# Iran Rebuilds Its Proxy Network While Washington Negotiates > Introduction: fragile diplomacy against relentless realpolitik - Author: Maxime Marquette - Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co) - Section: Note - Published: 2026-07-03 - Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/billet-liran-rebatit-son-reseau-de-proxys-pendant-que-washington-negocie ## Introduction: fragile diplomacy against relentless realpolitik ### A deal under negotiation, a threat that persists While the **United States** and **Iran** pursue discreet negotiations around a memorandum of understanding signed in mid-June 2026, several regional analysts warn that **Tehran** is simultaneously continuing to rebuild and expand its network of proxy militias across the **Middle East**, according to information reported by **Chosun Biz** and the **Times of Israel**. This dual Iranian approach, negotiating on one hand while consolidating its indirect military projection capabilities on the other, illustrates a realpolitik strategy that **Tehran** has perfected over decades in its confrontation with the **West** and **Israel**. ### Why this double game worries Western allies For **Israel** in particular, this continued expansion of the Iranian proxy network, despite ongoing diplomatic talks, confirms fears that any deal negotiated with **Washington** serves only to buy time rather than genuinely dismantle the regional infrastructure of the **axis of resistance** led by **Tehran**. *I remain deeply skeptical of this Iranian diplomacy that negotiates with one hand while rearming its proxies with the other, a strategic duplicity the West has already seen play out repeatedly in its dealings with the mullahs' regime.* ## The content of the memorandum of understanding negotiated in Washington ### A sixty-day window for a lasting agreement According to documents obtained by **CNN**, the memorandum of understanding signed in mid-June 2026 between the **United States** and **Iran** establishes a negotiating window of **sixty days** to reach a more detailed and lasting agreement on Iran's nuclear program and **Tehran's** regional activities. This document includes **fourteen points** covering various aspects of the bilateral relationship. This tight timeframe reflects the urgency the **Trump** administration perceives in stabilizing the regional situation after several months of direct military tensions between **Israel** and **Iran**, while maintaining maximum pressure on **Tehran** to secure substantial concessions on its nuclear program. ### The gray areas of the negotiated text Several observers note that the memorandum's text remains deliberately vague on the specific issue of Iran's regional proxy network, focusing mainly on the nuclear aspects of the file, a gap Israeli officials consider particularly worrying given the historical experience with **Tehran**. *This lack of clarity on the proxy issue strikes me as a major flaw in this deal under negotiation, since it leaves Iran considerable room to keep projecting its destabilizing influence throughout the region without technically violating the terms of the agreement.* ## The current state of the militia network backed by Tehran ### Hezbollah, a weakened but still active pillar **Lebanese Hezbollah**, long considered the spearhead of the Iranian proxy network, suffered significant losses during the conflict with **Israel** that intensified since October 2023, but nonetheless retains substantial military capabilities and continues to receive Iranian financial and logistical support, despite increased supply difficulties since the fall of the **Assad** regime in **Syria**. This resilience of **Hezbollah**, even weakened, demonstrates **Tehran's** ability to maintain its regional influence networks despite significant military setbacks, an important lesson for anyone hoping for a swift and complete dismantling of the Iranian **axis of resistance**. ### The Houthis, the most active link in the Iranian axis The **Houthis** in **Yemen** remain the most active and disruptive link in the Iranian proxy network at present, having resumed their attacks on commercial and military shipping in the **Red Sea** since late March 2026, after a pause following the **Gaza** ceasefire of October 2025. This resumption of hostilities confirms the continuity of Iranian support for this militia despite the evolving diplomatic context. *I believe the persistence of Houthi attacks, despite all the ongoing diplomatic negotiations, is the most tangible proof that Iran has no intention whatsoever of giving up its proxy network as a bargaining chip in talks with Washington.* ## Israel's position in the face of this American diplomacy ### Seeking guarantees rather than total victory According to an analysis published by the **Times of Israel**, the Israeli government has understood that the **Trump** administration favors a negotiated diplomatic resolution over a total military victory against **Iran**, forcing **Jerusalem** to redirect its strategy toward securing concrete security guarantees rather than the complete elimination of the Iranian threat. This Israeli strategic shift reflects a realistic reading of **Washington's** priorities, which above all seeks to avoid a prolonged military entanglement in the **Middle East** that could divert American strategic resources and attention from other geopolitical priorities, notably the confrontation with **China**. ### Jerusalem's minimum demands in the negotiations Israeli officials insist on several non-negotiable guarantees, including a robust verification mechanism for Iran's nuclear program and binding provisions limiting the rearmament of **Hezbollah** and other proxy militias, conditions that, if granted, could constitute a substantial diplomatic victory despite the absence of a complete military dismantling. *I think Israel is right to demand these concrete guarantees rather than settling for vague diplomatic promises, since recent history amply shows that Tehran only honors its commitments under constant and verifiable pressure.* ## The repercussions for long-term regional stability ### A Middle East still at the mercy of the Iranian axis As long as the Iranian proxy network retains significant operational capacity, the regional stability of the **Middle East** remains structurally fragile, regardless of any formal diplomatic agreement on Iran's nuclear program. This reality forces regional partners of the **United States**, notably **Saudi Arabia** and the **United Arab Emirates**, to maintain constant vigilance against **Tehran's** persistent destabilizing capabilities. This structural fragility highlights the limits of a diplomatic approach focused exclusively on the nuclear question, without binding and verifiable engagement with the proxy dimension of the regional Iranian threat, a strategic blind spot several Western analysts consider worrying. ### The role of Russia and China in this regional equation The persistence of the Iranian proxy network indirectly benefits the strategic interests of **Russia** and **China**, which benefit from continued regional instability in the **Middle East** diverting Western attention and resources from their own priority strategic theaters, **Ukraine** for **Moscow** and the **Indo-Pacific** for **Beijing** respectively. *I see in this convergence of interests between Tehran, Moscow, and Beijing further confirmation of a coordinated, even if informal, authoritarian axis that systematically exploits every regional instability to weaken the West's overall strategic capacity.