# ANALYSIS: Haiti, the state that keeps slipping under the weight of gangs

> Things need to be named with precision before giving in to easy emotion: Haiti is no longer, in practice, a state that controls its own territory.

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Analysis
- Published: 2026-07-20
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/analysis-haiti-the-state-that-keeps-slipping-under-the-weight-of-gangs

## Introduction: a capital that answers to no one anymore

### A country where public authority has changed hands

Things need to be named with precision before giving in to easy emotion: **Haiti** is no longer, in practice, a **state** that controls its own **territory**. According to the latest tally cited by **Vatican News** on **July 8, 2026**, the **security crisis** has already killed at least **1,600 people** and wounded **745** since the start of the year, while **1.5 million** people have been forcibly displaced by **gang violence** (**Vatican News**, July 8, 2026). These figures are not vague estimates pulled from rumor on the ground: they come from the **United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti**, the UN body responsible for tracking the country's political and security situation.

What these numbers tell, at their core, is the story of a **state** that has lost, neighborhood by neighborhood, the capacity to guarantee basic **security** for its population. **Port-au-Prince**, the capital, remains largely under the grip of gang coalitions that dictate who can move, who can trade, who can simply stay home. This is not a classic **civil war** with two identifiable sides: it is an institutional collapse in which the Haitian **state** retreats a little further every month before armed groups that are better organized than its own security forces.

### Why this file concerns the West directly

One could assume the Haitian **crisis** is only Haiti's business. That is an analytical mistake. The **Caribbean** remains a zone of direct influence for the **United States**, and the prolonged collapse of a **state** just a few hundred kilometers from American shores produces migratory and security shockwaves that **Washington** cannot ignore indefinitely. That is precisely why the American administration pushed, as early as 2025, for the creation of an **international force** with a more robust mandate than the previous mission led by **Kenya**.

This American involvement is no diplomatic accident: it reflects the belated but real recognition that inaction in **Haiti** carries a direct cost for **regional stability**. American ambassador **Michael Waltz**, who defended this file before the **UN Security Council**, himself called this force a "key first step" toward addressing Haiti's humanitarian and security crisis (**United Nations**, September 30, 2025).

*I do not think anyone can look at **Haiti** today without feeling a mix of cold anger and helplessness. A million and a half displaced people in 2026 is not an abstract statistic: it is an entire country that has stopped believing anyone, anywhere, will come to protect it in time.*

## The Gang Suppression Force, a bet launched half-heartedly

### A robust mandate, skeletal staffing

The **Gang Suppression Force**, or **GSF**, was authorized by the **UN Security Council** on September 30, 2025, with a ceiling set at **5,550 personnel** and a mandate that, for the first time, authorizes **direct arrests** of gang members (**United Nations**, September 30, 2025). On paper, this force represents a qualitative leap from the Kenyan-led mission that preceded it. On the ground, as of July 10, 2026, it reportedly counted only about **1,000 personnel** deployed, far short of its target, with **full operational capacity** now pushed back to **October 2026** (**Ops Con**, July 10, 2026).

This gap between **political ambition** and **logistical reality** is not a simple administrative delay. It means, concretely, that the force meant to retake control of **Port-au-Prince** is operating today at less than a fifth of its planned strength, in an environment where the **gangs** have not waited for anyone to consolidate their **territorial grip**. A force at a third of its intended size cannot clean up a capital; at best, it can hold a few strategic roads.

### The Kenyan withdrawal and Sri Lanka's arrival

The mission led by **Kenya**, which had laid the first groundwork for this international intervention starting in 2024, withdrew in April 2026, making way for the new **GSF** configuration. **Chad** provided one of the first significant contingents, with several hundred police officers and gendarmes deployed starting in April, since joined by other contributors, including **Sri Lanka**, which confirmed its participation in this **multinational force**.

This diversification of contributors, however symbolic, does not solve the core problem: the slowness of **funding** and **troop mobilization**. Every month of delay translates, on the ground in Haiti, into **gangs** gaining time to reinforce their positions, recruit, and secure their weapons supply routes, often coming directly from the **United States** through poorly controlled smuggling networks.

