# ANALYSIS: Ukraine-Germany, the Anti-Ballistic Forge and TerMIT Robots Are Changing the War

> On June 18, 2026, in Brussels, Ukraine and Germany signed two agreements: jointly developing a new anti-ballistic system and co-producing TerMIT ground robots in Germany. This is no longer aid — it is industrial alliance.

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Analysis
- Published: 2026-06-20
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/analyse-ukraine-allemagne-la-forge-anti-balistique-et-les-robots-termit-changent-la-guer

## Introduction: Brussels, June 18, 2026 — The Day Defense Co-Production Becomes Real

### A Signature That Goes Beyond the Symbolic

On June 18, 2026, on the sidelines of the 35th meeting of the **Ukraine Defense Contact Group** — the Ramstein format — in Brussels, two defense ministers signed two distinct but complementary agreements. On one side, **Mykhailo Fedorov**, Ukraine's Minister of Defence, and **Boris Pistorius**, his German counterpart, formalized a partnership for the **joint development of a next-generation anti-ballistic system**. On the other, they ratified the **industrial co-production of TerMIT ground robots**, designed by Ukrainian firm Tencore, whose manufacturing lines will be established on German soil. This is not a vague memorandum or a diplomatic wish list: it is a technical, industrial, and strategic agreement inscribed in the continuity of a war effort that **Kyiv and Berlin** have been intensifying since the full-scale invasion of February 2022.

The context is brutal. **Russian ballistic missiles** continue to strike Ukrainian cities with a lethal precision that existing interception systems struggle to neutralize. **IRIS-T, Patriot, surface-to-air systems**: all are operational, all are outpaced by the volume of Russian strikes. The critical shortage of interceptor missiles is such that President **Volodymyr Zelensky**, in his statements at the same summit, called for an urgent continental industrial effort. The German-Ukrainian agreement of June 18 is precisely the response Brussels had hoped to formulate.

### Two Agreements, One Doctrine

The **duality of the June 18 signing** is not fortuitous. Coupling an agreement on **anti-ballistic defense** — high technology, long-term development, continental strategic stakes — with an agreement on the **mass production of modular TerMIT ground robots** — immediate needs, combat-proven technology, rapid deliveries — reveals a coherent vision of modern warfare. Protecting the sky and robotizing the ground: these are the two faces of a single doctrine that recognizes that high-intensity 21st-century warfare is won on multiple registers simultaneously.

The **35th Contact Group meeting** brought together more than fifty nations and concluded with the announcement of more than four billion dollars in military aid. In this context of extraordinary mobilization, the two German-Ukrainian agreements stand out for their qualitatively different nature: this is no longer just about delivering existing stocks, but about **building together** capabilities that neither Ukraine nor Germany could develop at this speed and scale separately. It is the transition from aid to industrial alliance.

*I'll admit it: when I first read the initial dispatch, I assumed it was another agreement, one of those protocols destined to fade in diplomatic archives. Then I saw that Fedorov and Pistorius had signed two distinct texts — one on anti-ballistics, the other on TerMITs. Two agreements on the same day, on the sidelines of a 35-nation Ramstein that mobilized over four billion dollars. That is when I understood something different was being built.*

## The Anatomy of the Threat: Why Russian Ballistics Pose a Systemic Challenge

### Ballistics: the Achilles Heel of Current Ukrainian Defense

Ballistic missiles — **Iskander-M, Kinzhal, North Korean KN-23 systems** imported by Moscow — follow arcing trajectories at altitudes and speeds that make interception exponentially more difficult than cruise missiles or Shahed drones. The interception window is narrow, the response must be near-instantaneous, and the interceptors capable of reaching these targets in their terminal phase are rare, expensive, and consumed at a rapid rate. As **Mykhailo Fedorov** stated with remarkable candor at the Brussels meeting: **"Ballistic missiles remain one of the greatest threats to Ukraine."**

It is precisely this capability gap that the Ukraine-Germany agreement seeks to fill. The objective is not only to deliver existing stocks — Germany will also supply approximately one hundred additional air-to-air missiles from its own stocks — but to **build together a next-generation interception system**. The text signed by Fedorov and Pistorius provides that Ukrainian and German companies **each contribute their own technologies** to merge them in a common architecture. Zelensky summarized it clearly: **"We have certain technologies and Germany has others. Today our defense ministers have already signed an agreement to combine these capabilities."**

