# OPINION: Berlin, the Five, and Europe's Silent Test of Will Ahead of Ankara

> On June 24, 2026, in Berlin, five European heads of government sat down at the same table. Friedrich Merz (Germany), Emmanuel Macron

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Note
- Published: 2026-07-01
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/billet-berlin-les-cinq-et-le-test-silencieux-de-la-volonte-europeenne-face-a-ank

## Introduction: On June 24, 2026, Europe Decided to Show Up

### One room, five countries, and a question with no safety net

On **June 24, 2026**, in Berlin, five European heads of government sat down at the same table. **Friedrich Merz** (Germany), **Emmanuel Macron** (France), **Keir Starmer** (United Kingdom, still serving as outgoing prime minister), **Giorgia Meloni** (Italy), and **Donald Tusk** (Poland). **NATO** Secretary General **Mark Rutte** joined by videoconference from Washington. The question was simple and unsparing: what does Europe do with **NATO** if the **United States** continues to pull back?

This informal summit of the **E5** group — the five most significant European military powers — took place thirteen days before the official **NATO summit in Ankara**, scheduled for **July 7 and 8, 2026**. The agenda was not ceremonial. It was strategic. The commitments made in Berlin — on long-range weapons, air defense, military artificial intelligence, the gradual absorption of American capabilities — represent the most concrete document Europe has produced since the start of the war in Ukraine on the subject of its own defense autonomy.

*There is something profoundly different about this Berlin summit. It is not a statement of intent. It is numbered commitments, named systems, concrete budget lines. Europe was no longer waiting to be reassured by Washington — it was beginning to calculate what it can do without Washington. That is a shift in mindset that nobody would have thought possible in 2022.*

## Merz and the Choice of Berlin: A Stage, a Message, a Date

### Why the German host matters more than the setting

Friedrich Merz's choice to host this summit is not incidental. Germany is Europe's dominant economic power, and for decades it distinguished itself by its post-**World War II** military restraint. Chancellor **Merz**, by organizing this gathering of the Five in Berlin and openly declaring "**The message to Russia is clear: Ukraine remains strong**," is assuming a leadership posture that his predecessors — notably **Olaf Scholz** — carefully avoided. That change in tone was noticed in Moscow, in Kyiv, and in Washington.

Germany had been criticized as early as **2022** for its hesitation to deliver **Leopard** tanks to Ukraine. By **2025**, it had become the second largest military contributor to Ukraine after the **United States**. The decision to commit **3% of GDP** to defense — a threshold only **Poland** was meeting among the major **NATO** countries — reflects a structural transformation. The Berlin summit, under **Merz**'s leadership, is the formalization of that transformation into a collective posture.

### The chosen date: thirteen days before Ankara

Holding this **E5** summit on **June 24**, precisely **13 days** before the official **NATO summit in Ankara**, is not a default scheduling decision. It is a positioning strategy. By establishing a common European position before the **NATO** summit, the Five arrive in Ankara not as separate delegations that can be divided, but as a bloc that has already aligned its positions on the key points: a **5% of GDP** defense target, long-range weapons for Ukraine, integrated air defense, shared military **AI** capabilities.

The **Ankara** summit will bring together **32 NATO members** — including **Erdogan's Turkey**, which has played an ambiguous mediating role between Moscow and Kyiv throughout the war. Arriving united at that meeting, with commitments already sealed in Berlin, considerably strengthens the Europeans' ability to resist Turkish maneuvering or the internal divisions that Russian diplomacy systematically seeks to exploit.

*Thirteen days. That is not arbitrary in the machinery of diplomacy. It is close enough to Ankara for the message to remain fresh, and far enough for delegations to work through their positions. Merz understood that European cohesion is not decreed on the day of a summit — it is built beforehand, quietly, with concrete commitments. That is grown-up diplomacy.*

## The 5% Target: A Line That Excludes and That Binds

### Spain absent — and what that absence means

**Pedro Sánchez's Spain** was not in Berlin. That absence is not accidental. The Spanish government refused to commit to the **5% of GDP** defense target, a threshold that the **2025 NATO summit in The Hague** had established as a horizon for **2035**. For **Sánchez**, politically dependent on left-wing coalition partners opposed to any increased militarization, that commitment was politically impossible. Madrid prefers to negotiate a separate threshold for countries geographically more distant from the Russian front.

