# ANALYSIS: Balikatan 2026 in five numbers

> Some military exercises pass unnoticed, and then there is Balikatan. In 2026, this joint maneuver between the Philippines and the United States took on unprecedented scale, pulling in partners from seven different…

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Analysis
- Published: 2026-07-20
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/analysis-balikatan-2026-in-five-numbers

## Introduction

Some military exercises pass unnoticed, and then there is Balikatan. In 2026, this joint maneuver between the Philippines and the United States took on **unprecedented scale**, pulling in partners from seven different countries for a combined **17,000 troops** deployed simultaneously across the Philippine archipelago, according to a report published by Asialink in 2026. That number alone measures the **strategic shift** underway in the region: what was long a bilateral U.S.-Philippine exercise has become, within a few short years, a **collective demonstration** that even Japan chose to join, at a level of commitment no analyst had expected.

Because that is exactly where the most talked-about surprise of this edition lies: Tokyo carried out, as part of Balikatan 2026, its **first combat deployment since 1945**. A sentence that, written plainly, deserves a second read, given that it compresses **eight decades of Japanese constitutional restraint** into a single operational decision. This move, reported by Asialink, changes how the entire exercise should be read, and shifts the analytical center of gravity from Manila to Tokyo. *When a country breaks an eighty-year taboo in a single maneuver, it is never a scheduling accident: it is a message aimed at someone very specific.*

This analysis reads Balikatan 2026 through five key numbers, chosen for their ability to tell, without unnecessary emphasis, what actually happened in the waters and along the coasts of the Philippines that summer. The exercise unfolded against a **backdrop of persistent tension** in the South China Sea, according to the same source. China, for its part, did not sit still while seven nations maneuvered at its doorstep: it **kept up its own naval and coast guard activity** across the region for the entire period in question, according to a Reuters report dated July 10, 2026. Understanding Balikatan, then, means understanding an entire region holding its breath, and a **strategic competition** that takes no summer break.

## First number: 17,000 troops, seven nations

### A coalition that outgrows the usual format

The figure of **17,000 troops** mobilized for Balikatan 2026 places this edition among the largest in the exercise's history, an exercise originally conceived as a simple **bilateral drill** between Manila and Washington. The participation of **seven distinct countries** transforms the very nature of the event: this is no longer a two-party show of force, but an **assembled coalition** built around a shared goal — reassuring regional partners worried about Chinese expansion in the South China Sea, according to the report published by Asialink.

The number also has to be read for what it implies: it reveals the **logistical capacity** required to coordinate that many troops from that many different commands. A mobilization of this kind does not come together in a few weeks. It requires **months of planning**, troop-movement agreements, intelligence-sharing arrangements, and a stated political will from each of the **seven participating governments**. The simple fact that this **coordination** came together at all is, in itself, a strategic data point as significant as the raw number of troops deployed.

### What the exercise's size signals to Beijing

A maneuver of this scale is never neutral in the eyes of China, which systematically watches these exercises as indicators of **Western cohesion** in the Indo-Pacific. The shift from a bilateral exercise to a seven-member coalition sends a clear signal: regional partners no longer treat deterrence against Beijing as a strictly Philippine-American affair, but as a **collective stake** that draws in the entire Indo-Pacific security architecture.

This shift fits into a broader trend of **strengthened security partnerships** observed over several years in the region, as Chinese maritime claims have run into **increasingly organized diplomatic and military resistance**. Balikatan 2026 is therefore not an isolated event, but the most visible expression of an underlying dynamic running through the entire Indo-Pacific, one that shapes, year after year, the relationship between Beijing and its neighbors. *A coalition that keeps growing year over year never reassures an adversary; it simply tells that adversary, with growing precision, what to fear more.*

## Second number: 1945, the year that haunts Japan's deployment

### A historic break loaded with meaning

Japan's combat deployment as part of Balikatan 2026 constitutes its **first engagement of this kind** since the 1945 surrender, according to Asialink. Since the end of the Second World War, **Japanese military doctrine** has been built around a **strictly defensive posture**, framed by a pacifist constitution that long limited any participation in offensive operations, even within a multinational training framework. *It took eight decades of constitutional caution for Japan to cross this line; it took only a handful of years of mounting Chinese pressure to convince it to do so.*

This shift did not appear out of nowhere. It fits into a gradual evolution of **Japanese security posture**, sharpened by the perception of a **growing regional threat** stemming from Chinese activity in the East and South China Seas, as well as by the **persistent tensions** around Taiwan, a file Tokyo follows with **particular attention** given its direct geographic proximity to the island.

