# ANALYSIS: the Israeli delegation in Venezuela, a controversial but strategic presence

> Since late June 2026, an Israeli delegation of roughly thirty members has been operating in Venezuela, under a joint mission run by the foreign ministry and the Israeli military's Home Front Command.

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Analysis
- Published: 2026-07-20
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/analysis-the-israeli-delegation-in-venezuela-a-controversial-but-strategic-prese

## Key takeaways

- The delegation, led by Brigadier General Elad Edri and ambassador-designate Yoed Magen, follows seventeen years of severed diplomatic relations between the two countries.
- It has surveyed about 1,300 damaged buildings, and Delcy Rodríguez's government extended its mission by two weeks on July 8, 2026.
- Netanyahu said on July 10 that the mission was helping "rebuild relations," which the author reads as a diplomatic as well as humanitarian aim.
- Chavista groups criticized the presence, while many affected residents favored the concrete aid.
- The author sees the wider Western presence, including US Marines, as a strategic opening, and notes possible implications for Iran and oil interests, though no formal normalization has been announced.

## Introduction: an unlikely rapprochement born of disaster

### Seventeen years of diplomatic rupture erased by an earthquake

Since late June 2026, an **Israeli** delegation of roughly thirty members has been operating in **Venezuela**, under a joint mission run by the foreign ministry and the Israeli military's **Home Front Command**. This presence comes seventeen years after the two countries severed diplomatic relations, a decision made by **Caracas** in 2009 in protest against the Israeli military operation **Cast Lead** in Gaza.

The fact that Israeli officials can now move freely through a country that has had zero diplomatic relations with **Israel** for nearly two decades shows just how much the scale of the earthquake disaster has upended the usual political priorities of the Venezuelan interim government led by **Delcy Rodríguez**.

### A mission led by experienced figures

This delegation is led by Brigadier General **Elad Edri**, head of international operations for the **Home Front Command**, alongside ambassador-designate **Yoed Magen**. Their official mission is to map the damage caused by the **twin earthquakes** of **June 24, 2026** and to propose a multi-year reconstruction plan, a technical offer that Venezuelan authorities quickly accepted despite the absence of formal diplomatic relations between the two countries.

This analysis examines the reasons behind this unexpected rapprochement, the reactions it has sparked within Venezuelan society, and what it reveals about the broader geopolitical realignments underway in **Latin America** since **Nicolás Maduro's** capture in January 2026.

*I find this image striking: a country that severed relations with Israel in the name of solidarity with Gaza now welcomes an Israeli military mission on its own soil. The natural disaster clearly weighed more heavily than seventeen years of proclaimed ideological rupture.*

## What the delegation's work on the ground actually shows

### A methodical mapping of the damage

According to available information, the **Israeli** delegation has already surveyed roughly **1,300 damaged buildings** in the areas hardest hit by the **twin earthquakes**, technical mapping work drawing on the Israeli **Home Front Command's** recognized expertise in disaster management, a skill built over decades of experience dealing with the seismic and security threats specific to Israeli territory.

This detailed mapping made it possible to quickly establish a multi-year reconstruction plan, approved by interim president **Delcy Rodríguez** in a particularly short timeframe, which speaks both to the urgency of the situation and to the perceived technical credibility Venezuelan authorities assign to Israeli expertise.

### A mission extension that confirms its perceived usefulness

On **July 8, 2026**, at **Delcy Rodríguez's** explicit request, the Israeli mission was extended by two additional weeks, a move suggesting the Venezuelan government considers this expertise useful enough to justify maintaining this domestically controversial presence.

This extension, decided despite persistent ideological tensions within Venezuelan society, reveals a form of pragmatism the interim authorities have chosen to embrace, apparently favoring the technical effectiveness of reconstruction over the historical diplomatic considerations that had until now governed the relationship between the two countries.

