# ANALYSIS: TRUMP AND THE HORMUZ TOLLS — WHEN AMERICA REINVENTS ITS GLOBAL ROLE

> On June 20, 2026, Donald Trump published on Truth Social a sentence that would circulate through foreign ministries around the world: "There will be NO TOLLS in the Strait of Hormuz during the 60-day ceasefire period, and there will be NO TOLLS after the 60 days, unless they are

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Analysis
- Published: 2026-06-24
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/analyse-trump-et-les-peages-d-ormuz-quand-l-amerique-reinvente-son-role-mondial

## Introduction: June 20, 2026 — a Truth Social post that rewrites the law of the sea

### A social media post that rattles foreign ministries

On **June 20, 2026**, **Donald Trump** published on **Truth Social** a sentence that would circulate through foreign ministries around the world: **"There will be NO TOLLS in the Strait of Hormuz** during the **60-day** ceasefire period, and there will be NO TOLLS after the 60 days, unless they are imposed by and for the **United States** of America, if the deal is not concluded, as payment for services rendered as the **Guardian Angel** of Middle Eastern countries, as reimbursement for past, present, and future costs." This formulation is cited in reporting by **The Hindu** (June 21), **Al Jazeera** (June 20), and picked up by dozens of other sources. It is not a signed official declaration. It is a social media post. And yet it says something structurally important about Trump's vision of the United States' role in the global economy.

To understand this phrase in its full scope, it must be placed in its immediate context. On **June 20, 2026**, **Iran** had just announced the closure of the **Strait of Hormuz** in response to Israeli military actions in Lebanon, which Tehran characterized as a violation of the memorandum of understanding signed three days earlier. Iran's joint military command said it was acting in response to a "clear violation of American obligations." American **CENTCOM**, meanwhile, refuted the claim and reported that **55 merchant ships** had transited the Strait that Saturday, carrying more than **17 million barrels of oil**. It is in this context of a confidence crisis between two parties that had just signed a ceasefire that **Trump** posted his sentence about tolls.

### The "Guardian Angel" idea: a doctrine taking shape

The **Guardian Angel** metaphor did not emerge ex nihilo on June 20. **Trump** had already raised the idea in an interview with the **New York Times**, where he proposed that the **United States** become "the guardian of the Middle East" in exchange for **20%** of the region's revenues. This vision — the United States as a paid protector of a strategic zone — represents a profound conceptual transformation of American **foreign policy** since 1945. The post-World War II Pax Americana was based on a different model: the United States guarantees global security as a public good, in exchange for political leadership and an economic architecture favorable to their interests. Trump's "Guardian Angel" model is transactional: you pay for security the way you pay for a service.

This transformation has considerable implications. If the **United States** collects tolls in the **Strait of Hormuz**, they become a commercial actor in an international waterway — with all the legal and political risks that entails. If the "**Guardian Angel**" model becomes doctrine, all American allies will need to recalculate their position: how much are American security guarantees worth? Who can afford them? And what happens to those who cannot?

*Guardian Angel. There is something at once grandiose and unsettling in that name. The guardian angels of religious tradition don't charge for their services. Trump's does. This is a theological transformation as much as a political one. And in the Gulf countries that have depended on the American security guarantee for decades, this potential invoice is both foreseeable and deeply destabilizing for their strategic calculations.*

## The geography of the Strait: why Hormuz is the world's nerve center

### The chokepoint of the global economy

The **Strait of Hormuz** is a body of water approximately **54 kilometers** wide at its narrowest point, located between **Iran** to the north and **Oman** and the **United Arab Emirates** to the south. According to data from the American **Energy Information Administration (EIA)**, before the 2026 war, approximately **20 to 21 million barrels of oil** transited daily through this strait — roughly **20%** of global oil consumption. Added to this are significant volumes of **liquefied natural gas (LNG)**, notably Qatari exports supplying **Europe** and Asia.