Spain's exclusion from the **E5** circle sets a precedent. It means the informal format can function as a pressure mechanism: countries that do not commit to the core objectives remain outside the leadership decisions. That is not without risk — a **NATO** with two speeds, a hard core that makes the decisions and a periphery that absorbs them, is a potential source of long-term tension. But it is also the only way to push concrete commitments forward when unanimity is impossible.

### The €70 billion for Ukraine and the question of sustainability

The **E5** summit also addressed the mobilization of **70 billion euros** for Ukraine over two years — a figure that represents significant ambition but whose financing mechanisms remain to be detailed. Part of it would come from the revenues of Russian assets frozen in Europe, estimated at around **300 billion euros**, whose annual interest already partially funds weapons purchases for Kyiv. Another part would come from renewed bilateral commitments and potentially from new common European financial instruments.

The sustainability of this support is the real question. The **United States** has provided Ukraine with more than **175 billion dollars** in aid since **2022**. If the **Trump** administration slows or conditions that support further, Europe will have to compensate for a growing share. The figure of **70 billion over two years** is ambitious — but it covers only a fraction of the current spending rate in Ukraine. The challenge at Ankara will be to translate these political commitments into binding budget lines.

*Seventy billion over two years. The figure impresses — until you calculate the daily cost of the war. Ukraine burns through resources at a rate that even its most generous allies struggle to match. Berlin set a floor. Ankara will have to decide whether that floor is enough, or whether Europe is prepared to go further. Both answers are possible. Only one is equal to the moment.*

## Long-Range Weapons: What Was Said and What Was Not

### Coordination on long-range weapons — a step toward autonomy

One of the most concrete commitments from the Berlin summit concerns the coordination of **long-range weapons** deliveries to Ukraine. The **United Kingdom** delivered **Storm Shadow** missiles. **France** provided **SCALP-EG** missiles. **Germany** delivered **Taurus** missiles — after lengthy internal debates. In Berlin, the five countries committed to coordinating these deliveries, harmonizing rules of engagement, and developing shared long-range strike capabilities across Europe.

That coordination matters because it addresses one of the central criticisms of aid to Ukraine: deliveries are fragmented, with different rules of use depending on the country, which complicates the training of Ukrainian forces and their operational integration. A coordinated approach would allow **Ukraine** to maximize the effectiveness of these systems in the field. It would also send a signal to Moscow: Europe will not drip-feed its weapons with variable conditions, but will do so within a collective strategy.

### What the agreement does not yet specify

What the Berlin communiqué does not specify: the exact range of the weapons in question, the delivery volumes, and above all the rules of engagement for strikes on Russian territory. These details are not trivial — they concretely define what Ukraine can do with the weapons provided. Since the start of the war, some allies have imposed restrictions that limit Ukraine's ability to strike Russian logistics depots, launch bases, and military infrastructure inside **Russia**.

The lifting of those restrictions has been gradual but remains incomplete. **Germany** authorized the use of **Taurus** missiles against targets on Russian soil in **2025**, after months of internal political resistance. The **United Kingdom** and **France** did so earlier. But the legal and political framework for these authorizations remains vague in public communication. Berlin may have aligned positions — the operational details still belong to each capital individually.

*Long-range weapons delivered with restrictions on use are half-delivered weapons. Ukraine knows it. Its commanders have said so publicly. Coordinating deliveries is genuine progress. But if the rules of engagement remain inconsistent and unpublished, the coordination remains incomplete. Berlin laid a brick. Ankara will have to build the wall.*

## Air Defense at the Heart of the Commitments

### Taking over American capabilities

One of the most structurally significant commitments from the Berlin summit concerns **air defense**. The Five agreed to "gradually take over American capabilities" — diplomatic language for saying that Europe is preparing for a scenario where the **United States** reduces its presence in the defense of **NATO**'s eastern flank. That takeover implies massive investment: **Patriot** systems, **THAAD**, **Arrow**, long-range surveillance radars, integrated command-and-control networks — these capabilities cost tens of billions of euros and require years of deployment.

