# OPINION: F126 Cancelled, SCAF Buried, Pensions Delayed — Germany Learning Hardship at Full Speed

> In a single week of June 2026, Germany absorbed three consecutive shocks that say something essential about its relationship with power: the cancellation of the F126 frigate program, the official burial of the Franco-German sixth-generation fighter SCAF, and the presentation of a pension reform that will push the legal retirement age toward 70. Three seemingly disparate issues.

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Note
- Published: 2026-06-27
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/billet-f126-annulee-scaf-enterre-retraites-repoussees-l-allemagne-apprend-la-dur

## Key takeaways

- The F126 program was closed on June 24, 2026, after DSNS missed deadlines; costs reached over 18 billion euros, and Germany will order eight smaller MEKO A-200 frigates from TKMS instead.
- On June 8, 2026, Macron and Merz officially buried the piloted fighter component of SCAF, after nine years of Dassault-Airbus disputes over intellectual property and work shares.
- The author sees the German consensus model as too slow for current threats, and argues Germany needs a clear defence doctrine and faster acquisition processes.
- Pension commission recommendations, presented June 23, 2026, include linking retirement age to life expectancy and ending the "Rente mit 63."
- The author calls Merz's response pragmatic and a start, but doubts it is sufficient.

## Introduction: Berlin Against the Wall of Its Own Ambition

### A Week That Summarizes Ten Years of Avoided Decisions

In a single week of **June 2026**, **Germany** absorbed three consecutive shocks that say something essential about its relationship with power: the cancellation of the **F126** frigate program, the official burial of the Franco-German sixth-generation fighter **SCAF**, and the presentation of a pension reform that will push the legal retirement age toward **70**. Three seemingly disparate issues. One common thread: a nation that has long managed its structural difficulties through avoidance and must now confront them all at once.

This opinion piece is not an inventory of disasters. It is an attempt to understand why **Germany** — the **European Union**'s largest economy, a nation that brilliantly completed its reunification and dominated the continent for thirty years — finds itself today forced to reform, cancel, and improvise on all fronts simultaneously. The answer is simple to state, hard to accept: **Berlin** has lived too long on its past achievements, and reality is now presenting the bill.

### The Paradox of the Paralyzed Giant

**Germany** possesses the world's fourth-largest economy, a world-class manufacturing industry, and some of the most solid public finances in **Europe**. It has a tradition of engineering, precision, and quality that the world envies. And yet, in **2026**, it is incapable of building modern frigates on time and on budget, incapable of agreeing with **France** on a combat aircraft, and incapable of reforming its pension system without triggering a political crisis. This paradox deserves examination without complacency.

*Germany in 2026 reminds me of a great company that was long the best in its field and, when faced with disruption, responds with committees, studies, and process reviews rather than rapid decisions. Operational excellence under stable conditions can become a weakness in emergency conditions. Germany excels in normalcy. It suffers in urgency. And the world of 2026 is not normal.*

## The F126 — Symbol of a Defence Industry That Cannot Reform Itself

### Six Frigates, Ten Billion Euros, Six Years Late

The **F126** program was meant to be the pride of the German navy (**Bundesmarine**): six giant anti-submarine frigates of **10,500 tonnes** and **166 metres**, with an initial budget of **10 billion euros**. Launched in **2020**, the contract had been awarded to Dutch shipyard **Damen Schelde Naval Shipbuilding (DSNS)**. Six years later, the verdict is devastating: **DSNS** did not meet its deadlines or budget constraints, the first vessel (originally planned for **2027**) could not be delivered before **2031** at the earliest, and the completion cost had ballooned to more than **18 billion euros** — nearly double the original estimate.

On **June 24, 2026**, the **Ministry of Defence** officially closed the program. The market reaction was immediate: shares of **Rheinmetall** — which was involved in the subcontracting chain — fell by as much as **13%** intraday. Shares of **ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems (TKMS)**, which will inherit the new contract, surged **10%**. In place of the six **F126** frigates, **Germany** will order eight **MEKO A-200** frigates (**F128**) from **TKMS** — vessels of **3,900 tonnes**, much smaller, at a total cost of approximately **11.6 billion euros** for all eight. The first delivery is expected by **2029**.