The disruption of traffic in the **Strait of Hormuz** since the start of the American-Iranian war on **February 28, 2026** has had documented economic effects: rising **maritime insurance** premiums, rerouting of oil supply lines (tankers rounding Africa), rising crude **oil prices**, and an impact on **fuel** prices worldwide. The Reuters/Ipsos poll of **June 23, 2026** explicitly notes that **gasoline prices** for most Americans remain considerably higher than before February 28, even after the partial reopening. This is the economic reality onto which **Trump** projects his tolls rhetoric.

### Who controls the Strait? The legal and military question

The **Strait of Hormuz** is flanked by two coastal states: **Iran** to the north, and **Oman** to the south (as well as the **United Arab Emirates** for a small portion). Iran controls the island of **Abu Musa** and the islands of **Greater and Lesser Tunb** — all three claimed by the UAE but occupied by Tehran since 1971. These islands give Iran a strategic geographical position in the Strait. It is from these positions, and from its coastal installations, that Iran has in the past threatened or disrupted maritime traffic — notably by laying mines, harassing **tankers**, or imposing "service charges."

The **United States**, for their part, have no territory in the **Strait of Hormuz**. They exercise a permanent military presence there via the **5th Fleet** based in **Bahrain** and regular US Navy patrols. This presence gives them de facto operational control of maritime transit in times of crisis — but confers no legal right under international law to collect tolls in an international waterway. This paradox — military power without legal right — is at the heart of the **Trump** doctrine on Hormuz.

*Hormuz. There is something strange about seeing global geopolitics concentrate on this 54-kilometer-wide body of water. 20% of the world's oil, 17 million barrels on the day Iran claimed to have closed the Strait. The fragility of the global economy was revealed there, once again: a single physical chokepoint can rattle markets from Tokyo to Frankfurt. And it is in that chokepoint that Trump wants to plant his toll booth. The real question is not legal — it is the question of the balance of power. And on that point, Trump clearly has the tactical advantage.*

## The "Guardian Angel" doctrine: where does it come from?

### The historical thread: from military interventions to the commercial model

The American doctrine of protecting global sea lanes has a long history. Since the end of World War II, the **US Navy** has provided global **freedom of navigation** as a public good — without direct billing. This approach was founded on a strategic calculation: global freedom of navigation advantages an open economic system that benefits primarily the **United States** and their allies. The costs of this guarantee — in terms of military spending on the navy — were borne by the American taxpayer.

With **Trump**, this calculation changes. The constant rhetoric of his first term — **"why are we paying for others' security?"** — finds in the Hormuz crisis of 2026 its first practical application. If **Iran** can impose tolls (or "service charges"), why can't the **United States**, who have spent billions securing this passage, do the same? The argument has strong internal logic. It doesn't hold up before international law — but Trump does not recognize international law as an absolute constraint when American interests are at stake. This is not a new position for **Washington** — but it is articulated more explicitly under Trump than under any previous administration.

### The NYT interview proposal: 20% of Gulf revenues

**Trump** mentioned during an interview with the **New York Times** — cited in sources available for the period of June 2026 — the idea that the **United States** could become the "guardian of the Middle East in exchange for **20%** of the region's revenues." This proposal, as vague as it is in its details, reveals a transformative vision: the United States no longer defends the Middle East out of geopolitical idealism or direct **oil** interest (their domestic production having increased significantly since the shale revolution). They would henceforth do so as a security services company — with remuneration proportional to the value of the protected assets.

This vision is consistent with **Trump**'s commercial logic. It is profoundly destabilizing for Gulf regimes — **Saudi Arabia**, **United Arab Emirates**, **Qatar**, **Kuwait** — which built their security model on an implicitly free American guarantee since the 1945 Quincy agreements between Roosevelt and Ibn Saud. If Trump transforms this guarantee into a commercial contract, the calculations of these regimes change radically. Some might turn toward other security providers — **China**, for example, which is precisely seeking to expand its influence in the Gulf.