*This governmental pragmatism strikes me as understandable given the humanitarian urgency, but it also exposes Delcy Rodríguez to a political contradiction that is hard to carry in front of a Chavista base historically very critical of Israel.*

*I also note that this two-week extension is far from symbolically neutral: it turns a one-off emergency intervention into a lasting Israeli presence on Venezuelan soil, a political choice Caracas is now openly owning.*

## Netanyahu's official position on this mission

### A message that goes beyond the humanitarian dimension alone

On **July 10, 2026**, Israeli Prime Minister **Benjamin Netanyahu** publicly praised the work of the Israeli aid team in **Venezuela**, stating that this mission was helping "rebuild relations" between the two countries after seventeen years of diplomatic rupture. This statement, delivered from **Jerusalem**, goes well beyond the purely humanitarian register to explicitly fit into a logic of diplomatic normalization openly embraced by the Israeli government.

This framing carries major analytical weight: it confirms that, from the Israeli standpoint, this earthquake relief mission is not seen solely as a disinterested humanitarian gesture, but as a strategic opportunity to re-establish a diplomatic presence in a South American country rich in oil resources and politically significant in the region.

### A strategy consistent with recent Israeli regional diplomacy

This approach fits into a broader Israeli diplomatic strategy that has, in recent years, sought to multiply footholds in **Latin America**, a region where Israeli influence remains historically limited compared to other powers such as the **United States**, **China**, or even **Iran**, whose partnerships with several left-leaning Latin American governments have worried **Jerusalem** for years.

Under **Hugo Chávez** and then **Nicolás Maduro**, **Venezuela** in particular maintained significant ties with **Iran**, a partnership **Jerusalem** watched with real wariness, which makes the current rapprochement all the more strategically significant for Israeli diplomacy in the region.

*This strategic dimension needs to be named without naivety: Netanyahu isn't just talking about humanitarian relief, he's explicitly talking about diplomatic reconstruction. That's an honest reading of the situation, not an unfounded accusation.*

## The Chavista reaction, between outrage and resignation

### Denunciation statements circulating in activist circles

Several organizations and figures associated with the historic Chavista movement have published statements denouncing the presence of the **Israeli** delegation in **Venezuela**, seeing in it a fundamental contradiction with decades of proclaimed solidarity with the Palestinian cause under the successive governments of **Hugo Chávez** and **Nicolás Maduro**. These same critics also link this presence to a broader rapprochement with the **Donald Trump** administration, seen by some Chavista circles as a sign of ideological capitulation by the interim government.

These same statements invoke the civilian losses suffered by the population of **Gaza** during Israeli military operations in recent years, a matter this piece cannot independently establish or adjudicate, though it remains a major ideological friction point for a significant share of Venezuelan public opinion sympathetic to the historic Chavista movement.

### A pragmatic resignation in the face of humanitarian urgency

Despite these documented criticisms, part of the population directly affected by the **twin earthquakes** appears to be adopting a more pragmatic stance, favoring the concrete aid the **Israeli** delegation is providing for rebuilding their homes over the more abstract ideological considerations upheld by the most radical Chavista activist circles.

This tension between ideological principle and immediate humanitarian pragmatism illustrates a real rift within today's Venezuelan society, between a historic activist base attached to longstanding geopolitical positions and a disaster-affected population more concerned with the concrete rebuilding of daily life devastated by the earthquake.

*I understand this rift without judging it: it is legitimate for longtime activists to denounce an ideological contradiction, just as it is legitimate for affected families to prioritize effective technical aid, whatever its diplomatic origin.*

## The broader context of Western presence in Venezuela

### A convergence of foreign presences since the disaster

The Israeli delegation is only one of several elements of a considerably increased international presence in **Venezuela** since the **twin earthquakes** of June 2026. Alongside this mission, more than **1,300 American Marines** and several hundred airmen have been operating since **July 1, 2026** at **Simón Bolívar** Airport and the port of **La Guaira**, as part of a humanitarian assistance operation coordinated by **US Southern Command**.

This convergence of Western, Israeli and American, presences on Venezuelan territory within just a few weeks outlines the contours of a geopolitical realignment accelerated by the natural disaster, in a country that had previously maintained privileged relations with powers rivaling the **West**, such as **China**, **Russia** and **Iran**.

