# To Brazil, dear Marco Rubio, listen to your own allies

> Introduction: a letter to a secretary of state who won't back down

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Open letter
- Published: 2026-07-04
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/au-bresil-cher-marco-rubio-ecoutez-vos-propres-allies

## Introduction: a letter to a secretary of state who won't back down

### A trade file turned diplomatic arm-wrestle

Dear **Marco Rubio**, I write this letter at the precise moment your administration is maintaining, against every call for restraint, the threat of a **25% tariff** on a large share of Brazilian imports. This file, opened by the **Office of the United States Trade Representative** (**USTR**) in early June 2026 under a **Section 301** investigation, has turned within a matter of weeks into a major diplomatic standoff between **Washington** and **Brasília**.

The U.S. Trade Representative, **Jamieson Greer**, concluded that **Brazil** was engaging in trade practices deemed "unreasonable" in six areas: **digital commerce**, **electronic payments**, **preferential tariffs**, **protection of intellectual property**, access to the **ethanol market** and **illegal deforestation**. A **public hearing** is scheduled for **July 6, 2026** before the **United States International Trade Commission**, and Brazil has until **July 15** to take what **Washington** calls "responsive action."

### Why I am writing to you directly, Mr. Secretary

I am addressing this letter to you because I believe **trade diplomacy** should never turn into an instrument for settling electoral scores, yet that is precisely what several observers fear now that **Brazilian senator Flávio Bolsonaro**, a declared candidate for the **presidential election** of **October 2026**, has registered to personally testify at the **July 6** hearing against a **tariff** he calls counterproductive for both countries.

Brazilian **president** **Luiz Inácio Lula** da Silva has not minced words, calling the tariff "unjustified and politically motivated," and even branding you a "mortal enemy" of **Latin America**, according to several media outlets that have tracked this rare verbal escalation between two **governments** otherwise bound by decades of mutually beneficial trade.

*I believe, dear Secretary of State, that this inflamed rhetoric on both sides masks a far more serious question: whether the **West** can still conduct coherent trade **diplomacy** without letting its calendar be dictated by the electoral cycles of a third country.*

## What the **Section 301** investigation on Brazil actually reveals

### Six precise grievances, not a mere punitive posture

The investigation conducted by the **USTR**, launched in **July 2025** on direct order from **President Trump**, led to conclusions documented in a **notice** published in the **Federal Register** on **June 1, 2026**: Brazil allegedly maintains discriminatory practices affecting electronic payment systems such as **Pix**, an application of **preferential tariffs** toward India and Mexico deemed unfair to American companies, along with insufficient enforcement of **anti-corruption** and **anti-deforestation** laws.

These grievances, however technical they may appear to the general public, represent, according to **Washington**, a **real burden** on American trade, a conclusion that legally opens the door to imposing **punitive tariffs** under the 1974 trade law.

### A list of exemptions that limits the tariff's real reach

It should nonetheless be noted, for accuracy's sake, that the American proposal exempts more than **1,600 product categories**, including some of Brazil's leading exports to the **United States**: **coffee**, **beef**, **orange juice**, **rare earths** and **aircraft parts**. According to economic estimates cited by several analysts, the measure would ultimately affect less than **30%** of Brazilian exports to the American market.

This nuance is essential: it contradicts the image of a sweeping, blanket tariff that some commentators have tried to present, while doing nothing to lessen the political gravity of the move against a long-standing historical trade partner.

*I believe it is intellectually dishonest to present this measure as a mere punitive whim: the grievances are documented, precise, and corroborated by a methodical investigation, even if the diplomatic form chosen to advance them clearly deserves to be questioned.*

## The Brazilian electoral context that complicates everything

### Flávio **Bolsonaro**, a witness far from neutral

Senator **Flávio Bolsonaro**, son of former president **Jair Bolsonaro**, has requested a five-minute slot to testify personally at the **July 6** hearing, arguing that this 25% tariff will fail to correct the practices it targets. In a letter addressed directly to you, Mr. Rubio, he formally reiterated his request that the United States abandon this measure, invoking a partnership "beneficial to both nations for more than 80 years."

This **intervention** is obviously not free of political calculation: as a declared candidate for the October 2026 presidential race, the senator is clearly positioning himself as Washington's preferred interlocutor against a **Lula** he is fighting head-on in Brazilian domestic politics.

### The **Lula** government chooses the path of strategic absence

Notably: according to several sources, the **Lula** government does not plan to send official representatives to this July 6 public hearing, judging that the forum is aimed more at the **private and civil sectors** than at governments themselves. **Brasília** apparently prefers to communicate through written channels and more discreet diplomatic avenues rather than lend itself to a public exercise that could work to the political advantage of its domestic opponents.