### What the F126 Reveals About Germany's Strategic Procrastination

The **F126** disaster is not just an industrial failure — it is the symptom of a deeper malady in German defence acquisition management. **Germany** had entrusted the construction of its frigates to a foreign shipyard (**DSNS**, Dutch), thereby bypassing its own domestic shipyards (**TKMS**, **NVL**) for cost and capacity reasons. It then hesitated for months on the cancellation decision, preferring to explore rescue solutions involving a prime contractor transfer to **NVL** (a **Rheinmetall** subsidiary) — an option ultimately rejected as unviable.

The result is that **2.3 billion euros** — according to official figures — have already been spent on a program that produces nothing. Worse: the German navy will find itself without modern anti-submarine capability for several more years. In a context of growing Russian submarine activity in the **Baltic Sea** and **North Atlantic**, this is a concerning capability gap for **NATO**.

*I will be direct: this is an industrial and strategic catastrophe. Two billion euros swallowed for nothing. A program that takes ten years to reach a cancellation decision. A navy without modern ASW frigates during a period when Russian submarines are more active than ever. This is not one person's fault — it is the result of a defence program management culture that prioritizes consensus over decision. Germany must fundamentally reform its military acquisition processes.*

## SCAF Buried — The Failure of a European Dream

### Nine Years for Nothing, a Hundred Billion Lost in Negotiations

The **SCAF** (Future Air Combat System), launched in **2017** by **Macron** and Chancellor **Merkel**, was meant to be the symbol of European **strategic sovereignty** in the air domain: a Franco-German-Spanish sixth-generation fighter to replace the **Rafale** and **Eurofighter** by **2040**. A program valued at more than **100 billion euros**. On **June 8, 2026**, at a summit in **Montenegro**, **Macron** and **Merz** officially buried the piloted aircraft component of the program — the **NGF** (New Generation Fighter). It was the end of an ambition.

The cause of this failure is well known: the chronic inability of **Dassault** and **Airbus** to agree on the distribution of intellectual property and industrial work shares. The two companies did not see themselves as partners but as rivals. **Dassault** refused to share its flight navigation technologies, considered the DNA of its expertise. **Airbus** wanted a leadership share proportional to **Germany**'s industrial weight. Nine years of negotiations did not resolve this fundamental tension. German Defence Minister **Boris Pistorius** summarized the situation with rare candour: **"It was a great ambitious project that is now collapsing in the face of reality."**

### What SCAF Should Have Been — and Will Not Be

The abandonment of **SCAF** has strategic implications that go beyond the industrial file. The program was meant to give **Europe** an air combat capability independent of the **United States** — particularly independent of the American **F-35**, whose purchase by several European countries creates a technological and political dependency on **Washington**. Without **SCAF**, **Europe** will likely turn to additional **F-35** acquisitions or life extensions of the **Eurofighter** — which precisely consolidates the transatlantic dependency the program was meant to reduce.

**Spain**, the third partner in the program, finds itself in a particularly uncomfortable position. **Madrid** had committed resources and political hopes to **SCAF**. The Franco-German abandonment of the piloted aircraft component without deep prior consultation with the Spanish is a reminder of **Europe**'s bad habit of a two-speed approach in which major decisions are made between **Paris** and **Berlin**, with others informed after the fact.

*The failure of SCAF deeply saddens me — not because of industrial interests, but because of what it represented for the European project. If Europe cannot agree to build a combat aircraft together, how could it agree on truly difficult political decisions? The industrial rivalry between Dassault and Airbus killed more than a weapons program. It killed a demonstration that European strategic autonomy is possible.*

## The Berlin-Paris-NATO Triangle After SCAF

### Germany Turning Toward Washington

The abandonment of **SCAF** reveals a deep divergence between the French and German strategic visions. **Macron**'s **France** has been pushing for years toward a **strategically autonomous Europe**, capable of acting militarily without systematically depending on the **United States**. **Germany**, since the end of the **Cold War**, has developed a visceral Atlanticism — **NATO** with the **United States** at its head is perceived as the ultimate and irreplaceable security guarantee.