### The Role of German Industrial Capacity

Germany does not arrive empty-handed in this equation. The German defense industrial base — **Rheinmetall, Diehl Defence, Hensoldt** — is the densest in continental Europe. Diehl Defence produces the **IRIS-T SLS and SLM systems**, a new unit of which was delivered to Ukraine just days before the signing. Hensoldt, for its part, signed a separate memorandum with Ukrainian company **Fire Point** on integrating its radars into the **FREYA** system — another German-Ukrainian anti-ballistic defense project. The June 18 agreement therefore does not start from scratch: it formalizes and amplifies a technical cooperation already underway between the two industries.

Pistorius himself noted that **several German companies have expressed interest** in the project. He called the initiative a **"potentially significant contribution to security in Europe and Ukraine"** — signaling that the agreement's scope extends beyond the Ukrainian theater alone. This is not unilateral aid: it is a shared security infrastructure from which Germany will itself ultimately benefit.

*I reject the narrative that Berlin is acting out of altruism. Germany is investing in anti-ballistic defense because it knows that if Russian missiles breach Ukrainian lines tomorrow without a credible response, Warsaw and Vilnius are next on the list. German interest aligns with Ukrainian interest — and that is precisely why this agreement is solid.*

## TerMIT: Anatomy of a Modular Ukrainian-Made Combat Robot

### Tencore and the Genesis of the TerMIT System

The **TerMIT** is an unmanned ground vehicle developed by Ukrainian company **Tencore**. Its design is modular — meaning, in military engineering vocabulary, a base architecture capable of accepting interchangeable functional modules depending on the mission. The platform is equipped with **sensors, cameras, and communication systems** enabling teleoperation from a remote position. In logistics configuration, it transports equipment and munitions to forward positions. In medical evacuation configuration, it brings wounded soldiers back from the firing line. In fire support configuration, it can integrate an armed module. In mine-clearing configuration, it deploys the appropriate tools for neutralizing IEDs and anti-personnel mines saturating thousands of square kilometers of liberated or contested Ukrainian territory.

This versatility is precisely what high-intensity modern warfare requires, where human casualties in tactical support missions are intolerable over the long term. According to information reported by **Euromaidan Press**, the agreement covers the production of **several thousand TerMIT units** for Ukrainian forces, with all financing provided by Germany. The necessary production facilities will be established on German territory — a strategic decision protecting the supply chain from Russian long-range strikes.

### The Industrial Logic of Relocating to Germany

Producing Ukrainian robots in Germany is not an abandonment of sovereignty: it is a decision of **industrial resilience**. Ukrainian factories remain under the permanent threat of Russian strikes, which methodically target defense production capabilities. Relocating part of the industrial chain to a NATO partner protects delivery continuity. It is the same reasoning that led Ukraine to export drone designs to Sweden, the Netherlands, and Lithuania under the **"Build with Ukraine"** program.

Minister Pistorius confirmed that **the necessary production facilities will be established in Germany**. This implies supervised technology transfers, probably manufacturing licenses granted by Tencore to German industrial partners, and a scale-up timeline that will need to be rapid to meet field requirements. **Ukraine had ordered 25,000 ground robots for the first half of 2026 alone** — more than double its 2025 total — which gives the measure of operational appetite for these systems.

*What impresses me about the TerMIT is less the technology itself — competitors exist, MAUL, ARDAL, TARANTULA — than the speed at which Ukraine went from front-line design to international co-production. That is a lesson in wartime industrial agility that many established powers should meditate on.*

## The 35th Ramstein: A Summit Under the Sign of Anti-Ballistic Urgency

### Four Billion Dollars and One Common Obsession

The 35th meeting of the **Ukraine Defense Contact Group** concluded on June 18 with an announcement of considerable scope: **more than four billion dollars** in new military aid for Kyiv. The UK announced the most publicly visible package: **£752 million sterling** (approximately one billion dollars), including **150,000 drones, more than 350 air defense missiles, and radar systems**. British Minister Dan Jarvis called this package **"the largest ever commitment revealed at a contact group meeting."**