This calculated withdrawal strategy illustrates the complexity of a trade file that has, in practice, largely turned into a matter of Brazilian domestic politics, blurring the line between economic diplomacy and electoral calculation on both sides of the Atlantic.

*I find it telling that **Brasília** chooses evasion over direct confrontation: it is the sign of a government that knows this file above all serves its rivals' electoral agenda, and that refuses to hand them any more public visibility.*

## Brazil's reciprocity law, a double-edged weapon

### Brasília reserves the right to retaliate

The Brazilian government has warned that it does not intend to passively absorb these measures, signaling that it could invoke its recently adopted **reciprocity law**, passed unanimously by the **Brazilian Congress**, a text allowing it to respond to tariffs deemed unfair under international trade rules. This law, passed in a rare moment of Brazilian political consensus, shows just how much the country's political class, across all leanings, perceives this American pressure as excessive.

A potential Brazilian **retaliation** could target strategic American sectors, turning this dispute into a **bilateral trade war** with potentially damaging consequences for companies in both countries, at a time when the global economy is already struggling to absorb the multiple tariff shocks launched by the **Trump** administration since its return to power.

### An already weakened American legal context

It bears recalling that the **United States Supreme Court** ruled in **February 2026** that President Trump had exceeded his authority by using a separate law, **IEEPA**, to impose sweeping tariffs on numerous trading partners, including Brazil. It is precisely this judicial ruling that pushed the administration to fall back on the slower but legally sturdier route of **Section 301**, requiring country-by-country investigations, consultations and public hearings before any implementation.

This procedural detour, though it slows the timeline, paradoxically confers greater legal legitimacy on the current approach toward Brazil, compared with the broad tariffs struck down by the courts just months earlier.

*I note with some interest that this American legal battle, far from weakening Washington's position, has in fact reinforced it legally on this specific Brazilian file, even if the political price paid in terms of bilateral relations remains considerable.*

## The legacy of an earlier 50% tariff that still weighs heavily

### A sanction born of a Brazilian judicial dispute

This new trade dispute did not arise from nowhere: it continues a prior 50% tariff imposed by President Trump last year, largely as a sanction against the **judicial prosecution** targeting former president **Jair Bolsonaro** in Brazil. The newly proposed 25% tariff would partially replace that earlier measure, with a combined rate of **40%** mentioned by some sources for goods covered by that initial political sanction.

This continuity between political sanction and documented trade grievance further muddies the reading of this file, with several analysts questioning the real share of economic motivation versus the purely punitive dimension against **Lula's** political camp.

### A U.S. **Senate** that had already tried to rein in the executive

It should also be recalled that in **October 2025**, the **U.S. Senate** voted, with the support of five Republicans joining all Democrats, for a resolution to cancel the national emergency invoked by President Trump to justify these 50% tariffs on most Brazilian goods, including **coffee**, **soybeans** and **beef**. That vote, though largely symbolic given the presidential veto power, already reflected bipartisan unease over using tariffs as a diplomatic weapon.

This earlier Senate resistance casts a particular light on your administration's current persistence, Mr. Rubio, which appears determined to keep up pressure on Brasília despite signals of caution from within its own legislative ranks.

*I believe this bipartisan resistance in the **Senate**, even if futile in practice, deserved greater attention from the executive branch: a signal coming from one's own political camp should never be brushed aside on such a diplomatically sensitive file.*

## The tight timeline that heightens the pressure

### A ten-day window between the hearing and the final decision

The timeline set by the **USTR** leaves little room to maneuver: after the **July 6** public hearing, Brasília has barely nine days to take **responsive action** deemed satisfactory by Washington before the **July 15** deadline. This accelerated timeline, consistent with the Trump administration's stated intent to run these **Section 301** proceedings on an "accelerated schedule," leaves little room for in-depth negotiation.

This time compression worries several trade lawyers, who note that, unlike previous Section 301 proceedings, the **USTR** has not indicated it will accept rebuttal comments after the hearing, further limiting Brasília's opportunities to present additional arguments before the final decision.

### A regulatory gray zone that should not be overlooked

There is also a regulatory gray area between **July 15**, the date the responsive action is expected, and **July 24**, the expiration date of the blanket **10%** tariff currently imposed on Brazil under **Section 122**. This nine-day window could create considerable **legal uncertainty** for Brazilian exporters, who will not know exactly which tariff regime applies to their products during this transitional stretch.

