# OPINION: Israel refuses to leave Lebanon: the pebble in the accord

> In June 2026, Israel and Lebanon found themselves once again in Washington, attempting to negotiate a way out of the crisis. Delegations exchanged positions, communiqués were politely worded, and the outcome arrived: no substantial progress. The joint text published by the United States, Israel, and Lebanon conditions any cessation of hostilities on a complete halt to Hezbollah

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Note
- Published: 2026-06-28
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/billet-israel-refuse-de-quitter-le-liban-le-caillou-dans-l-accord

## Key takeaways

- The joint US-Israel-Lebanon text conditions any cessation of hostilities on a complete halt to Hezbollah fire and its members' withdrawal south of the Litani, with no timeline for Israeli withdrawal beyond the 5 to 10 km buffer zone.
- Israel proposes "pilot zones" where the Lebanese Armed Forces would take control, which the author sees as letting the IDF decide when and where to withdraw.
- The author says Hezbollah's drones give Israel a lasting justification for its presence, and that the LAF lacks the means to replace either Hezbollah or the IDF.
- Iran remains Hezbollah's backer, and the author sees no serious sign that a US-Iran deal will address Lebanon.
- UNIFIL and Resolution 1701 are described as unable to enforce either Israeli withdrawal or Hezbollah disarmament, and the author criticizes the US for shielding Israel.

## Introduction: a paper agreement sitting on a volcano

### Washington signs, Israel stays put

In June 2026, **Israel** and **Lebanon** found themselves once again in **Washington**, attempting to negotiate a way out of the crisis. Delegations exchanged positions, communiqués were politely worded, and the outcome arrived: **no substantial progress**. The joint text published by the **United States**, **Israel**, and **Lebanon** conditions any cessation of hostilities on a **complete halt to Hezbollah fire** and the withdrawal of its members from the southern sector of the **Litani River**. Not a single word about a timeline for Israeli withdrawal beyond the buffer zone that **the IDF** occupies at a depth of **5 to 10 kilometers**.

The paradox is striking: a **complete disarmament** of **Hezbollah** is demanded while Israel retains its **total operational freedom** in the south of the country. The **Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF)** are supposed to take control of **pilot zones**, but no one says when **the Israeli military** will vacate the ground it occupies. We face an equation in which **one of the unknowns** is deliberately left unaddressed.

### A ceasefire that is not a ceasefire

The truce of **April 17, 2026** officially held for a few weeks before collapsing. **The intensification of fighting** and **Israeli ground advances** in southern Lebanon confirmed the failure of that first attempt. By early June, negotiators returned to the table, but without tangible results. New political and security discussions were announced for the week of **June 22** — pushing the horizon of real peace further out still.

What is euphemistically called a **"minimalist agreement"** actually pushes back the prospect of a lasting ceasefire. **Lebanon** is exhausted, its institutions weakened. **Israel** seeks to preserve a **maximum of operational freedom**. And meanwhile, Lebanese civilians pay the price of a war with no visible end.

*What passes for diplomacy in the Middle East often resembles a shell game. Israel signs what suits it, stays where it wants to stay, and leaves others to demand the withdrawal. This has been going on for decades. I don't claim to have the solution — but I refuse to pretend that what is being presented to us as an "agreement" actually is one.*

## The Israeli logic: security first, law second

### The doctrine of "pilot zones"

**Israel** has proposed a gradual approach: the creation of **"pilot zones"** over which the **Lebanese Armed Forces** would take exclusive control, excluding **Hezbollah**. On paper, that is reasonable. In practice, this mechanism allows **the IDF** to withdraw only where it deems conditions safe — and to remain everywhere else. It amounts to a **conditional withdrawal**, managed by the occupying force itself, at its own pace and according to its own security criteria.

The **United States have committed to reinforcing the LAF's capabilities** to assist in this mission. That is a useful gesture — the **Lebanese Armed Forces** are desperately short of equipment and training — but it does not resolve the fundamental question: **who decides when Israel leaves Lebanese territory?** The implicit answer is: **Israel itself**. And that is precisely where the shoe pinches.

### The Hezbollah drone file: the ultimate pretext

The June 2026 agreement also fails to settle, for **the Jewish state**, the question of **drones operated by Hezbollah**. **Israel** has reaffirmed that its security can only be guaranteed by the **complete disarmament of Hezbollah** and respect for its territorial integrity. This condition is both legitimate in principle and practically unachievable within the required timeframe — which guarantees that **the IDF** will remain present indefinitely in **southern Lebanon**.