Chancellor **Merz** confirmed this divergence by declaring that German requirements for a combat aircraft differ from French requirements — **Germany** does not need an aircraft capable of carrying nuclear weapons or taking off from an aircraft carrier. These constraints specific to France's **Force de Frappe** and its navy made a common design impossible. **Germany** will probably look toward the American **F-35** or toward the independent development of an **Eurofighter** successor in partnership with the **United Kingdom** and **Italy** — the **GCAP** (Global Combat Air Programme).

### The Consequences for the Franco-German Partnership

The failure of **SCAF** is the latest in a series of disappointments in the "**Franco-German couple**" that traditionally forms the motor of the **European Union**. Disagreements over the management of the Ukrainian crisis, energy policy (nuclear vs. renewables), reform of European budgetary rules, and now air defence, paint a growing distance between the two capitals. This is not a break — the two countries have too many common interests to split — but it is a real strategic divergence that weakens their ability to bring **Europe** along with them.

**Paris** will likely focus on its own **Rafale F5** program — an advanced evolution of the current fighter — and on partnerships with certain European countries that share its vision of strategic autonomy. **Germany** will find itself in a paradoxical situation: it is massively increasing its defence budget (**2% of GDP** since **2023**, with further increases announced), but without a coherent strategic vision of how to spend that money optimally.

*Germany increasing its defence budget without a clear doctrine concerns me. Money alone does not build military power. You need a vision — what threats you are protecting against, which partnerships to prioritize, which capabilities to develop independently. Buying American F-35s solves the short-term problem but deepens strategic dependency. I would like to hear Merz or Pistorius explain what Germany's defence doctrine is for 2030. For now, I only hear reactions to successive crises.*

## German Rearmament — Budgetary Ambition, Chaotic Reality

### Scholz's Zeitenwende — Two Years Later

In **February 2022**, immediately after the Russian invasion of **Ukraine**, Chancellor **Scholz** uttered the word "**Zeitenwende**" (historic turning point) and announced a special fund of **100 billion euros** to modernize the **Bundeswehr**. Two and a half years later, the reality of German rearmament is more complicated than the speech promised. The cancellations, delays, and industrial improvisations — of which the **F126** and **SCAF** are the most visible examples — illustrate the systemic difficulties of converting increased budgets into effective military capabilities.

The **Bundeswehr**'s acquisition processes are renowned for their bureaucratic slowness. The **BAAINBw** (Federal Office of Bundeswehr Equipment, Information Technology and In-Service Support) — the German equivalent of France's **DGA** or the American **DARPA** — is often criticized for its delays, administrative rigidity, and difficulty adapting to operational emergencies. The speed with which **Ukraine** has been able to deploy and integrate new weapons systems is the polar opposite of the German tempo.

### The MEKO Orders — A Pragmatic Decision With Obvious Limits

The decision to cancel the **F126** and order eight **MEKO A-200** frigates is pragmatic in the short term but imperfect in substance. The **MEKO A-200** vessels are proven, well-known ships with an established logistics chain. **TKMS**, the builder, has promised a first delivery by **2029**. But the **MEKO A-200** are **3,900-tonne** frigates — less than a third of the displacement planned for the **F126**. Their anti-submarine capabilities, while real, are significantly inferior to what the **F126** would have offered.

Vice Admiral **Jan Christian Kaack**, head of the German navy, has certified that the **MEKO** frigates can fulfil essential anti-submarine warfare missions and honour Germany's commitments to **NATO**. This is technically defensible. But it is a second-choice response to a problem that called for greater ambition. **Germany**, which aspires to be a credible naval power in the **Baltic Sea** and **North Atlantic**, finds itself with vessels that reflect the budgetary constraints of an emergency replacement program rather than a long-term naval vision.

*The MEKO A-200 are good ships — do not misread me. But choosing them by default, after losing two billion euros in the F126, in a context of growing Russian submarine threats in the Baltic, is dispiriting. Germany deserved better than this. And so did its sailors. I hope the lesson of the F126 will finally lead to a deep reform of defence acquisition program management — but I am not holding my breath.*

## The German Army and Ukraine — Between Stated Support and Persistent Ambiguities

### Arms Deliveries to Ukraine — A Real but Contested Contribution

On the Ukrainian file, **Germany** made a significant shift under **Scholz**, then under **Merz**. The **Bundeswehr** delivered **Patriot** systems, **Leopard 2A6** tanks, **Gepard** anti-aircraft systems, **PzH 2000** artillery, and early warning systems. These deliveries have been invaluable to **Ukraine** — the **Patriot** in particular has saved lives and protected critical Ukrainian infrastructure against Russian missile strikes.

