# To the 144 Drones That Flew Over Our NATO Bases Unseen

> I am writing today to you, leaders of NATO, defense ministers and chiefs of staff, after reading the damning report published by

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Open letter
- Published: 2026-07-06
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/aux-144-drones-qui-ont-survole-nos-bases-de-l-otan-sans-etre-vus

## Introduction: a letter to those who close their eyes to the sky

### Dear Western defense officials, I have read your report

I am writing today to you, **leaders** of **NATO**, defense ministers and chiefs of staff, after reading the damning report published by the **International Institute for Strategic Studies** on July 2, 2026. This document, relayed by the **New York Times**, counts no fewer than **144 incidents** of unidentified drones flying over sensitive **infrastructure** spread across **twelve to thirteen countries of the Atlantic Alliance**, between August 2024 and February 2026. You already know these numbers. I want to talk to you about what they actually mean.

Researcher **Charlie Edwards**, the study's lead author, does not mince words: "We consider this a coordinated strategy," he said, adding that this campaign "has operated with considerable impunity and represents a series of tactical successes for the **Kremlin**, while exposing a **strategic** gap in allied **defense**." Those words should haunt you as much as they haunt me.

### Why I chose to write to you directly, without diplomatic detour

I could have written a cold, distant analysis of this report. I chose the open letter instead, because this subject demands a direct address to those responsible for protecting European skies. You are not solely **responsible** for this failure, of course. But you are the ones who must, starting now, turn this damning finding into concrete action.

German Chancellor **Friedrich Merz** had already sensed it back in October, after a spike in incursions: "We suspect that **Russia** is behind most of these **drone** flights." A year later, the **IISS** report confirms what many had already quietly feared.

*I'll say it plainly: learning that 144 drones flew over our nuclear bases and our ports without a single one being intercepted doesn't just worry me, it makes me angry. The **West** can no longer afford this complacency toward **Moscow**.*

## What your silence allowed for eighteen months

### Nuclear bases overflown like a routine exercise

Dear **leaders**, your report confirms that **drones** flew over **RAF Lakenheath** and **RAF Fairford**, two British bases used for the potential storage of American nuclear weapons. The submarine base at **Île Longue**, in France, home to the French nuclear **deterrent** force, was also overflown. In Belgium, **Kleine-Brogel**, and in the Netherlands, **Volkel**, two sites hosting American nuclear weapons under **NATO**'s nuclear-sharing arrangement, were not spared either.

These are not amateurs piloting these machines. Analyst **Ulrike Franke** states it without equivocation: "It is illogical to assume these are amateur systems," and she adds a sentence that should echo through every European general staff: "A similar attack against **NATO** territory is entirely possible, and we are not prepared for it."

### Germany, the quiet epicenter of a silent war

It is **Germany** that recorded the highest number of documented incidents, with **58 overflights**, including six directly above the American base at **Ramstein**. That figure alone should be enough to justify a complete overhaul of German defensive posture against this type of **hybrid** **threat**.

Nearly half of these incidents targeted military bases, while 18 percent disrupted civilian **airports**, forcing temporary closures in **Copenhagen, Oslo, Brussels, Munich, and Vilnius**. The remainder, about 26 percent, targeted ports, power plants, and **strategic** industrial sites.

*I think the very fact that these overflights could repeat for **eighteen months** without a coordinated response says a great deal about how fragmented our air defense systems are. This is exactly the kind of gap Putin is looking to exploit.*

## The shadow fleet, a weapon of war sailing beneath our radar

### Civilian vessels turned into launch platforms

The report identifies specific ships belonging to the **Russian shadow fleet**, that network of aging tankers and cargo ships registered under flags of convenience that **Moscow** uses to dodge Western sanctions. The vessel **Hav Dolphin** is suspected of having served as a mobile launch platform for **Orlan-10** type **drones**, capable of a range exceeding 480 kilometers. The tanker **Seasons 1** is also cited in the investigation.