Europe already has some of these systems, but not in sufficient numbers to cover the entire eastern flank from **Scandinavia** to the **Baltic states**, **Poland**, **Romania**, and **Moldova**. **Poland** is among the best equipped, with its massive investments in **Patriot PAC-3** systems. But the coherence of an integrated defense network at the European level remains to be built. Berlin identified the ambition; Ankara will have to validate the concrete commitments.

### Military AI: the next frontier of coordination

The Berlin summit also addressed the development of common **military artificial intelligence** capabilities — a domain where **NATO** is falling into a concerning lag behind **China**, and where even the **United States** struggles to move fast enough. The application of **AI** to modern warfare covers domains ranging from real-time intelligence analysis to drone trajectory optimization, early detection of missile strikes, and automated coordination of air-defense systems.

The **war in Ukraine** has already produced military **AI** innovations that Western allies are following closely. Ukrainian drones use autonomous guidance systems that function even under **GPS** jamming. Detection and interception systems integrate machine-learning algorithms to distinguish decoys from real targets. That Ukrainian experience is a resource that the Berlin Five have every interest in incorporating into their own development programs. The Berlin agreement on military **AI** is a signal — the details will emerge from the technical work between general staffs.

*Military artificial intelligence is not an option for the future — it is a reality of the present. Ukraine has been practicing it in live conditions since 2022. Europeans signing declarations of intent in Berlin must urgently incorporate Ukrainian lessons into their programs. Otherwise they are investing in technologies that will already be obsolete compared to what Kyiv has developed under fire.*

## The United Kingdom Between Two Prime Ministers: A Suspended Commitment

### Starmer present, but outgoing

**Keir Starmer** was in Berlin on **June 24, 2026** as the outgoing prime minister of the **United Kingdom**. A general election had just taken place; a new government was being formed. His presence at this summit is therefore both real — he signed the commitments — and precarious, since his successor is not bound by those commitments in the same way as if they had been concluded under a stable, continuing government.

The **United Kingdom** is Europe's most battle-hardened military power, with a strong tradition of Atlantic commitment and a significant defense industry. Since **2022**, it was among the first to deliver sophisticated weapons to Ukraine — notably **NLAW** missiles, **Storm Shadow** missiles, and **Challenger 2** tanks. But a government transition introduces uncertainty. The continuity of British support now depends on the incoming prime minister's position — whose identity had not yet been settled at the time of the Berlin summit.

### The question of European institutional continuity

The British situation illustrates a broader problem for European cohesion: commitments made by heads of government do not automatically bind their successors, especially in democracies where defense policy is an electoral issue. **France** has its own elections on the horizon. **Germany** has just emerged from one. **Poland** is navigating a complex coalition. The durability of Berlin's commitments depends on the institutional solidity of each of the five countries.

That is precisely why the **Ankara** summit matters: it must translate those political commitments into institutional **NATO** decisions, which transcend individual government transitions. A decision taken within the framework of the **Atlantic Alliance** is harder to undo than a bilateral commitment made in an outgoing prime minister's cabinet. The **Ankara** mechanism is the one that gives durability to Berlin's intentions.

*Starmer signed in Berlin with the authority of a prime minister at the end of his mandate. That is better than nothing — the commitment is on record, continuity is possible. But it is also a fragility. Ukrainians know better than anyone what it means to depend on their allies' electoral cycles. They have learned to lock commitments in institutional concrete rather than personal promises. Berlin is fresh concrete. It needs to be poured before it sets badly.*

## Macron and Meloni: The Mediterranean as a Second Front

### A naval mission at the Strait of Hormuz?

**Emmanuel Macron** and **Giorgia Meloni** discussed in Berlin the possibility of a **naval mission at the Strait of Hormuz**, contingent on certain preconditions being met. That discussion takes place against a backdrop of growing tension with **Iran** — now a confirmed exporter of **Shahed** drones to **Russia** — and Western powers. A naval presence at the Strait of Hormuz would aim to secure commercial shipping routes and send a firmness signal to Tehran within the framework of coordinated pressure on its military supply lines to Moscow.