But it was the **anti-ballistic** theme that dominated the exchanges. NATO Secretary General **Mark Rutte** emphasized the three priorities allies must address: **air defense systems, drones, and long-range munitions**. It is in this framework that the German-Ukrainian agreement found its full resonance. Zelensky was blunt before journalists: **"We all see that Putin is now betting on one thing: constant missile strikes, and he has ballistic missiles. So we need anti-ballistic capabilities."**

### The G7 and the Question of Production Licenses

The Brussels meeting took place in parallel with a game-changing G7 dynamic. The G7 nations in Europe, with the United States, indicated their readiness to **allow Ukrainian companies to manufacture under license** long-range missiles and air defense systems currently produced abroad. German Chancellor **Friedrich Merz** put it plainly: **"We are all producing too little right now, and this can be offset by granting licenses to companies that have the capacity, including in Europe and Ukraine."** A diplomatic source confirmed that licensed production would cover **"not only air defense systems, but also deep-strike capabilities."**

This American opening — Zelensky himself reported a **"positive"** reaction from Trump to the proposal to obtain U.S. licenses to produce anti-ballistic systems in Ukraine — reshapes the strategic landscape. The Ukraine-Germany agreement of June 18 thus fits within a broader architecture: a Euro-Atlantic co-production ecosystem where each nation contributes its comparative strengths to build an industrial response to Russia's fire war.

*It took me time to take Trump seriously on the Ukraine file. His positive reaction to production licenses partially reconciles me with the idea that he can, in his erratic way, shift lines where the establishment was paralyzed. Necessary evil, I said. I maintain it.*

## Industrial Co-Production: A New Model for European Defense

### Going Beyond Aid to Build a Common Industry

Classic military aid operates on a simple model: a donor country delivers existing equipment to a recipient country. This model has obvious limits: stocks deplete, supply chains strain, and the recipient remains dependent. **Industrial co-production** is a fundamentally different paradigm. It involves **technology transfer, pooling of manufacturing capacities,** and co-design of new systems. What Germany is doing with TerMIT, Sweden with the MAUL robot, the Netherlands with long-range drones, or Lithuania with tactical drones under the **Build with Ukraine** program, is precisely this model shift.

The TerMIT agreement is particularly structuring because it covers the production of **several thousand units**, with full German financing. This is not a pilot project: it is a large-scale industrial program. It reflects Berlin's confidence in Tencore's capacity to provide reliable, combat-proven technology adaptable to European industrial constraints. For a Ukrainian defense startup, it is a remarkable dimensional leap.

### Consolidating the Kyiv-Berlin Axis

Ukrainian-German relations have had their turbulences. The initial refusal to deliver Leopard tanks, the hesitations over Taurus missiles, the political vacillation of successive Berlin coalitions: Germany has sometimes been the country Kyiv watched with a mix of hope and frustration. June 18, 2026 marks a qualitative turning point. **Boris Pistorius** is the symbol of a Germany that has finished looking at itself in the mirror of the Zeitenwende — the "epochal change" proclaimed by Olaf Scholz in 2022 — and now acts with the conviction that defending Ukraine is defending Europe.

Since the start of 2026, Germany has delivered a new **IRIS-T** system, accelerated delivery of **IRIS-T SLS and SLM** guided missiles, announced several hundred million for **PAC-3** missiles via the Jumpstart program, and provided approximately one hundred air-to-air missiles from its own stocks. It is also one of the contributing countries to the Priority Requirements for Ukraine Program (PURL). No other European country has engaged such a density of aid instruments over the same period.

*I still remember the interminable Bundestag debates on Leopard tanks. Two years later, Berlin is signing robotics co-production and anti-ballistic agreements. This is not complacency: it is evolution. And in a war, evolve fast or die slowly is not a metaphor.*

## Anti-Ballistics as a European Civilizational Issue

### Beyond Ukraine: Continental Security

Pistorius chose his words carefully. He said the German-Ukrainian anti-ballistic defense project could make **"a potentially significant contribution to security in Europe and Ukraine."** The word order is revealing: Europe first, Ukraine second. This is not a rhetorical slip — it is a political signal. The development of a joint ballistic interception system is not only a response to the Russia-Ukraine war: it is the embryo of a European anti-missile defense architecture that the continent has critically lacked for decades.