*A **security** force that arrives at a third of its strength and promises full capacity by October, while the population keeps dying every week, is not a plan, it is a wish dressed up as a **Security Council** resolution. Haitians deserved better than this bureaucratic slowness.*

## The human weight of a crisis numbers alone cannot capture

### A million and a half uprooted lives

Behind the figure of **1.5 million** displaced, cited by the **United Nations** and repeated by **Vatican News**, lies a reality that statistics struggle to convey: entire families who fled their neighborhoods with whatever they could carry, children with no access to school anymore, women exposed to **sexual violence** documented by several UN reports as a weapon of territorial control used by the **gangs**.

This mass displacement is not a one-off event tied to an isolated episode of violence. It is a continuous movement, fed month after month by the expansion of gang-controlled zones in the capital and in some outlying regions. **Displacement camps**, often set up in schools or requisitioned public buildings, structurally lack clean water, medical care and **security**, which exposes an already vulnerable population to new cycles of violence.

### Anti-gang operations and their human cost

The report of the UN **Secretary-General** dated April 2026 indicates that anti-gang operations conducted between December 2025 and February 2026, with support from the nascent **GSF** and the **Haitian National Police**, resulted in the deaths of **1,343 alleged gang members** (**United Nations**, April 23, 2026). As striking as this figure is, it illustrates an uncomfortable reality: repression, even when it produces tactical results, is not accompanied by a lasting reconquest of territory by the **state**.

This paradox deserves to be stated plainly. A **state** that eliminates more than a thousand armed combatants in three months without managing to restore stable authority over its capital is not winning a war: it is, at best, managing a hemorrhage. It is this difference between **tactical victory** and **strategic reconquest** that defines the Haitian impasse today.

*I refuse to celebrate a body count of neutralized fighters as if it were a sign of progress, while the population keeps fleeing by the hundreds of thousands. Repression without institutional rebuilding is not a **strategy**, it is a bandage on a hemorrhage.*

## The ambiguous role of private security companies

### Erik Prince and the drone strike gamble

Facing the slow pace of international mobilization, Haiti's transitional government, led by prime minister **Alix Didier Fils-Aimé**, chose to directly contract an American **private security** firm, **Vectus Global**, run by **Erik Prince**, founder of the former firm **Blackwater**. This company has been tasked with conducting operations relying heavily on armed **drone strikes** against gang positions, a method that has raised serious concerns among human rights defenders.

Relying on a private company to carry out lethal operations on Haitian soil raises a fundamental question the international community often prefers to avoid: when a **state** can no longer guarantee its own security, how far can it outsource **legitimate violence** without losing control of its own institutions? It is a tension **Haiti** embodies in almost textbook fashion.

### Accusations of extrajudicial killings

According to a report cited by the **UN Audiovisual Library** on April 23, 2026, some of these **drone strikes** and helicopter-borne operations could be described as targeted killings, aimed at individuals identified in advance with no prior judicial process. This type of accusation, documented by **human rights** observers, casts an additional shadow over an already fragile security strategy.

This potential drift toward extrajudicial methods illustrates the main risk of a hasty outsourcing of **security**: the weakening of the **rule of law** at the very moment it needs rebuilding. A government that turns to mercenaries to compensate for the absence of regular forces is not building lasting **sovereignty**, it is buying time at the price of its own institutional credibility.

*I understand the temptation, for a desperate government, to turn to mercenaries when international aid is slow to arrive. But legitimizing **drone strikes** with no judicial oversight opens a box no weakened state closes easily.*

## What ambassador Waltz's visit reveals

### American diplomacy trying to speed up the timeline

The visit of American ambassador **Michael Waltz** to **Haiti** reflects a stated desire by **Washington** to accelerate the deployment of the **GSF** and maintain diplomatic pressure on troop-contributing countries. This direct involvement reflects an implicit recognition that the initial timeline, which anticipated full capacity by summer, has already failed.

The choice of the **United States** to get so visibly involved in this file, rather than leaving it solely to the **UN's multilateral diplomacy**, shows how much **Washington** views Haitian **stability** as a matter of direct national security, not simply a distant humanitarian question.

