# OPINION: U.S. Customs — the Decree Turning Fraud Hunters Into a Fiscal War Machine

> On June 3, 2026, Donald Trump signed Executive Order 14411 titled "Strengthening Customs Enforcement," and most mainstream media barely noticed. People were

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Note
- Published: 2026-06-23
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/billet-douanes-americaines-le-decret-qui-transforme-la-chasse-aux-fraudeurs-en-m

## Key takeaways

- The decree sets deadlines of 45, 90, and 180 days, targeting foreign importers of record, customs brokers, and fraudsters who undervalue goods or falsify origin.
- It requires a 50% minimum penalty floor, bars foreign IORs from informal entries, and bans importers that fail to meet new conditions.
- It makes brokers more accountable for vetting clients and subjects them to continuous verification.
- Navarro projects $15 billion in the first year, $25 billion the next, and $80 to $100 billion long term, which the author finds overly optimistic.
- The author warns that allied firms, including Canadian and European companies, could be caught in the same net, and that small importers will inherit rules shaped by large companies.

## Introduction: Washington Pulls Out the Big Customs Hammer

### A Decree Signed in Silence, With Devastating Effects

On June 3, 2026, **Donald Trump** signed Executive Order 14411 titled **"Strengthening Customs Enforcement,"** and most mainstream media barely noticed. People were still talking about the tariff refunds ordered by the Supreme Court, the legal acrobatics around Section 122, the upcoming G7 summit. Meanwhile, in the shadow of official press releases, the Trump administration had just fundamentally reconfigured the American customs system, with consequences that will affect thousands of importers, customs brokers, and global supply chains.

This decree is not a show piece. It is precise, dated, equipped with binding deadlines — **45 days, 90 days, 180 days** — and targets three main objectives: foreign importers improperly identified, overly compliant customs brokers, and fraudsters who undervalue their merchandise or manipulate origin declarations. According to Peter Navarro, senior advisor for trade and manufacturing, this reform should generate **$15 billion in the first year**, $25 billion in the next, and as much as **$80 to $100 billion** in the long term by plugging the gaps opened by fraudsters.

### The Mechanics of an Unprecedented Regulatory Overhaul

The text charges the Secretary of Homeland Security to revise eligibility criteria for Importers of Record (**IOR**), strengthen supply chain disclosure obligations, establish a minimum penalty threshold of **50% of the assessed amount**, and tighten rules applicable to customs brokers. **U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)** is on the front line. The decree was published in the Federal Register on June 10, 2026 (91 FR 35125). It is official, in force, and serious.

What many have not yet grasped is that this text does not invent new customs categories — it **intensifies enforcement of existing rules**. As Trade Compliance Records noted in its June 6, 2026 analysis: "The executive order does not create a new compliance category; it intensifies the enforcement of existing categories, specifically regarding broker due diligence on supplier documentation." There lies all the subtlety.

*I must admit something: for years, I watched American tariff wars with a certain weariness. Customs duties announced with fanfare, challenged in court, struck down, reimposed. An ongoing spectacle. But this particular decree holds my attention more. It does not talk about new taxes. It talks about enforcement. And that, courts have a much harder time stopping.*

## The Context: When the Supreme Court Struck Down IEEPA Tariffs

### The Judicial Earthquake of February 20, 2026

To understand why this decree exists, one must go back to **February 20, 2026**. That day, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a 6-to-3 ruling in **Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump**: the president cannot impose customs tariffs under the **International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA)**. The ruling is clear — imposing tariffs is a congressional taxing power, and IEEPA does not delegate that power sufficiently explicitly. Direct consequence: the famous "Liberation Day" tariffs of April 2025, as well as the fentanyl-related duties imposed on China, Mexico, and Canada, were invalidated. CBP had to begin processing refunds that could reach **$127 to $182 billion**.

The Trump administration did not capitulate. It immediately pivoted to **Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974** to impose a 10% surcharge on nearly all imports for 150 days. On May 7, 2026, the Court of International Trade ruled that this use of Section 122 exceeded the statute's legal limits — but the decision is on appeal, and tariffs continue to be collected in the meantime. The Atlantic Council, in its Trump Tariff Tracker updated June 17, 2026, notes that the administration launched two major **Section 301** investigations to keep tariff revenues "essentially unchanged."