In December 2025, four large military **drones** flew over an Irish navy vessel, the **LÉ William Butler Yeats**, precisely during President **Volodymyr Zelensky**'s visit to **Dublin**. A troubling coincidence, or a deliberate message from **Moscow**? I lean strongly toward the second option.

### A French aircraft carrier targeted in the middle of the Baltic Sea

In February 2026, a French aircraft carrier sailing off the coast of **Sweden** was itself targeted by a drone, eventually neutralized. This incident shows just how far the **threat** has spread beyond the land territory of member states, now reaching the international waters used by Western naval forces.

This gradual escalation, from simple aerial observation to direct targeting of allied naval units, traces a troubling trajectory that the **IISS** report documents with a rigor that leaves little room for doubt.

*I believe this **shadow fleet** has become one of the most insidious tools of Russian hybrid warfare. It lets **Moscow** strike without ever directly owning responsibility for its actions, and that is precisely what makes it so dangerous.*

## The strategic failure no one wants to name

### Not a single drone intercepted in eighteen months

Here is the number that should chill your blood, dear **officials**: out of **144 documented incidents**, not one drone was intercepted or shot down by Western defenses. The **IISS** report calls this, without ambiguity, a "**strategic** failure of allied defenses." This is not criticism from the outside; it is a documented finding by researchers who methodically analyzed every incident.

This capability gap is no surprise to specialists in the field, but it becomes intolerable once exposed so clearly in broad daylight, in a report that will be read by allies, but also, let's be honest, by our adversaries.

### The "drone wall" concept still stuck on paper

The **European Union** has been discussing a "**drone wall**" concept for months, meant to protect its eastern border against this kind of repeated incursion. Yet this initiative struggles to gain the political and financial momentum needed to become an operational reality. How many more incidents will it take before this project finally leaves Brussels meeting rooms?

I put the question to you directly, European **leaders**: what are you waiting for to turn this concept into an absolute budgetary priority, on par with weapons deliveries to **Ukraine**?

*I believe this **drone wall** should have been an absolute priority since the very first documented incident in 2024. Every additional month of delay is a month handed freely to the **Kremlin**'s harassment strategy.*

## What the NATO summit in Ankara must change now

### A golden opportunity for a collective response

The **NATO summit in Ankara**, bringing together Alliance leaders in the days following this report's publication, represents a golden opportunity to turn this awareness into concrete commitment. Western defense leaders must use this platform to announce massive **investments** in detecting and **intercepting** low-altitude drones.

According to the summit's preparatory analyses, defense spending among member countries keeps rising, an encouraging trend I welcome, but one that must now translate into concrete **capabilities** against this specific **hybrid** threat, rather than generic budget increases alone.

### The role Washington must keep playing

I say this without excessive indulgence: on the strictly military front, the current American administration deserves credit for maintaining pressure on European allies to raise their contributions to collective **defense**. This stance, however contested it may be on other files, helps strengthen Western **deterrence** against **Russia**.

But this budgetary pressure will not be enough unless it comes paired with stronger technical **coordination** among allies to close precisely the gaps this **IISS** report has just exposed with surgical precision.

*I believe the pressure **Washington** applied for Europeans to pay their fair share of collective defense was necessary, even if the way it was phrased was often clumsy. On this specific military point, I give **Trump** credit.*

## The psychological dimension of a war that dares not speak its name

### Sowing doubt without triggering open war

What strikes me most in this report, dear **leaders**, is the very logic of this drone campaign. It is not about provoking a direct confrontation that would trigger **Article 5** of **NATO**, but about maintaining a constant, diffuse pressure, nearly impossible to formally attribute, that erodes European **populations**' trust in their own security institutions.

This threshold strategy, carefully calibrated to stay below the level that would trigger an automatic collective response, illustrates the sophistication of Russian **hybrid** doctrine, refined after years of war in **Ukraine**.