### August 2026 elections, a political timeline under pressure

The deployment of the **GSF** coincides with preparations for **national elections** in Haiti, planned after prolonged postponements, with a first round of voting announced for August 2026 and nearly 300 political parties and groupings already registered (**Al Jazeera**, April 1, 2026). Organizing a credible vote in a country where **gangs** control a significant part of the capital represents a considerable logistical and security challenge.

This electoral deadline adds further pressure on an already understaffed **security** force. A vote held without minimal security guarantees would risk further delegitimizing already weakened Haitian institutions, while yet another postponement would fuel the widely shared feeling among the population that the **Haitian state** remains unable to keep its own commitments.

*Organizing elections in a country where **gangs** control entire neighborhoods of the capital is a political tightrope act I would not wish on any democratic government. But postponing this vote again would risk killing the last remnants of trust in the **Haitian state**.*

## The structural failure of previous international missions

### The Kenyan mission, a precedent that still weighs

Before the **GSF**, the **Multinational Security Support Mission**, led by **Kenya** starting in June 2024, had been presented as the solution to stabilize **Haiti**. This mission, supposed to reach **2,500 personnel**, never counted more than **1,000**, for lack of funding and sufficient contributors, according to several independent reports including the **Bertelsmann Transformation Index** for 2026.

This failure is not incidental: it directly shaped the **current distrust** toward new deployment promises. When an international mission fails to reach even 40% of its planned strength for nearly two years, it becomes difficult to convince the Haitian population, and international observers, that the new configuration will do better without structural change in **funding** and **contributing-country commitment**.

### The trap of chronic underfunding

The **GSF** benefits from more than **220 million dollars** in announced funding and troop commitments, an amount that nonetheless remains insufficient given the scale of the task: retaking control of a capital of more than two million people, largely carved up by armed groups. The **UN Support Office in Haiti**, responsible for the force's logistics, has itself acknowledged operating in a high-risk environment with limited infrastructure.

This chronic underfunding is not unique to **Haiti**: it reflects a broader fatigue within the international community toward long-term **stabilization missions**, particularly when the country in question does not present an immediate geopolitical stake comparable to **Ukraine** or the **Middle East**. It is an implicit hierarchy of crises that directly fails the Haitian population.

*There is a cynical hierarchy in international attention, and **Haiti** has paid the price for it for decades. A country with no oil and no direct strategic border with a rival great power draws fewer troops, less money, less patience.*

## Gangs as quasi-state actors

### A parallel governance that replaces the state

What sets the **Haitian crisis** apart from a simple crime problem is the ability of gang coalitions to exercise a form of **parallel governance** over the territories they control: informal taxation of merchants, control of road access, selective distribution of resources to certain communities in exchange for loyalty. These groups are no longer simple criminal networks, they have become **quasi-state actors**.

This mutation fundamentally changes the nature of the security challenge. One does not fight an entrenched **parallel governance** with the same tools as an ordinary crime wave. It requires a full **institutional reconquest**, including justice, local administration and public services, a project that goes far beyond the purely military dimension of the **GSF**.

### Gang financing through illegal arms networks

A significant share of the arsenal used by **Haitian gangs** comes from illegal arms trafficking, often originating in the **United States**, through insufficiently monitored maritime smuggling networks. The **GSF**, under its mandate, is supposed to work precisely with regional countries to disrupt these **financial and logistical flows**, targeting border crossings and maritime smuggling routes.

As long as these arms flows are not truly interrupted, any tactical victory against the **gangs** will remain temporary. A neutralized armed group can be replaced by another, as long as the **weapons supply** keeps flowing in without serious control from outside the country.

*I am still struck by the relative silence over where these weapons fueling **Haitian gangs** come from. A meaningful part of that arsenal crosses borders that wealthy, well-equipped countries should be able to monitor far better than they do.*

## What the Haitian crisis reveals about the UN's limits

### A robust mandate, a structurally fragile execution

The **GSF** mandate, which for the first time authorizes **direct arrests**, marks a notable legal evolution in the history of UN interventions. But an ambitious mandate on paper is worth nothing without the human and financial means to execute it. It is this contradiction, recurring throughout the history of UN **peace operations**, that the **Haitian crisis** illustrates once again with almost brutal clarity.