### The limits of too quick a reading

It would nonetheless be **excessive** to present this deployment as a **sweeping and irreversible militarization** of Japan. The available sources describe an engagement **confined** to the Balikatan exercise itself, with no indication of a broader **doctrinal shift** publicly announced by Tokyo on this particular occasion. **Methodological caution** requires treating this deployment as a **strong but one-off signal**, rather than as proof of a total and definitive strategic break.

What remains undeniable, however, is the **symbolic weight** of this first participation. In a region where every military gesture gets decoded, analyzed, and commented on by dozens of **research centers**, the simple fact that Japan chose this precise moment to cross this threshold is a data point neither Beijing nor Washington can **ignore**, and one that will weigh on the **strategic calculations** of both capitals for years to come.

## Third number: Chinese persistence throughout the exercise

### A naval presence that does not retreat

While seven nations maneuvered across the Philippine archipelago, China **kept up its own naval and coast guard activity** in the region without interruption, according to Reuters. This continuity is not a minor detail: it shows that Beijing does not view Balikatan as a maneuver capable of shifting its underlying strategic calculus, and that it intends to keep its presence in disputed zones regardless of the size of the **opposing coalition** deployed nearby.

This Chinese posture fits a logic of **continuous presence** rather than direct confrontation, a strategy several analysts describe as **gray zone** tactics: neither open war nor withdrawal, but a de facto **occupation** of disputed spaces, maintained day after day, independent of the cycles of Western military exercises that come and go in the region.

### Scarborough Shoal, a lasting symbol

The regional backdrop against which Balikatan 2026 unfolds includes, notably, the situation of Filipino fishermen, who say they are **still being driven away** from Scarborough Shoal a decade after the 2016 international arbitral ruling that favored them, according to a Reuters report published July 10, 2026. This concrete reality, lived by **fishing communities** long before it was theorized by geopolitical analysts, illustrates the **persistent gap** between international law and the operational situation on the ground.

It is precisely that gap that Balikatan 2026 attempts, without saying so outright, to close through a **show of force** rather than a renewed appeal to law. The military coalition does not replace the 2016 arbitral decision, but it serves, for some regional governments, as the **operational complement** deemed necessary against a China that has never recognized the legitimacy of that ruling. *An arbitral victory won on paper is worth, on the water, only what the opposing navy is willing to concede.*

## Fourth number: the diplomatic tensions of June 2026

### The ban on the Philippine defense minister

The diplomatic climate surrounding Balikatan 2026 was marked by a significant incident: China **barred entry into its territory** to the Philippine defense minister, a decision reported on June 11, 2026, amid rising tension in the South China Sea, according to Al Jazeera. This diplomatic move, coming just weeks before the military exercise, illustrates the **ongoing deterioration** of bilateral relations between Manila and Beijing, despite official diplomatic channels that remain, in theory, open between the two capitals.

Denying a defense minister entry is never a mere administrative hiccup; it is a **diplomatic message** deliberately chosen to be read as such. The timing of this decision, just weeks before Balikatan, cannot reasonably be read as **simple coincidence**, given how precisely both governments have learned to read each other's gestures.

### An escalation that precedes and follows the exercise

This sequence of events — a diplomatic ban in June, a multinational exercise weeks later, and continued Chinese naval activity during and after Balikatan — traces a **coherent thread** of muted but ongoing confrontation. Neither side is seeking open conflict, but each keeps multiplying gestures meant to demonstrate its resolve to the other, in a balancing act **diplomats** often describe as **competition below the threshold of conflict**.