### A strategic opportunity for the West to regain a foothold in the region

This convergence is probably not accidental. It illustrates a strategic opportunity that Western powers, particularly the **United States** and **Israel**, appear to have quickly seized to regain a foothold in a country that had largely been closed to them for years, taking advantage of an undeniable humanitarian emergency to establish a presence that would have been politically impossible to negotiate under normal diplomatic conditions.

This geopolitical reading takes nothing away from the sincerity of the humanitarian aid delivered on the ground, but it deserves to be fully factored into any serious analysis of the motivations underlying this rapid, coordinated Western mobilization toward a disaster-hit country.

*I believe this Western convergence in Venezuela is good strategic news, provided it translates into lasting engagement rather than mere opportunism. The West has every interest in consolidating this presence rather than letting it fade once the emergency phase ends.*

## What this mission reveals about Israeli crisis-management expertise

### Internationally recognized know-how

The expertise of the Israeli **Home Front Command** in managing natural and security disasters is widely recognized internationally, the fruit of decades of accumulated experience facing the multiple security and environmental threats **Israel** has had to confront throughout its history. This technical expertise partly explains how quickly the Venezuelan government accepted the offer of Israeli assistance, despite the absence of formal diplomatic relations between the two countries.

This recognized technical competence constitutes a significant diplomatic asset for **Israel**, which can position itself as a useful and credible partner in natural disaster contexts, independent of the broader political considerations that might, under normal circumstances, limit its diplomatic reach in certain regions of the world.

### A diplomacy of technical expertise rather than ideological solidarity alone

This approach, based on demonstrating concrete technical competence rather than pre-existing ideological affinities, could serve as a replicable model for Israeli diplomacy in other natural disaster contexts around the world, particularly in countries where formal diplomatic relations remain difficult or nonexistent for historical political reasons.

This **diplomacy of expertise** strategy deserves close monitoring, as it could redefine how some countries historically hostile to **Israel** perceive the possibility of one-off technical cooperation, without necessarily implying full and immediate diplomatic normalization.

*I find this Israeli strategy particularly clever: demonstrate concrete usefulness before talking about full diplomatic normalization. That's a pragmatic approach that deserves to be recognized as such, independent of whatever ideological judgments it may otherwise provoke.*

## The structural limits of this diplomatic rapprochement

### A normalization that remains far from guaranteed

Despite **Benjamin Netanyahu's** optimistic statements about rebuilding bilateral relations, it would be premature to view this humanitarian mission as the assured prelude to full diplomatic normalization between **Caracas** and **Jerusalem**. No official announcement about restoring formal diplomatic relations has been made by the Venezuelan government at this stage, and interim president **Delcy Rodríguez** has not explicitly confirmed such an intention beyond the current technical cooperation alone.

This governmental caution is probably explained by a desire to avoid further internal political polarization, in a context where the interim government already faces massive public disapproval over its handling of the earthquake crisis, without needing to add a diplomatic controversy that could further weaken its already contested legitimacy.

### Ideological obstacles that will not disappear quickly

The ideological obstacles between the two countries, built over nearly two decades of diplomatic rupture and anti-Israeli rhetoric carried by the historic Chavista movement, will probably not simply vanish thanks to a humanitarian aid mission, however useful and appreciated it may be technically by current Venezuelan authorities.

This structural reality calls for a measured reading of this rapprochement: a useful, one-off technical cooperation should not be confused with a full diplomatic reconciliation, which would require much deeper and probably much longer political negotiations than the duration of this post-earthquake assistance mission alone.

*I would rather stay cautious than give in to excessive diplomatic optimism. A successful technical aid mission is an encouraging first step, but it does not, on its own, resolve seventeen years of deep ideological rupture between the two governments.*

## The role of humanitarian crisis as a geopolitical catalyst

### A phenomenon observed in other international contexts

The Venezuelan case illustrates a broader phenomenon observed in other international contexts: major natural disasters sometimes act as catalysts for diplomatic rapprochements that would have been politically impossible to negotiate under normal circumstances. Humanitarian urgency creates a window of opportunity where immediate pragmatic considerations can temporarily override old and deeply entrenched ideological blockages.

This phenomenon, documented in several historical precedents around the world, does not, however, guarantee the durability of the rapprochement thus created, once the humanitarian emergency phase has been absorbed and the usual political priorities are gradually restored in the countries involved.