This structural fragility is nothing new specific to **Haiti**. It reflects a systemic problem of the **Security Council**: the ability to pass ambitious resolutions far exceeds the collective capacity of member states to fund and deploy the means needed to make them effective on the ground.

### Secretary-General Guterres's role

Secretary-General **António Guterres** personally visited the **GSF** base in **Port-au-Prince** on June 16, 2026, calling this deployment a "real opportunity" to reduce **violence** and restore the **state's** authority, while warning that the international community "did not have the right to squander this opportunity" (**UN News**, June 16, 2026).

This statement, however sincere, carries little weight against the arithmetic reality of the deployed troop numbers. A secretary-general who must publicly appeal to member states' goodwill to complete a mandate they already voted for reveals, through that very appeal, the scale of the gap between **commitments made in New York** and the resources actually mobilized on Haitian soil.

*A UN **secretary-general** forced to beg member states not to waste an opportunity they themselves voted for is the symptom of an institution that has lost its power of enforcement. Words do not replace the battalions missing on the ground.*

## The regional dimension of a collapse that goes beyond Haiti

### The Caribbean as a shared vulnerability zone

**Haitian instability** does not stay confined within its borders. Migratory flows toward the **Dominican Republic**, the **Bahamas** and, more broadly, toward American shores, have intensified in step with the security decline. This regional migratory pressure partly explains the direct involvement of the **United States** in funding and diplomacy around the **GSF**.

This regional dimension is a reminder that **Caribbean stability** cannot be thought of country by country. A **failed state** at the heart of this strategic maritime zone produces security and humanitarian contagion effects that its neighbors, regardless of their willingness, cannot absorb indefinitely without structured outside support.

### The precedent Haiti sets for other fragile states

What is at stake in **Port-au-Prince** goes beyond the Haitian case alone: it is a test of the international community's ability to prevent the complete collapse of a **state** when the immediate geopolitical stakes seem limited. If the **GSF** fails to durably reverse the trend, this precedent could discourage future similar interventions elsewhere in the world, including in contexts where **gangs** or militias threaten fragile states on other continents.

This symbolic weight gives the **Haitian crisis** an importance that far exceeds its demographic size or economic weight. It directly questions the future credibility of **multilateralism** in the face of the collapse of a UN member state.

***Haiti** has become, without anyone really choosing it, a credibility test for the entire multilateral system. If the international community fails here, with all the resources theoretically available, what message does that send to the next states heading toward the same collapse?*

## The weight of past Western inaction

### Decades of unfinished interventions

It would be dishonest to analyze the current crisis without recalling that **Haiti** has already gone through several waves of international intervention since the 1990s, each followed by a premature withdrawal that left the country's **structural fragilities** largely intact. This historical repetition feeds, among part of the Haitian population, a legitimate distrust of any new stabilization promise coming from outside.

This collective memory also explains why some Haitians, as reported by **Democracy Now** on June 18, 2026, remain hostile to any new foreign intervention, denouncing a history of political and economic destabilization tied to past interventions. This skepticism is not irrational: it rests on a documented record of international commitments that have never kept their promises over time.

### What the West owes Haiti today

Given this track record, the **West**, and particularly the **United States**, carries a **particular responsibility** for the success or failure of the **GSF**. This is not merely a question of humanitarian generosity, but of strategic coherence: a **failed state** at North America's doorstep is a security risk that mere indifference will not be enough to contain.

This responsibility should not, however, translate into a new form of guardianship that ignores Haitian institutions themselves. The **lasting rebuilding** of the **Haitian state** will, eventually, have to rest on strengthened local institutions, not on permanent dependence on foreign forces, however good their initial intentions.

*You do not repair decades of broken promises with a new **Security Council** resolution, however well-intentioned. The **West** owes **Haiti** more than a troop deployment: it owes it the consistency it has never shown until now.*

## Gangs, arms trafficking and the underground economy of violence

### A criminal economy financing urban war

Haitian **gang coalitions**, the best known operating under unifying banners in the **Port-au-Prince** region, draw a significant share of their revenue from systematic **extortion** of transporters, merchants and even humanitarian organizations trying to deliver aid into the areas they control. This underground economy allows them to finance continued weapons purchases and maintain the loyalty of their fighters, often very young men recruited from impoverished neighborhoods.