Hezbollah's drones, real and worrying, thus become a **permanent trump card** in Israeli hands. As long as they exist — and they will exist for a long time — Israel has an ironclad argument for maintaining a military presence that international law would otherwise condemn unambiguously. **The legitimate security of a nation** is being instrumentalized here as a tool for non-withdrawal.

*I understand why the Israeli military is unwilling to leave terrain without solid guarantees. Who would be, after everything Israel has been through? But there is a difference between legitimate guarantees and an occupation dressed up as diplomacy. What I see in 2026 is a democratic state using the language of security to circumvent its international obligations.*

## Hezbollah: weakened but not eliminated

### A drained organization, not a destroyed one

Israeli military operations since 2024 have **heavily damaged Hezbollah's infrastructure**. Commanders have been eliminated, weapons depots destroyed, communication networks disrupted. The Shia organization is no longer what it was at the peak of its power. But it **is not dead**. It adapts, reconfigures, recruits — and still benefits from the logistical and financial backing of **Iran**, even a weakened Iran.

The question, therefore, is not whether **Hezbollah** has been weakened — it has — but whether **its weakening indefinitely justifies Israeli presence in Lebanon**. A presence which, according to analysts, in turn fuels resentment among the local population and **hands Hezbollah** its best recruitment argument: resistance to the occupier.

### The LAF's dilemma in the face of dual pressure

The **Lebanese Armed Forces** are caught in a vice. On one side, **Israel** asks them to deploy effectively in the South, to control the pilot zones, and to block **Hezbollah**. On the other side, their capacity to fulfill that role depends on international financial and material support that remains insufficient. **The Lebanese army** has neither the manpower nor the equipment needed to control a border stretching dozens of kilometers against a seasoned paramilitary organization.

The **United States** commit to **strengthening the LAF** — but at what pace and with what concrete resources? The American promise is genuine, but it does not compensate for **years of disinvestment** in the Lebanese army. And as long as the LAF lacks credibility on the ground, **Israel** will readily maintain its positions by arguing that no viable substitute yet exists.

*The Lebanese army deserves more respect than the West gives it. These are professional soldiers, often well trained, who patrol a country whose state is in ruins. To leave them with vague promises and demand that they simultaneously replace both Hezbollah and the IDF is to hand them an impossible mission. And everyone knows it.*

## Iran behind the curtain: a formidable diplomatic obstacle

### Tehran finances and watches

**Iran** remains the funder and strategic inspiration behind **Hezbollah**. Despite sanctions, despite tensions over its nuclear program, and despite a nascent deal with **Washington** in June 2026, **Tehran** has no intention of loosening its grip on **Lebanon**. **Hezbollah** is too valuable as a regional lever to be abandoned as part of a simple bilateral Israeli-Lebanese negotiation.

Discussions between **Washington** and **Tehran** on the nuclear issue, described by **JD Vance** as a "very good foundation" on June 22, 2026, could theoretically open space for a comprehensive solution that includes **Lebanon**. But that is a very distant horizon. **Iran** will not sacrifice its Lebanese influence in exchange for nuclear sanction relief — those are two files it is careful to keep separate.

### The US-Iran deal: a window cracked open

The initial agreement between the **United States** and **Iran** announced in late June 2026 is presented as a first step toward ending direct hostilities and easing sanctions. **Washington** agreed to unblock approximately **24 to 25 billion dollars** in frozen assets and pave the way for **300 billion dollars** in reconstruction. It is a strong signal — but it says nothing about the role of **Hezbollah** in **Lebanon**.

For this deal to genuinely serve peace in Lebanon, it would need to include an explicit clause on Hezbollah's disarmament or at minimum the neutralization of its Iranian backing. No serious source confirms that this condition is on the table. Iran treats **Hezbollah** as a strategic investment, not as a negotiable concession. As long as **Tehran** holds that thread, **Beirut** will remain under tension.

*A US-Iran deal that ignores Hezbollah is like negotiating a flood agreement without mentioning the dam that is cracking. Iran knows exactly what it is doing. Washington almost certainly does too. What troubles me is the complete absence of public discussion about the price Lebanon will have to pay for this normalization in progress.*

## Resolution 1701: the letter and the spirit

### A text everyone invokes and nobody applies

**UN Security Council Resolution 1701**, adopted in 2006, provides for the deployment of **UNIFIL** in southern Lebanon and the disarmament of armed groups — Hezbollah included. Twenty years later, this resolution is still cited in every communiqué, every framework agreement, every diplomatic statement. And still just as poorly respected in its essential provisions.

**Israel** invokes **1701** to justify its operations: Hezbollah violates the text by remaining armed south of the **Litani**. True. But **Israel** also violates this resolution by maintaining a military presence on Lebanese territory without authorization from the **Security Council**. The **double standard** is blatant — and it undermines the credibility of the entire international law framework in the region.