But **Germany** continues to be perceived by some allies — particularly the Baltic states and **Poland** — as too cautious, too slow, too prone to concessions toward **Moscow**. Every decision to deliver new systems required lengthy political debates. The memory of decades of "**Wandel durch Handel**" (change through trade) — that doctrine which predicted that economic exchanges with **Russia** would transform it peacefully — is still present in some German political families, even though it collapsed with the **2022** invasion.

### Under Merz — A More Confident Atlanticism?

Under **Friedrich Merz**, **Germany** appears to have assumed a clearer Atlanticism than under the equivocating **Scholz**. Support for **Ukraine** is maintained and even strengthened in its public statements. Germany's commitment to spending **2% of GDP** on defence is being met. Planned spending on military capabilities — including the **MEKO** frigates replacing the **F126** — points in the right direction. But strategic coherence is still lacking. More money is being spent. Without always knowing why.

What **Ukraine** expects from **Germany** — and what the **NATO** eastern flank member states expect — is not only money and equipment. It is also a clear political commitment that **Germany** is prepared to militarily defend its allies if necessary. On this point, the German domestic debate remains difficult — the constitutional and cultural pacifism of postwar **Germany** is deeply rooted and resists the transformation that the current geopolitical circumstances demand.

*Germany still carries the weight of its history with a guilt that sometimes prevents it from acting like the great power it has become. That guilt was understandable — even healthy — in the postwar decades. But in 2026, faced with a Russia that bombs Ukrainian cities, that paralysis becomes passive complicity. Zelensky needs allies who act, not allies who deliberate. Merz is better than Scholz on this point — but he can do better still.*

## Retirement at 70 — Third Shock of the German Week

### A Political Calendar Inadvertently Overloaded

On **June 23, 2026** — the day after the **F126** cancellation — the pensions commission presented its **33 recommendations**, including the progressive indexation of retirement age to life expectancy and the elimination of the "**Rente mit 63**" (retirement at 63). This calendar coincidence created a particularly politically charged week for the **Merz** government, which simultaneously had to manage three sensitive files.

The overlap of these three crises — naval defence, combat aviation, pensions — is not accidental. It reflects the accumulation of deferred decisions over many years. The frigates should have been ordered differently. **SCAF** should either have been seriously engaged or abandoned much earlier. Pensions should have been reformed after the **2018** report that drew the same conclusions as the **2026** commission. All of this is arriving simultaneously because **Germany** has been pushing difficult decisions down the road until the impossibility of waiting any longer made them urgent.

### German Governance Facing the Speed of the World

The **Federal Republic** is built on a model of consensus — "**Konsens**" — which has its virtues: it favours decisions that enjoy broad social legitimacy, minimizes abrupt disruptions, and ensures continuity of public policies. But this model has a major flaw in an accelerating world: it is too slow. When the Russian threat forces rapid rearmament, when **AI** disruption forces labour market adaptation, when demographic transition forces pension reform — the German consensus tempo belongs to a bygone era.

The fundamental question these three simultaneous crises raise is: can **Germany** reform at the speed that circumstances demand while maintaining its consensus governance model? This is the central tension in German politics in **2026**. **Merz** appears to have understood the urgency. It remains to be seen whether he has the political tools to convert that understanding into action.

*I find the German consensus governance model fundamentally sound for normal times. But we are no longer in normal times. A Europe at war on its borders, a global economy disrupted by AI, a demographically unsustainable pension system — all of this calls for an agility that consensus by nature slows down. This is the existential challenge of liberal democracy: can it make hard decisions fast enough to survive? The answer, for Germany, is being decided right now.*

## The Bundeswehr's Credibility Crisis — Between Promises and Reality

### The 100 Billion Sondervermögen — Spent How?

The special fund of **100 billion euros** (**Sondervermögen**) announced in **2022** was legally created and the funds are available. But the **Bundeswehr**'s ability to spend them effectively is more limited than it appears. The problems are multiple: insufficient domestic industrial capacity to absorb massive and sudden orders, administrative acquisition processes that take years, a shortage of trained personnel to operate new systems, and competition with other **NATO** nations ordering the same equipment from the same manufacturers.