This economic dimension of **violence** explains why military operations alone, however effective at times, never manage to durably eradicate these groups. As long as the **extortion** economy remains profitable, new fighters will replace those neutralized, in a self-sustaining cycle absent structural intervention on illicit financial flows.

### Impact on humanitarian access and aid organizations

Humanitarian organizations present in **Haiti**, including some UN agencies, must regularly negotiate safe-passage corridors with local **gang** leaders to deliver food, water and medical care to displaced populations. This reality, rarely discussed publicly for operational security reasons, illustrates just how far **state authority** has been supplanted, even in the distribution of basic **humanitarian aid**.

This system of informal negotiation, however necessary to save lives in the short term, paradoxically reinforces the de facto legitimacy of armed groups among local populations, who sometimes come to see the **gangs** as the only actors capable of guaranteeing a minimum of predictability in their daily lives.

*There is something deeply tragic in the fact that humanitarian agencies must negotiate with **gang** leaders to save lives, while international resolutions pile up in New York without ever changing this reality on the ground.*

## Possible scenarios for the coming months

### A scenario of prolonged stalemate

The most likely scenario, if the current pace of **GSF** deployment holds, is one of **prolonged stalemate**: a force reaching full capacity by late 2026, in a context where the **gangs** will have had time to further reinforce their positions and financing networks. This scenario does not necessarily imply a continuous worsening of violence, but rather a stabilization at an already critical level.

This type of stalemate, already observed with the previous **Kenyan mission**, risks turning an acute crisis into a **chronic crisis**, where the international presence becomes permanent without ever reaching a structural resolution. It is the most costly scenario over the long run, both in human lives and in international resources mobilized without a decisive result.

### The narrow window of the August elections

The vote planned for August 2026 represents a **narrow but real window** for a shift in political trajectory. Elections perceived as credible, even partially, could restore a minimal legitimacy to Haitian institutions and facilitate more effective coordination with the **GSF** on the ground.

But this window remains fragile. Any major dispute over the result, or any inability to secure polling stations in gang-controlled zones, would risk instead worsening the **legitimacy crisis** already gripping the **Haitian state** since the establishment of the **Transitional Presidential Council** in 2024.

*I would not dare predict a happy short-term outcome for **Haiti**, and I think it is precisely this honesty that is most often missing from coverage of this crisis. We need to stop selling easy hope on a file that first demands consistency.*

## What Haiti teaches about international intervention fatigue

### A textbook case for rethinking intervention doctrine

Haiti's trajectory, from the **Kenyan mission** to the **Gang Suppression Force**, offers a textbook case for rethinking international intervention doctrine toward **failing states**. The same errors of underfunding and slow mobilization seem to repeat from one configuration to the next, which raises questions about the collective ability of multilateral institutions to learn from their own failures.

This observation is not meant to discourage future intervention altogether, but to demand a more realistic design, based on **binding commitments** rather than voluntary promises regularly broken by member states. It is this rigor that is structurally missing from the current UN system.

### The urgency of a more binding doctrine

Some diplomats now advocate for **automatic funding** mechanisms and binding troop-contribution quotas for missions deemed priorities, in order to avoid every deployment depending on the fluctuating goodwill of a handful of donor countries. Such a reform, should it materialize, would fundamentally change the future credibility of missions like the **GSF**.

Without this structural evolution, there is a real risk that **Haiti** becomes merely a prelude to other similar failures elsewhere, with each new crisis demonstrating once again that resolutions passed unanimously at the **Security Council** guarantee nothing about their effective execution on the ground.

*I believe firmly that we must move past diplomatic volunteerism for crises of this severity. A resolution passed unanimously that produces only a fifth of the promised troop strength is not a multilateral victory, it is an admission of failure dressed up as a press release.*

## The discreet but real role of Caribbean neighbors

### The Dominican Republic, on the migratory front line

The **Dominican Republic**, Haiti's direct neighbor, has for years borne the most immediate migratory pressure of this crisis, with mass deportation policies regularly criticized by **human rights** organizations. This difficult neighborhood illustrates how much the Haitian collapse is redrawing, whether it wants to or not, the security and political balances of the entire island.