### UNIFIL: powerless observers

The **United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)** counts approximately **10,000 troops** deployed in the south of the country. It observes, documents, reports — but can neither disarm **Hezbollah** nor compel **the IDF** to withdraw. Its mandate is limited, its rules of engagement cautious, and its effectiveness contested by all parties. It is a symbolic presence in a very real conflict.

In June 2026, **UNIFIL** continued to document **incidents in the blue line zone** without being able to impose anything on **Israel** or **Hezbollah**. Its existence reassures Western chancelleries and provides political cover, but it has not changed the reality on the ground since 2006. The cruel truth is that no international mechanism currently has the means to enforce an Israeli withdrawal or a Hezbollah disarmament.

*UNIFIL is the perfect symbol of what the UN can do when the great powers don't really want a solution: send soldiers, forbid them to fight, and call it peacekeeping. This is not a criticism of the troops on the ground — they do what they can. It is a criticism of the system that places them in this absurd situation.*

## Lebanon in pieces: a state brought low by its own paralysis

### Lebanese institutions on their knees

**Lebanon** in 2026 is a drained country. After years of **economic crisis**, the explosion at the port of **Beirut** in 2020, the pandemic, war with Israel, and the persistence of a corrupt sectarian political system, its institutions are on the brink. **The Lebanese state** does not truly control its own territory — part of it is under **Hezbollah**'s influence, another part under de facto Israeli occupation.

This institutional paralysis is a windfall for all those seeking to avoid a solution. **Israel** can argue that without a strong state, no effective control is possible — justifying its presence. **Iran** can maintain its influence through **Hezbollah** in the absence of a credible state alternative. And ordinary **Lebanese** — Christians, Sunnis, Shia, Druze — pay the bill for a geopolitical game in which they are not the players.

### The Lebanese economy: a prolonged catastrophe

The **Lebanese pound** is worth nothing. The banking system has been paralyzed since 2019. **Banque du Liban** operates in opacity. International aid trickles in, conditioned on reforms that the Lebanese political class is structurally incapable of undertaking. According to recent estimates, **Lebanon's GDP per capita** has fallen by more than **70% in under a decade**.

In this context of economic devastation, the absence of a peace agreement makes things worse still. **Investments** flee, **talent** emigrates, and the populations that remain live in total uncertainty. Every new round of failed negotiations is another bloodletting for a country that has no blood left to lose. **Peace in Lebanon** is not only a matter of international law — it is a humanitarian emergency.

*I struggle to look at images of Beirut in 2026 and recognize a country that still belongs to the same world as ours. What has happened there is a civilizational catastrophe. And the current diplomatic impasse, with its "pilot zones" and polished communiqués, feels like organized bureaucracy while the house burns down.*

## International pressure: between posturing and powerlessness

### Europe: firm declarations, weak levers

The European powers — **France**, **Germany**, the **United Kingdom** — continue to call for **respect for Resolution 1701** and an Israeli withdrawal from **Lebanon**. These declarations are sincere, but their diplomatic weight is limited. **Israel** faces no European sanctions. Trade relations between the **EU and Israel**, despite tensions, remain solid. And Washington provides Israel political cover for its operations.

The **European Union** finds itself in an uncomfortable position: it finances part of the humanitarian aid to **Lebanon**, contributes to **UNIFIL**, verbally champions Lebanese sovereignty — but has no real leverage to change the behavior of either **Israel** or **Iran**. This is the structural limit of a European diplomacy that is not yet sovereign vis-à-vis the region's major powers.

### Washington: the paralyzed grand arbiter

The **United States** remains the indispensable power in this file. They are the only actor capable of applying real pressure on **Israel** — and they have systematically refused to do so decisively. The **Biden administration** in its time, the **Trump administration** today, have both shielded **Israel** from the legal and diplomatic consequences of its actions in **Lebanon**. **Washington** negotiates with **Tehran** on the nuclear issue while covering the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon — a permanent balancing act.

This is not bad faith: it is realpolitik. The **United States** has strategic interests in the region that far exceed the Lebanese question. But the result is that **Lebanon** has no real protector — only observers, donors, and allies who look away when things truly burn.

*I sometimes wonder what Lebanon would need to do differently to be taken seriously by Washington. Buy itself a nuclear program? Have abundant oil reserves? The honest answer is that a country without major strategic resources in an unstable region cannot force great powers to act. That is brutal, but it is the naked geopolitical truth.*

## The humanitarian dimension: civilians held hostage to an endless conflict

### Displaced populations with no prospect of return

In southern **Lebanon**, civilian populations who had fled the fighting in **2024** had still not been able to return home in **June 2026**. The villages bordering the **buffer zone** controlled by **the IDF** remain inaccessible. Tens of thousands of **South Lebanese** are living in makeshift camps or with relatives in **Beirut** and other regions, in a state of total uncertainty. No one tells them when they can go back — because no one knows when **Israel** will withdraw.

