# INVESTIGATION: AUKUS Nuclear Submarines — the Truth Behind the June 2026 Drone Exercises

> On June 22, 2026, Australia's Department of Defence proudly published the results of the Army Warfighting Experiment 2026: Australian, American, and British soldiers had tested autonomous drone swarms on the plains of Salisbury Plain, England, in conditions of "near-continuous ra

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Investigation
- Published: 2026-06-27
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/aukus-sous-marins-nucleaires-la-verite-derriere-les-exercices-de-drones-en-juin

## Introduction: The Tree That Hides the Underwater Forest

### Spectacular Drones, a Faltering Nuclear Program

On **June 22, 2026**, Australia's Department of Defence proudly published the results of the **Army Warfighting Experiment 2026**: Australian, American, and British soldiers had tested autonomous drone swarms on the plains of **Salisbury Plain**, England, in conditions of "near-continuous rain" and "challenging woodland." Up to **six drones at a time** scanned terrain, identified targets, and transmitted data in near-real-time between AUKUS partners. A fine technological spectacle, generating guaranteed media coverage. But this so-called "Pillar II" strand of AUKUS — the one dealing with advanced conventional technologies — also serves as a convenient showcase, diverting attention from the true Gordian knot of the partnership: nuclear-powered submarines.

Colonel **Jake Penley**, director of Australia's robotic and autonomous systems coordination office, enthused that autonomous systems "are no longer experimental and are entering the core of how land forces operate." An encouraging result, without a doubt. But the generals in Washington, Canberra, and London know full well that infantry drones do not compensate for the absence of a strategic nuclear submarine capability. What truly counts in AUKUS — what the partnership was created for in September 2021 — is **Pillar I**: nuclear-powered submarines (SSN) for the Royal Australian Navy. And there, the reality is far less glorious.

### The May 2026 Review: An Admission of Industrial Difficulties

On **May 30, 2026**, at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, Australian Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister **Richard Marles** announced a significant revision of the acquisition plan. Australia will now receive **three in-service Virginia-class Block IV submarines** — instead of two Block IV and at least one newly built Block V or VII — with deliveries planned for **2032, 2035, and 2038**. The first SSN-AUKUS (the new trilateral-build submarine) is not expected until the "early **2040s**."

Marles presented this as a "rationalization" designed to simplify maintenance and training. Analysts immediately identified the underlying reality: the American submarine industrial base is in deep crisis. US shipyards are only producing **1.2 to 1.3 Virginia submarines per year**, far short of the **2.33 boats annually** that the US Navy considers necessary to satisfy both its own operational readiness needs AND its AUKUS commitments. The revision toward three in-service Block IVs — ships already built, some still in trials — is a pragmatic way of working around that industrial bottleneck without publicly admitting it.

*This repositioning toward "second-hand" Block IVs is honest in its logic — but we must call things by their name. Australia will not receive brand-new submarines within the originally promised timelines, because the United States cannot build them fast enough. That is an American industrial weakness that Beijing is observing very carefully.*

## Pillar I Under the Microscope: Timelines, Obstacles, and Blind Spots

### The In-Service Block IVs: Ships With Reduced Operational Life

The three Block IVs designated for Australia come from the **SSN-792 to SSN-800** group, commissioned between **2020 and 2028**. Some are still under construction or in sea trials. Transferring in-service submarines to Australia entails a brutal accounting reality: these vessels will enter Australian service having already consumed a portion of their reactor life. A newly built SSN offers approximately **33 years** of service. The transferred Block IVs will offer only about **23 years** after integration into the Australian navy. The third vessel, delivered in **2038**, will be operational until approximately **2061** — a full ten years less than a newly built ship would have provided.

This compression of the life cycle creates a structural challenge: if the SSN-AUKUS program experiences delays in the 2040s — which risk assessments consider plausible — Australia would find itself with a reduced nuclear submarine capability at precisely the moment the Chinese submarine threat is at its peak. **China** currently has **32 nuclear-powered submarines** and launched **10** between 2021 and 2025, compared with only **7** for the United States over the same period. The production gap is widening in the wrong direction.