### What this suggests for the future of Venezuela-Israel relations

For **Venezuela** and **Israel** specifically, this dynamic suggests that the true measure of this rapprochement's success will not play out during the current emergency phase, but in the months following the end of the humanitarian mission, when both governments will need to decide whether they want to build on this technical cooperation to construct a more structured diplomatic relationship, or whether it will remain an isolated episode with no lasting political follow-through.

This question remains, to date, entirely open, and only how the coming months unfold will determine which of these two trajectories actually plays out between the two governments involved.

*I think this window of opportunity, if not seized quickly by both governments, will probably close without leaving a lasting diplomatic trace. History is full of examples of humanitarian rapprochements that never led to real normalization.*

## The regional dimension of this rapprochement for Latin America

### A signal sent to other governments in the region

This rapprochement between **Caracas** and **Jerusalem**, however limited and technical it currently is, sends a potentially significant signal to other Latin American governments that have historically maintained tense or severed relations with **Israel**, particularly those stemming from left-wing political movements sharing certain ideological affinities with Venezuelan Chavismo.

Should this rapprochement become consolidated over time, it could serve as an encouraging precedent for Israeli diplomacy's broader ambition to rebuild bridges with historically distant Latin American governments, by demonstrating that pragmatic technical cooperation can gradually pave the way toward more normalized relations.

### An influence competition that goes beyond the Venezuelan case alone

This regional dynamic also fits into a broader competition of influence between the **West**, represented here by **Israel** and the **United States**, and rival powers such as **China**, **Russia** and **Iran**, which have historically cultivated privileged relations with several Latin American governments critical of traditional Western influence in the region.

In this context of broader geopolitical rivalry, every Western diplomatic advance in **Latin America**, even one born of a natural disaster rather than classic diplomatic negotiation, represents a potentially significant strategic gain against rival powers that will probably seek to limit the scope of this renewed Western influence in a region they consider strategically important to their own interests.

*I believe this influence competition amply justifies stronger Western support for this kind of diplomatic rapprochement, even one born from the circumstances of a natural disaster. The West cannot afford to let China, Russia or Iran fill the diplomatic vacuum alone in such a strategic region.*

## The ethical questions raised by this cooperation

### Can humanitarian aid ever be fully depoliticized

This story raises a broader ethical question, applicable to many international humanitarian aid contexts: can technical assistance, however sincere and useful on the ground, ever be fully depoliticized when it is provided by a government engaged in otherwise widely controversial geopolitical and diplomatic dynamics, as is the case for **Israel** regarding the situation in **Gaza**?

This question has no simple or clear-cut answer, and it deserves to be asked without excessive instrumentalization in either direction, acknowledging both the real, documented technical usefulness of this humanitarian mission for affected Venezuelan populations, and the undeniable geopolitical dimension it simultaneously carries.

### The right of affected populations to receive all available aid

Facing this ethical tension, it seems reasonable to acknowledge that Venezuelan populations directly affected by the **twin earthquakes**, facing a human toll now exceeding **4,300 dead**, have a legitimate right to benefit from all available technical expertise to speed up their reconstruction, independent of the broader geopolitical considerations that inevitably surround every international actor involved in this assistance.

This priority given to the immediate human needs of affected populations, without ignoring the legitimate geopolitical questions this cooperation raises, is probably the most honest balance a rigorous analysis of this complex, multidimensional story can strike.

*I think we must resist the temptation to excessively politicize technical aid that is concretely saving lives on the ground, while simultaneously refusing to deny the real geopolitical dimension that inevitably accompanies this kind of international cooperation.*

## What this story reveals about today's Chavista fragmentation

### A historic movement facing difficult pragmatic choices

The controversy sparked by this Israeli delegation also reveals a growing fragmentation within the Venezuelan Chavista movement since **Nicolás Maduro's** capture in January 2026. **Delcy Rodríguez's** interim government, while claiming the Chavista political legacy, is making pragmatic choices that diverge significantly from certain ideological positions historically upheld by that same movement, particularly regarding relations with **Israel** and the **United States**.