This bilateral dynamic further complicates the international response, since **Santo Domingo** has long favored a defensive approach of border closure rather than direct involvement in stabilizing its neighbor, an understandable posture domestically but one that deprives the region of a potentially key partner for the **GSF**.

### CARICOM's relative silence

The **Caribbean Community**, or **CARICOM**, which brings together most of the region's island states, remains largely on the sidelines of the Haitian file, limiting itself to statements of diplomatic support with no significant commitment of troops or direct funding for the **Gang Suppression Force**. This regional withdrawal leaves the weight of the intervention almost entirely in the hands of actors from outside the Caribbean itself.

This absence of stronger regional leadership deprives **Haiti** of natural allies who, in theory, would have the greatest interest in seeing the crisis resolved before it further destabilizes the entire Caribbean zone, from tourism to maritime trade routes.

*I am struck by the relative silence of the Caribbean region itself in the face of this crisis. The **West** cannot be asked to carry alone a burden that Haiti's immediate neighbors seem determined to avoid taking on directly.*

### The absence of a coordinated regional naval force

No coordinated regional naval force exists today to monitor the arms smuggling routes that fuel **Haitian gangs**, despite repeated calls from American diplomats and UN officials to strengthen this maritime dimension of the fight against **insecurity**. This capability gap persists even though several **Caribbean** countries have coast guards theoretically capable of contributing to a joint effort.

This lack of naval coordination illustrates, once again, the structural difficulty of turning a shared concern into concrete **collective action**. As long as weapons keep flowing freely by sea into **Haiti**, the **Gang Suppression Force** will be fighting a symptom without ever addressing its root cause.

*There is a quiet **hypocrisy** in multiplying resolutions on Haiti while leaving arms smuggling routes largely unwatched. I think that is where, far more than in speeches, the real international will to act is measured.*

## Conclusion: a reconquest still to be built, not just announced

### The gap between resolutions and the reality on the ground

**Haiti** does not need a new **Security Council** resolution to prove the world cares. The country needs troops actually deployed, funding actually disbursed, and a political consistency that previous international interventions have never demonstrated over time. The gap between the stated ambition of the **Gang Suppression Force** and its actual strength as of July 10, 2026, sums up, on its own, the scale of the challenge still ahead of us.

### What Haiti's future still has to prove

The question that remains open is not whether **Haiti** deserves international attention: it fully deserves it, just as much as any UN member state facing a security collapse of this magnitude. The real question is whether the international community, this time, will keep its commitments all the way through, beyond the symbolic deadlines of October 2026 or the August elections.

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

## Sources

### Primary sources

- [Vatican News, tally of 1.5 million displaced and 1,600 killed in Haiti — July 8, 2026](https://www.vaticannews.va/en/world/news/2026-07/haiti-1-5-million-displaced-and-1-600-people-killed-in-three-mo.html)

- [Ops Con, understaffed deployment of the Gang Suppression Force — July 10, 2026](https://theopscon.com/intelligence/haiti-gsf-early-deployment-gang-control-2026-07-10)

- [UN News, Secretary-General Guterres's visit to the GSF base — June 16, 2026](https://news.un.org/en/story/2026/06/1167732)

- United Nations, Security Council authorization of the Gang Suppression Force — September 30, 2025

### Secondary sources

- [Al Jazeera, first troops of the Gang Suppression Force arrive in Haiti — April 1, 2026](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/4/1/first-troops-from-un-backed-gang-suppression-force-arrive-in-haiti)

- [Reuters, Chadian forces arrive in Haiti — April 1, 2026](https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/chadian-forces-arrive-haiti-fight-gangs-part-new-un-backed-force-2026-04-01/)

- [PassBlue, doubts over whether the Gang Suppression Force will ever materialize — March 30, 2026](https://passblue.com/2026/03/30/will-the-un-backed-gang-suppression-force-for-haiti-ever-materialize/)

- [Bertelsmann Transformation Index, Haiti country report 2026](https://bti-project.org/en/reports/country-report/HTI)

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Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/analysis-haiti-the-state-that-keeps-slipping-under-the-weight-of-gangs