NATO relies on the American missile shield to protect Europe from strategic threats. But tactical and operational capabilities against intermediate-range ballistic missiles — the category of weapons Moscow is using in Ukraine — remain insufficient. The German-Ukrainian initiative fills a gap that neither the European Defence Agency nor existing NATO programs had yet frontally addressed. **Zelensky** formulated it with disarming clarity: **"This is something everyone needs, not just Ukraine, and it is a long-term effort."**

### The Winter 2026 Window and Calendar Pressure

Zelensky is not a man who lets himself be locked into undefined horizons. In Brussels, he set a precise temporal objective: **"By this winter, we should already see concrete results from our joint work on anti-ballistic defense."** Winter is the season when Russians traditionally intensify their strikes on critical Ukrainian infrastructure — power networks, heating installations, hospitals. It is the season when the shortage of ballistic interception capacity is paid for in civilian lives. The calendar pressure is not arbitrary: it is dictated by field reality.

This deadline places industrialists under severe constraint. Pistorius conditioned the project's progression on the capacity of **"industries to reach an agreement."** German companies involved will need to negotiate contracts, formalize technology transfers, establish production timelines, and validate integration tests — all within a few months. It is ambitious. It may be the only thing that can work in a war that does not wait.

*The winter window — that is Zelensky in all his strategic lucidity. He does not ask his allies for rhetoric; he imposes a deadline. That is the wartime leader speaking, not the campaign politician. And personally, I find this calendar demand more stimulating than any speech about transatlantic solidarity.*

## Tencore, a Wartime Startup Turned Continental Industrial Actor

### The Trajectory of a Company Born Under Strikes

Not much is yet known about **Tencore** in Western chancelleries. It is one of those Ukrainian defense companies born or transformed by the total war of 2022, which compressed decades of technological development into a few years of lethal pressure. Its **TerMIT** is a modular unmanned ground vehicle designed for the most extreme combat conditions: heat, mud, electronic jamming, precision fire. The fact that Germany — with all its engineering rigor and notoriously unforgiving industrial standards — chose this platform as a co-production partner is itself a world-class certification.

It is significant that **Militarnyi** reports that the combat turrets of **Frontline Robotics** have already been integrated into TerMIT 2.0, among other robotic platforms. This confirms that the Ukrainian robotics ecosystem does not operate in silos: it integrates modules from different actors, creating an open and adaptable architecture that precisely matches the demands of modern high-intensity warfare. It is a competitive strength that established defense groups have not always been able to develop as rapidly.

### The Tencore-Germany Model as a Template for Other Partnerships

The TerMIT agreement could serve as a model for other collaborations between Ukrainian defense startups and established European industries. The formula is replicable: **combat-proven Ukrainian design + European industrial capacity + government financing** = production at scale, out of reach of Russian strikes. That is exactly what **AIDronesUA is doing with Njord Technology in Sweden** for the MAUL robot, or what The Fourth Law is doing with RSI Europe in Lithuania for drones. The German-Ukrainian agreement on TerMIT is the most ambitious version of this model, in terms of volume (several thousand units) and fully public financing.

The multiplication of these partnerships creates a **distributed Ukrainian defense industry** across Europe — a decentralized production network that resists destruction through its geographic dispersion. This may be the true strategic innovation of the Russia-Ukraine war: Ukraine is externalizing its defense industrial base into NATO member countries, creating economic and security ties that make Western disengagement structurally difficult.

*I want to say something that may be uncomfortable: this Ukrainian industrial distribution strategy is extraordinarily intelligent. It creates positive dependencies. Every factory for Ukrainian drones or robots opened in Sweden, Germany, or the Netherlands is a natural lobby for continued support for Kyiv. Ukraine is not just receiving aid; it is embedding itself in the European defense economy. Brilliant.*

## The Differentiator: How This Agreement Differs from the FREYA Shield

### Two Complementary but Distinct Logics

The **FREYA** shield — signed days earlier in Paris at **Eurosatory 2026** between **Hensoldt** and **Fire Point** — is an agreement of a different nature. It covers the integration of German Hensoldt radars into the Ukrainian FREYA system, a ground-based air defense system designed for detection and interception of ballistic missiles. It is a component-by-component integration agreement between two private companies, in a specific industrial framework. The June 18 agreement is, by contrast, a government-to-government inter-state agreement, which opens the door to **a entirely new joint system** — not the adaptation of an existing system, but the creation of novel capabilities from the combination of both countries' technologies.