The **UNHCR** and various humanitarian organizations have documented the degraded living conditions of these **internally displaced persons**. Without agricultural land, without access to their properties, without stable incomes, they represent a social time bomb. The **humanitarian crisis in southern Lebanon** is directly tied to the absence of a political resolution — and every additional month of Israeli occupation irreversibly worsens their situation.

### Destroyed infrastructure and suspended reconstruction

The **bombings** of 2024–2025 left deep scars in the villages of **southern Lebanon**. Houses, roads, water and electricity infrastructure were destroyed. **Reconstruction** cannot begin in earnest as long as security uncertainty persists and civilians cannot return to oversee the work. International aid promised — notably by **Qatar**, **Saudi Arabia**, and the **European Union** — is conditioned on a stabilization that the diplomatic impasse indefinitely delays.

This destructive cycle — conflict, partial reconstruction, new conflict — has exhausted the resilience of communities in **southern Lebanon**. Some families have fled three or four times since **2006**. What they are being asked to do today is wait yet again: for diplomats to find a formula, for militaries to agree on pilot zones, for politicians to stop stalling. That wait has a human cost that diplomatic communiqués never adequately acknowledge.

*What top negotiators seem to forget too often is that there are real people at the end of every decision not taken. Families waiting to go home for months. Farmers looking at their olive trees unable to harvest them. The human cost of this diplomatic impasse is not abstract — it is measured in wasted lives, in children growing up far from their village. No framework agreement will ever say that clearly enough.*

## Conclusion: a pebble that blocks the entire road

### The agreement that goes nowhere

In **June 2026**, the **Israeli-Lebanese agreement** remains an unfinished document, built on calculated ambiguities. **Israel** maintains its military presence in **southern Lebanon** with the tacit blessing of the **United States**. **Hezbollah** is weakened but not disarmed. The **LAF** has promised to deploy, but without the necessary means. And **civilian Lebanon** continues to bleed, slowly, inexorably.

This Israeli refusal to withdraw is, objectively, **the pebble in the shoe** of all regional diplomacy. Not the only one — an armed **Hezbollah** with **Iran** behind it constitutes a symmetrical problem — but as long as **Israel** does not withdraw from Lebanese territory, no lasting peace architecture can be built. The texts signed in **Washington** will be nothing more than fine paper.

### A people who have waited too long

The **Lebanese** deserve better than this perpetual cycle of war and false agreements. They deserve a functioning state, a viable economy, a sovereign territory. Neither **Israel** nor **Hezbollah** nor **Iran** nor the great powers seem prepared to give them that today. This columnist's opinion piece can only acknowledge the failure and hope that the next round of negotiations — probably in the fall of 2026 — produces something tangible. Hope is slim. But it persists.

*I end this piece with a simple conviction: international law is not optional for the powerful and obligatory for the weak. If we accept that Israel can indefinitely occupy southern Lebanon without consequences, we validate a dangerous precedent that others — Russia, China, Iran — have already begun to use. Consistency is not merely a moral principle; it is a strategic necessity.*

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

## Sources

### Primary sources

- [Le Monde — Israel-Lebanon agreement: a minimalist accord — June 4, 2026](https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2026/06/04/entre-israel-et-le-liban-un-accord-minimaliste-qui-repousse-la-perspective-d-un-cessez-le-feu-durable_6697336_3210.html)

- [Euromaidan Press — Polish FM warns Putin's retaliatory rhetoric — June 24, 2026](https://euromaidanpress.com/2026/06/24/polish-fm-warns-putins-retaliatory-rhetoric-sounds-like-an-announcement-of-a-provocation/)

- The Guardian — Vance: "very good foundation" for Iran deal — June 22, 2026

### Secondary sources

- [Al Jazeera — The Baltics urgently need a de-escalation mechanism — May 27, 2026](https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2026/5/27/the-baltics-urgently-need-a-de-escalation-mechanism-belarus-can-help)

- [ISW — Iran Update Special Report — June 21, 2026](https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-june-21-2026/)

- [Ground News — US-Iran initial agreement, ceasefire and sanctions — June 23, 2026](https://ground.news/article/b656df9e-us-iran-initial-agreement-ceasefire-sanctions)

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Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/billet-israel-refuse-de-quitter-le-liban-le-caillou-dans-l-accord