This dynamic, far from cooling down, appears to have **intensified** throughout 2026, with each side answering the other's moves with a **further show of firmness**, without either party crossing the line that would turn this competition into direct, declared confrontation. *Nobody wants war; everybody trains as though it could arrive next week.*

## Fifth number: seven participants, one strategic question

### Who the coalition partners actually were

While the sources consulted for this analysis do not spell out the full list of the seven participating countries beyond the Philippines, the United States, and Japan, the **structure of the coalition itself** reveals an intent to move beyond the strictly bilateral framework that defined Balikatan for decades, according to Asialink. This growth in participants fits a pattern seen in several recent regional exercises, where **Western and Indo-Pacific partners** systematically seek to widen the circle of involved nations.

This expansion strategy answers a **logic of collective deterrence**: the more nations involved, the more **politically costly** it becomes for Beijing to present its maritime claims as a simple bilateral dispute it could resolve by pressuring a single weaker counterpart.

### The question that dominates regardless

Behind these five numbers lies a single strategic question, the one running through South China Sea analysis for a decade: does this accumulation of Western military demonstrations actually change China's calculus on the ground, or does it simply coexist, year after year, with a **Chinese presence that never retreats**? The facts available for 2026 lean toward the second hypothesis, without invalidating the **long-term deterrent value** of these expanded coalitions.

It is this unresolved tension — between Western shows of force and the permanence of the Chinese presence — that gives Balikatan 2026 its full analytical weight, well beyond a simple headcount of troops mobilized for a few weeks of exercises, and one that should continue to shape regional strategic debate for years to come. *Counting soldiers is easy; measuring what they actually prevent from happening is, by definition, nearly impossible.*

## The naval dimension, often underrated

### What the maneuvers reveal about real capability

Beyond personnel figures, Balikatan 2026 tested **joint capabilities** between forces that, in some cases, had never operated together at this scale. **Logistical coordination** across seven different commands is an exercise in itself, apart from the tactical scenarios simulated on the ground. This technical dimension, less spectacular than the mobilization numbers, is nonetheless the one that will determine the coalition's **real operational value** in an actual crisis.

Experts who follow these exercises routinely stress that the **ability to coordinate** multinational forces quickly is a far more reliable indicator of true readiness than the raw number of participants on display. Balikatan 2026, in that respect, serves as a **real-scale test** for a regional security architecture still under construction, whose foundations are laid exercise after exercise. *A coalition isn't judged on parade day, but on the day it has to respond, without warning, to a real crisis.*

### The structural limits of a one-off coalition

It's worth remembering, though, that an exercise, however large, does not amount to an **automatic mutual-defense commitment**. Each of the seven participating nations retains its own **national decision-making process**, and nothing guarantees that a real crisis in the South China Sea would trigger a collective response as fast and coordinated as the one seen within the controlled setting of a pre-planned exercise.

This structural limit is well known to **military planners** themselves, who generally present these exercises as **preparedness tools** and political signaling, rather than as formal guarantees of automatic military solidarity in a crisis. Beijing, for its part, does not seem to ignore that distinction, which may partly explain its decision to keep its own activities running uninterrupted for the duration of the exercise.

## The Philippine perspective, often forgotten in geopolitical analysis

### What Balikatan means for Manila

For the Philippines, Balikatan 2026 goes well beyond its symbolic international dimension: it is a **concrete tool of national deterrence** against Chinese pressure that directly affects **entire coastal communities**, of which the fishermen driven away from Scarborough Shoal are the most documented example, according to Reuters. For these populations, the arrival of **17,000 allied troops** is not a strategic abstraction, but a tangible response to an economic and security reality lived every day.

This **human dimension**, often absent from analyses focused exclusively on great-power rivalry, deserves to be stated plainly: behind every multinational exercise are communities whose **economic survival** depends directly on the outcome of these muted confrontations over disputed waters. Staff maps never show the empty nets or the boats coming home empty-handed for ten years running.