### Building a Strategy That Holds Up in Court

It is in this context of repeated judicial defeat that the June 3, 2026 decree takes on its full meaning. Rather than inventing a new legal basis for additional tariffs — an approach that risked being struck down again — the Trump administration chose a far more robust path: **use existing authorities**, clearly inscribed in the U.S. Trade Code (19 U.S.C. 66, 1484, 1498, 1623, 1624, 4320), to force customs compliance. Sidley Austin, in its June 8, 2026 analysis, notes that "the sign that Trump's America First trade policy aims to be comprehensive in scope, extending beyond new tariff regimes."

The strategy is therefore twofold: on one hand, rebuild the tariff wall through Sections 301 and 232 — legal foundations that courts have historically found harder to invalidate. On the other, **maximize collection on existing tariffs** by tracking evasion, false declarations, and undervaluation. All while relying on customs authorities Congress has unambiguously delegated for decades. Less exposed to legal attacks. Far more dangerous for fraudsters.

*Here is what distinguishes this decree from the usual tariff posturing: it relies on decades-old customs law, not a creative reading of an emergency statute. Hard for a judge to overturn in two hearings. In its own way, it represents a moment of legal maturity from an administration that has been sorely lacking in it on the tariff file.*

## Importers of Record Under Total Surveillance

### The Radical Redefinition of Who Can Import

The first major thrust of the decree concerns **Importers of Record (IOR)** — the entities legally responsible for the entry of goods into American territory. The text draws a sharp line between American and foreign IORs. A foreign IOR is any importer not incorporated under American laws, not possessing significant real property assets in the United States, or whose beneficial owners are not U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents. This is a broad definition that will encompass thousands of companies that previously imported without major difficulties.

Within **180 days** of the decree's signing, all IORs will be required to maintain a minimum level of domestic tangible assets or bonds, provide CBP with additional data — anticipated import volumes, real and beneficial ownership disclosure, trade affiliations — and maintain a status of **"good standing"** defined by CBP based on compliance history. Importers who do not meet these conditions will be **prohibited from importing**. No penalty. Outright prohibition.

### Foreign IORs Under Priority Scrutiny

Foreign IORs are subject to even stricter restrictions. They will be **prohibited from using informal entries** — a simplified mechanism commonly used for low-value imports. For formal entries, they can no longer use continuous bonds except by individually demonstrating to CBP that customs revenues would be fully protected. Additionally, they must be validated through the **CTPAT (Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism)** program, or use a customs broker that is itself CTPAT-certified.

Holland & Knight, in its June 9, 2026 analysis, details the practical consequences: Canadian companies that sell to American customers in **DDP (Delivered Duty Paid)** terms — that is, acting as the importer of record themselves — will be directly affected. Foreign companies that created American subsidiaries without real property assets in the United States could also find themselves in the foreign IOR category, with all the resulting constraints. The reform is structural, not cosmetic.

*There is much talk of large Chinese multinationals using shell companies to circumvent tariffs. But this decree will cast a much wider net. Canadian SMEs, European distributors, perfectly legitimate Asian e-commerce operators will find themselves caught in a net designed to catch fraudsters. That is the price of rigor: it is rarely surgically targeted.*

## Customs Brokers: The End of Complacency

### A Profession Transformed Into a Co-Responsible Compliance Actor

**Customs brokers** — those licensed intermediaries who handle the entry formalities for goods on behalf of importers — find themselves at the heart of the new framework. Until now, their liability in the event of fraud committed by their clients was limited. The June 3 decree radically changes this equation. CBP will now be able to impose maximum penalties on brokers who fail to exercise **reasonable due diligence** on their clients, who repeatedly represent non-compliant importers, or who fail to respond to CBP information requests within the required timeframes.

