# Kim Jong-un wants a nuclear navy, and that should worry us > Introduction: the sea as a new nuclear frontier - Author: Maxime Marquette - Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co) - Section: Note - Published: 2026-07-03 - Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/billet-kim-jong-un-veut-une-marine-nucleaire-et-ca-devrait-nous-inquieter ## Introduction: the sea as a new **nuclear** frontier ### An announcement that changes the game **Kim Jong-un** has ordered an **"exponential"** expansion of **North Korea**'s **nuclear** arsenal, this time including plans for naval **destroyers** capable of carrying **nuclear** weapons. This is no longer just a question of land-based missiles: **Pyongyang** now wants to project its **nuclear** power onto the seas. This announcement, confirmed by North Korean state media and relayed by several international agencies, marks a further step in **Pyongyang**'s strategy toward full naval nuclearization, a goal few observers took seriously just a few years ago. ### Why this opinion piece, why now I won't lie to you: this issue worries me more than most recent North Korean military developments. A land-based missile remains, technically, a matter of range and interception. A mobile **nuclear** destroyer completely changes the regional strategic equation, particularly for **Japan**, **South Korea**, and American forces deployed in the Pacific. This piece does not claim to explain everything about this **program**. It simply aims to ask the right questions, with the facts available, without giving in to either panic or dismissiveness. ## What **Kim Jong-un** actually announced ### The speech at the shipyards According to available reports, **Kim Jong-un** reportedly asked the North Korean **navy** to build about two new warships a year over the next five years, with a clear goal of gradually nuclearizing the fleet. This construction pace, if confirmed, would represent a considerable industrial effort for a country under severe economic **sanctions**. The North Korean leader also mentioned the recent commissioning of a new warship, presented by official propaganda as a step toward a genuinely deterrent **navy** at the regional scale. ### The context of an already advanced **program** This announcement did not come out of nowhere. **North Korea** has stepped up ballistic and cruise missile tests in recent years, while quietly continuing to develop its land-based nuclear **program**. Adding a naval nuclear component fits a logic of diversifying delivery systems, making North Korean **deterrence** harder to fully neutralize. Nuclear **proliferation** experts believe this diversification is explicitly aimed at complicating American and South Korean strategic calculations in the event of a major crisis in the region. ## The regional reaction, between worry and preparation ### Seoul and Tokyo on alert **South Korea** and **Japan**, already facing the North Korean ballistic **threat** for years, are watching this naval development with particular concern. A North Korean nuclear **navy**, even limited in the number of units, considerably complicates their own missile defense and maritime surveillance calculations. Both countries have strengthened their military cooperation with the **United States** in recent years, a trend that should accelerate further given this new dimension of the North Korean **threat**. ### Washington facing a strategic dilemma For the **United States**, this development poses a classic but always complex dilemma: strengthening the military presence in the Pacific risks being seen by **Pyongyang** as a provocation justifying further escalation, while too measured a response could be read as a sign of weakness by the North Korean **regime**. This delicate equation illustrates the limits of **deterrence** diplomacy against a **regime** that seems determined to pursue its nuclear **program** regardless of international pressure. ## The worrying link with **Russia** ### A deepening partnership This North Korean naval **program** is not developing in a vacuum. Growing military ties between **Pyongyang** and **Moscow**, notably through the deployment of North Korean troops to support the Russian war effort in **Ukraine**, raise legitimate questions about a possible transfer of naval or nuclear technology in exchange for this direct military support. Western intelligence services are closely monitoring this possibility, which would represent a significant escalation in cooperation between these two authoritarian **regime**s, already largely isolated from the rest of the international community. ### An authoritarian axis taking shape This convergence between **Russia**, **North Korea**, and to a lesser extent **China** and **Iran**, sketches the outline of an increasingly coordinated authoritarian bloc, capable of mutually supporting each other against Western pressure. Ignoring this dynamic would be a major strategic mistake for Western democracies. This piece does not claim to establish formal proof of a direct technology transfer, but the current geopolitical context makes this hypothesis plausible enough to warrant heightened vigilance from our intelligence services. ## The real limits of the North Korean **program** ### Severe industrial constraints Still, some measure of restraint is warranted regarding this announcement. **North Korea** remains under severe international economic **sanctions** that considerably limit its ability to produce sophisticated warships at the pace announced by **Kim Jong-un**. Nuclear naval construction requires technologies and materials **Pyongyang** only partially masters. Several Western military analysts remain skeptical about the **regime**'s real ability to meet the stated goals within the announced timeframe, pointing to the frequent gap between propaganda announcements and the country's actual industrial capabilities. ### Rhetoric that also serves domestic politics It should also be noted that these spectacular announcements serve a domestic political function for **Kim Jong-un**, reinforcing the image of a strong, technologically advanced **regime** among his own population, largely cut off from any independent information about the country's real capabilities. This dimension of internal propaganda should not, however, lead to a complete underestimation of the risk, given that the recent history of the North Korean nuclear program has shown a capacity for adaptation and technical progress exceeding the initial forecasts of Western experts. ## What this means for the regional balance ### An accelerating arms race This announcement risks fueling an arms race already well