* ## The role of Iraqi proxies in the regional equation ### Shiite militias still armed despite the pressure The Iraqi Shiite militias aligned with **Tehran**, grouped notably within the **Popular Mobilization Forces**, continue to possess substantial arsenals despite American diplomatic pressure on the **Baghdad** government to limit their political and military influence in the country. These groups have occasionally launched attacks against American installations in **Iraq** and **Syria** in recent months, a reminder that the Iranian proxy network retains a regional nuisance capacity that extends far beyond the Lebanese or Yemeni files alone. ### A precarious balance for the Iraqi government The Iraqi government finds itself caught between American demands to disarm the militias and its own political dependence on these same armed groups, illustrating the enduring complexity of dismantling Iranian influence in a country where **Tehran** has invested decades in building political and religious influence. This situation shows just how deeply the Iranian proxy network has become institutionalized beyond simple external armed groups, integrating deeply into the national political structures of several countries in the region. *I believe the Iraqi case perfectly illustrates the limits of any Western strategy that focuses solely on Iran's nuclear program without tackling this deeply entrenched architecture of political influence in several states of the region.* ## Lessons drawn from previous agreements with Tehran ### The still-vivid memory of the 2015 nuclear deal Many Western and Israeli analysts point out that the 2015 nuclear deal, signed under the **Obama** administration, did not prevent **Tehran** from continuing to fund and arm its regional proxies throughout its implementation, a historical experience that today fuels deep skepticism toward any new negotiation limited to the nuclear track alone. This historical precedent largely explains why **Israel** now insists that any new agreement include explicit provisions on dismantling the proxy network, rather than repeating what is seen as the mistake of the previous deal. ### A structural mistrust weighing on current negotiations This historical mistrust largely shapes the Israeli approach and that of several Western allies toward the current negotiations, even as the **Trump** administration claims to have learned from past mistakes by incorporating stricter verification mechanisms into the framework currently being negotiated with **Tehran**. It remains to be seen whether these strengthened mechanisms will be enough to prevent a repeat of the 2015 scenario, when **Tehran** was able to exploit ambiguities in the text to continue its destabilizing regional activities without formally, technically violating the signed agreement. *I remain marked by this historical failure of 2015, and I believe the West would be wrong to repeat the same mistake by focusing exclusively on the nuclear issue without demanding firm, verifiable guarantees on the actual dismantling of the proxy network.* ## The role of Qatar and Oman as discreet mediators ### Essential parallel diplomatic channels **Qatar** and **Oman** continue to play a discreet but essential mediating role between **Washington** and **Tehran**, facilitating indirect communication channels that keep dialogue alive even when direct military tensions between **Israel** and **Iran** complicate formal negotiations. This behind-the-scenes diplomacy, carried out by **Gulf states** eager to preserve their own regional stability, illustrates the complexity of a file that involves far more than just the actors directly in conflict. *I recognize the practical usefulness of these regional mediators, but I remain convinced that Western vigilance must stay fully intact, no matter how many additional diplomatic channels are mobilized to appease Tehran.* ## Conclusion: a Western vigilance that cannot let up ### A necessary but insufficient agreement on its own While a formal diplomatic agreement between **Washington** and **Tehran** represents a preferable step over uncontrolled military escalation, it cannot alone guarantee regional stability as long as the Iranian proxy network retains its operational capacity intact across **Lebanon**, **Yemen**, **Iraq**, and **Syria**. The West and its regional partners will need to maintain constant vigilance and robust verification mechanisms to ensure that any diplomatic concession granted to **Tehran** comes with verifiable constraints on its indirect military projection capabilities across the region. ### The ultimate test of the next sixty days The coming weeks of negotiation will determine whether this diplomatic approach can truly produce lasting results, or whether it represents merely another tactical pause in **Tehran's** long-term strategy of maintaining its regional influence through its proxies, regardless of formal agreements signed with **Washington**. *I conclude with the conviction that the only viable diplomacy toward Tehran is one that combines verifiable firmness with acknowledged distrust, because the history of the Iranian regime leaves no room for Western diplomatic naivety.* **By Maxime Marquette, columnist** ## Columnist's transparency note ### Editorial stance I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies. I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events. ### Method and sources This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here. **Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies. **Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations. When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**. ### Nature of the analysis The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted. My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors. This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text. ## Sources ### Primary sources - [Iran's proxy network expected to expand despite ongoing US talks — Chosun Biz, June 29, 2026](https://biz.chosun.com/en/en-international/2026/06/29/QSOW7ZED75HHPIRUEHQJIYEGPY/) - [Trump's emerging Iran deal forces Israel to seek guarantees, not victory — Times of Israel, June 29, 2026](https://www.timesofisrael.com/trumps-emerging-iran-deal-forces-israel-to-seek-guarantees-not-victory/) ### Secondary sources - [Text of the US-Iran memorandum of understanding revealed — CNN, June 17, 2026](https://www.cnn.com/2026/06/17/middleeast/us-iran-war-mou-text-intl) - [2026 Houthi strikes on Israel — updated July 2026](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_Houthi_strikes_on_Israel) - [Red Sea, Bab el-Mandeb Strait — Houthi attacks advisory — US Maritime Administration, 2026](https://www.maritime.dot.gov/msci/2026-006-red-sea-bab-el-mandeb-strait-gulf-aden-arabian-sea-and-somali-basin-houthi-attacks) - Iran's proxy strategy after the ceasefire: an assessment — Foreign Policy, July 2026 --- Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. 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