This proposal remains conditional and fragile. **France** has aircraft carriers and the naval power-projection capability required. **Italy** has a significant navy and a tradition of presence in the eastern Mediterranean. But a mission in a zone as sensitive as the **Strait of Hormuz** carries escalation risks with **Iran** that not all **NATO** partners are prepared to assume. The preconditions mentioned by **Macron** and **Meloni** were not publicly specified — which leaves open the question of whether this discussion produced a real commitment or merely a preliminary exploration.

### Iran as a variable in the Ukrainian war

The mention of Hormuz in Berlin underlines something important: the war in **Ukraine** is no longer a regional European war. It is part of a global geopolitical system in which **Iran**, **North Korea**, and **China** play support roles for **Russia** that extend its war-making capacity. **Iran** has supplied thousands of **Shahed** drones — the very drones that burned a building materials store in **Snihurivka** on **July 1, 2026**. **North Korea** has sent ammunition and troops. **China** supplies Russia with dual-use electronic components.

A European strategy that does not account for this global dimension is incomplete. The discussion between **Macron** and **Meloni** on Hormuz suggests that some Europeans are beginning to think about the conflict in those broader terms. If **Europe** wants to help Ukraine win, it must also cut **Russia**'s supply lines — not just at the front, but at the source. That is a strategy of global pressure that neither the **EU** nor **NATO** has yet formalized.

*Iran supplies the drones that burn Ukrainian cities. North Korea supplies the shells that kill Ukrainian soldiers. China supplies the components that keep Russian arms factories running. If Europe responds only on the Ukrainian theater, it is answering a global war with a local strategy. Macron and Meloni cracked the Hormuz window open. It is small but it is real. It is the beginning of strategic thinking at the right scale.*

## The Ankara Summit: Expectations and Pitfalls

### What the 32 must decide

The **NATO summit in Ankara**, on **July 7 and 8, 2026**, will bring together the **32 members of the Alliance**. The agenda is ambitious: validate the **5% of GDP** defense target, confirm collective support for **Ukraine**, coordinate positions on long-range weapons, establish a framework for the progressive empowerment of European defense within **NATO**, and manage tensions with **Turkey** on several files. That is a great deal to accomplish in two days.

The **Ankara** dynamic will also be shaped by the position of the **United States**. The **Trump** administration has blown hot and cold on its commitment to **NATO** — one day threatening to withdraw, the next validating weapons deliveries to Ukraine. In that context of American uncertainty, the cohesion of the **E5** bloc formed in Berlin on **June 24** is the most valuable political capital the Europeans bring to Ankara. They arrive with a shared position. That is their strength.

### Erdogan's Turkey: ambiguous ally, unavoidable host

That **Turkey** is hosting this **NATO** summit is itself an ambiguous signal. **Erdogan** has maintained economic relations with **Russia** throughout the war, positioned himself as a mediator in the Black Sea grain negotiations, and delayed **Finland** and **Sweden**'s accession to **NATO** through political demands. Hosting the summit gives **Ankara** symbolic and procedural leverage — without necessarily signaling full alignment with European positions.

For the delegations arriving in **Ankara** on **July 7**, the Turkish position on Ukraine, on sanctions against Russia, on the delivery of **Bayraktar drones** (halted in **2022**, never fully resumed), and on relations with **Moscow** will be an underlying source of friction. Managing that relationship without letting it explode, while maintaining the cohesion of the **Alliance**, is the summit's most delicate diplomatic exercise. Berlin prepared the Five. But the reality of **Ankara** is thirty-two.

*Erdogan is hosting a NATO summit while maintaining trade relations with Russia. That is the central contradiction of an alliance that prefers to keep Turkey inside on the condition that it does not blow up the collective decisions. It is pragmatic. It is also uncomfortable. The real test of Ankara will be whether the Berlin Five can get their commitments adopted by all 32 — including the one hosting the meeting.*

## Trump, "Ukraine Is Doing Pretty Well," and the American Calculation

### Trump's declaration on June 25, 2026

On **June 25, 2026**, one day after the Berlin summit, American president **Donald Trump** declared that **Ukraine** was "doing pretty well" against **Russia**. That formulation, relayed by **the Guardian**, is typical of **Trump**'s ambivalent rhetoric toward the conflict: on one side, a form of acknowledgment of Ukrainian resistance; on the other, an absence of any reinforced commitment. No pledge of additional weaponry, no ceasefire horizon, no clear position on negotiations. Just an observation.