This uncertainty, documented by several firms specializing in international trade law, illustrates the practical difficulties faced by companies caught between two overlapping American legal regimes.

*I believe this regulatory uncertainty, however technical, illustrates a broader problem: the haste with which the American administration multiplies complex tariff proceedings ultimately undermines the very predictability of international trade it claims to defend.*

## The agricultural dimension of the file, an underestimated stake

### Ethanol and soybeans at the heart of bilateral tensions

Beyond the digital and judicial questions, this tariff file directly touches the agricultural sector, with access to the **Brazilian ethanol market** identified as one of the six formal grievances retained by the **USTR**. American producers of **corn** and ethanol have for years accused Brazil of maintaining tariff barriers that put their exports at a disadvantage against local production, a technical but economically significant grievance for several American farm states.

This agricultural dimension, often overshadowed by the more spectacular aspects of the political dispute between **Lula** and the **Trump** administration, nonetheless reflects the concrete reality of this file: it is not merely a rhetorical confrontation, but precise sectoral economic interests that deserve to be handled with technical rigor rather than grandiose posturing.

### Targeted exemptions protecting certain sensitive sectors

It is revealing that **coffee** and **beef**, two of Brazil's most important exports to the United States, are among the products exempted from the proposed **25%** tariff, a decision suggesting a desire to limit the impact on American consumers themselves rather than a blanket economic punishment of Brazil as a whole.

This selectivity in the exemptions reveals an American administration conscious of the domestic political costs of a sweeping tariff on everyday consumer goods, while maintaining targeted pressure on the sectors identified as problematic by the Section 301 investigation.

*I believe this selectivity in the exemptions shows, paradoxically, that even in its avowed firmness, the American administration remains sensitive to the domestic political consequences of its own tariff measures, which should encourage Brasília to negotiate rather than flare up rhetorically.*

## The Brazilian business community's reaction to the uncertainty

### Exporters caught in the crossfire

Brazilian business federations have expressed growing concern over this prolonged tariff uncertainty, with several industrial sectors denouncing an already measurable impact on investment decisions and medium-term export contracts to the American market. This anxiety within the business world contrasts with the more combative rhetoric adopted by the **Lula** government in public.

Several large Brazilian **companies** are reportedly holding discreet discussions with American intermediaries to try to secure additional exemptions before the final **July 15** decision, an approach that illustrates the sometimes wide gap between official political posturing and the concrete economic interests of private actors.

### Risks of relocation toward other markets

Some Brazilian economic analysts already point to the possibility that exporting companies could redirect part of their production toward other markets, notably European or Asian ones, should American tariff uncertainty persist beyond the **July 15** deadline. This defensive diversification, while rational from the perspective of the companies involved, would further weaken the historical trade ties between the two countries.

This diversification dynamic, if confirmed in the months ahead, could have lasting consequences for the very structure of bilateral trade between the United States and Brazil, well beyond the mere outcome of this specific tariff dispute.

*I fear that this prolonged uncertainty will push rational Brazilian companies toward alternative markets, an outcome that would ultimately hurt American economic interests far more than the trade practices this tariff claims to correct.*

## Historical precedents of U.S.-Brazil trade tensions

### A bilateral relationship marked by cycles of friction

This dispute is not the first snag in the trade relationship between **Washington** and **Brasília**: over the decades, several cycles of friction have punctuated an otherwise broadly fruitful exchange, notably around **steel**, **aluminum** and the respective **agricultural subsidies** of both countries within the **World Trade Organization**.

This history of cyclical tensions is a reminder that the U.S.-Brazil relationship, though anchored in decades of economic cooperation, has never been free of sectoral disagreements, which should encourage both parties to favor faster and less spectacular resolution mechanisms than those currently at play.

### An American trade surplus that weakens the punitive argument

It is worth highlighting a fact often overlooked in media coverage of this file: the **United States** has maintained a trade surplus with Brazil for a decade, which complicates the argument that Brasília is structurally harming American economic interests through its contested trade practices.

This statistical reality, documented by several independent economic analyses, considerably tempers the scope of the American trade grievance, without invalidating the more specific concerns regarding **intellectual property** or illegal **deforestation** identified by the investigation.

*I find it troubling that the American administration is building a narrative of trade victimhood against a country with which it has maintained a comfortable trade surplus for ten years, a contradiction that deserves to be pointedly underscored.*

## Dissenting voices within the Republican camp itself

### American lawmakers worried for their own farm-belt constituents

Several **Republican lawmakers** representing American farm districts have expressed, privately according to certain journalistic sources, reservations about the potential impact of Brazilian retaliatory measures against American agricultural exports, particularly if Brasília were to target **soybeans** or **meat** in any tariff response.