Susan Thomas, CBP's executive deputy commissioner, was explicit in a LinkedIn video: "Brokers, they are responsible for vetting their clients more thoroughly." This simple formulation summarizes a profound transformation. The broker is no longer merely an administrative service provider. It becomes a **compliance actor**, with the financial and legal risks that entails. The NCBFAA (National Customs Brokers & Forwarders Association of America) reported on June 5, 2026 that brokers would face more audits and that those who repeatedly represent non-compliant importers face severe sanctions.

### Continuous Vetting as the New Professional Standard

The decree also requires that within **180 days**, CBP establish enhanced and continuous verification procedures for all actors directly involved in importation: brokers, freight forwarders, bonded warehouse operators, and their affiliates. Lenny Feldman, NCBFAA's legal counsel, noted that CBP is already "very intentionally" requesting identification documents and passports to validate the identity of importers granting powers of attorney to brokers. This level of scrutiny did not previously exist at this scale.

For brokers working with large volumes of foreign importers — particularly in the **cross-border e-commerce** sector — the impact will be immediate. Some will need to completely reorganize their client vetting model, invest in continuous monitoring systems, or even decline mandates deemed too risky. The customs services market will restructure accordingly, with a growing premium for players able to demonstrate flawless compliance.

*I will not feel sorry for customs brokers who turned a blind eye to their clients' questionable practices. The profession has benefited from an implicit code of silence for too long. But I note that we are transforming service providers into customs police auxiliaries — without giving them the investigative means that implies. This is a contradictory injunction that deserves to be named.*

## The 50% Penalty Floor: The End of Easy Negotiation

### A Revolution in Customs Sanction Mitigation

Among the most immediately impactful measures in the decree is the establishment of a **minimum penalty threshold of 50%** of the assessed amount. Until now, the American mitigation system allowed importers to negotiate significant reductions — often down to nominal amounts — by invoking the absence of fraudulent intent, mitigating circumstances, or simply first occurrence. That era is over. Within **90 days** of the decree's signing, DHS must revise its mitigation guidelines to establish this floor.

Holland & Knight underlines the scope of this provision: "Under the old framework, penalties were frequently reduced to nominal amounts. That era appears to be over." Repeat offenders will receive **no mitigation**. Minimum liquidated damages will also increase. For a sector that had grown accustomed to managing customs errors as manageable operational risks, this represents a complete paradigm shift.

### Enforcement Priorities Targeting Systemic Major Fraud

The decree designates four priority areas for enhanced customs enforcement: **forced labor**, **tariff misclassification**, **undervaluation** of imports, and **illegal transshipment** — the practice of routing Chinese goods through a third country to mask their origin and circumvent tariffs. These four vectors represent the bulk of American tariff evasion. The decree asks the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Attorney General to treat them as enforcement priorities, thus mobilizing the DOJ alongside CBP.

The creation of a joint **Trade Fraud Task Force** by DOJ/DHS dates back to August 2025 — this decree gives it a stronger regulatory foundation and additional tools. On transshipment, for example, the decree expands documentation requirements: within **90 days**, importers will need to provide CBP with any document that the foreign exporter was required to submit to their own customs authority before shipping to the United States. This is a brilliantly logical measure: importing foreign regulatory obligations into the American framework to trace the actual origin of goods.

*Chinese transshipment via Vietnam, Thailand, or Mexico is one of the most documented — and least resolved — topics in international trade over the past decade. If this decree actually manages to address it, that will be an achievement whose scope far exceeds Trump's tariff policy. It will be a victory for the integrity of global trade rules. And yes, even a man I regularly criticize can be right on a specific point.*

## Artificial Intelligence Reinforcing CBP

### A Technology Deployment Announced With Fanfare

One element that attracted attention at the decree's signing was the prominent role assigned to **artificial intelligence** in the new detection mechanisms. Peter Navarro described the administration's ambition at the June 3 press conference: "We are able — in real time — to track every ship and every cargo leaving every port every day, literally processing billions of bits of data, and determining with a high degree of probability whether there is tariff evasion or other problems like drugs, illicit goods." The speech is spectacular. The technological reality is more nuanced.