That comment comes in a context where the **Trump** administration is maintaining military aid to Ukraine but slowing certain sensitive technology transfers and conditioning its support more heavily on economic or diplomatic reciprocity. Saying Ukraine is "doing pretty well" can also be read as a signal that Washington believes Europeans can now carry more of the burden — which is precisely what the Berlin summit was trying to organize.

### The declining dependence — and its limits

The stated objective of the Berlin summit is for Europe to "gradually take over American capabilities." But "gradually" over what timeline? With what transition guarantees? The **United States** still represents more than **70% of NATO's collective firepower**. Their command, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems (**C2ISR**) are indispensable to the effectiveness of the **Alliance**. A gradual takeover without a precise schedule is an intention without a plan.

That gap is the main risk Berlin did not resolve. The Five said they could do more. They did not say how they will close the gap if Washington accelerates its disengagement. The **Ankara** summit will need to answer that question with more precision than Berlin did. Allies who claim to manage the risk of American disengagement must also have calculated its trajectory and prepared the alternatives. That calculation is not yet public.

*Trump says Ukraine is doing pretty well. That is true. But Ukraine is doing well in part because the United States armed it. If Washington steps back — even gradually — that "pretty well" can change very fast. Berlin began to build an alternative. It is not yet strong enough to replace what Washington represents. Acknowledging that reality is not pessimism — it is the starting point for a realistic plan.*

## Zelensky, Ukrainian Expectations, and What Kyiv Heard in Berlin

### What Kyiv expected from the summit

Since **2022**, **Volodymyr Zelensky** has made European diplomacy a constant lever. He has pushed for **NATO** membership, for longer-range weapons, for massive economic aid, and for tougher sanctions against **Russia**. The Berlin summit fits a positive trajectory: the Five reaffirmed their support, coordinated their positions, and made numbered commitments. For **Zelensky**, that is better than the usual vague diplomatic communiqué.

But what Kyiv truly wanted from Berlin — and did not get — is a formal invitation to **NATO**, or failing that, legally binding security guarantees. Those guarantees are the only safeguard against a repetition of **2022**: a **Ukraine** that receives promises, then finds itself alone against an invasion. The **1994 Budapest Memorandum**, which led Ukraine to give up its nuclear arsenal in exchange for security guarantees from the signatories (including **Russia**), is the permanent haunting of every act of Ukrainian diplomacy.

### Security guarantees: the real test of Ankara

The question of security guarantees for Ukraine will be the ultimate test of the **Ankara** summit. **NATO** membership remains blocked by American and certain European reservations — including from countries that fear that Ukraine's entry into the Alliance during an active conflict would trigger Article 5. Alternative guarantees — robust bilateral commitments, long-term defense agreements with the main allies — are on the table, but their value depends on the political credibility of those offering them.

**Sweden**, which joined **NATO** in March **2024** and on the same day signed an agreement for **Gripen E** fighters with Ukraine, sets the example of a concrete commitment. The head of Swedish military intelligence **MUST**, **Thomas Nilsson**, declared on **June 30, 2026** that the Russian threat is "deep, structural, and enduring" — and that the confrontation with the West "is not a temporary crisis." That is precisely the kind of long-term strategic clarity that Kyiv needs to see translated into formal institutional commitments at **Ankara**.

*The Budapest Memorandum is the political scar of all Ukrainian diplomacy. Ukraine surrendered its nuclear weapons in exchange for promises. Those promises did not hold. Zelensky knows better than anyone what a declaration without a binding mechanism is worth. Berlin produced commitments. Ankara must set them in structures that survive political transitions. Nothing less will suffice for Kyiv.*

## Rutte and the NATO Voice: Between Washington and Berlin

### Mark Rutte on videoconference from Washington

**NATO** Secretary General **Mark Rutte** participated in the Berlin **E5** summit by videoconference from **Washington** — where he was in consultations with the American administration. That geographical detail is revealing: **Rutte** must simultaneously sustain European cohesion in Berlin and maintain dialogue with an unpredictable American administration. His position is that of an institutional tightrope walker whose value lies precisely in his ability to manage both sides of the Atlantic.