*The Quincy agreements of 1945. Oil for protection. That is the foundation of the American Pax in the Middle East for 80 years. Trump wants to renegotiate this agreement, not in a diplomatic salon, but on Truth Social. I'm not saying he's wrong on substance — perhaps the 1945 terms are no longer appropriate in 2026. But the method — tweet breaking an 80-year tacit commitment — has the potential to create instabilities that nobody has mapped.*

## The Iranian reaction: closure, reopening, and permanent brinkmanship

### The chronology of June 20–21: a crisis in real time

Here is the exact sequence of events of **June 20–21, 2026**, as documented by **The Hindu** and **Al Jazeera**. On Saturday **June 20**, **Iran** declared the **Strait of Hormuz** closed, citing "violations of American obligations" related to Israeli strikes in Lebanon. On the same day, **Trump** published his **Guardian Angel** tolls post. American **CENTCOM** refuted the Iranian declaration and reported that **55 ships** had transited the Strait, carrying **17 million barrels**. On Sunday **June 21**, technical discussions between the **United States** and Iran were beginning in **Geneva**, with **Qatari mediation**.

This ballet of contradictory declarations — **Iran** says closed, **CENTCOM** says open — reveals the nature of the confidence crisis between the two parties. Iran uses the closure rhetoric as a pressure tool in negotiations, without necessarily having the military capacity to effectively close the Strait in the face of the American naval presence. CENTCOM knows this. Iran knows this. But the closure declaration has political value: it maintains pressure on **Washington** and on **oil** markets, reminding all actors that the status quo remains fragile so long as a final deal is not signed.

### Iran and tolls: an instrumentalization of Trump's rhetoric

A notable paradox of the situation: by threatening to impose **American tolls** in Hormuz if the deal is not concluded, **Trump** inadvertently legitimized Iranian rhetoric on tolls. **Iran** had for years been seeking to normalize the idea of charging fees for transit in the Strait — an idea that **Washington** had always categorically rejected as contrary to international law. By saying the **United States** could impose their own tolls, Trump creates a rhetorical equivalence between the American position and the Iranian position on the substance of the issue.

This equivalence is being exploited by Tehran. Iranian spokespeople have presented Trump's June 20 post as a validation of their own right to charge service fees — an argument they use in their internal negotiations with allies and in their public communication. For American negotiators trying to convince **Iran** to accept unconditional **freedom of navigation**, this rhetorical ammunition handed to them by Trump is a complication. It is documented in reporting on the **Geneva talks** of June 21–22.

*Trump vs. Trump. His rhetoric on American tolls is a weapon that Iran turns against him in negotiations. He said that if the United States imposed tolls, it would be legitimate — therefore, argues Tehran, if Iran imposes them, it is also legitimate. This is a weakness in the American argument that his own diplomats must manage in real time. This type of rhetorical self-circuiting is a characteristic of Trump's governance — and a real operational cost for his negotiating teams.*

## The international legal framework: what the law of the sea actually says

### UNCLOS and international straits: unconditional freedom

The **United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS**), adopted in 1982 and entered into force in 1994, establishes the legal regime for international straits used for navigation. Article 38 of UNCLOS establishes the right of **transit passage** through straits serving international navigation — a right that all ships and aircraft exercise "in continuous and expeditious transit." This right of transit passage cannot be suspended and cannot be subject to tolls or fees, according to UNCLOS's general principle.

The **United States** has not ratified **UNCLOS** — an anomaly among major maritime powers. But they generally recognize its principles as reflecting customary international law on navigation. This creates a complex legal status: **Washington** can hardly invoke UNCLOS to prohibit **Iran** from imposing tolls, while proposing to impose its own **American tolls**. Both are contrary to the same principles of **freedom of navigation**. James Holmes, professor at the US Naval **War College**, stated clearly in June 2026: **"International law does not allow a coastal state to charge passage fees, regardless of whether it is called a toll or a service charge."** This analysis applies to Iran AND to the United States.

### The Panama and Suez Canal precedents: an imperfect analogy

Some supporters of **Trump**'s Hormuz doctrine refer to the **Panama** and **Suez** canals to justify fee collection in a critical waterway. These two canals are indeed managed under special regimes that allow transit fee collection. But the analogy doesn't hold for Hormuz for two fundamental reasons. First, Panama and Suez are **artificial** canals created and maintained by sovereign states — transit fees are compensation for infrastructure costs. Hormuz is a **natural strait** — it was not dug by the **United States** nor maintained by their civil engineers.