underway in the Indo-Pacific region, where **South Korea**, **Japan**, and even **Taiwan** are strengthening their own defense capabilities against the combined **threat**s of **China** and **North Korea**. This regional dynamic further complicates the already fragile strategic stability of the area. Western allies will likely need to adapt their naval **deterrence** posture in the Pacific to account for this new dimension of the North Korean **threat**, an adaptation that will require considerable time and resources. ### A test for Western credibility Finally, this development is a further test of the credibility of Western **deterrence** in the region. If **Pyongyang** manages to significantly advance this naval program without a firm response from the international community, it could encourage other hostile regimes to pursue similar ambitions, convinced there will be no real consequences. This is exactly the kind of signal the **West** cannot afford to send, in a geopolitical context already marked by multiple simultaneous flashpoints. ## The role of international diplomacy ### Limited channels of communication Diplomatic channels with **North Korea** remain extremely limited, with most direct dialogue attempts having failed in recent years. This lack of communication makes it all the more difficult to try to defuse tensions related to this new nuclear naval program before it reaches an advanced stage of development. The United Nations, despite several resolutions condemning North Korean nuclear programs, has limited leverage against a regime largely immunized against traditional **sanctions** thanks to Chinese and Russian economic support. ### A closing window for action Some experts believe there is still a window for diplomatic action before the North Korean nuclear naval program reaches a level of maturity that would make any dismantlement negotiation practically impossible. This window, however, is closing quickly as **Pyongyang** advances its technical capabilities. The absence of firm international coordination on this specific issue illustrates the structural limits of the current non-**proliferation** architecture, largely outpaced by the reality of contemporary North Korean ambitions. ## Historical precedents of naval **proliferation** ### A very exclusive club of nuclear naval powers Historically, only a handful of major powers, including the **United States**, **Russia**, **China**, **France**, and the **United Kingdom**, have developed credible nuclear naval capabilities, notably through ballistic missile submarines. **North Korea**'s potential entry into this restricted category would constitute a significant precedent in the history of global nuclear **proliferation**. This precedent could also encourage other states with nuclear ambitions, notably **Iran**, to consider similar paths of diversifying their own strategic delivery systems in the years ahead. ### Cold War lessons, ignored The Cold War's lessons on the dangers of naval nuclear **proliferation** appear largely ignored by the North Korean regime, which continues on its own path regardless of international norms established over decades through non-**proliferation** treaties. This disregard for international norms confirms, once again, that **Pyongyang** views multilateral bodies only as obstacles to circumvent rather than as legitimate frameworks to respect. ## Conclusion: an opinion piece, a legitimate concern ### What to take away from this issue This piece does not claim to offer absolute certainty about the future trajectory of the North Korean nuclear naval program. It simply aims to highlight the importance of this development, too often treated as a footnote in international media coverage, when it represents a significant qualitative shift in **Pyongyang**'s **deterrence** strategy. The real scale of this naval ambition remains to be confirmed in the months and years ahead, but the political intent is now public and openly owned by **Kim Jong-un** himself. ### Western vigilance is essential For the **West**, this issue must remain a monitoring priority, in close coordination with regional allies **Japan** and **South Korea**. Firmness and vigilance remain the only coherent responses to a regime that has consistently shown its ability to turn rhetorical ambitions into concrete technical advances, sometimes faster than Western analysts expected. I close this piece with sincere, non-alarmist concern, but one that deserves to be shared well beyond specialized international security circles. **By Maxime Marquette, columnist** ## Columnist's transparency note ### Editorial stance I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies. I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events. ### Method and sources This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here. **Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies. **Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations. When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**. ### Nature of the analysis The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted. My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors. This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text. ## Sources ### Primary sources - [The Guardian — Kim Jong-un pushes 'exponential' nuclear expansion with nuclear-armed destroyers — June 24, 2026](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/jun/24/north-korea-nuclear-program-kim-jong-un) - [Al Jazeera — North Korea's Kim orders navy to build 10,000-tonne destroyer — June 6, 2026](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/6/6/north-koreas-kim-orders-navy-to-build-10000-tonne-destroyer-state-media) - [The Straits Times — North Korea should build two warships a year in next five years, Kim says — June 2026](https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/north-korea-should-build-two-warships-a-year-in-next-five-years-kim-says) ### Secondary sources - [CNN — North Korea nuclear plant expansion under Kim Jong-un — June 4, 2026](https://www.cnn.com/2026/06/04/asia/north-korea-nuclear-plant-kim-intl-hnk-ml) - [The Washington Post — North Korea's Kim Jong-un pushes for nuclear destroyer — June 23, 2026](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2026/06/23/north-korea-kim-jong-un-destroyer-nuclear/c20609c2-6f68-11f1-8730-e7fd0e2a6404_story.html) - [Institute for the Study of War — Korean Peninsula Update, June 23, 2026](https://understandingwar.org/research/china-taiwan/korean-peninsula-update-june-23-2026/) --- Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/billet-kim-jong-un-veut-une-marine-nucleaire-et-ca-devrait-nous-inquieter