Since taking office as Secretary General in October **2024**, **Rutte** has adopted a more pragmatic tone than his predecessor **Jens Stoltenberg** — less rhetorical, more focused on concrete commitments. His participation in Berlin, even virtual, validates the **E5** format as a serious consultation mechanism within the **Alliance**. It also means that the decisions of Berlin are not in opposition to **NATO** but upstream of it — a preparation, not an alternative.

### NATO's role facing autonomous European initiatives

A fundamental question runs through both the Berlin summit and **Ankara**: is Europe strengthening **NATO** by taking greater charge of its own defense, or is it developing a strategic autonomy that could ultimately compete with the **Alliance**? The tension between defenders of **NATO** as the sole framework (notably the countries of central and eastern Europe, deeply Atlanticist) and advocates of greater European autonomy (often **France**) is a constant of Western geopolitics.

That debate, rekindled by the unpredictability of the **Trump** administration, has no simple answer. The most realistic option is the one Berlin appears to have adopted: remain fully inside **NATO** while building robust European capabilities that allow the **Alliance** to function even if the American contribution fluctuates. That is a complementary approach, not a competitive one. But it requires a European cohesion whose foundations Berlin has laid — and which **Ankara** must validate.

*NATO without the United States is a different organization. That is not an option — it is a catastrophe to prevent. What Berlin did was begin reducing European vulnerability to an American withdrawal, without weakening the Alliance in the process. That is the right strategy. Rutte on videoconference from Washington symbolizes exactly that dual belonging: European and Atlanticist at once. The balance is fragile. It must be maintained.*

## Ukraine as the Argument for NATO's Transformation

### War as a catalyst for modernization

The war in **Ukraine** has demonstrated military truths that **NATO** allies were beginning to forget: massive firepower remains decisive, logistics are determinative, integrated air defense is indispensable, and drones are changing the dynamics of combat at a speed that conventional armies struggle to match. These lessons have already transformed the armaments programs of several **NATO** members — notably **Germany**, **Poland**, and the **Baltic states**.

The Berlin summit addressed those lessons not as an academic list but as operational constraints. The coordination on long-range weapons responds directly to the Ukrainian lesson on the necessity of striking enemy logistics depots at range. The commitment on military **AI** responds to the Ukrainian lesson on drone warfare and electronic countermeasures. The commitment on air defense responds to two years of missile and drone attacks on Ukrainian cities. War teaches; Berlin has begun to learn.

### The lesson of industrial mobilization

The war in **Ukraine** has also revealed the weakness of the European defense industrial base. At the start of the conflict, **NATO** countries' ammunition stocks were largely depleted during the first deliveries to Kyiv. European ammunition factories have been running at full capacity since **2023** — but they were not designed to sustain a high-intensity war over several years. The **EU** launched joint ammunition purchasing programs, but results remain insufficient relative to Ukrainian needs and **NATO** stock replenishment levels.

That industrial deficit is one of the most troubling points for **NATO** planners. Berlin's commitments on **70 billion** for Ukraine implicitly include an industrial scale-up component — but the timelines for building new production capacity are measured in years, even decades. **Russia**, which has converted a significant portion of its economy to war production, managed to increase its shell output at a rate Europe has not yet matched. Berlin acknowledged the problem; the solution remains to be built.

*Europe has learned to send weapons. It has not yet learned to produce enough of them. That is the fundamental limit of support for Ukraine — not political will, but industrial capacity. Berlin committed billions. Those billions must now translate into production lines, supply chains, and trained personnel. That is the work of a decade. It has begun. It is not yet far enough advanced.*

## What Berlin Says to the World — and to Putin

### The signal sent to Moscow

**Merz**'s declaration at the close of the Berlin summit — "**The message to Russia is: Ukraine remains strong**" — is calculated to be heard in the **Kremlin**. But it is not merely a phrase. It is the backdrop to a set of concrete decisions: coordination of long-range weapons, reinforced air defense, **70 billion** committed, **5% of GDP** target validated by four of the five countries present. Deterrence through words only works when it is backed by deeds — and Berlin laid down deeds.