CBP has been working for years on improving its **Automated Commercial Environment (ACE)** system — the central import monitoring platform. Modernization of this system was at the heart of the difficulties encountered in processing IEEPA tariff refunds in March 2026, when CBP indicated to the court that it could not process more than 54 million individual refunds without a technological upgrade. The decree pushes to accelerate this modernization, integrating predictive analytics capabilities to identify evasion patterns. But concrete results will take months, if not years, to materialize.

### New Identifiers and Supply Chain Traceability

On the practical side, the decree requires new trade identifiers — **foreign tax identification numbers** and **Global Business Identifiers (GBI)** — as well as detailed supply chain data: product model or style numbers, composition, grade, dimensions. This information will allow CBP to cross-reference customs declarations with external commercial databases to detect inconsistencies. Holland & Knight notes that this represents a **significant expansion** of the data surface available to customs investigators.

Importers will also need to certify their compliance with the **Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA)**, the anti-smuggling law 18 U.S.C. § 545, and other texts CBP will designate. For companies importing electronic components, textiles, or food products from countries subject to sanctions or suspected of using forced labor — particularly China — these certification requirements will generate considerable legal risks. A false declaration prosecuted criminally is another dimension entirely from a simple customs fine.

*Customs AI fascinates and concerns me in equal measure. I have no doubt about algorithms' capacity to spot evasion patterns that human agents would never see. What I do not know — and what no one truly knows yet — is how these systems handle false positives, and what concrete recourse a legitimate importer has when an algorithm designates them a fraudster. Customs law has not yet caught up with AI. And that is a ticking time bomb.*

## The Global Tariff Strategy: Building What Courts Cannot Demolish

### After IEEPA, the Search for a Legal Fortress

The most interesting validation of this decree is not tariff-related — it is **constitutional**. Since the **Learning Resources v. Trump** ruling of February 20, 2026, the Trump administration has been at war with the federal courts on the trade front. IEEPA tariffs fell. Section 122 tariffs are contested. Even the major steel and aluminum tariffs under Section 232 are under growing judicial pressure. In this context, a decree relying on traditional customs authorities — Title 19 of the Code of Federal Regulations, laws decades old — is structurally far harder to attack in court.

Covington & Burling summarized the stakes on June 5, 2026: the decree specifies it must be implemented "in accordance with applicable law, including the Administrative Procedure Act," meaning certain provisions will require a rulemaking process with public consultation. This is admittedly a speed bump, but it is also a **partial immunization against legal challenges**: if CBP scrupulously follows APA procedure, it will be far harder for a plaintiff to obtain an injunction. The Trump administration has learned — painfully — that procedural shortcuts end in judicial catastrophe.

### The Pivot Toward Sections 301 and 232 as the Tariff Backbone

Alongside this enforcement decree, the administration is rebuilding its tariff architecture on firmer foundations. As the Atlantic Council's Trump Tariff Tracker (updated June 17, 2026) details, two major Section 301 investigations are underway: one on structural industrial overcapacity in sixteen countries, the other on forced labor enforcement practices in sixty economies, covering "nearly all American imports." Section 301 gives the president tariff powers far more explicitly delegated by Congress than IEEPA. And **Section 232**, founded on national security, stands — its tariffs on steel, aluminum, and copper have weathered legal waves.

The June 3 decree fits into this recomposition strategy: while White House lawyers rebuild the tariff wall through Sections 301 and 232, CBP is tasked with maximizing revenue collection on existing tariffs by crushing evasion. The two movements are complementary. One looks toward the future — rebuilding tariffs on solid foundations. The other looks at the present — collecting what is owed. This is a coherent strategy, even if carried by an administration whose consistency is not always its hallmark.

*I must be honest: I am not entirely comfortable with the direction this file is taking. The Trump administration is building a customs fortress that, piece by piece, becomes less legally attackable. Which, in theory, should reassure me — we want laws to be respected. But the same tools that track Chinese fraudsters can be applied to European or Canadian allies, and there we enter a zone of trade tensions that does not please me.*

## The IOR Registry, Risk Tiers, and the Purge of Ghost Importers

### A Massive Cleanup of the Active Importer Registry

One of the least publicized but potentially most disruptive aspects of the decree is the order to CBP to **purge the inactive IOR registry** and create a **risk tier system** for active importers. The American importer of record registry is today cluttered with ghost entities — companies created for a transaction, then abandoned, but still registered and sometimes reactivated for fraudulent purposes. CBP must verify the compliance of active IORs and assign them a risk level based on their audit and inspection history.