The global shortage of certain weapons systems — notably **IRIS-T** surface-to-air missiles, artillery ammunition, and anti-drone defence systems — means that even countries like **Germany** that have the budgets must wait several years before receiving their orders. The production deficit in the European defence industry, revealed by **Ukraine**'s needs, is a collective problem that transcends any single country's political choices.

### Soldiers Without Equipment — A Persistent Paradox

Parliamentary investigations and reports from the **Bundeswehr Ombudsman** have regularly documented German soldiers lacking essential equipment — uniforms, training ammunition, spare parts. These deficiencies, inherited from decades of underinvestment during the post-**Cold War** era, do not disappear overnight even with increased budgets. It takes years to rebuild stocks, train personnel, and upgrade logistics capabilities.

In this context, the pragmatic decision to order **MEKO A-200** frigates rather than experimental over-budget ones may be wiser than it appears. These are known ships, with known equipment, for known missions. The risk of a new setback is limited. The German navy needs ships that work, not ships that promise theoretical capabilities they will never be able to demonstrate.

*There is wisdom in pragmatism — ordering what you know how to build rather than what you hope to build. But ambition is also needed — a vision of what the German navy must be in ten or twenty years. The MEKO frigates fill an urgent gap. They do not build a naval doctrine. Germany needs both: immediate capability AND long-term vision. For now, it is managing the emergency. I hope it will not stop there.*

## Germany in the Mirror of Its Allies — Stark Comparisons

### France — A Counter-Intuitive Model

**France** is often presented by economic liberals as the counter-model: too much state, too many rigidities, too slow to reform. And yet, in defence, **France** demonstrates a coherence and effectiveness that **Germany** lacks. The **Rafale** program was developed, produced, and successfully exported. The nuclear **Force de Frappe** is maintained. The French navy has operational aircraft carriers. The French defence industry — centred around major groups such as **Dassault**, **Thales**, **Naval Group**, and **KNDS** — is capable of producing complete weapons systems from design to delivery.

This French capability rests on a political decision made after **1945** and maintained since: to have a national defence industry capable of strategic sovereignty. This choice has a cost — often criticized as economically inefficient — but it provides a strategic resilience that **Germany**, which outsourced its security to **NATO** for 70 years, has not developed.

### The United Kingdom and Poland — Two Models of Urgency

The **United Kingdom**, despite the chaos of **Brexit** and its chronic economic difficulties, maintains a significant defence industrial capability and a serious military commitment. **Poland** — which has become one of **NATO**'s most militarily engaged countries, with defence spending exceeding **4% of GDP** — is the most striking example of what a country can do when it perceives a real existential threat. **Warsaw** orders massively, quickly, and without **Berlin**'s bureaucratic hesitations. The contrast is striking.

These comparisons are not a condemnation of **Germany**. They illustrate the potential flexibility of defence policies in democracies when political will is present. **Germany** has the economic and industrial capacity to become a serious military power rapidly — if it truly decides to want it. The week of **June 23–26, 2026** may be the additional alarm signal it needed.

*Poland spends 4% of its GDP on defence. France maintains its nuclear deterrent and exports Rafale jets worldwide. The United Kingdom remains a serious military actor despite its difficulties. And Germany — Europe's largest economy — manages frigate cancellations, buries combat aircraft programs, and debates every acquisition decision for years. The gap between German economic power and its military power is an anomaly that Russia has clearly noted. It is time to correct this anomaly.*

## The Reconstruction — What Germany Must Now Do

### A Clear Defence Doctrine — Vision First, Purchases Second

The absolute priority for **Germany** is to define a **clear defence doctrine** for the years **2026–2040**. What threats? What operational theatres have priority? Which capabilities to develop independently vs. purchase from allies? Which development partnerships to prioritize? Without this doctrine, military spending will always be reactive — responses to crises rather than the implementation of a vision. The German **White Paper on Defence**, which was due for an update in **2025**, is being drafted. It should be the strategic compass that is missing from all of these purchasing decisions.