The scope is therefore qualitatively different. The FREYA-Hensoldt agreement is a brick in the FREYA edifice. The Ukraine-Germany agreement of June 18 is the foundation of a new edifice. Both are necessary, both are complementary, but the agreement analyzed here involves a government-level political commitment, large-scale public financing for TerMITs, and a long-term vision for anti-ballistic defense that transcends bilateral industrial contracts.

### The Industrial Co-Production Dimension as a Novel Angle

What fundamentally distinguishes the June 18 agreement is the **duality of its scope**: it couples the development of a high-technology anti-ballistic system with mass industrial production of modular ground robots. This coupling is not accidental. It reflects a complete vision of modern warfare: **aerial superiority complemented by ground robotization**. Protecting the sky with an anti-ballistic shield while deploying thousands of unmanned robots on the ground for support, logistics, and combat missions — that is a coherent doctrine that Ukrainian armed forces have been testing, refining, and industrializing over two years of total war.

**TerMITs are force multipliers** for an army facing severe demographic constraints. Every robot performing a medical evacuation mission is a soldier who will not die under fire trying to retrieve a wounded comrade. Every logistics robot is a supply chain protected from snipers. Every mine-clearing robot is a sapper Ukraine has not sacrificed to the contamination of liberated territories. The philosophy is not appealing in itself — it is functionally necessary for the survival of the Ukrainian army on the horizon of 2026–2030.

*The distinction between the FREYA shield and the June 18 agreement took me time to articulate clearly. These are two different levels: one is an integration contract, the other is a state program. A bit like the difference between buying a brick and building a house. I do not rank their importance — both are vital — but confusing them would be an analytical error I could not permit myself.*

## TerMIT Technology Facing the Ukrainian Combat Environment

### What War Teaches Engineers

You cannot design a combat robot in Silicon Valley and send it into the Donbas mud hoping it will function. What Ukrainian engineering has understood better than anyone is that every prototype must be **tested in real conditions, immediately**. Field feedback — communication jamming, EMP exposure, mud, frost, artillery fire — is integrated into successive iterations at a speed that defies classical Western defense industry development cycles. **TerMIT 2.0** integrates combat turrets developed by Frontline Robotics, evidencing a rapid modular integration capacity that only an industry born under the pressure of war can develop.

**Remote teleoperation** is the system's functional key. The communication systems embedded in TerMIT must be robust against electronic jamming that Russian forces deploy massively. It is on this technological layer — secure communications, link redundancy, resistance to electronic countermeasures — that the integration of German components can bring significant added value. The German telecommunications and defense electronics industry has expertise in secure links and resilient command-and-control systems that the young Ukrainian industry can absorb rapidly.

### Interoperability with NATO Doctrines

The fact that TerMIT production is established in Germany, a NATO member, and financed by Berlin, is not trivial from a standardization standpoint. One of the longstanding challenges of Ukrainian integration into Western structures is the interoperability of combat systems — procedures, communication protocols, technical standards. By producing TerMIT in a German industrial framework subject to NATO norms, Ukraine begins **aligning its robotic systems with alliance standards**. This is a strategic integration advance that goes far beyond mere production volume.

The **25,000 ground robots ordered by Ukraine for the first half of 2026 alone** represent an unprecedented acquisition effort for a military power at war. This figure, reported by Euromaidan Press, illustrates the scale of the doctrinal transformation underway: robotization is no longer a marginal experiment — it has become a mass acquisition priority. The German-Ukrainian co-production will now accelerate it.