These internal reservations, though rarely voiced publicly out of partisan loyalty to the Trump administration, reflect real concern over the concrete economic consequences American agriculture could suffer should this dispute degenerate into a prolonged trade confrontation.

### The October 2025 Senate vote precedent that still weighs heavily

The fact that five Republican senators joined all Democrats in October 2025 to try to cancel the earlier tariffs on Brazil remains a significant political signal, revealing that the presidential party's displayed unity on this trade file remains largely superficial once the media spotlight fades.

This internal fracture, documented in the official voting records of the U.S. Senate, suggests that political pressure on the Trump administration could intensify should the negative economic consequences of this dispute begin to concretely materialize in the coming months for American farm-belt voters.

*I believe this Republican fracture, still muted today, could become far louder if American farmers begin to concretely feel the effects of a potential Brazilian trade retaliation in their own pocketbooks.*

## The position of European allies on this transatlantic dispute

### A **European Union** watching closely

The **European Union**, itself engaged in complex negotiations with **Mercosur**, of which Brazil is the principal economic pillar, is watching this U.S.-Brazil dispute with particular interest, with some European diplomats seeing an opportunity to strengthen trade ties between Brussels and Brasília at Washington's expense.

This competitive dynamic among Western powers for economic influence over Brazil paradoxically illustrates a form of fragmentation within the Western camp itself, at a time when cohesion against **China** and **Russia** should instead take priority over internal trade rivalries.

### A **Mercosur**-**European Union** deal that could benefit from this context

Several European negotiators believe that trade tensions between Washington and Brasília could accelerate the final ratification of the trade agreement between the **European Union** and **Mercosur**, a text negotiated over more than two decades that could offer Brazil a substantial trade alternative amid the current American uncertainty.

This prospect, should it materialize, would strengthen the European position in the region while illustrating the unintended consequences that an American trade diplomacy perceived as erratic can produce among its historical partners on the American continent.

*I believe this opportunity handed to the European Union to strengthen its ties with Brazil should serve as a wake-up call to Washington: the West cannot afford to fragment itself commercially while **China** watches for the slightest opening to extend its influence.*

## Lessons to draw for the future of Western trade diplomacy

### The need for a more predictable, less personalized approach

This Brazilian file illustrates a broader structural problem affecting contemporary American trade diplomacy: the excessive personalization of trade disputes, blending legitimate economic grievances with political grudges against specific foreign leaders, undermines the predictability that businesses and partner governments are entitled to expect.

A more institutionalized approach, less dependent on personal relationships between leaders, would likely allow these disputes to be resolved more quickly and at lower political cost for all parties involved, including American interests themselves in the long run.

### A test of the West's credibility against emerging powers

Beyond the specific Brazilian case, this dispute stands as a revealing test of the West's overall credibility in its ability to deal fairly with the emerging powers of the **Global South**, without artificially pushing them toward Chinese or Russian orbits through excessive punitive rigidity.

This test, whose outcome will take shape in the weeks following the July 6 hearing and the July 15 deadline, could have lasting repercussions on how other emerging powers perceive the reliability of the West as a long-term trade partner.

*I believe that how this file is resolved in the coming weeks will send a decisive signal to the entire Global South about the reliability of the West as a trade partner, a stake that goes far beyond this single U.S.-Brazil bilateral case.*

## What this means for the West with regard to its own partners

### Brazil, a Global South partner not yet tilting toward **Beijing**

Dear Secretary of State, I remind you that **Brazil** remains a key player within **BRICS**, a bloc where **China** is actively seeking to expand its economic influence against a West sometimes perceived as arrogant or punitive toward emerging powers. Every uncontrolled tariff escalation against Brasília risks pushing this South American giant a little further into the arms of alternative trade partners, at the very moment the West should instead be consolidating its alliances against rising Chinese power.

This geostrategic dimension, often overshadowed by the technical details of trade investigations, deserves to be placed at the center of the debate: clumsy trade diplomacy toward a Global South partner objectively serves the interests of the West's strategic rivals far more than those of the American workers this tariff claims to protect.

### A necessary firmness, but one that must stay targeted

I do not dispute, Mr. Rubio, the legitimacy of certain American trade grievances against Brazil: protecting intellectual property and fighting illegal deforestation are real issues that deserve a firm response. But legitimate firmness must remain distinct from electorally motivated punishment, and it is precisely this confusion of genres that worries even members of your own political majority.

Credible Western trade diplomacy must know how to distinguish real technical matters from political score-settling, or risk losing the trust of the very partners it legitimately seeks to hold accountable for their trade practices.