This seemingly administrative measure has profound implications. Companies that used legitimate but complex structures — subsidiaries, holdings, transit agents — could find themselves reclassified into high-risk tiers that will trigger additional audits, enhanced bonding requirements, and extended customs clearance times. In a context of global supply chains already under strain since the pandemic and tariff wars, **every additional delay has a direct cost**. Companies that thought they had optimized their logistics will need to recalibrate their models.

### Informal Entries and E-Commerce in Turmoil

The **cross-border e-commerce** sector is particularly exposed. The prohibition on foreign IORs from using informal entries — which cover packages below $2,500, the low end of commercial imports — will directly impact thousands of online sellers operating from China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, or other Asian countries. These sellers had massively used low-value status to avoid full customs formalities and, in some cases, to underreport the value of goods. The door is closing.

The NCBFAA reported that Lenny Feldman sees "an unprecedented level of scrutiny as to the right to make entry" of goods taking shape. This formulation covers both large manufacturing companies and small e-commerce merchants. The cross-border B2C e-commerce ecosystem, dominated by platforms such as **Shein, Temu, and AliExpress** — whose logistics models relied heavily on the flexibility of informal entries and de minimis thresholds — will need to reinvent itself. This is structurally painful, but economically justified.

*Shein and Temu prospered on American regulatory arbitrage. I shed no tears for them. What concerns me is the collateral effect on low-income American consumers who have grown accustomed to buying cheap products on these platforms. The line between protecting domestic industry and impoverishing modest households is thinner than it appears, and the Trump administration does not seem to give it much thought.*

## The National Security Imperative: Fentanyl, Forced Labor, and Countermeasures

### The Decree as a Foreign Policy Tool

The decree is not limited to revenue collection. It is explicitly positioned as a **national security instrument**. The preamble is clear: "Customs enforcement is essential to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States." The list of importers that will never be admitted to "good standing" status expressly includes those involved in importing **fentanyl, chemical precursors, or any other contraband**. This is a final determination, with no rehabilitation procedure described.

On the **forced labor** front, the decree mobilizes several existing texts, notably the **Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act** and CAATSA. Importers will need to certify that their supply chains do not involve forced labor, with criminal penalties for false certification. For companies sourcing components from China — an enormous proportion of the global industrial fabric — this certification requirement will necessitate supplier audits at the second and third tier levels of depth never previously required. This is costly, complex, and potentially very revealing.

### China as the Implicit Target of the Entire Framework

Even though the decree does not name China explicitly — except in references to CAATSA and supply chain concerns — the text's architecture is built around Chinese trade practices. Transshipment through third countries, false origin declarations, the use of shell companies, the abusive use of informal entries for low-value shipments: all these practices are massively associated with Chinese exporters and their intermediaries in **U.S. Trade Representative** analyses. China is not mentioned. It is targeted.

The Biden administration had attempted to plug some of these gaps in a targeted manner — notably on the de minimis threshold, the exemption regime for packages under $800 that was massively abused. The Trump administration goes much further and more systemically. By forcing foreign IORs to genuinely anchor themselves to the United States — real estate assets, substantial bonds, disclosure of beneficial owners — the decree structurally makes it more costly and more risky to run the kind of tariff circumvention operations American authorities have been documenting for years. **This is a trade war fought through customs forms**, but it is no less real for that.

*China is clearly the central target of this reform. And I own that. Beijing has spent twenty years building an export system that maximizes every regulatory gap, every threshold, every exception. Faced with this engineering of dependency, a decree that says "show us your real assets, your real owners, your real supply chain" seems to me a minimal and legitimate response. Even if it comes from a president I would criticize on just about everything else.*

## Enforcement Deadlines and the Compliance Window

### An Aggressive but Articulated Timeline

The decree sets a four-phase enforcement timeline. Within **45 days** (by mid-July 2026), the Secretary of Homeland Security must submit to the president legislative recommendations to strengthen customs enforcement. Within **90 days** (early September 2026), new penalty mitigation rules must be revised, foreign export documentation requirements established, expedited seizure procedures put in place, and enhanced transparency reports produced. This is the phase that will most immediately impact importers in terms of penalty risk.