*NATO standardization through industrial co-production is Ukraine's integration into the alliance through the back door — not diplomatic, not formal, but functional. Every TerMIT produced in Germany under NATO standards is one more argument for Ukraine to end up where it should have been long ago: inside the alliance itself.*

## Putin's Response: Why Moscow Cannot Ignore This Agreement

### Ballistics as Moscow's Absolute Weapon — Being Challenged

Since the 2022 escalation, **Putin** has invested massively in the production and deployment of ballistic missiles — Iskander-M, Kinzhal — and in importing North Korean KN-23 missiles, whose ballistic characteristics sufficiently mimic Iskanders to complicate identification by Ukrainian defense systems. This strategy rests on a simple bet: ballistic missiles are too fast, too high, too difficult to intercept for Ukraine to build a credible response within a reasonable timeframe. The June 18 agreement begins to unmake this bet.

If **Kyiv and Berlin** manage to produce an operational ballistic interception system by winter 2026 — even as a partial capability — the cost-effectiveness of Russian ballistic strikes degrades sharply. Each Iskander missile costs approximately three million dollars according to Western estimates. If Ukraine intercepts 60–70% of ballistic strikes instead of the current 20–30%, the accounting logic of Russian strikes collapses. That is the fundamental dialectic of anti-ballistic defense: making attack too costly for the attacker.

### The Geopolitical Signal for Moscow

Beyond the technical aspect, the Ukraine-Germany agreement sends a geopolitical message Moscow cannot ignore. Germany — the EU's largest economy, the continent's reference industrial power — is committing to a joint program for developing anti-ballistic capabilities with Ukraine. This signal goes beyond the bilateral framework: it indicates to European allies that deep defense cooperation with Ukraine is politically viable, industrially possible, and strategically necessary. It is an open invitation for other European nations to join a collective antimissile defense architecture that will, in time, make **Russian ballistic blackmail** structurally less effective.

Putin bets on exhaustion — on democracies' weariness, on the erosion of their political will to support Ukraine. Industrial co-production agreements like those of June 18 build economic interests, jobs, long-term contracts that resist political erosion. They make defending Ukraine an **institutional** matter, not only a matter of political will. And institutions resist better than moods.

*Putin bet on Western diplomatic and economic attrition. Every co-production agreement like June 18's is a structural response to that strategy. You do not tire of an industrial program in which you have invested billions and created jobs. The best answer to Russian attrition is not only military: it is economic and institutional. Berlin just wrote that in black and white.*

## Zelensky's Position: Exigence and Strategic Lucidity

### A Leader Who Sets the Terms of Cooperation

What strikes in **Volodymyr Zelensky's** declarations in Brussels on June 18 is the combination of gratitude and exigence. He thanks, he salutes, and immediately fixes a timeline: **concrete results by winter**. He does not merely applaud the agreement's signing — he inscribes it in a precise, public timeline, creating accountability pressure on his German partners. This method is characteristic of Zelensky's leadership since 2022: transforming vague announcements into measurable commitments.

His formulation on complementary technologies deserves full citation: **"We have certain technologies and Germany has others. And today our defense ministers have already signed an agreement to combine these capabilities."** This sentence summarizes the philosophy of Ukrainian defense cooperation: not begging, not dependence, but **technological complementarity**. Ukraine brings its combat experience, its rapid innovation capacity, its field-proven systems. Its partners bring industrial capacity, financing, standardization. The exchange is balanced. Dignity is preserved.

### The American License Proposal: A Successful Diplomatic Gamble

Zelensky did not wait for Brussels to work the production licenses question. According to information reported by the **Kyiv Independent**, he submitted to **Donald Trump** at the G7 in France the proposal to obtain American licenses for producing anti-ballistic systems and their missiles in Ukraine. And Trump, according to Zelensky himself, **reacted positively for the first time**. That is a turning point. Until then, Washington had jealously protected advanced missile technologies as exclusive property of its defense industrial base. An opening on production licenses in Ukraine or Europe would represent a first-order doctrinal shift.

This opening, combined with the G7 nations' readiness to authorize licensed production of long-range missiles, creates an unprecedented favorable ecosystem for the German-Ukrainian anti-ballistic project. If American companies provide cutting-edge technologies for interceptors — precision terminal guidance, false-target discriminators, advanced infrared sensors — and Ukrainian and German industries handle integration and production, the resulting system could reach performances that neither Europe nor Ukraine could have developed alone within the same timeframe.