### American and Australian Shipyards: An Impossible Equation?

The American submarine industrial base suffers from a chronic shortage of skilled labour, procurement delays for specialized materials, and maintenance capacity already saturated by the existing fleet's needs. The recent contract for a partnership with the **HMAS Stirling** shipyards in Western Australia — the future base for Australian SSNs — provides for massive infrastructure works to accommodate nuclear submarines. Those works are underway but whether they will be completed in time for 2032 remains an ambitious target.

Within Australia itself, training a generation of nuclear submariners takes time. Australian sailors are being trained in the United States and the United Kingdom — an integration program that works but cannot be accelerated at will. The initial rotation of American and British submarines based in Australia (already underway in Perth since **2023**) serves as a pedagogical stepping stone, but it is not yet a sovereign Australian capability.

*I am wary of those who say everything is fine with AUKUS. I am equally wary of those who declare it a disaster. The truth is somewhere in between: a highly ambitious program confronting hard industrial realities, moving forward — but more slowly and less cleanly than the official announcements suggest. And Beijing is not waiting.*

## Pillar II as Narrative Compensation

### The Salisbury Plain Drones: Real Progress, False Priority

The **Army Warfighting Experiment 2026** genuinely produced interesting results. Soldiers expanded the complexity of autonomous operations from two to six drones, using swarming software to subdivide areas of interest, perform scans, and return imagery to handheld devices. An AI model was refined through repeated cycles of identification and confirmation. The near-real-time sharing of mission data between AUKUS partners represented a concrete advance in interoperability.

Australian engineer **Hing-Wah Kwok** from the **DSTG** (Defence Science and Technology Group) explained that the objective is for each partner to improve its systems internally, retrain models in the field, and share those models with allies to "build capabilities beyond what any single country could achieve alone." That is sound thinking. But one must acknowledge that infantry drones tested on Salisbury Plain do not replace the strategic deterrence embodied by a nuclear submarine patrolling the depths of the Western Pacific.

### The True Strategic Value of AUKUS Pillar I

The deep purpose of AUKUS — the reason Paris erupted in **September 2021** when **Canberra** cancelled its massive conventional submarine contract with **France** — is the strategic posture in the **Indo-Pacific** against China's rising naval power. **China** added approximately **79,000 tonnes** of nuclear warships between **2021 and 2025**, against **55,500 tonnes** for the **United States**. At that pace, American submarine supremacy guaranteeing freedom of navigation in the Indo-Pacific will be contested by the **2030s**.

Australian nuclear submarines operating in the region's waters would exponentially multiply Western surveillance and deterrence coverage. They would allow the US Navy to redistribute resources elsewhere. They would send a clear signal to **Beijing** about the resolve of Indo-Pacific allies. That is precisely why this program holds a strategic value that drone exercises cannot match — however technically impressive they may be. Lance Corporal **Kai Smith**, a drone operator with Australia's **1st Armoured Regiment**, is the kind of human face the program needs — but not its strategic core.

*China is building submarines faster than the United States. Australia needs them urgently. And yet delivery delays are being announced. There is no polite formulation for this situation: it is a serious problem that should be triggering emergency industrial reforms in Washington and Canberra, not press conferences about drones on Salisbury Plain.*

## Political and Diplomatic Obstacles

### The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Question

Australia's acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines under AUKUS raises complex non-proliferation questions. The vessels will be nuclear-propelled but will carry no nuclear weapons — a crucial distinction that several countries, including **China** and **India**, have publicly contested. The **International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)** has validated a unique safeguards arrangement for **Australia**, but the modalities of oversight for enriched nuclear fuel supplied by the **United States** continue to be the subject of complex technical discussions with the UN agency.

**China** has systematically denounced AUKUS as a containment attempt and a violation of the spirit of non-proliferation. **Beijing** has raised the issue in multiple international forums. While these objections have not blocked the program, they create lasting diplomatic pressure on **Canberra**, which must constantly justify the partnership to its **Southeast Asian** neighbours — several of whom maintain significant economic ties with **China** and are reluctant to be drawn into a Sino-American confrontation.