### The silent anxiety of overflown populations

Imagine, dear **officials**, what residents feel in towns where airports had to shut down abruptly because of an unidentified drone. This daily anxiety, rarely quantified in **strategic** reports, is nonetheless one of this campaign's primary goals: to psychologically wear down populations who are starting to doubt their governments' ability to protect them.

It is precisely this erosion of public **trust** that **Russia** seeks to provoke, far more than one-off material damage to any single isolated piece of infrastructure.

*I think this psychological war waged in small strokes may be more dangerous in the long run than a single spectacular strike, because it attacks directly the trust that Western citizens place in their own institutions.*

## The Ukrainian precedent the West still refuses to see

### A drone war already tested on the Ukrainian front

**Russia** has tested, refined, and perfected its **drone** tactics for more than four years on Ukrainian soil, before gradually exporting them to **NATO** territory. Kyiv endures daily waves of **Shahed** drones and other loitering munitions, a full-scale laboratory from which **Moscow** is clearly drawing operational lessons it now applies elsewhere in **Europe**.

Ignoring this direct link between the Ukrainian theater and the incursions observed on allied territory would be a major **strategic** analysis error, dear **leaders**, and I fear that is exactly the mistake some of you are still making today.

### Supporting Ukraine is also protecting yourselves

Every air defense system supplied to **Ukraine**, every dollar invested in its **detection** **capabilities**, indirectly helps slow the refinement of Russian tactics that sooner or later get tested against Western targets. President **Zelensky** has repeated it for years: the defense of **Ukraine** is the first line of defense for all of **Europe**.

This **IISS** report should convince the last skeptics that this link is not a mere rhetorical formula, but a **strategic** reality documented by concrete incidents on the very soil of Alliance member states.

*I remain convinced that every dollar, every euro invested in Ukrainian defense is a direct investment in our own security. Those who still forget this should reread this **IISS** report carefully.*

## What I concretely expect from you, dear leaders

### A unified chain of command against the drone threat

I ask you, dear **NATO** **officials**, to create a unified command structure specifically dedicated to **detecting** and neutralizing unidentified drones over allied territory. The current fragmentation of responsibilities among member countries, each managing its own air defense under its own rules of engagement, is precisely the gap this report documents so well.

This **coordination** must not remain a pious wish voiced at summits, but must translate into regular joint exercises, real-time shared alert protocols, and budgets clearly earmarked for this specific threat rather than diluted into generic **defense** envelopes.

### Public transparency about every confirmed incident

I also ask for greater **transparency** toward European **populations**. Too many incidents have been downplayed or kept quiet out of fear of appearing alarmist, when it is precisely this silence that now feeds public disbelief about the real scale of this Russian campaign.

An informed population is a population that more readily supports the necessary **defense** **investments**. Excessive secrecy, on the other hand, benefits only those seeking to destabilize us in the shadows.

*I deeply believe that transparency, even uncomfortable transparency, remains the best democratic weapon against this kind of hybrid threat. Hiding the scale of the problem from the public only delays the mobilization needed to respond to it.*

## The wider threat China is watching closely

### Beijing is learning from our gaps too

It would be naive to believe that only **Russia** is watching the Western reaction to this drone campaign. **China**, our main long-term **strategic** rival, is almost certainly studying how the **Atlantic Alliance** responds to this type of low-intensity **hybrid** threat, lessons it could one day apply in the **Pacific** or elsewhere.

A **West** unable to close its gaps against relatively rudimentary **drones** sends a dangerous signal of weakness to adversaries far more technologically advanced in this specific field.

### Iran and North Korea, interested spectators

**Iran**, whose own **drone** **capabilities** have heavily supplied the Russian arsenal used against **Ukraine**, and **North Korea**, which is developing its own military drone programs, are also watching closely how the **West** responds to this new form of warfare. Every gap documented in this report becomes, unfortunately, a free lesson handed to this entire authoritarian axis.

That is why I believe the response to this report must not be thought of solely in terms of **Russia**, but as a **deterrence** message aimed at every power that might be tempted to test our **defenses** the same way.