### A divided Philippine public opinion

The available sources do not allow for a firm read on Philippine public opinion regarding Balikatan 2026, but the regional context suggests a **persistent ambivalence**: support for the deterrent presence of the U.S. and its allies on one hand, caution about the risk of direct escalation with a neighbor as powerful as China on the other. This ambivalence is not unique to the Philippines; it runs through most **societies in the region** facing the same strategic dilemma.

It is in this delicate balance, between **the need for protection** and **fear of escalation**, that a significant part of the region's diplomatic future is being decided, regardless of the immediate outcome of any single exercise like Balikatan. *You can want a strong ally and dread, at the very same time, the price of its overly visible presence.*

## China's reading of these exercises, rarely documented in the West

### A steady rhetoric of denunciation

Beijing **routinely** describes these multinational exercises as outside interference meant to destabilize the region, a rhetoric that has not shifted meaningfully over the years despite the continuous expansion of Western coalitions. This rhetorical consistency contrasts with the very real evolution, this time, of the **composition and scale** of the exercises themselves, which suggests that China's official messaging answers a **strategic communications logic** more than a case-by-case reactive assessment of each exercise.

This **rhetorical rigidity** should not, however, be mistaken for **operational passivity**: China continues, in practice, to adjust its own naval and coast guard presence according to the timing and scale of Western exercises, which reflects a **pragmatic response** behind an official discourse that has, itself, stayed unchanged for years. China's official line hasn't budged a word in years; its ships, on the other hand, move every single day.

### What this asymmetry reveals

This asymmetry between words and action is perhaps the most useful lesson of Balikatan 2026: China does not respond to multinational exercises with dramatic statements, but with a **silent, continuous presence** that could, over the long run, prove more decisive than any one-off Western show of force. It is this long-term reading, more than a number-by-number breakdown of a single exercise, that should guide observation of the region in the years ahead.

The five numbers presented in this analysis tell neither a **victory** nor a **defeat** for anyone, but rather a snapshot of an **unstable balance**, where each side measures its moves with near-surgical precision, aware that no miscalculation is acceptable in a region where the economic and security interests of several billion people are directly at stake. *The most fragile balance is often the one nobody has an interest in breaking first.*

## What Japan risks politically within its own borders

### A constitutional debate reignited

Japan's participation in Balikatan 2026 is not limited to its regional consequences: it reignites, inside Japan itself, an old **constitutional debate** over the limits of the country's military engagement. This debate, dormant for decades, resurfaces every time a Japanese government crosses a symbolic line, and the **domestic political weight** of this deployment should not be overlooked in regional analysis.

Successive Japanese governments have, in recent years, sought to **gradually widen** the interpretive margins of the pacifist constitution, without ever proposing an **outright reform** that would risk deeply dividing domestic public opinion. The Balikatan deployment fits this pattern of **gradual evolution** rather than an official, declared break.

### Outside pressure that eases domestic choices

Growing **Chinese pressure** in the East China Sea and around Taiwan gives Japanese governments a convenient political argument to justify this gradual evolution of national military posture. Every Chinese gesture perceived as aggressive reinforces, in effect, the domestic **political legitimacy** of Tokyo's defense choices, including ones that, like participation in Balikatan, would have been unthinkable just a decade ago.

This circular dynamic — Chinese pressure justifying Japan's response, Japan's response in turn feeding China's rhetoric of denunciation — illustrates the **structural complexity** of Indo-Pacific strategic competition, where every actor finds, in the other's moves, a justification for its own political and military evolution. *Each side blames the other for starting it; neither now has any interest in being the one who backs down.*

## Washington's quiet role in orchestrating the region

### Washington, conductor more than mere participant

Behind the staging of a seven-member coalition, the **United States** retains a central organizational and political role in Balikatan, an exercise that remains, historically, rooted in the U.S.-Philippine mutual defense treaty. This American centrality does not disappear because other nations join the exercise; it instead transforms into a **coordination capacity** Washington puts at the service of an expanded coalition, all while keeping the bulk of its influence over the timeline and doctrine applied on the ground.