### Domestic Political Factors in Australia

Within **Australia**, AUKUS enjoys bipartisan support, but the program is not without controversy. Its total cost — estimated at several hundred billion Australian dollars over several decades — ties up resources that could otherwise go to other defence or social priorities. Some Australian defence experts continue to question the logic of resorting to in-service **Block IVs** with reduced reactor life, when cutting-edge conventional submarines could have been acquired more cheaply and quickly.

The decision by **Richard Marles** at **Shangri-La** represents a difficult political choice: it implicitly acknowledges that the original objective was too ambitious, while affirming that the program remains on track. The Australian government is navigating a delicate balance between transparency and maintaining confidence in a program that has become a central pillar of its foreign and defence policy. Critics in the Australian parliamentary opposition note that **Block IVs** approaching half their reactor life at the time of transfer represent a sub-optimal investment for Australian taxpayers.

*I understand Canberra's dilemma. Admitting that the original objective was unrealistic is politically costly. But persisting in a non-viable trajectory would be even more costly in the long run. The May 2026 decision is pragmatic — I would have preferred it accompanied by more candid communication about the real industrial reasons, rather than the rhetorical packaging of "rationalization."*

## The State of Shipyards and Industrial Partnerships

### American Investments in Their Own Industrial Base

The **United States** has launched major investments to ramp up its submarine production rate. Partnerships with shipyards such as **General Dynamics Electric Boat** and **Huntington Ingalls Industries** have received additional funding. **Australia** itself contributed funds to the American submarine industrial base — approximately **3 billion Australian dollars** — to accelerate production. But results take time to materialize: skilled workers capable of welding nuclear submarine hulls are trained over years, not months.

In the **United Kingdom**, the **BAE Systems** yards at **Barrow-in-Furness** — where British SSN-AUKUS vessels and a portion of Australian ships will be assembled — have also received investment. The schedule envisions delivery of the first Australian **SSN-AUKUS** in the "early **2040s**." But that timetable is subject to the risk that American production problems persist AND that the **SSN-AUKUS** program, which uses an entirely new design, encounters its own development delays — a risk analysts consider significant.

### The Initial Rotation and Submariner Training

The initial rotation of American and British submarines based in **Australia** — already underway in **Perth** since **2023** — serves as a pedagogical stepping stone for training a generation of Australian submariners operating nuclear-powered platforms. This program works but cannot be accelerated at will: nuclear reactor qualifications require years of rigorous training. Australian sailors are training in the **United States** and the **United Kingdom** under real submarine operating conditions. The **HMAS Stirling** infrastructure in **Western Australia** is undergoing massive works to accommodate nuclear submarines.

This training and infrastructure strand — less spectacular than contract announcements — may be the most critical for the program's long-term viability. A submarine without a qualified crew is merely a very expensive metal hull. **Australia** is investing heavily in this human capital — and that is an aspect worth acknowledging, even if government communications often favour order figures over photographs of instructors in reactor simulators. The challenge remains building this human pipeline at the pace demanded by China's military buildup.

*AUKUS is one of the West's most important geostrategic bets in the Indo-Pacific. It deserves better than press conferences about drones when fundamental industrial questions remain without satisfactory answers. Transparency about real difficulties would, in the long run, be far more beneficial to the partnership's credibility than communicating tactical victories.*

## Pillar II as Narrative Compensation

### The Salisbury Plain Drones: Real Progress, False Priority

The **Army Warfighting Experiment 2026** genuinely produced interesting results. Soldiers expanded the complexity of autonomous operations from two to six drones, using swarming software to subdivide areas of interest, perform scans, and return imagery to handheld devices. An **AI** model was refined through repeated cycles of identification and confirmation. The near-real-time sharing of mission data between **AUKUS** partners represented a concrete advance in interoperability.

Australian engineer **Hing-Wah Kwok** from the **DSTG** (Defence Science and Technology Group) explained that the objective is for each partner to improve its systems internally, retrain models in the field, and share those models between allies to "build capabilities beyond what any single country could achieve alone." That is sound thinking. But one must acknowledge that infantry drones tested at **Salisbury Plain** do not replace the strategic deterrence embodied by a nuclear submarine patrolling the depths of the **Western Pacific**.