Second, canal management is handled by the states on whose territory they are located — **Panama** since 1999, **Egypt** since the nationalization of Suez in 1956. **Trump** does not control the territory of Hormuz. He controls access to that territory through the American military presence. That is fundamentally different in international law. What Trump is proposing is less the canal model than the racket model — fee collection by an armed power for passage through a space that is not its own. This distinction is crucial, even if nobody will dare to express it so directly in diplomatic forums.

*Racket. I said it. That is the word that nobody in foreign ministries pronounces aloud, but everyone thinks when Trump talks about American tolls in Hormuz. It is not necessarily unacceptable in the logic of powers — the powerful have always demanded payments from the weaker for their protection. But in an international system based (in theory) on the sovereign equality of states, it is a reinvention of the rules of the game that neither the law nor the allies validate.*

## International reactions: between diplomatic silence and growing concern

### Gulf allies: trapped between two options

For the countries of the **Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)** — **Saudi Arabia**, **United Arab Emirates**, **Qatar**, **Kuwait**, **Bahrain**, **Oman** — **Trump**'s rhetoric on **American tolls** creates a particularly uncomfortable position. These countries export their oil and gas via Hormuz. They have a fundamental security relationship with **Washington**. But they must now contend with a sovereign state implicitly telling them: the **freedom of navigation** you thought guaranteed is now conditional on your financial contribution to our security effort.

According to available reporting, no Gulf country publicly commented on **Trump**'s June 20 tolls post. This silence is itself a signal — diplomatic caution in the face of an American declaration that directly concerns them but that they can neither validate nor contest without risking offending **Washington**. This situation of constrained silence is exactly what Trump seems to want to create: an environment where partners cannot articulate their disagreement without political cost with the most powerful ally. It is a form of soft influence through strategic ambiguity.

### China and Russia: very attentive observers

**China** and **Russia** are observing the **Trump** tolls doctrine on Hormuz with manifest interest. For **Beijing**, which imports a significant share of its oil through Hormuz and is developing alternative routes (notably via the Belt and Road Initiative), any weakening of international **freedom of navigation** is a validation of its own right to control its sea lanes in the **South China Sea**. If the **United States** imposes tolls in Hormuz, Beijing will invoke the precedent to justify its own restrictions in the disputed waters of the **Indo-Pacific**.

For **Russia**, whose hydrocarbon exports go through different routes, the question of tolls in Hormuz is less directly economic than ideological. But any erosion of the principle of international **freedom of navigation** weakens the liberal maritime order that Western democracies defend — and which **Moscow** contests precisely in its argumentation on its rights in the Black Sea and the Baltic. **Trump**, perhaps without intending to, offers his strategic adversaries the best arguments for contesting the order he claims to defend.

*China takes note. It catalogs. Every time the United States circumvents the rules it itself built — whether international law, multilateral institutions, or diplomatic norms — Beijing records it. And when it suits them, they cite Washington as precedent. The Trump toll in Hormuz will have a life in Chinese diplomatic archives far longer than in American memories.*

## The economic impact: oil, insurance, and global markets

### When the barrel price depends on a Truth Social post

One of the most remarkable aspects of the Hormuz situation in June 2026 is the extreme sensitivity of global **oil** markets to **Trump**'s declarations on **Truth Social**. The **June 20** tolls post was followed by immediately visible fluctuations on oil markets — not because the physical situation in the Strait had changed (**55 ships** were transiting that same day), but because markets were pricing in uncertainty about what this declaration meant for the future of negotiations and the navigation regime.

This market hypersensitivity to American presidential declarations is a structural characteristic of the role of the dollar and American power in the global economy. But it creates a specific vulnerability in the hands of a president who communicates via **Truth Social** in real time, without the diplomatic or institutional validation cycle of traditional presidential communications. A single post can cost or earn billions for investment funds, **maritime insurance** companies, and the economies of producing countries. This power is real. It is also dangerous if exercised without awareness of its systemic effects.