Within **180 days** (late November 2026), the heavier structural reforms kick in: new IOR eligibility rules, asset and bonding requirements, good standing system, enhanced vetting of all importation chain actors. This is the phase that will force corporate restructurings. In one year (June 2027), an effectiveness report will be submitted to the president. This timeline is ambitious, but Holland & Knight notes that many of these changes can be implemented through regulatory modifications that CBP can manage itself, without waiting for new legislation.

### Practical Recommendations for Importers

Firms specializing in international trade law are unanimous: the time for passive reaction is over. Covington & Burling recommends that all American importers carefully monitor the deployment of new regulations, seek to participate in public comment procedures, and review the adequacy of their customs compliance programs. Sidley Austin emphasizes that companies should "seize opportunities to comment on or influence the implementation process" — because it is there, in the next 90 days, that critical details will be decided.

For foreign IORs and companies that use them, the restructuring window is **narrow but real**. Those who act now — by transferring the IOR to an American entity with real assets, obtaining CTPAT certification, strengthening supplier audits — will be in a far more comfortable position than those waiting for CBP's first injunctions. American customs law rarely rewards procrastination, and this decree even less than previous ones.

*I have seen too many companies wait until the last minute on regulatory reforms to have confidence in their collective capacity for anticipation. Most affected importers will spend the coming months watching who moves first, waiting for the first CBP circulars, hoping that deadlines slide. Some will be right. Others will pay dearly for that calculation. And the brokers advising them will need to decide whether they share this waiting game or get ahead of it.*

## Tariff Revenues: A First-Order Budgetary Issue

### Filling the Post-IEEPA Revenue Gap

Behind the security rhetoric of the decree lies a brutal budgetary reality. The Supreme Court ruling invalidating IEEPA tariffs potentially deprived the U.S. Treasury of **tens of billions of dollars** in annual revenues. The ongoing refunds — estimated between $90 and $127 billion by CBP, possibly up to $182 billion according to independent estimates reported by Reuters on March 5, 2026 — represent a considerable financial hemorrhage. In this context, any mechanism that increases collection on legally valid tariffs becomes a fiscal imperative.

Peter Navarro quantified the stakes at the signing ceremony: "I guarantee that the first year will be at least $15 billion, the next year $25 billion, and out there there is $80 to $100 billion that tariff fraudsters are stealing." These figures are presented as savings — revenues recovered from existing fraud, not new taxes. This is rhetorically clever: we are not taxing more, we are recovering what is owed. But for the companies that will find themselves in the net's mesh — whether fraudulent or simply unprepared — the distinction is purely semantic. **The bill will be real**.

### The Fiscal Credibility of Trump's Trade Strategy

Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent had declared in February 2026 that total tariff revenues would be "little or not at all modified" despite the IEEPA invalidation — implying that other mechanisms would compensate for the shortfall. This decree is one of those mechanisms. It fits into a strategic triptych: tariff reconstruction through Sections 301 and 232, Section 122 surcharge maintained on appeal, and maximization of collection through enhanced customs enforcement. If all three pillars hold, the administration's fiscal strategy can indeed prove coherent. If one of them collapses again in court, the $15 billion Navarro announced will remain in White House PowerPoint presentations.

*The $80 to $100 billion in tariff fraud cited by Navarro: I believe that figure at its upper range. American customs fraud is massively underdocumented and under-prosecuted for decades. What I do not believe is that we can recover all of it in 12 months with a decree and a few CBP circulars. The structural transformation of a control system takes years. Navarro's promise is political. The result will be more modest, but real nonetheless.*

## Reactions From the Customs Sector and Initial Challenges

### Between Adaptation and Resistance in the Professional World

The response from the customs and international trade sector was quick. The **NCBFAA** published an analysis on June 5, 2026 highlighting the challenges posed to foreign IORs and increased broker responsibility. Trade Compliance Records posted a reference guide on June 6. The major specialized firms — Covington, Sidley, Holland & Knight, Torres Trade Law — all published detailed analyses in the days following the signing. The customs community reacted quickly, reflecting both the perceived gravity of the text and the commercial appetite for advisory services.

