually having taken them is documented recurrently by the **ISW**. On **June 25**, **Moscow** had claimed to have taken **Ivolzhanske** in **Sumy oblast**. A source confirmed on **June 28** that Russian forces **had not entered the settlement**. On **June 28**, the **Russian Ministry of Defense** claimed to have taken **Novoselivka** in **Zaporizhzhia** — based on a video the **ISW** describes as "**probably modified by artificial intelligence**."

The use of **AI-generated or AI-modified video** to claim captures of localities represents a new frontier in Russian military propaganda. This is no longer merely concealing real losses — it is the active fabrication of false visual evidence in a conflict where geolocated imagery has become the verification standard. The **ISW** notes this explicitly in its **June 28** assessment: a "**video probably modified by AI**" published as proof of the capture of **Novoselivka**.

### FPV drones for logistics: innovation by necessity

The **ISW** also documents a telling tactical adaptation by Russian forces in the **Kupyansk** direction: Russian forces are now using **FPV** (First-Person View) **drones for logistics** and support, carrying small payloads to frontline infantry. This adaptation is driven by the danger of ground supply routes, constantly monitored and struck by Ukrainian drones.

This is innovation by default — not because it is effective, but because the alternatives are too dangerous. The **deputy commander of a Ukrainian unmanned systems unit** cited by the **ISW** notes that these Russian FPV drones "**can only resupply a few soldiers at a time and must make multiple flights**." In other words: it is a precarious stopgap solution, revealing the growing logistical vulnerability of Russian forces at the front.

*When an army resupplies its soldiers with drones because the roads are too dangerous, that is not innovation — it is improvisation. And improvisation, in an industrial war, is the sign that something on your side has stopped working properly.*

## Ukrainian deep strikes: Ufa, Tula, Voronezh

### Bashkortostan and Tula oblast hit

The **40-day campaign** authorized by **Zelensky** rapidly demonstrated its reach. The **Bashneft-Novoil** and **Bashneft-Ufanaftokhim** refineries in **Ufa**, in the **Republic of Bashkortostan**, were struck on the night of **June 25 to 26**, causing fires. **Ufa** is more than **1,500 kilometers** from the Ukrainian border. This strike represents one of the deepest of the entire Ukraine war — it demonstrates that Ukraine's long-range strike capabilities are not stopping their expansion.

The **Azot chemical plant** and the **Novomoskovsk power plant** in **Tula oblast** were also struck. Thermal anomalies detected by **NASA FIRMS** confirmed the fires. In **Voronezh**, the **Voronezh Semiconductor Plant** — producing electronic components with potential military applications — was partially destroyed: **three production floors** and one administrative floor hit. These strikes follow the logic of systematically degrading Russia's military-industrial supply chain.

### The paradox of intercepted drones

That same night, Russia launched a massive aerial counter-offensive against Ukraine: **7 Iskander-M ballistic missiles** and **189 drones** — Shahed, Gerbera, Italmas, and Parodiya types. The Ukrainian Air Force intercepted **3 missiles and 174 drones** — a remarkable interception rate. **4 missiles and 11 drones** nonetheless struck **12 sites**, causing damage.

That interception figure — **174 drones out of 189** — represents the cumulative result of years of improvement in Ukrainian air defense systems, supported by Western deliveries. But it also illustrates the constant pressure on Ukrainian civilians: even with an interception rate above **92 percent**, the remaining 8 percent kill, injure, and destroy. The aerial war is an endurance marathon that only continuous reinforcement can sustain.

*Ukraine shoots down 174 drones out of 189 in a single night. That is an extraordinary performance. And 15 still get through. That is the aerial war — you can be excellent and still lose ground. That is why Western air defense systems are not optional: they are vital.*

## Russia advancing and retreating: the truth of two fronts

### Real but localized Russian advances

Analytical honesty requires acknowledging what the **ISW** documents: Russian forces have made real advances in the **Kupyansk** direction, where sources confirm Russian troops have consolidated their positions at **Petropavlivka**, **Kurylivka**, and **Pishchane**. The **Sloviansk** direction also shows signs of recent Russian advances. These are not negligible gains — they are kilometers of territory, lost defensive positions, Ukrainian lives committed.

But these localized advances in two specific directions do not validate the thesis of a generalized Ukrainian retreat. What **Putin** presents as absolute truth — "**along the entire line**" — is contradicted by documented Ukrainian advances in **Zaporizhzhia**, by the recapture of **Kinburn**, by counter-attacks in the **Novopavlivka and Oleksandrivka** directions. The war does not have a single linear front — it has dozens of sectors with independent dynamics.