This fragmentation illustrates the deep internal tensions currently running through Venezuelan Chavismo, simultaneously confronted with a major institutional legitimacy crisis, a natural disaster of exceptional scale, and the pragmatic necessity of dealing with international powers historically presented as ideological adversaries by decades of official political rhetoric.

### A test of ideological coherence for the movement's future

How **Delcy Rodríguez** and her interim government navigate these contradictions in the months ahead will serve as a revealing test of the future ideological coherence of the Chavista movement, in a context where the current exceptional circumstances could either reinforce a lasting pragmatism or trigger a return to stricter ideological positions once the humanitarian emergency phase has passed.

This test of coherence, closely followed by observers of Venezuelan politics, could determine not only the future of relations with **Israel** and the **United States**, but also the broader political trajectory of post-**Maduro** **Venezuela** in the years ahead.

*I find this Chavista fragmentation particularly revealing: it shows that a political movement, even one solidly rooted ideologically, can be forced by circumstances into pragmatic choices that directly contradict decades of official rhetoric.*

## The potential impact on relations with Iran

### An Israeli rapprochement that necessarily worries Tehran

This rapprochement between **Caracas** and **Jerusalem** cannot fail to worry **Tehran**, which maintained privileged relations with **Venezuela** under **Hugo Chávez** and **Nicolás Maduro**, particularly in the energy and military fields. Any normalization, even partial and strictly technical, between **Caracas** and **Israel** would represent a strategic setback for **Iran**, which traditionally views **Venezuela** as a key partner in its network of alliances in **Latin America**.

No official Iranian reaction has yet been publicly documented regarding this Israeli delegation in **Venezuela**, but it would be surprising if **Tehran** remained silent for long should this rapprochement become further consolidated in the months following the current humanitarian emergency phase.

### A realignment of alliances that benefits the West

This potential realignment of Venezuelan alliances, should it be confirmed, would objectively benefit the **West** in its broader strategic competition against Iranian influence in **Latin America**, a region where **Tehran** has, in recent years, sought to expand its influence through economic and military partnerships with several governments critical of the **United States** and its allies.

This strategic dimension, often underestimated in analyses focused solely on the humanitarian aspect of this mission, deserves to be fully factored into any serious assessment of the long-term geopolitical consequences of this still-nascent Israeli-Venezuelan rapprochement.

*I think this anti-Iranian dimension, even if not explicitly stated by the actors involved, constitutes an additional strategic argument in favor of stronger Western support for this nascent Israeli-Venezuelan cooperation.*

## The precedent of other Israeli humanitarian missions abroad

### A tested doctrine in several countries without formal diplomatic relations

**Venezuela** is not the first country without formal diplomatic relations with **Israel** to accept a humanitarian aid mission from the **Home Front Command**. This unit has already been deployed in several **natural disaster** contexts around the world, often in countries maintaining distant or nonexistent diplomatic relations with **Jerusalem**, which confirms a fairly consistent Israeli doctrine of using **technical humanitarian aid** as a first point of diplomatic contact.

This doctrine, applied here to the Venezuelan case, fits into a well-documented strategic continuity of **Israeli diplomacy**, which has for several years relied on demonstrating **concrete technical skills** to gradually reduce the diplomatic isolation **Israel** still suffers in several regions of the world, particularly in **Latin America**.

### What this continuity suggests for assessing the Venezuelan case

This doctrinal continuity suggests that the Venezuelan case, however politically significant, is not an isolated improvisation on **Jerusalem's** part, but the application of a **proven strategy** used elsewhere in the world, which increases the likelihood that this mission is being carried out with a high degree of technical professionalism, independent of the political controversies surrounding it within **Venezuela** itself.

This observation, however, does not answer the question of whether this proven strategy will, in the specific Venezuelan case, produce the same long-term diplomatic results it has produced elsewhere, a question that, as discussed above, remains largely open at this stage.