In parallel, reforming the **Bundeswehr**'s acquisition processes is urgent. The bureaucratic slowness of **BAAINBw** has been documented for years — it is time to address it structurally, not at the margins. Models exist in **Europe** (France's **DGA**, the UK's **DSTL**) and in the **United States** (**DARPA**, **DIU**) from which **Germany** could draw inspiration to accelerate its acquisition cycles.

### A New Germany — Possible but Demanding

The week of **June 23–26, 2026** exposed **Germany**'s structural challenges with unusual clarity. The good news in all of this is that **Merz** appears to have the correct diagnosis — and the willingness to address the problems. The bad news — cancellations, delays, coalition difficulties — are the painful manifestations of a necessary transformation. **Germany** cannot remain what it was: an economic giant that outsources its security, defers its reforms, and avoids difficult decisions.

The **Germany** of **2030** will be different from that of **2020**. It will be militarily stronger, with a reoriented defence industry. It will be more realistic about pensions, with a system better suited to actual demographics. It will no doubt be less ambitious on certain European programs it cannot finance — but more reliable on the commitments it makes. This is a painful adjustment. It is also a necessary maturity.

*I trust Germany — it is a serious country with solid institutions and responsible citizens. The week we just lived through is symptomatic of a period of transition, not a collapse. Germany has overcome far more difficult trials. What concerns me is the slowness of the awakening — and the time it will take for today's decisions to translate into real capabilities tomorrow. In the current geopolitical environment, time is as precious a resource as budgets.*

## The Provisional Balance — A Nation in Forced Transformation

### What the Week of June 23–26 Says About Germany in 2026

The week of **June 23–26, 2026** will have been one of the most revealing weeks for German politics since the "**Zeitenwende**" of **2022**. It simultaneously laid bare the limits of military acquisition (F126), European defence cooperation (SCAF), and social welfare sustainability (pensions). These three domains are distinct in their mechanisms but converge in their diagnosis: **Germany** has managed its structural difficulties through deferral and avoidance, and reality is now presenting all the bills at once.

**Merz**'s response — pragmatic on frigates, resolute on pensions, accepting reality on **SCAF** — is that of a leader who has decided to manage reality rather than deny it. That is already more than his predecessors. Is it sufficient to transform **Germany** at the speed that circumstances demand? Probably not. But it is a start.

### What Europe Must Retain

**Europe** is watching what is happening in **Germany** with attention mixed with anxiety. The continent's largest economy is undergoing a strategic reconfiguration. Common European programs — whether industrial, military, or social — depend on Germany's ability to define its vision, honour its commitments, and make decisions within reasonable timeframes. A strong, coherent, and reformed **Germany** is **Europe**'s principal asset. A hesitant, paralyzed, and lagging **Germany** is its principal burden. The outcome of this transitional period will largely determine **Europe**'s fate for the coming decades.

*We sometimes forget that Germany matters not only for itself. It is the economic engine, the political stabilizer, and the main financial contributor of the European Union. What happens in Germany affects the entire continent. That is why the week of June 23–26, 2026 deserved such careful analysis. This is not simply a German story — it is a European story.*

## The Eurodrone Programme and Combat Drones — Europe Without a Vision for the Future

### The Other European Defence Programme in Agony

Beyond **SCAF**, European defence cooperation has another troubled project: the **Eurodrone** programme. This high-altitude surveillance drone, developed in cooperation between **Germany**, **France**, **Spain**, and **Italy**, is accumulating delays and budget overruns. Its first delivery, initially planned for **2025**, has been pushed back to **2027** at best. The programme, designed to give European armies an independent persistent observation capability free from American systems, illustrates the same industrial cooperation difficulties as **SCAF**.

These difficulties are structural. Each participating country wants its share of the industrial work, its own technical specifications, its own intellectual property clauses. The result is an aircraft or drone designed by committee, whose technical compromises translate into additional costs and repeated delays. The **Bundeswehr**, which urgently needs modern surveillance capabilities — notably in the face of Russian activities on **NATO**'s eastern flank — cannot wait indefinitely. This reality is pushing **Germany** to consider American alternatives like the **Reaper** or to develop its own independent capabilities.

### Counter-Drone Defence — A Critical Blind Spot

The conflict in **Ukraine** has demonstrated the crucial importance of **drones** in modern combat — both as attack vectors and as reconnaissance tools. It has also demonstrated the necessity of effective **counter-drone defence** systems. The **Bundeswehr** has limited capabilities in this domain, while **NATO** armies consider this gap one of the most urgent vulnerabilities to address.