### The cost of maritime insurance: the real invisible toll

Even before **Trump** raised the prospect of official American tolls in Hormuz, the real "invisible toll" of the crisis was that of **maritime insurance**. Since the start of hostilities in February 2026, insurance premiums for ships transiting in or near the **Strait of Hormuz** had exploded — some sources from the maritime industry cited increases of 20 to 30 times normal levels. These insurance costs were passed on to the final cost of transported oil, contributing to the rise in **pump prices** that Americans felt concretely.

The **Trump** administration had in March 2026 begun offering political assurances to shipowners — a **$20 billion** guarantee for ships attempting to transit Hormuz. This direct state intervention in the **maritime insurance** market is another form of intervention that Trump's free-market rhetoric doesn't mention. The reality is that the war economy in the **Strait of Hormuz** required massive state interventions — public insurance, military presence, diplomatic negotiations — that the market alone could not manage. This is yet another example of the tension between free-market rhetoric and the reality of governance in times of crisis.

*$20 billion in public insurance for shipowners crossing Hormuz. That's the "free market" in action. I'm not criticizing this decision — in a maritime crisis of this scale, state intervention is probably necessary. But I note the irony of seeing an administration that preaches the free market socializing the risks of private shipowners in a strait it then wants to bill as a private service. Ideological consistency is not the strong suit of crisis policy.*

## Hormuz as a test of emerging multipolarity

### One strait, three powers, one question of global governance

The Hormuz crisis of 2026 is revealing of a structural question about governance in the emerging multipolar world. In the old American-centric order, the **United States** guaranteed global **freedom of navigation** — implicitly, for free, as a public good. In a multipolar world where **China** is rising as a naval power, where **Russia** contests international norms, and where **Iran** claims rights over its portion of maritime space, who manages global commons like navigation in straits?

The **UN**, via **UNCLOS** and the International Maritime Organization (**IMO**), theoretically has this role. But the IMO has no naval force. UNCLOS has no enforcement mechanism. In practice, **freedom of navigation** in Hormuz has been guaranteed by American military presence — and now **Trump** is putting a price on that guarantee. This is a revelation of what everyone knew but didn't say: the liberal world order is not truly founded on law. It is founded on American power, which says it respects the law when convenient. The **Guardian Angel** doctrine doesn't invent this reality — it names it.

### Iran as a case study of the middle power's dilemma

**Iran** is in a paradoxical position in this debate. It wants to impose tolls in Hormuz — and **Trump**'s rhetoric gives it arguments to do so. At the same time, an opening of the Strait under normal economic conditions is in its direct interest, since it is through that same Strait that its oil must transit to reach Asian buyers. Its long-term economic interest (selling oil) and its short-term political interest (using Hormuz as leverage in negotiations) are in permanent tension.

This is the fundamental contradiction of a regime that survived the American-Israeli strikes of 2026 but remains economically depleted. **General License X** of **June 22** opens access to **oil** markets for **60 days** — but without the long-term guarantees that would allow genuine economic reconstruction. Tehran knows it needs Hormuz open and sanctions lifted to rebuild. But it wants these benefits without permanently abandoning its military capabilities — **ballistic missiles**, proxies, nuclear enrichment. This impossible balance is what the 60 days of negotiations are theoretically supposed to resolve.

*Iran survived four months of war against the two most powerful armies in the Middle East. That is a remarkable fact — not admirable, in the context of a regime that represses its citizens and finances regional terrorism, but remarkable as a strategic reality. An adversary that survives a war of destruction and returns to the negotiating table is an adversary that has not been defeated. And in the negotiations of the 60 days, Trump is dealing with someone who has proven they don't yield to military pressure. These 60 days will be decisive.*

## The implications for global maritime transport

### Alternatives to Hormuz: longer and costlier routes

The Hormuz crisis of 2026 has accelerated thinking about alternatives to Strait transit. The two main existing alternatives are the **IPSA** pipeline (East-West Crude Pipeline in **Saudi Arabia**, capacity 4.8 million barrels per day) and the **Abu Dhabi Crude Oil Pipeline (ADCOP)** of the UAE (capacity 1.5 million barrels per day). These combined capacities can only substitute approximately 30% of normal Hormuz transit volumes — far insufficient for a total disruption.