### The True Strategic Value of AUKUS Pillar I

The deep purpose of **AUKUS** — the reason Paris erupted in **September 2021** when **Canberra** cancelled its mega-contract for conventional submarines with **France** — is the strategic posture in the **Indo-Pacific** against China's rising naval power. **China** added approximately **79,000 tonnes** of nuclear warships between **2021 and 2025**, against **55,500 tonnes** for the **United States**. At that pace, American submarine supremacy will be contested by the **2030s**.

Australian nuclear submarines operating in the region's waters would exponentially multiply Western surveillance and deterrence coverage. They would allow the US Navy to redistribute resources elsewhere. They would send a clear signal to **Beijing** about the resolve of Indo-Pacific allies. That is precisely why this program holds a strategic value that drone exercises cannot match — however technically impressive they may be. Lance Corporal **Kai Smith**, a drone operator with Australia's **1st Armoured Regiment**, is the human face the program needs — but not its strategic heart.

*AUKUS is one of the West's most important geostrategic bets in the Indo-Pacific. It deserves better than press conferences about drones when fundamental industrial questions remain without satisfactory answers. Transparency about real difficulties would, in the long run, be far more beneficial to the partnership's credibility than communicating tactical victories.*

## Political and Diplomatic Obstacles

### The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Question

Australia's acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines under **AUKUS** raises complex non-proliferation questions. The vessels will be nuclear-propelled but will carry no nuclear weapons — a crucial distinction that several countries, including **China** and **India**, have publicly contested. The **International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)** has validated a unique safeguards arrangement for **Australia**, but the modalities of oversight for enriched nuclear fuel supplied by the **United States** continue to be the subject of complex technical discussions.

**China** has systematically denounced **AUKUS** as a containment attempt and a violation of the spirit of non-proliferation. **Beijing** has raised the issue in multiple international forums. While these objections have not blocked the program, they create lasting diplomatic pressure on **Canberra**, which must constantly justify the partnership to its **Southeast Asian** neighbours — several of whom maintain significant economic ties with **China** and are reluctant to be drawn into a Sino-American confrontation.

### Domestic Political Factors in Australia

In **Australia**, **AUKUS** enjoys bipartisan support, but the program is not without controversy. Its total cost — estimated at several hundred billion Australian dollars over several decades — ties up resources that could otherwise go to other defence or social priorities. Some Australian defence experts continue to question the logic of resorting to in-service **Block IVs** with reduced reactor life, when cutting-edge conventional submarines could have been acquired more cheaply.

The decision by **Richard Marles** at **Shangri-La** represents a difficult political choice: it implicitly acknowledges that the original objective was too ambitious, while affirming that the program remains on track. The Australian government is navigating a delicate balance between transparency and maintaining confidence in a program that has become a central pillar of its foreign and defence policy. Critics in the Australian parliamentary opposition note that **Block IVs** in service approaching half their reactor life at the time of transfer represent a sub-optimal investment for Australian taxpayers.

*I am wary of those who say everything is fine with AUKUS. I am equally wary of those who declare it a disaster. The truth is somewhere in between: a highly ambitious program confronting hard industrial realities, moving forward — but more slowly and less cleanly than the official announcements suggest. And Beijing is not waiting.*

## The State of Shipyards and Industrial Partnerships

### American Investments in Their Own Industrial Base

The **United States** has launched major investments to ramp up its submarine production rate. Partnerships with shipyards such as **General Dynamics Electric Boat** and **Huntington Ingalls Industries** have received additional funding. **Australia** itself contributed funds to the American submarine industrial base — approximately **3 billion Australian dollars** — to accelerate production. But results take time to materialize: skilled workers capable of welding nuclear submarine hulls are trained over years, not months.