Germany's defence industry — **Rheinmetall**, **MBDA Germany**, **Hensoldt** — is developing counter-drone solutions, but their integration into **Bundeswehr** forces will take time. German military acquisition procedures, notoriously slow and bureaucratic, are ill-suited to the operational urgency revealed by the Ukrainian conflict. This is a domain where reforming acquisition processes is as important as the budget investments themselves.

*What strikes me about the SCAF affair and the Eurodrone affair is that Europe keeps repeating the same mistakes. Multinational programs launched with great ambitions, undermined by national industrial interests, ultimately costing more and taking longer than national or American alternatives. We must either fundamentally reform how these programs are governed, or accept increased dependency on American systems. This choice cannot be avoided indefinitely.*

## Defence Industrial Policy — The Urgency of Systemic Reform

### Rheinmetall and Industrial Acceleration

**Rheinmetall**, Germany's largest manufacturer of ammunition and armoured vehicles, is one of the rare industrial actors in German defence that has managed to significantly accelerate its production since **2022**. The company has announced massive investments in expanding its artillery ammunition production capacity — an absolute priority for Eastern European armies consuming considerable quantities in support of **Ukraine**. **Rheinmetall** has also established a joint venture with the Ukrainian army for the production of armoured vehicles in **Ukraine** — a strategically courageous decision.

But the **Rheinmetall** example also reveals the gulf between actors capable of rapid adaptation and institutional military acquisition programs. State contracts for major military platforms — ships, aircraft, missiles — remain mired in procedures stretching over years or even decades. The **Bundeswehr** needs to fundamentally reform its acquisition processes — not to sacrifice rigour, but to adapt decision-making speed to contemporary strategic imperatives.

### The Bundestag as Accelerator or Brake?

One of the peculiarities of the German defence system is the central role of the **Bundestag** in military acquisition decisions. While this parliamentary oversight strengthens democratic legitimacy, it can also considerably slow decision-making processes. **Parliament** must approve major armament contracts, creating opportunities for political blocking or parliamentary negotiations that have little to do with actual military needs.

**France**, by comparison, has far more centralized and faster military acquisition procedures. The **United Kingdom** reformed its procedures after the acquisition disasters of the **2000s–2010s**. **Germany** needs a comparable reform — maintaining democratic oversight while creating more agile decision-making pathways for urgent military acquisitions. This reform is politically difficult but strategically necessary.

*Democracy and military effectiveness are not incompatible — provided that democratic oversight mechanisms are intelligently designed. The German model, which imposes detailed parliamentary oversight on every acquisition decision, was designed to prevent the militarist excesses of German history. That is understandable. But it must be adapted to contemporary emergencies. **Emergency procedures** are needed for acquisitions in times of crisis — without sacrificing long-term democratic oversight.*

## The Domestic Dimension — How Germans Are Living These Transformations

### Public Opinion Facing Rearmament and Reform

Opinion polls in **Germany** reflect a society in transition. A **majority of Germans** now support an increase in defence spending — a radical shift compared to the pre-**2022** mindset. But this principled support runs into concrete reluctance: a majority of the population opposes the deployment of German soldiers to fight in **Ukraine**, and trade unions remain fiercely opposed to pension reform. **Germany** is a country that wants the results of reforms without paying the cost.

This gap between principled support and practical resistance is **Merz**'s central political challenge. He must simultaneously convince public opinion that the ongoing transformations are necessary, manage trade union opposition to pensions, maintain governing coalition support for defence spending, and produce tangible results quickly enough not to lose the confidence of allies. This is a high-wire political balancing act.

### Generation Z Facing the Strategic Legacy

Young Germans of **Generation Z** — born after reunification, raised in a country at peace since **1945** — must assimilate a strategic reality that their parents and grandparents had carefully kept at arm's length. War on **Europe**'s borders, the return of defence spending, the end of the peace dividend — all of this challenges the certainties on which their worldview was built. Recent polls show a German **Generation Z** more willing than previous generations to commit to the country's defence — but also more anxious about the world's uncertainties.