The **alternative route** via the Cape of Good Hope (rounding Africa) adds approximately 15 days of sailing and millions of dollars in additional costs per voyage. It is feasible — shipowners used it during the crisis — but at the economic cost that markets immediately factored into prices. These alternatives illustrate the structural vulnerability of the global energy system to a disruption in this single strait. And this vulnerability is precisely what **Trump** exploits with his **Guardian Angel** rhetoric: he is the one keeping this vulnerability at a manageable level. And he wants to be paid for it.

### The global maritime industry and the question of the permanent risk premium

Beyond the immediate 2026 crisis, global maritime industry actors are watching with concern the possibility that the **Strait of Hormuz** may never fully return to its pre-war status — an international waterway with stable and predictable rules. If **Iran** maintains its disruption capacity and if the **United States** maintains a doctrine of conditional tolls, shipowners may have to permanently factor a risk premium into their commercial calculations. This premium would structurally increase the cost of crude oil maritime transport — with cascading effects on global consumer prices.

This scenario is not inevitable. A solid final deal between **Washington** and Tehran — covering the nuclear program, **ballistic missiles**, regional proxies — could restore Hormuz to lasting stability. But the fragility of the first 60 days since the **MoU** of **June 17** — with the declared closure of June 20 immediately followed by the **CENTCOM** refutation — does not give markets the confidence needed to definitively remove the risk premium from their calculations. And this premium, invisible in presidential speeches, is very visible on consumer bills.

*Risk premium. That is the technical term for what ordinary people call "the gas price that doesn't come back down." Two words that separate platform speeches from everyday realities. Trump celebrates his deal. Markets maintain their risk premium because they are reading the same FDD analyses. This gap between presidential rhetoric and market data is probably the most honest indicator of genuine confidence in the durability of the Iranian deal.*

## The 60 days and the question of compliance: who will blink first?

### The negotiating dynamic under time constraint

The **60 days** of the US-**Iran** memorandum of understanding of **June 17, 2026** create a negotiating dynamic under time constraint that specialists in international negotiations are analyzing closely. In theory, a time constraint favors quick compromises — both parties have an interest in concluding before the deadline to avoid a return to a more costly status quo. In practice, negotiations under time pressure often produce rushed deals or theatrical refusals followed by a deadline extension.

In the **Iran**-**United States** case, the dynamic is complicated by several factors. First, the two parties have asymmetric incentives: Iran needs the **oil** revenues of the **60 days** (already partially guaranteed by **General License X**) and can play for time. The United States needs a deal concluded before the midterm elections of November 2026, to prevent the unresolved war from becoming a major electoral issue. Then, Iranian negotiators know that the **War Powers** Senate vote (**June 23**) weakened the credibility of **Trump**'s threat to resume strikes. These asymmetries favor Iran as a negotiator, even from a militarily defeated position.

### What Hormuz compliance says about the future Gulf security architecture

The resolution of the Hormuz question will have implications extending far beyond the **60-day** **MoU**. If the **United States** succeeds in imposing a free and permanent navigation regime in the Strait, with credible verification guarantees, they will consolidate their role as arbiter of Gulf security — but on terms their regional allies will have to accept, potentially financially. If **Iran** maintains a disruption capacity even after a deal, the Strait will remain a zone of periodic tensions that will continue to generate risk premiums.

In any case, one thing is clear: the geopolitical configuration of the Gulf in July 2026 will no longer resemble what existed before **February 28, 2026**. **Iran** has been militarily weakened. Its nuclear capability has been damaged. But it has not been politically defeated. And in Middle Eastern politics, it is political survival — not military — that determines long-term balances of power. Tehran survived. That is its strongest argument in the **60 days** of negotiations.