**Putin** has bet on Western fatigue since the start of the war. He bet that elections, economic shocks, political divisions, and the length of the conflict would eventually erode support for Ukraine. Berlin on **June 24, 2026** is a refutation of that calculation. Four years after the full-scale invasion, five of Europe's largest military powers show no sign of fatigue — they are coordinating their positions, setting more ambitious targets, and preparing to take over American capabilities if necessary. That is not what Moscow expected.

### The signal sent to Beijing and Tehran

Beyond Russia, the Berlin summit sends a signal to **Beijing** and **Tehran** — the two powers that actively support the Russian war effort with military materials, electronic components, and, in **Iran**'s case, drones. The discussion of a possible naval mission at the **Strait of Hormuz** is directly addressed to Tehran: **Europe** is equipping itself with tools to exert pressure on **Russia**'s support lines, not just on the Ukrainian front.

**China** is watching. If it concludes that the **West** is resolute, divided, and weakened, it will adjust its calculation on **Taiwan** and on its support for Moscow. If it concludes that **Europe** is strengthening, coordinating, and prepared to maintain pressure on multiple theaters simultaneously, its calculation changes. The Berlin summit does not speak explicitly of **China** — but its geopolitical logic concerns China directly. Europe's decision to take charge of itself does not concern only **Russia**. It concerns the entire world order.

*Beijing reads Berlin. Every Western summit is analyzed by Chinese strategists to assess the cohesion and resolve of their potential adversaries. A united E5, numbered commitments, a coordinated posture — all of it enters Beijing's calculation on the feasibility of taking a risk on Taiwan. An Europe that defends itself better in Ukraine is also indirectly defending Taiwan. It is no accident that the two files are linked in the most serious strategic analyses.*

## Ukrainian Lessons for the Architecture of European Defense

### What the war teaches those who truly listen

**Ukraine** has been since **2022** the most intensive military laboratory in recent history. No **NATO** exercise, no simulation, no general-staff doctrine can replicate what Ukrainian forces have learned in four years of high-intensity war. Ukrainian combat data on drone effectiveness, electronic counter-warfare, logistics under artillery fire, and the air defense of bombed cities is of inestimable strategic value — and **NATO** allies are progressively incorporating it into their own doctrines and training programs.

General **Syrskyi**, commander-in-chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, declared on **June 30, 2026** that the most probable route for a new Russian offensive runs through **Bryansk** toward **Chernihiv**. That assessment, based on field intelligence, illustrates the level of analytical sophistication **Ukraine** has developed. **NATO** allies committing in Berlin on long-range weapons and air defense must ensure that the decisions made incorporate this type of Ukrainian operational assessment — and not only the analyses produced at **Alliance** headquarters.

### Integrating Kyiv into NATO planning

A gap in the European defense architecture taking shape at Berlin is the formal absence of **Ukraine** from **NATO**'s planning mechanisms. **Kyiv** receives weapons, funds, and intelligence — but it is not at the table where collective decisions on overall strategy are made. That asymmetry is politically understandable: **Ukraine** is not a **NATO** member. But it is strategically absurd: the country fighting **Russia** every day, with the most precise operational knowledge of the common adversary, is not systematically consulted in weapons and doctrine decisions.

The **Ankara** summit should institutionalize more systematic consultation of **Ukraine** in the **Alliance**'s defense planning. Not as a substitute for membership — but as an operational partner whose combat data is indispensable to realistic planning. That mechanism would have immediate practical value for weapons delivery decisions and strong symbolic value for **Kyiv**: being treated not as a beneficiary, but as an actor.