*I deeply believe that the West cannot afford to lose strategic Global South partners to China simply because an American administration confuses, knowingly or not, legitimate trade firmness with the electoral exploitation of a technical tariff file.*

## The role of Brazil's Congress in what comes next

### A divided Congress united on the reciprocity law

The **Brazilian Congress**, split by deep political divisions between **Lula's** allies and those of the **Bolsonaro** family, nonetheless voted unanimously for the trade reciprocity law, a rare feat underscoring just how much this tariff question transcends the usual partisan divides of contemporary Brazilian politics.

This parliamentary unity, difficult to achieve on virtually any other issue in Brazil today, sends a clear signal to Washington: even Lula's political opponents are not willing to passively accept tariffs perceived as unjust to the Brazilian economy as a whole.

### Further legislative consultations expected before July 15

Several Brazilian parliamentary committees specializing in **international trade** plan to hold additional consultations in the days leading up to the July 15 deadline, seeking to coordinate a coherent legislative response should the American administration actually impose the 25% tariff.

This Brazilian parliamentary mobilization, though largely unknown to the Western general public, could prove decisive in shaping a measured Brazilian response rather than an uncontrolled escalation, a scenario both parties would objectively have an interest in avoiding.

*I find it encouraging that Brazil's Congress, despite its deep divisions on nearly every other subject, manages to unite on this tariff file: this unity could paradoxically facilitate a negotiated resolution rather than an uncontrolled escalation between the two countries.*

## Conclusion: an outstretched hand, but with eyes wide open

### What I hope for from the July 6 hearing

Dear Secretary of State Rubio, I sincerely hope the July 6 hearing will allow for a rigorous debate on the real trade grievances documented by the Section 301 investigation, without this forum turning into mere Brazilian electoral theater foreshadowing the October presidential race. Businesses and workers in both countries deserve a resolution grounded in verifiable economic facts, not partisan calculations on either side of the Atlantic.

I hope that this negotiating window, narrow as it is until July 15, produces a reasonable compromise that preserves both legitimate American trade interests and the historic relationship between the two largest democracies of the American continent.

### A letter that closes with a call for clear-headedness

I close this open letter with the conviction that Western firmness toward unfair trade practices remains necessary in a world where China, **Iran**, Russia and **North Korea** watch for the slightest division within the Western camp and its natural partners. But that firmness must be exercised with discernment, never handing our strategic rivals, on a silver platter, a Global South partner the West has every interest in keeping within its economic and diplomatic orbit.

It is up to you, Mr. Rubio, to decide whether this Brazilian file will go down in history as an example of justified trade firmness, or as a missed opportunity to preserve a precious alliance against the true threats facing the Western international order.

*I close this letter hoping that strategic reason will prevail over the temptation to punish, because history will judge harshly an administration that sacrificed a precious continental alliance on the altar of a short-sighted electoral calculation.*

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

## Sources

### Primary sources

- [USTR Section 301 Determination on Brazil's Unreasonable Acts — USTR, June 2026](https://ustr.gov/about/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2026/june/ustr-section-301-determination-brazils-unreasonable-acts-policies-and-practices)

- [Trump administration proposes 25% tariff to punish Brazil — Reuters, June 2, 2026](https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/trump-administration-proposes-25-tariff-punish-brazil-over-trade-practices-2026-06-02/)

- [Brazil Trump tariffs trade — Associated Press](https://apnews.com/article/brazil-trump-tariffs-trade-3f389d69e8706d773ed19eb4de6a4726)

### Secondary sources

- [Trump proposes 25% tariff on Brazil — CNBC, June 2, 2026](https://www.cnbc.com/2026/06/02/trump-proposes-25-tariff-on-brazil.html)

- [Results of US Section 301 Investigation into Brazil — Covington, June 2026](https://www.cov.com/news-and-insights/insights/2026/06/results-of-us-section-301-investigation-into-brazil-proposed-us-tariffs-and-renewed-bilateral-tensions)

- [Brazil-US trade row deepens as Lula slams Rubio — IntelliNews](https://new.intellinews.com/articles/brazil-us-trade-row-deepens-as-lula-slams-rubio-and-brands-bolsonaro-a-traitor-446412)

- [Brazil's Flavio Bolsonaro plans to testify against proposed US tariffs — Reuters, June 23, 2026](https://www.reuters.com/world/us/brazils-flavio-bolsonaro-plans-testify-against-proposed-us-tariffs-2026-06-23/)

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Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/au-bresil-cher-marco-rubio-ecoutez-vos-propres-allies