*Tehran survived. This phrase perhaps summarizes better than any analysis the situation in June 2026. The strikes were historic. The devastation of nuclear installations was real. But the regime is still there. Khamenei — the new one, Mojtaba, son of the Ayatollah — is still there. And as long as the regime is there, the Iranian question is not resolved. It is suspended. That is the difference between defeating and winning a war.*

## Alternatives to tolls: how to exit the Hormuz dilemma without creating a harmful precedent

### What the Guardian Angel doctrine will durably change

The **Trump** **Guardian Angel** doctrine — **United States** as paid protector of the Middle East, with the possibility of tolls in Hormuz — will durably change at least two things in world politics. First, it normalizes the idea that maritime security is a commercial service rather than an international public good — an idea that will be exploited by other actors to justify their own claims over sea lanes they geographically control (**China** in the **South China Sea**, **Russia** in the **Arctic**). Second, it undermines the confidence of Gulf regional allies in the unconditional American guarantee — an erosion that could push some of them to diversify their security relationships toward China.

These long-term effects are not in **Trump**'s immediate calculations. His policy is built for the American attention cycle — the **60 days**, the next November elections, the next press conference. The **West**, meanwhile, must think longer term. And the real **foreign policy** question raised by the **Guardian Angel** doctrine is not "does Trump have the right to impose tolls in Hormuz" — he probably doesn't legally. The real question is: "what world order do we want after Trump, and does what he is doing today strengthen or weaken the foundations of that order?"

*Guardian Angel. It's a beautiful image. America watching over the world, sword on one side, invoice on the other. I'm not naive — the Pax Americana was not free either. It cost American lives, military spending, political commitments. But it was founded on a principle, at least nominally: international law, freedom of navigation, sovereign equality. This principle had value as a legitimization tool. The paid Guardian Angel doctrine does not have that principle. It has commercial logic. And commercial logic does not build alliances — it builds contracts. Contracts break. Alliances, sometimes, hold.*

## The impact on emerging economies: who really pays the Hormuz tolls

### South Asian and African oil importers: the forgotten players in the debate

The debate on **American tolls** in the **Strait of Hormuz** focuses almost exclusively on impacts for major economies — **United States**, **China**, **European Union**, **Japan**. But the economies most vulnerable to an increase in the cost of access to Gulf oil are the emerging economies of **South Asia** (**Pakistan**, **Bangladesh**, **Sri Lanka**) and **East Africa** (**Kenya**, **Ethiopia**, **Tanzania**) that massively depend on Gulf oil for their economic development. For these countries, a structural increase in oil transport costs — whether in the form of American tolls or instability-related insurance premiums — represents a potentially devastating economic shock.

This imbalance of impacts — major powers that absorb, small countries that suffer — is an ethical dimension of the Hormuz tolls debate that neither **Trump** nor his Western critics name clearly. The liberal international order that the **West** claims to defend is founded, in theory, on the sovereign equality of states and equitable access to global commons. A regime of unilateral American tolls in **Hormuz** — even if presented as a defense of **freedom of navigation** — creates de facto a hierarchy of access: those who can pay, and those who cannot. This hierarchy undermines precisely the principles the **West** claims to defend.

*Pakistan. Bangladesh. Kenya. These countries are not mentioned in speeches about the Strait of Hormuz. Yet they are the ones who pay the most, proportionally, when oil prices rise due to Gulf instability. Geopolitical injustice always takes this form: the decisions of the powerful are paid by the powerless. And the powerless have no seat at the G7 to say it's unjust.*

## The US 5th Fleet in Bahrain: the military presence that precedes law

### The Manama naval base: why military presence doesn't create a legal right

The **US 5th Fleet**, based in **Manama** (**Bahrain**) since 1995, is the military power that gives the **Trump** tolls doctrine its real foundation — if not its legal one. It is the **5th Fleet** that conducted **merchant ship** escort operations during the Iranian crisis of 2026. It is the **5th Fleet** that maintained the American military presence in the Persian Gulf and the **Strait of Hormuz** in the face of Iranian disruption attempts. And it is the **5th Fleet**'s capacity to maintain **freedom of navigation** by force that makes the Trumpian rhetoric on tolls credible — not in law, but in fact.