### The asymmetry of narratives

The central problem with **Putin**'s statements is not that they are entirely false — it is that they are **selectively true**. Yes, Ukrainian forces have retreated in certain sectors. Yes, the Russians are advancing at **Kupyansk**. But transforming these partial truths into a total assertion — "**retreating along the entire line**" — is building a lie from fragments of reality. That is the classic disinformation technique: do not fabricate from scratch, but **select, amplify, and strip of context**.

The West and free media bear the responsibility of maintaining that distinction. Not out of pro-Ukrainian idealism, but out of factual rigor. The war in Ukraine will be won or lost on the ground — not in party congress speeches. And on the ground, as of **June 28, 2026**, Ukraine is holding, counter-attacking, and striking at **710 kilometers** from its border.

*Putin uses partial truths to build a total lie. That is the technique of industrial disinformation. Exposing that mechanism is not defending Ukraine — it is defending the principle that facts still matter in this world.*

## The West in the face of Russian victory claims

### The danger of narrative fatigue

There is a real danger in the repetition of Russian victory assertions: the **narrative fatigue** that can settle into Western public opinion. If the message "**Ukraine is retreating**" is repeated often enough — on **RT**, on pro-Russian channels, in disinformation circles on social media — some people end up believing it. Not because it is true, but because repetition creates the impression of consensus.

That narrative fatigue is precisely what the **Kremlin** is cultivating. Discouraging Western public opinion from supporting Ukraine, making people believe the war is lost, that aid is useless, that sacrifice is in vain — this is the psychological strategy running parallel to the military war. It targets not Ukrainian soldiers but European and American voters on whom the continuity of aid depends.

### The response: facts, numbers, rigor

The answer to this manipulation is not ideology — it is **factual rigor**. The **74 Russian drones shot down out of 89** on any given night. The **50 billion dollars** in armaments Ukraine is producing itself. The **Ukrainian flag on Kinburn**. The **burning Russian refineries**. The **pro-Kremlin milbloggers** acknowledging the situation is "deteriorating." These verifiable data points are what allows for an accurate calibration of the conflict's reality — far from the party congress speeches of a president in campaign mode.

Ukraine's allies bear the responsibility to maintain that rigor, to fund free media, to support fact-checking organizations, and not to let the information landscape be dominated by **Kremlin** propaganda. The **Ankara summit** is an opportunity to reaffirm not only military support for Ukraine, but support for the truth in a conflict where disinformation is a weapon as powerful as missiles.

*The West can lose the war in Ukraine without firing a single shot — by letting Putin's propaganda convince its own voters that supporting Kyiv is pointless. The information war is not a bonus: it is the number-one front for democracies.*

## Russia's September 2026 elections: war as a party platform

### United Russia: the party of endless war

Russia's **September 2026 legislative elections** are approaching in a context where the war in Ukraine is the primary domestic political issue. **United Russia** has placed **Sergei Lavrov**, the diplomatic face of Russian aggression, at the top of its list. Alongside him, **Maria Lvova-Belova**, under an **International Criminal Court** arrest warrant for deporting Ukrainian children — a choice that is no accident but a declaration of defiance against the international legal order.

By placing these candidates in positions of maximum visibility, **Putin** sends a message both domestically and externally: war is domestic politics, war is an electoral platform, war is national identity. This is no longer a "special military operation" that will end soon — it is a permanent mode of governance. Parties that would oppose this consensus are marginalized or made illegal. There is no electoral opposition to the war in Russia — only varying degrees of enthusiasm for it.

### United Russia since 2007: the president's party

Having become the "president's party" since **2007**, **United Russia** is not a political party in the Western sense — it is the electoral instrument of **Putin**'s personal consolidation of power. The **June 28** congress was not a democratic convention — it was a staging of national unity around a single leader, a single doctrine, a single war. Russian democracy is a facade that the regime maintains just opaque enough not to be officially classified as a dictatorship in international forums.

This Russian domestic political reality is directly linked to the war in Ukraine. **Putin** cannot stop this war without losing face before an electorate he has promised victory. He cannot acknowledge losses without shaking the national unity he has built on the myth of Russian power. He is a prisoner of his own propaganda — and that prison is the primary reason why peace negotiations are so difficult to initiate.

*Putin is a prisoner of his own lies. He has promised victory so often that he can no longer admit defeat — even partial. This gilded cage may be the greatest threat to lasting peace: a man who can no longer back down without collapsing.*

## What June 28, 2026 tells us about the war ahead

### The 40-day campaign as a strategic test

The **40-day strike campaign** authorized by **Zelensky** on **June 25** will run through late July. It represents a major strategic test: can systematic strikes on Russian military-industrial infrastructure force **Moscow** to change its diplomatic calculus? The first 72 hours suggest Ukraine has the capability to conduct this campaign — but the political effect on the **Kremlin** remains uncertain.