This reality takes nothing away from the political value of broader participation: it simply reminds us that **collective deterrence** still largely rests on a pre-existing American architecture, one that newcomers like Japan are joining rather than replacing. *A seven-nation coalition can impress in an official photo; the skeleton underneath, though, remains largely American.*

### What this means going forward

This Washington-centered architecture also means that the durability of this type of coalition will depend, in the years ahead, on the **steadiness of American commitment** to the region, a **factor** largely outside the control of regional partners themselves. Manila, Tokyo, and the other participants know that their own deterrent capacity against Beijing remains, for the most part, anchored to an **outside guarantee** they do not fully control.

It is a **structural vulnerability** that Beijing watches closely, knowing that any fluctuation in American commitment to the region could, over time, weaken the cohesion of coalitions like the one assembled for Balikatan 2026, without any regional partner having to lift a finger to bring that about.

## The concrete military lessons drawn from the exercise

### Scenarios modeled on real crises

The scenarios simulated during Balikatan 2026, following the exercise's usual practice, draw on plausible **regional crisis** situations, including **coastal defense scenarios** and rapid response to maritime incidents. This **realistic approach** allows participating forces to test their procedures within a framework that **reflects**, as closely as possible, the **tensions actually observed** in the South China Sea, rather than purely theoretical assumptions.

This practical dimension partly explains why the exercise draws such sustained media and diplomatic attention every year: it is not a mere symbolic parade, but a **genuine operational laboratory** where participants refine procedures that could, one day, prove necessary in a far less controlled context. *You rarely train for the worst-case scenario out of excess caution; you train for it because you know it's plausible.*

### Preparation with a political and financial cost

Organizing an exercise mobilizing **17,000 troops** from seven nations represents a considerable **financial** and logistical investment for all participating governments, a **cost rarely detailed** publicly but one that necessarily weighs on their respective national defense budgets. This political and financial cost is, in itself, further proof of the importance these governments place on **regional deterrence** against China.

This kind of sustained investment, repeated year after year, can only be justified over time if the governments involved perceive a **threat serious enough** to keep mobilizing such significant resources, which is, in effect, a further **indicator** of the real level of concern China's behavior in the region provokes.

## The precedent of past years, a measurable, gradual escalation

### An exercise growing continuously in size

Balikatan did not always mobilize **17,000 troops** or seven nations. The exercise, born from a strictly bilateral framework between Manila and Washington, has seen **gradual growth** in its scale across successive editions, a direct reflection of the ongoing deterioration of the security climate in the South China Sea. This upward trajectory is no statistical accident: it corresponds, year after year, to a **regional perception of threat** that has kept strengthening rather than easing.

This continuous growth is, in itself, a **valuable indicator** for anyone trying to gauge the evolution of the regional balance of power without relying solely on official government statements. The number of troops mobilized, the diversity of participating nations, and the growing complexity of the scenarios tested tell, on their own, a story official press releases never tell quite so directly.

### What this trajectory suggests going forward

If this trend continues, future editions of Balikatan could see the arrival of **even more participants**, further reinforcing the exercise's multinational dimension. Nothing in the sources consulted, however, allows for a definitive claim about what shape the next edition will take, and any projection on this point would amount to speculation rather than the rigorous factual analysis this piece aims to maintain. *A trend is not a certainty, but ignoring a trend this consistent would be, for any serious analyst, a culpable oversight.*

What remains certain, on the other hand, is that the **trajectory observed over several years** points in no case toward a reduction in the scale of this exercise, which, in effect, confirms that participating governments continue to view **Chinese pressure** as a durable, structural factor in their regional defense policy rather than a passing threat expected to fade quickly.