On the criticism side, the first voices raised point to the risk of **discriminatory treatment** toward legitimate foreign importers. The broad definition of foreign IOR could encompass Canadian, European, or Japanese companies that have imported in good faith for decades. The requirement to hold "a significant amount of real property in the United States" as a condition for being classified as an American IOR is considered arbitrary by some practitioners. These criticisms are part of a broader debate about the decree's compatibility with U.S. trade obligations toward the **WTO** and bilateral investment agreements.

### Rulemaking Procedures as the Next Battleground

Covington & Burling identified the **APA rulemaking** window as an opportunity for importers to influence the decree's implementation. Companies and trade associations should prepare to submit detailed comments during the public consultations CBP will need to organize before adopting new regulations. It is there that critical details will be decided: the exact bonding thresholds, the operational definition of "good standing," the practical modalities for verifying foreign IORs. Sidley Austin notes that these procedures "will provide opportunities for legislative engagement if customs reform is needed."

For well-organized companies with sufficient legal resources, this rulemaking window represents a real chance to bend the rules toward something more workable. For importing SMEs that cannot afford to hire specialized American trade law firms, the rules that emerge will be those that large companies have shaped. This is a structural inequality inherent in the American rulemaking system, and this decree is no exception to that immutable rule.

*I am a spectator here of the old democratic paradox of American rulemaking: those who have the means to influence the rules are those who need the least protection from them. Average importers, SMEs, good-faith actors without a legal armada will inherit the rules that multinationals agreed to see written. This is frustrating, but that is how regulation works in a system dominated by lobbying.*

## Europe, Canada, and Allies in the Involuntary Crosshairs

### Allies Who Risk Paying the Price

If the decree's strategic target is clearly Chinese-origin fraud, the tools deployed are agnostic about the nationality of their victims. **Canadian, European, and Japanese** companies that use import structures without American real estate anchoring, or that rely on foreign IORs for DDP deliveries, will find themselves subject to the same enhanced rules as the fraudsters the decree claims to target. Holland & Knight specifically highlights the example of "Canadian companies that sell to American customers in DDP terms" — a common practice in North American cross-border trade.

The European Union, already engaged in tense tariff negotiations with Washington following the post-IEEPA agreements' unraveling, will need to closely monitor the implementation of these new rules. If European exporters find themselves systematically reclassified as foreign IORs and subjected to disproportionate obligations, this could constitute an additional WTO trade dispute. The Trudeau government in Ottawa has already expressed concerns about several aspects of American trade policy — this decree gives it one more reason for worry. **The transatlantic alliance weakens every time Washington legislates without consulting its partners**.

### Western Solidarity Tested by Judicial Protectionism

I remain pro-West at heart. I believe the democratic bloc must remain united, strong, and coherent against the challenges posed by China, Putin's Russia, Iran, and North Korea. But this solidarity rests on mutually respected trade rules. When Washington treats its commercial allies with the same suspicion as its adversaries — demanding from them the same disclosures, the same bonds, the same certifications — it erodes a little more the foundation of trust that makes the alliance possible. This is not an argument for customs inaction. It is an argument for differentiated implementation that protects relations with allied democracies while targeting malicious actors.

Trump remains, from this perspective, a necessary evil for the West — a president who forces difficult conversations about commercial dependency, about the naivety of free trade rules in the face of actors who do not respect them, about the need to secure critical supply chains. But a necessary evil remains an evil. And this decree, in its collateral effects on allies, is a reminder that the brutality of American trade policy implementation does not always distinguish between friends and adversaries.