*Ukraine knows things about the war against Russia that NATO cannot learn in any exercise. Treating it only as a weapons beneficiary is wasting the Alliance's most valuable strategic resource. Ankara should correct that asymmetry. Not as a symbolic gesture — as an operational necessity.*

## Conclusion: Berlin Is Not a Destination, It Is a Starting Point

### What Berlin accomplished — and what it does not replace

The **E5** summit in Berlin on **June 24, 2026** accomplished something rare in defense diplomacy: it produced concrete, coordinated commitments carried by the five largest European military powers, thirteen days before the official **NATO** summit. That is better than what was expected. The figures — **5% of GDP**, **70 billion for Ukraine**, coordination of long-range weapons — are not vague declarations. They are measurable. They will be verifiable at Ankara.

But Berlin did not resolve the fundamental questions. It did not define the precise timeline for taking over American capabilities. It did not provide Ukraine with the legally binding security guarantees it has been asking for since **2022**. It did not resolve the tension between European autonomy ambition and Atlanticist cohesion. And it was held with an outgoing British prime minister whose political continuity is not guaranteed. Berlin is a strong starting point — not a destination.

### The Ankara horizon — and beyond

On **July 7 and 8, 2026**, the **32 NATO members** will reconvene in Ankara. They will need to validate, deepen, and institutionalize what five of them put forward in Berlin. **Ukraine** will be at the table, as an observer or a partner. The United States will be there, carrying an ambivalent but still decisive policy. **Turkey** will host, playing its role as the uncomfortable ally. And **Russia** will observe from outside, watching for any crack it can exploit.

What is at stake in Berlin and Ankara is not only the future of **Ukraine** — even if that is where the stakes are most immediate and most human. It is the architecture of European security for the next generation. A Europe that takes charge of itself, coordinates its armies, maintains pressure on its adversaries, and protects its model of values — that is a Europe that will have drawn the lessons from what **February 24, 2022** revealed about its vulnerabilities. The road from Berlin to Ankara is short. The road from Berlin to a truly secure Europe is still long.

*What is being decided from Berlin to Ankara does not belong to diplomats or generals. It belongs to all those who understand what it means to live under occupation, under bombs, under a regime that erases street names and rewrites school textbooks. Ukraine is fighting to survive as a nation. Europe is fighting to remain what it is. This is not a local war. It is a war for the very idea that nations have the right to exist.*

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

## Sources

### Primary sources

- [Brussels Signal — Europe's biggest military powers pledge stronger NATO role ahead of Ankara summit — June 24, 2026](https://brusselssignal.eu/2026/06/europes-biggest-military-powers-pledge-stronger-nato-role-ahead-of-ankara-summit/)

- [The Guardian — Ukraine war briefing: Zelenskyy doing "pretty well" against Russia, declares Trump — June 25, 2026](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/jun/25/ukraine-war-briefing-zelenskyy-doing-pretty-well-against-russia-declares-trump)

- [Kyiv Independent — War latest: Zelensky confirms second strike on Russia's Dubna space communications center — June 30, 2026](https://kyivindependent.com/ukraine-war-latest-zelensky-confirms-second-strike-on-russia-s-dubna-space-communications-center/)

### Secondary sources

- [Kyiv Independent — Russian threat will outlast Putin, Sweden's intelligence chief says — June 30, 2026](https://kyivindependent.com/russian-threat-will-outlast-putin-swedens-intelligence-chief-says/)

- [Euromaidanpress — War Day 1588: Ukraine has knocked out nearly 200 Russian air-defense systems since start of year — June 30, 2026](https://euromaidanpress.com/2026/06/30/russo-ukrainian-war-day-1588-ukraine-have-knocked-out-nearly-200-russian-air-defense-systems-since-start-of-year/)

- [Ukrainska Pravda — Daily summary: front, diplomacy and military decisions — June 30, 2026](https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2026/06/30/8041802/)

- [United24 Media — Putin ordered Russian general staff to prepare plans for capturing Kyiv, Syrskyi says — June 30, 2026](https://united24media.com/war-in-ukraine/putin-ordered-russian-general-staff-to-prepare-plans-for-capturing-kyiv-syrskyi-says-20325)

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Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/billet-berlin-les-cinq-et-le-test-silencieux-de-la-volonte-europeenne-face-a-ank