*Zelensky at Trump's with the American license proposal — I would have liked to witness that. Two men at opposite ends of style and substance, discussing what is potentially the most important military technology cooperation of the decade. And Trump says yes, at least verbally. That may be the moment where the "necessary evil" becomes something more constructive. Perhaps.*

## The Ukrainian Robotics Ecosystem: TerMIT in a Landscape in Ferment

### A Robotics Industry Born Under Strikes

TerMIT is not an exception in the Ukrainian robotics landscape: it is its most accomplished expression at the level of international co-production. In just a few weeks around June 18, 2026, several major agreements illustrate the sector's effervescence. **AIDronesUA and Swedish Njord Technology AB** signed at the same Eurosatory salon a strategic partnership agreement for production of the MAUL robot — medical evacuation, logistics, munitions delivery — in Sweden. **Frontline Robotics and Dropla** (a Danish-Ukrainian company) formalized cooperation on artificial intelligence for real-time threat detection, with integration of Burya turrets in Dropla's Logist. **The Fourth Law and Lithuanian RSI Europe** launched joint drone production in Lithuania.

This constellation of agreements maps a Ukrainian defense industry distributed across Northern Europe: **Sweden, Germany, Lithuania, Netherlands** — all hosting Ukrainian technologies, all co-financing a war industrial base that thus escapes the reach of Russian missiles. It is a strategic response to Ukraine's geographic vulnerability, and it is a response that deeply engages host economies in the long-term survival of this industrial fabric.

### Ukraine Orders 25,000 Robots for the First Half of 2026 Alone

The figure is staggering and deserves repeating: Ukraine ordered **25,000 ground robotic systems for the first half of 2026 alone** — more than double the 2025 total. This statistic is not speculation: it is documented by Euromaidan Press in its coverage of the Ukraine-Sweden MAUL robot agreement. It illustrates the scale of the doctrinal transformation underway in Ukrainian armed forces: robotization is no longer a marginal experiment, it has become a mass acquisition priority.

To respond to such demand, industrial capacities far exceeding what Ukraine can produce alone under strikes are required. Hence the absolute necessity of co-production agreements like the one concluded with Germany on TerMIT. **Several thousand TerMIT units produced in Germany** represent a fraction of total demand, but it is a critical fraction: TerMITs are modular platforms capable of fulfilling dozens of different roles, making them the highest value-added units in the Ukrainian robotic fleet.

*Twenty-five thousand ground robots ordered in six months. I have no perfect historical point of comparison, but it evokes the massive orders for tanks and aircraft in the early years of World War II — when warring nations understood that industrial production volume would be the decisive factor. Ukraine has understood this lesson. The question is whether its partners can keep the pace.*

## Implications for Post-War European Security Architecture

### Building European Defense From the Bottom Up

The European Union has been laboriously building its strategic autonomy for years, with disappointing results. The Ukraine-Germany agreement of June 18 illustrates an alternative path: not European defense from the top down — through Brussels institutions, framework treaties, bureaucratic mechanisms — but **from the bottom up, through bilateral co-production agreements** that create irreversible industrial facts. Steel, robots, factories — these are realities that treaties cannot undo as easily as political will.

If the Ukraine-Germany anti-ballistic agreement produces an operational system in a few years, several scenarios become possible. This system could be offered to other NATO members. It could become the core of a European antimissile defense architecture complementary to the American shield. It could allow Europe to reduce its dependence on American Patriot systems for intermediate-range ballistic threats. These are 2028–2030 horizons, but they begin on June 18, 2026, in Brussels, with the signature of Fedorov and Pistorius.

### The Ukrainian Model as Doctrinal Export

Ukraine is becoming **a living laboratory of high-intensity 21st-century warfare**. The robotic doctrines, drone strategies, electronic jamming techniques, decentralized logistics systems — everything Ukrainian armed forces experiment, validate, or reject under fire — becomes precious material for NATO armies. Industrial co-production agreements accelerate this doctrine transfer: by producing together, one learns together. German engineers working on TerMIT will see, in specifications imposed by Ukrainian combat experience, what real war requires of a combat robot. That is training no exercise can replace.