*I write these lines knowing I will displease everyone: the anti-Trump camp, who would have wanted me to condemn this decree wholesale, and the pro-Trump camp, who would have wanted me to celebrate it without nuance. But my job is not to satisfy you. It is to tell you what I see: an imperfect decree, targeting real problems, with legally solid tools, but carried by an administration that does not concern itself with collateral damage on its allies. And that is a problem that will outlast Trump.*

## Conclusion: Customs Toughening as the New Front in the Trade War

### A Durable Structural Reform, Whatever Administration Occupies the White House

The **"Strengthening Customs Enforcement"** decree of June 3, 2026 is not one more episode in Trump's tariff saga. It is a structural reform of the American customs system that relies on robust legal authorities, addresses dysfunctions documented for decades, and will have lasting effects well beyond the current administration's mandate. Disclosure requirements, risk tier systems, enhanced customs broker obligations, the 50% penalty floor — none of these mechanisms are easy to dismantle once established. They will become the new American customs normality.

In a post-IEEPA context where the administration is seeking to rebuild its commercial revenue architecture on legally unassailable foundations, this decree fulfills multiple functions simultaneously: it maximizes collection on existing tariffs, deters systemic fraud, reorients CBP toward a mission of protecting tax revenues and national security, and creates data on global supply chains that the United States previously lacked at this granularity. **This is an investment in state capacity**, and it is arguably what makes it the most durable commercial measure of this term.

### A Clear Signal for Fraudsters, a Warning for Everyone Else

The final message of the decree is simple: the United States has decided that **customs impunity is over**. Those who built their business model on exploiting loopholes — false origin declarations, undervaluation, transshipment, shell companies — will need to restructure or disappear from the American market. Complacent customs brokers will need to choose between rigor and criminal exposure. Legitimate but poorly organized importers will need to invest in compliance. And partner governments accustomed to a certain American flexibility on customs controls will need to adapt their trade practices to this new reality.

What happened on June 3, 2026 in the Oval Office was not just another signature. It was the beginning of a regulatory overhaul that will redefine the conditions for access to the world's largest consumer market. And in that overhaul, unlike the spectacular tariff wars of previous years, the courts will have a much harder time exercising their veto. **That is why this decree really matters.**

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

## Sources

### Primary Sources

- [Executive Order 14411 "Strengthening Customs Enforcement" — White House, June 3, 2026](https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2026/06/strengthening-customs-enforcement/)

- [91 FR 35125 — Federal Register publication of Executive Order 14411 — Office of the Federal Register, June 10, 2026](https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/FR-2026-06-10/2026-11595)

- [NCBFAA — "Customs Enforcement EO Causes Hurdles for Foreign IORs, Increased Broker Liability" — June 5, 2026](https://www.ncbfaa.org/news-advocacy/ncbfaa-in-the-news/2026/06/05/customs-enforcement-eo-causes-hurdles-for-foreign-iors--increased-broker-liability)

### Secondary Sources

- [Holland & Knight — "White House Issues Sweeping Customs Reform Executive Order" — June 9, 2026](https://www.hklaw.com/en/insights/publications/2026/06/white-house-issues-sweeping-customs-reform-executive-order)

- [Sidley Austin — "President Trump Issues Executive Order to Enhance Customs Enforcement" — June 8, 2026](https://www.sidley.com/en/insights/newsupdates/2026/06/president-trump-issues-executive-order-to-enhance-customs-enforcement)

- [Covington & Burling — "New Executive Order Calls for Significant Customs Law Changes" — June 5, 2026](https://www.cov.com/en/news-and-insights/insights/2026/06/new-executive-order-calls-for-significant-customs-law-changes-directs-cbp-to-crack-down-on-foreign-importers-and-enhance-penalties)

- [Torres Trade Law — "New Executive Order Directs CBP to Strengthen Importer Oversight, Bonding, and Customs Enforcement" — June 17, 2026](https://www.torrestradelaw.com/cat/Insights/5)

- [Atlantic Council — Trump Tariff Tracker (updated June 17, 2026)](https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/programs/geoeconomics-center/trump-tariff-tracker/)

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Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/billet-douanes-americaines-le-decret-qui-transforme-la-chasse-aux-fraudeurs-en-m