*I find it reassuring to know that this mission is built on a doctrine already proven elsewhere, rather than on risky improvisation. That strengthens my confidence in the technical quality of the work being carried out on Venezuelan soil.*

## The economic stakes underlying this diplomatic rapprochement

### Venezuela's oil potential as a factor of attraction

Beyond diplomatic and security considerations alone, **Venezuela's** economic potential, a country holding the world's largest proven **oil** reserves, is an obvious draw for any foreign power seeking to establish or strengthen a presence in the country, whether **Israel**, the **United States**, or rival powers such as **China** and **Russia**.

This economic dimension, rarely mentioned explicitly in official statements about the Israeli humanitarian mission, could nonetheless play a significant background role in **Jerusalem's** decision to invest substantial diplomatic and technical resources in this rapprochement with **Caracas**, beyond the publicly stated humanitarian motivation alone.

### An economic opportunity that remains hypothetical at this stage

It is nonetheless worth remaining cautious about the real scale of this economic opportunity for **Israel**: no concrete trade or energy agreement has been publicly announced between the two countries to date, and Venezuela's current economic situation, already weakened by years of crisis and worsened by the **twin earthquakes**, considerably limits the country's immediate capacity to offer substantial economic partnerships in the short term.

This necessary caution does not invalidate the hypothesis of an underlying economic interest, but it is a reminder that this interest, if it truly exists, could only materialize over the medium or long term, once the post-earthquake reconstruction phase is sufficiently advanced to allow the negotiation of more substantial economic partnerships between the two countries.

*I think it would be naive to ignore this oil dimension in the Israeli equation, but equally unwise to overstate it in the absence of any concrete agreement publicly announced to date between the two governments.*

## Conclusion: a controversial but probably beneficial presence in the emergency

### An overall positive record despite documented controversies

At the end of this analysis, the presence of the Israeli delegation in **Venezuela** appears as a deeply ambivalent story, blending a very real technical humanitarian usefulness, documented by the survey of more than **1,300 damaged buildings**, with legitimate ideological controversies raised by a significant part of Venezuelan society, particularly within historic Chavista movements most attached to solidarity with the Palestinian cause.

This ambivalent record does not allow for a definitive choice between a purely humanitarian and a purely geopolitical reading of this mission, reality clearly sitting at the intersection of these two dimensions, as is often the case for international aid deployed in contexts of major natural disaster.

### What will need to be watched in the coming months

How this story evolves in the months following the end of the current humanitarian emergency phase will determine whether this one-off technical rapprochement turns into a more structured diplomatic relationship, or remains an isolated episode with no lasting political follow-through between the two governments. This question, still entirely open today, deserves careful and rigorous monitoring from all observers of Latin American and Middle Eastern geopolitics.

Whatever the final political outcome of this story, the immediate humanitarian usefulness of this mission for affected Venezuelan populations remains difficult to dispute given the factual elements currently available about its concrete action on the ground.

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

## Sources

### Primary sources

- [Israeli delegation extends its reconstruction work in Venezuela — The Jerusalem Post, July 8, 2026](https://www.jpost.com/diaspora/article-901836)

- [PM hails Israeli aid team for rebuilding relations with Venezuela after 17 years of severed ties — The Times of Israel, July 10, 2026](https://www.timesofisrael.com/pm-hails-israeli-aid-team-for-rebuilding-relations-with-venezuela-after-17-years-of-severed-ties/)

### Secondary sources

- [Netanyahu speaks of rebuilding relations with Venezuela — The Jerusalem Post, July 10, 2026](https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/benjamin-netanyahu/article-902060)

- [Venezuelan government welcomes Israeli diplomatic and military mission — Venezuelanalysis, July 6, 2026](https://venezuelanalysis.com/news/venezuelan-govt-welcomes-israeli-diplomatic-and-military-mission/)

- [Chavistas repudiate Israeli delegation following deadly earthquakes in Venezuela — Orinoco Tribune, July 7, 2026](https://orinocotribune.com/chavistas-repudiate-israeli-delegation-following-deadly-earthquakes-in-venezuela/)

- [Israel sends quake relief team to Venezuela — Jewish News Syndicate, June 30, 2026](https://www.jns.org/news/world/israel-sends-quake-relief-team-to-venezuela)

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Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/analysis-the-israeli-delegation-in-venezuela-a-controversial-but-strategic-prese