*I think the **West** must send a clear signal to this authoritarian axis formed by **Russia**, China, Iran, and **North Korea**: our gaps of today will not remain permanent gaps. We will fix them, and quickly.*

## The lessons military history already teaches us

### Strategic surprise is never inevitable

Western military history is full of examples where an emerging threat was first underestimated before forcing a swift and effective **adaptation**. The **IISS** report merely confirms a classic pattern: a new war **technology**, here cheap drones launched from civilian ships, outpaces defenses designed for more conventional threats.

But this initial underestimation must never become an excuse for prolonged inaction. Every additional month without a coordinated response turns a simple capability gap into a lasting **strategic** vulnerability.

### Adapting faster than the adversary improves

The real question, dear **leaders**, is not whether the **West** can close this gap, but whether it can do so faster than **Russia** perfects its own tactics. This race against the clock, both technological and doctrinal, will largely determine the European **strategic** balance of the coming years.

I remain convinced that Western **industrial** and technological **capabilities**, properly mobilized, can quickly outpace the current tactics of the Russian **shadow fleet**, provided political will finally matches the scale of the challenge this report documents.

*I sincerely believe the **West** has always eventually adapted to emerging threats, often after a costly delay. The question this time is how many more incidents it will take before this adaptation finally becomes an accepted priority.*

## What European citizens have the right to demand

### Security is not a budgetary luxury

Dear **leaders**, the citizens you represent have the fundamental right to demand that their taxes go toward closing precisely this kind of gap, documented in black and white by a research institute as respected as the **IISS**. Aerial **security** over allied territory is not one budgetary luxury among others; it is a basic condition of national sovereignty.

I refuse to accept the argument that these **investments** would be too costly, when the human and political cost of a successful attack on critical infrastructure would itself be incalculable and potentially irreversible.

### A generation growing up under the drone threat

An entire generation of young Europeans is now growing up with the daily reality of **airport** closures caused by unidentified drones, a dangerous normalization that should never become acceptable in Western **democracies** supposedly built to offer their citizens security and stability.

This is the insidious normalization I refuse, and that I ask you, dear **officials**, to refuse as well, with the same firmness, in your upcoming budgetary and **strategic** decisions.

*I think the worst thing that could happen would be for us to collectively grow used to these drone overflights, as if they had become part of the normal backdrop of European life. That would be accepting a silent defeat.*

## The role Western defense industries must play in this response

### Accelerating the production of anti-drone systems

Western defense **industry** already has the **technologies** needed to detect and effectively neutralize this type of threat, whether laser systems, electronic jamming, or dedicated interceptors. The problem is less technological than political and budgetary, a finding that should actually make the solution considerably simpler.

European and American **defense** manufacturers must receive firm, massive orders for this type of equipment, rather than vague promises of future investment that never materialize with the urgency the situation clearly demands.

### Stronger transatlantic cooperation, not fragmentation

I am arguing for stronger transatlantic **cooperation** between American and European defense **industries** on this specific drone file, rather than sterile commercial competition among allies who should, instead, join forces against a clearly identified common threat.

This **industrial** **cooperation** would also send a strong political signal to **Moscow**: that of a **West** responding collectively, not in scattered fashion, to a campaign deliberately designed to exploit our internal divisions.

*I believe this drone crisis could, if well managed, become an opportunity to strengthen transatlantic industrial cooperation rather than yet another source of commercial friction among allies who have far better things to do than fight over market share.*

## What this report reveals about our collective relationship with risk

### Eighteen months of incidents before public awareness

It took **eighteen months** of documented incidents, and the publication of a detailed report by an independent research institute, for this **threat** to finally get the public attention it deserved since the first confirmed overflight in August 2024. This delay, by itself, illustrates a structural problem in how we collectively assess emerging threats before they turn into open crises.

I ask the question directly: how many other **hybrid** **threats** are currently brewing, documented only in confidential reports the general public will only discover months, or even years, later?