Voluntary military service, which replaced conscription in **Germany** in **2011**, is now being debated again. Some military and political figures are raising the need for a form of national service — military or civilian — to strengthen societal resilience and recreate a link between civil society and defence institutions. This debate, unthinkable in **Germany** ten years ago, is now possible — a sign that German strategic culture is genuinely in transformation.

*Transforming a nation's strategic culture takes a generation, not a legislature. What **Merz** is doing today — making difficult decisions on pensions, accepting the end of **SCAF**, reorienting military acquisitions — is laying the conditions for the next generation of Germans to inherit a more robust and realistic country. This is invisible in the short term. It is essential in the long term. This is the kind of policy that democracies rarely do well — because it produces no immediate electoral gratification.*

## Conclusion: Hardship as the Remedy for Complacency

### What "Learning Hardship" Means

The title of this opinion piece speaks of a **Germany learning hardship at full speed**. But what is strategic hardship for a country? It is not brutality or indifference to values. It is the ability to look reality in the eye, to make difficult decisions even when they are politically costly, to honour commitments even when it is uncomfortable, and to invest today for benefits that will only arrive tomorrow. That is precisely what circumstances are demanding of **Germany** in **2026**.

Cancelling the **F126** despite the losses already incurred — that is hardship. Burying **SCAF** rather than indefinitely pretending it might still come together — that is hardship. Reforming pensions despite trade union opposition — that is hardship. These decisions hurt in the moment. They build something solid for what comes next. **Germany** — and with it **Europe** — needs them.

### Merz's Choice — Between Historical Legacy and Present Urgency

Whether **Friedrich Merz** succeeds or fails in his attempt to reform **Germany** on multiple fronts simultaneously, his week of **June 23–26, 2026** outlined what his government will be judged on: its ability to make difficult decisions in the face of real problems. Not perfect decisions — there are none. Courageous decisions, within the time allotted, with the information available. History will judge harshly those who decided nothing. It will be more indulgent with those who tried, even imperfectly.

*I will conclude with this conviction: **Germany** is learning hardship at full speed, and it is painful. But a more realistic, more agile, and more decisive **Germany** is better news for **Europe** than a comfortable and paralyzed **Germany**. The world of **2026** has no room for nations that wait for problems to resolve themselves. **Merz** has understood this. The real question is whether Germany's institutions can keep up with his pace.*

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

## Sources

### Primary sources

- [Defense News — Germany scraps F126 frigate program, pivots to MEKO warships — June 24, 2026](https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2026/06/24/germany-scraps-f126-frigate-program-pivots-to-meko-warships-amid-cost-and-contractor-chaos/)

- [Naval Today — Germany cancels F126 frigate program — June 24, 2026](https://www.navaltoday.com/2026/06/24/germany-cancels-f126-frigate-program-plans-to-acquire-eight-meko-a-200-frigates-instead/)

- [Breaking Defense — SCAF is dead: Sixth-gen Franco-German fighter is all but over — February 18, 2026](https://breakingdefense.com/2026/02/scaf-is-dead-sixth-gen-franco-german-fighter-is-all-but-over-officials-and-analysts-say/)

- [New York Times — Germany Drops Plan to Build Warplane With Allies — June 9, 2026](https://www.nytimes.com/2026/06/09/world/europe/europe-fighter-fcas-germany-france.html)

### Secondary sources

- [Euronews — Rheinmetall sinks as Germany axes mega-warship project — June 24, 2026](https://www.euronews.com/business/2026/06/24/rheinmetall-sinks-as-germany-axes-mega-warship-project-after-spending-2bn)

- [Meta-Defense.fr — F126 cancelled, MEKO A-200 ordered — June 24, 2026](https://meta-defense.fr/en/2026/06/24/f126-cancelled-meko-a200-deutsche-marine-shortfall/)

- [HotAir — Germany's defense ramp-up just can't seem to get out of its own way — June 24, 2026](https://hotair.com/tree-hugging-sister/2026/06/24/germanys-defense-ramp-up-just-cant-seem-to-get-out-of-its-own-way-n3816306)

- [The Guardian — Germany pension reform — June 23, 2026](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/jun/23/merz-plans-germany-retirement-age-pension-reforms)

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Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/billet-f126-annulee-scaf-enterre-retraites-repoussees-l-allemagne-apprend-la-dur