## What Taiwan watches from afar, with particular attention

### An exercise closely followed in Taipei

Taipei, even while officially absent from the list of direct participants, follows Balikatan with **particular attention**, with each edition of this exercise analyzed as a further indicator of Western willingness to contain Chinese expansion across the entire Indo-Pacific region, including in the strait separating the island from the mainland. The Japanese precedent, in particular, resonates strongly in Taipei, where any shift in Tokyo's defense posture that could one day affect **regional solidarity** in a potential crisis across the Taiwan Strait is watched with interest.

This close attention has not, at this stage, translated into formal Taiwanese participation in the exercise itself, a **diplomatic caution** that reflects organizers' wish to avoid further escalation with Beijing on an already highly sensitive file. This official absence does not, however, stop **Taiwanese analysts** from drawing direct lessons from every edition of Balikatan for their own defense planning.

### An indirect but real link to the Taiwan question

The link between Balikatan and the Taiwan question, though indirect, is not purely theoretical: the **geographic proximity** between the Philippines and Taiwan means that any strengthened defense infrastructure in the Philippine archipelago could, in the event of a major crisis in the strait, play a **logistical** or strategic role whose exact scope remains, to this day, **difficult to assess** publicly given the sensitive nature of this type of planning.

This broader regional dimension illustrates why Balikatan, despite its officially strict Philippine-American anchoring, continues to be watched with an **attention** that reaches far beyond the archipelago's own borders — all the way to Tokyo, all the way to Taipei, and all the way to Beijing, which watches each of these gestures with the **same vigilance** it applies to its own **naval maneuvers** in the region. *Nobody in Taipei says out loud what everyone there is thinking quietly while watching Balikatan.*

## Conclusion

Balikatan 2026 will go down as the exercise that saw Japan cross an eighty-year-old symbolic threshold, and as the one that brought seven nations together around a shared goal in the face of a China that, for its part, changed nothing about its daily presence in disputed waters. The **17,000 troops** mobilized, the **first Japanese deployment** since 1945, the persistent Chinese naval presence, June's diplomatic ban, and the unresolved strategic question hanging over the entire region: these five numbers, taken together, draw a more faithful map of the Indo-Pacific in 2026 than any official communiqué.

Nothing in the sources consulted allows for the claim that this expanded coalition will durably change Beijing's strategic calculus. What these numbers do allow, with the **caution** the subject demands, is the claim that a **regional security architecture** is being recomposed, exercise after exercise, year after year, and that China, for its part, keeps answering with what it does best: a **continuous presence** that never yields ground, no matter how large the coalition assembled at its doorstep. *Seven nations can train together for a few weeks; China, for its part, has never left these waters at all.*

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

## Sources

### Primary sources

- [Reuters — A decade after the arbitral ruling, Filipino fishermen still driven away — July 10, 2026](https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/decade-after-historic-ruling-philippine-fishermen-say-driven-away-disputed-shoal-2026-07-10/)

- [Reuters — China raises defense budget to modernize weapons — March 10, 2026](https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/china-lifts-military-budget-modernize-weapons-defence-technology-2026-03-10/)

- [Reuters — Washington targets Chinese chipmaking with new export restrictions — April 3, 2026](https://www.reuters.com/world/china/us-targets-chinese-chipmaking-with-proposed-export-restrictions-asml-others-2026-04-03/)

### Secondary sources

- [Asialink — Report on the Balikatan 2026 exercise](https://asialink.unimelb.edu.au/diplomacy/insights/between-talks-and-tensions-why-south-china-sea-wont-stabilise-2026/)

- [Al Jazeera — China bars entry to Philippine defense chief — June 11, 2026](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/6/11/china-bars-philippines-defence-chief-as-south-china-sea-spat-sails-onwards)

- [Straits Times — Beijing favors quieter diplomatic pressure on Taiwan — June 15, 2026](https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/xi-swaps-fighter-jets-for-diplomatic-hardball-to-squeeze-taiwan)

- [Modern Diplomacy — China builds its own semiconductor supply chain — July 12, 2026](https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2026/07/12/starved-of-silicon-china-built-its-own/)

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Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/analysis-balikatan-2026-in-five-numbers