### Breaking with the culture of institutional denial

This culture of denial or minimization toward emerging **threats** must change, dear **leaders**. It protects no one; it only delays responses that become, over time, increasingly costly and increasingly urgent to implement in haste rather than through methodical preparation.

I sincerely hope this **IISS** report will mark a turning point in this institutional culture, rather than simply becoming one more document added to an already considerable pile of warnings largely ignored in the past.

*I think the culture of institutional denial toward hybrid threats may be our greatest collective vulnerability, far more than any single technological gap documented in this report.*

## What our Pacific allies are also watching closely

### Japan, Australia, and South Korea drawing their own lessons

It would be a mistake to think this **drone** crisis stays confined to the European theater. Our **Pacific** allies, **Japan**, **Australia**, and **South Korea**, are watching with particular attention how NATO responds to this Russian campaign, since they themselves face similar tactics from **China** and **North Korea** in their own regional neighborhood.

A firm, coordinated Western response to Russian drones would send a reassuring signal to these Indo-Pacific partners, showing them that Western **democracies** know how to adapt collectively to sophisticated **hybrid** threats, rather than remaining paralyzed by their own internal divisions.

### A deterrence that must now be thought of on a global scale

This global dimension of Western **deterrence** deserves to be fully integrated into the discussions at the Ankara summit. The defense of allied territory in **Europe** and strategic stability in the **Pacific** are today more interconnected than ever, a fact too many political **officials** unfortunately still treat as two entirely separate files.

I firmly believe **NATO** would benefit from strengthening its consultations with its Asian partners on this specific **drone** file, if only to pool lessons learned on both sides of the globe against adversary tactics that increasingly resemble one another.

*I think Western **deterrence** can no longer be thought of in purely regional silos. What is unfolding in European skies against Russian drones directly concerns our **Pacific** allies facing the same hybrid tactics coming from Beijing and **Pyongyang**.*

## Conclusion: a letter calling for action, not panic

### What I truly expect from this open letter

Dear **NATO** **leaders**, this letter is not a call for widespread panic, nor a gratuitous accusation against your institutions. It is an urgent invitation to turn a damning report into a concrete, measurable, and above all rapid plan of action. The **144 incidents** documented by the **IISS** are not fate; they are an alarm signal that we all have a duty to take seriously starting now.

The **Ankara** summit, the upcoming budget discussions, transatlantic **industrial** **cooperation**: all these levers already exist in your hands. At this stage, all that is missing is the political will to pull them with the urgency this file clearly demands.

### One last thought for those already keeping watch

I close this letter thinking of all those, soldiers, analysts, technicians, already working, often in the shadows, to close these documented gaps. Your work deserves to be backed by political decisions that match the risks you identify every day on the ground, rather than by reports that pile up without concrete follow-through.

The **West** has always managed to adapt in the face of adversity, provided it clearly recognizes the nature of the challenge. This report gives us that clarity. It is now up to you to turn it into something concrete.

*I close this letter with a simple conviction: European skies do not belong to those who fly over them in the shadows. They belong to the citizens you have a duty to protect, and I will keep reminding you of that as long as this report remains without concrete follow-through.*

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

## Sources

### Primary sources

- The New York Times — Russia waged 18-month drone campaign over Europe, IISS report, July 2, 2026

- Forbes — What defense leaders will discuss at the 2026 NATO summit, July 1, 2026

- The Guardian — Russia mounted drone surveillance of European nuclear sites over 18 months, July 2, 2026

### Secondary sources

- Newsmax — Russia drones Europe defense, July 2, 2026

- Telex — EU Russia Ukraine war drone airspace violations defence, July 1, 2026

- Wikipedia — 2026 Ankara NATO summit

- The Aviationist — Europe drone incursions Russia shadow fleet, July 3, 2026

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Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/aux-144-drones-qui-ont-survole-nos-bases-de-l-otan-sans-etre-vus