In the **United Kingdom**, the **BAE Systems** yards at **Barrow-in-Furness** — where British **SSN-AUKUS** vessels and a portion of Australian ships will be assembled — have also received investment. The schedule envisions delivery of the first Australian **SSN-AUKUS** in the "early **2040s**." But that timetable is subject to the risk that American production problems persist AND that the **SSN-AUKUS** program, which uses an entirely new design, encounters its own development delays — a risk analysts consider significant.

### The Rotation and Submariner Training

The initial rotation of American and British submarines based in **Australia** — already underway in **Perth** since **2023** — serves as a pedagogical stepping stone for training a generation of Australian submariners on nuclear-powered platforms. This program works but cannot be accelerated at will: nuclear reactor qualifications require years of rigorous training. Australian sailors are training in the **United States** and the **United Kingdom** under real submarine operating conditions. The **HMAS Stirling** infrastructure in **Western Australia** is undergoing massive works to accommodate nuclear submarines.

This training and infrastructure strand, less spectacular than contract announcements, may be the most critical for the program's long-term viability. A submarine without a qualified crew is merely a very expensive metal hull. **Australia** is investing heavily in this human capital — and that is an aspect worth acknowledging, even if government communications often favour order figures over photographs of instructors in reactor simulators. The challenge remains building this human pipeline at the pace demanded by China's military buildup.

*China is building submarines faster than the United States. Australia needs them urgently. And yet delivery delays are being announced. There is no polite formulation for this situation: it is a serious problem that should be triggering emergency industrial reforms in Washington and Canberra, not press conferences about drones on Salisbury Plain.*

## Conclusion: AUKUS Between Promises and Realities

### What Has Been Accomplished

AUKUS is not a failure. In less than five years of existence, the partnership has generated real technological cooperation in drones, AI, and autonomous systems. It has accelerated the return of American and British nuclear-powered submarines to Australian waters. It has durably reconfigured the alliance landscape in the Indo-Pacific. The Salisbury Plain exercise is not a diversion — it is a genuine demonstration of deepened military cooperation between three Anglophone allies in the technologies of the future.

### What Remains to Be Accomplished — and the Unanswered Questions

But the hard questions remain. Can the American submarine industrial base reach the pace of **2.33 boats per year** needed to honor its AUKUS commitments without undermining its own fleet? Will Australian and British shipyards be able to assemble the SSN-AUKUS within the announced timelines for the 2040s? Will Australia have the qualified workforce needed to operate a complex mixed fleet in the 2030s? These questions deserve precise and public answers. So far, they have largely received general assurances and drone presentations.

*AUKUS is not a failure. In less than five years of existence, the partnership has generated real technological cooperation. It has durably reconfigured the alliance landscape in the Indo-Pacific. But the hard questions remain: can the American submarine industrial base reach 2.33 boats per year? Will Australia have the qualified workforce for a mixed fleet in the 2030s? These questions deserve precise answers, not drone presentations.*

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

## Sources

### Primary sources

- [Australian Defence — AUKUS partners test drone swarming tactics — June 22, 2026](https://www.defence.gov.au/news-events/news/2026-06-22/aukus-partners-test-drone-swarming-tactics)

- [US Studies Centre (USSC) — By the numbers: AUKUS revised timeline comparison — June 10, 2026](https://www.ussc.edu.au/aukus-revised-timeline-comparison)

- [ISW — China Taiwan Update, June 26, 2026 — June 26, 2026](https://understandingwar.org/research/china-taiwan/china-taiwan-update-june-26-2026/)

### Secondary sources

- [Sasakawa Peace Foundation — Why North Korea's Involvement in Russo-Ukrainian War Matters for Indo-Pacific — June 2026](https://www.spf.org/iina/en/articles/lee_07.html)

- [CSIS — North Korea in 2026: Intentions, Realities, and Response — June 23, 2026](https://www.csis.org/podcasts/impossible-state/north-korea-2026-intentions-realities-and-response)

- [Asia Times — China tests Scarborough as Manila casts beyond US for help — June 26, 2026](https://asiatimes.com/2026/06/china-tests-scarborough-as-manila-casts-beyond-us-for-help/)

-

---

Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/aukus-sous-marins-nucleaires-la-verite-derriere-les-exercices-de-drones-en-juin