This doctrinal dimension of co-production is perhaps the least visible in the June 18 announcements, but long-term the most transformative. In ten years, European armies that have co-produced defense systems with Ukraine will have integrated into their doctrines, procedures, and industrial reflexes the lessons of a war that will have been the most intense and technologically advanced conflict since 1945. That is a strategic advantage not measurable in dollars or euros, but potentially decisive in future conflicts.

*I'll admit: I cannot predict with certainty what this German-Ukrainian anti-ballistic system will look like in three years. Defense timelines slip, budgets shrink, coalitions change. But I can state with certainty that the direction is right. A Europe that learns to defend itself with Ukraine is a Europe that finally understands the nature of the threat. And no calendar can erase that.*

## Conclusion: The Brussels Forge and the Choice of History

### A June 18 Unlike Any Other

June 18, 2026 will not be, in history books, one of those dates that sound like a cannon. No capitulation signed on a bridge, no capital liberated, no ceasefire proclaimed. And yet, in the patient, determined writing of Ukrainian resistance and Western support, that day in Brussels mattered. Two agreements — one to jointly develop a shield against the ballistic missiles that have been massacring Ukrainian civilians for three years, one to mass-produce robots that will save Ukrainian soldiers — were signed at the same moment, by the same ministers, in the same framework of the 35th Ukraine Defense Contact Group meeting. That is the very definition of a collective strategic bet on the future.

### What These Agreements Say About Us

These agreements do not only say something about the war in Ukraine. They say something about the West — about its capacity or incapacity to translate its values into steel, robots, and interception systems. They say that Germany, after decades of post-traumatic pacifism, has chosen to co-produce defensive weapons with Ukraine rather than watch Kyiv burn. They say that Ukrainian technology, born in pain and urgency, is now worthy of being co-produced by nations that claimed to know everything about defense. They say that **Zelensky**, that actor turned commander-in-chief of a people at war, has won something essential: the right to speak as an equal with the continent's great industrial powers. And they say that **Putin**, who bet on Western weariness, has lost that bet — at least for now. For now, that is already immense.

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

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The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

## Sources

### Primary Sources

- [Ukrainska Pravda — Ukraine and Germany sign agreement on jointly developing anti-ballistic air defence system — June 18, 2026](https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2026/06/18/8040002/)

- [Ukrainska Pravda — Germany to supply Ukraine with air-to-air missiles and jointly produce Termit ground robotic systems — June 18, 2026](https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2026/06/18/8040038/)

- [Euromaidan Press — Ukraine, Germany to jointly develop anti-ballistic air defense system amid increased attacks — June 18, 2026](https://euromaidanpress.com/2026/06/18/ukraine-germany-to-jointly-develop-anti-ballistic-air-defense-system/)

### Secondary Sources

- [Defence Express — Ukraine and Germany Launch Joint Anti-Ballistic Program and Termit Robot Production — June 18, 2026](https://en.defence-ua.com/news/ukraine_and_germany_launch_joint_anti_ballistic_program_and_termit_robot_production-18860.html)

- [The Kyiv Independent — Zelensky says anti-ballistic cooperation with allies should yield concrete results by winter — June 18, 2026](https://kyivindependent.com/zelensky-attends-important-ramstein-meeting-in-belgium/)

- [United24 Media — Zelenskyy Announces Major German-Ukrainian Anti-Ballistic Defense Initiative — June 18, 2026](https://united24media.com/world/zelenskyy-announces-major-german-ukrainian-anti-ballistic-defense-initiative-19955)

- [United24 Media — Ukraine Allies Pledge $4 Billion in New Military Aid at Ramstein Meeting — June 19, 2026](https://united24media.com/world/ukraine-allies-announce-more-than-4-billion-in-new-military-aid-at-ramstein-meeting-19970)

- [The Guardian — Ukraine war briefing: Allies give nod for Kyiv to reproduce their air-defence missiles — June 18, 2026](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/jun/18/ukraine-war-briefing-allies-give-nod-for-kyiv-to-reproduce-their-air-defence-missiles)

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Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/analyse-ukraine-allemagne-la-forge-anti-balistique-et-les-robots-termit-changent-la-guer