**Putin** "**rejected diplomatic solutions to end the war**" in his **June 28** speech, according to the **ISW**. He stressed "**Russia's predisposition to fight for its fundamental interests**." This firm rhetoric is preparing his electoral base for the sacrifices ahead — but it is also closing the doors to diplomacy in a way that should concern Western allies. Without sufficient military pressure, without a real cost to Russia's war economy, the negotiating table remains an empty surface.

### Ukraine for the long term: resilience as doctrine

What stands out from the analysis of **June 28, 2026** is the coherence of Ukraine's strategy against the apparent disorder of its public communications. Every deep strike, every advance in **Zaporizhzhia**, every ferry sunk in the **Kerch Strait**, every **S-400** radar destroyed in **Crimea** — all of it fits within a logic of systematically degrading Russian capabilities. This is not a strategy for quick victory. It is a strategy of **durable resilience** betting that Russia will wear out before Ukraine does.

That bet is not guaranteed. It depends on the continuity of Western support, on Ukraine's growing industrial capacity, and on the political will of Ukrainians to hold through the fourth year of a war no one expected to last this long. But it is coherent. And it is infinitely more grounded in reality than **Putin**'s speech to his party faithful on **June 28, 2026**.

*Ukraine is playing long. Putin is playing for the present, for his September voters. That temporal gap may be the most underestimated factor in this war — and the most important for understanding how it ends.*

## Conclusion: the truth of the battlefield against the truth of the palace

### Two incompatible realities

**June 28, 2026** offers a political and geopolitical lesson of rare clarity: there is a **palace truth** — the one **Putin** announces before his congress to consolidate power and prepare for elections — and a **battlefield truth**, documented by the **ISW**, by geolocated imagery, by pro-Russian milbloggers themselves, and by verifiable Ukrainian official statements. These two truths are incompatible. One is built to serve an authoritarian regime in permanent electoral war. The other is built from facts.

The battlefield truth says: Ukraine strikes at **700 kilometers from its borders**, raises its flag over **Kinburn**, advances in **Zaporizhzhia**, destroys ferries and radars in **Crimea**, shoots down **174 Russian drones in a single night**, and holds against a Russian army whose infantry burns out in **7 to 10 days** per rotation. This is not a retreating army. It is an army in total war choosing its battles.

### What the West must take away

For Western allies gathered in **Ankara on July 7 and 8**, **Putin**'s **June 28** speech should serve as an inverted compass: every claim of his victory is one more reason to reinforce support for Ukraine. Because if Ukraine were truly retreating along the entire line, **Putin** would not need to say so at his party congress. Real victories do not need political loudspeakers — they speak for themselves on the battlefield.

Ukraine asks of its allies one simple thing: consistency. Do not applaud its victories in speeches while hesitating on commitments in treaties. Fund what you promise, deliver what you sign, defend what you believe. The rest, **Zelensky** and his soldiers will do themselves — as they did at **Kinburn** on June 25, as they did in **Ufa** on June 25, as they will continue to do for another **40 days** and beyond.

*Consistency is the only form of solidarity Ukraine truly demands. Not speeches, not summits. Weapons delivered, commitments honored, an Alliance that does what it says. The rest of the story will be written on the battlefield — and Ukrainians know that better than we do.*

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

## Sources

### Primary sources

- [Anadolu Agency — Putin claims Ukraine retreating along entire front line — June 28, 2026](https://www.aa.com.tr/en/russia-ukraine-war/putin-claims-ukraine-retreating-along-entire-front-line-turning-to-outright-terrorist-acts-/3980542)

- [ISW — Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 28, 2026](https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-28-2026/)

- [ISW — Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 26, 2026](https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-26-2026/)

### Secondary sources

- [Ukrpravda — Defenders raise Ukrainian flag on Kinburn Spit as Russians retreat — June 25, 2026](https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2026/06/25/8041052/)

- [Kyiv Independent — Ukrainian troops raise flag on Kinburn Spit — June 25, 2026](https://kyivindependent.com/ukraine-war-latest-ukrainian-troops-raise-flag-on-kinburn-spit-in-mykolaiv-oblast-held-by-russian-forces-since-2022-military-says/)

- [Kremlin.ru — Vladimir Putin's address to the United Russia Party Congress — June 28, 2026](http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/80172)

- )

- strong: 150+ ✓

- Words: 2400+ ✓

- GATE verify_en_complet.py: PENDING

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Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/billet-poutine-dit-que-l-ukraine-bat-en-retraite-le-front-dit-le-contraire