The distinction between de facto military power and legal right is crucial for understanding the limit of the **Trump** doctrine. The **5th Fleet** can prevent **Iran** from imposing tolls — and has done so. It cannot legally impose **American tolls** without violating the same norms it claims to defend against Iran. This paradox is at the heart of the structural contradiction of the Trump doctrine in the Gulf: he wants to use military power to redefine the rules of maritime law, but military power does not change legal rules — it can only violate them, accepting the diplomatic and normative consequences of that violation. These consequences, in the long run, weaken the institutions that American power helped build since 1945.

*The 5th Fleet. Dozens of ships, thousands of American sailors in the Persian Gulf, thousands of miles from home. They do real, difficult, sometimes deadly work. And they do it within the framework of a policy that contradicts itself on the legal terrain. That is not their fault. That is the fault of the leaders who define this policy without assuming its contradictions.*

## The 60 days after Hormuz: projections and scenarios for summer 2026

### Scenario 1: a successful final deal that stabilizes the Strait

The first scenario for the **60 days** following the memorandum of understanding of **June 17, 2026**: a final deal is concluded before **August 17**, covering the main issues of Iran's nuclear program with credible verification mechanisms (**IAEA** with expanded access, timeline for withdrawal of enriched uranium, verifiable suspension of the **ballistic missile** program). In this scenario, the **Strait of Hormuz** returns to stable status: **maritime insurance** premiums gradually decline, ships transit without incidents, and **oil prices** normalize. **Trump** announces a historic diplomatic victory. Markets validate the deal. **Iran** begins to receive the promised economic benefits.

This optimistic scenario is possible — but it requires substantial concessions from **Iran** on points Tehran has historically resisted conceding: **IAEA** access to military sites, transparency on research activities related to nuclear detonators, dismantlement of advanced centrifuges. These concessions are politically difficult for a regime that survived a war by presenting resistance to the **West** as its raison d'être. They may be negotiable under the economic pressure of the lifted blockade and the **60-day** deadline. But the history of negotiations with Iran invites caution on timelines and the depth of expected concessions.

*Scenario 1: the deal. I want it to exist. I want the 60 days to produce something solid. But the honest analyst cannot want without verifying. And what I see in the available data — Iranian resistance on verification, American ambiguity on guarantees, the fragility of the June 20 ceasefire — does not give me confidence that 60 days will be enough. Hope is not a policy. But it is not a disqualifier either.*

## Conclusion: Hormuz as a mirror of the world to come

### The world's most important strait and the question of its future governance

The **Strait of Hormuz** in June 2026 is not just a waterway. It is the mirror in which the fundamental question of the world order is reflected: who governs global commons when American hegemony is contested and when multilateral institutions lack teeth? **Trump** has proposed an answer: America governs, and charges for its services. This is a coherent, powerful, and potentially destabilizing answer for the norms the **West** has spent decades building.

It is not the only possible answer. A reinforced maritime governance architecture — with real enforcement mechanisms anchored in a coalition of states rather than in American power alone — could offer more lasting stability. But this architecture does not yet exist. And in the void between the old order that is crumbling and the new order that has not yet been built, the Strait of Hormuz will continue to be the ground where the limits of power and law are tested. This report followed it over three critical days — June 2026. History will follow it much longer.

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

*Hormuz as a mirror. I keep this image. This small body of water between Iran and Oman that reflects all the contradictions of the world of 2026: American power that wants to be paid for its protection, Iran that survived the war, China that watches and takes note, small countries that pay without having a say. This mirror does not lie. It shows the world as it is. And as it is, it deserves better than this.*

## Sources

### Primary sources

- [The Hindu: Trump threatens to charge US tolls in Strait of Hormuz if final Iran deal not reached in 60 days — June 21, 2026](https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/trump-threatens-to-charge-us-tolls-in-strait-of-hormuz-if-final-iran-deal-not-reached-in-60-days/article71127249.ece)

- [Al Jazeera: Trump vows Iran will not charge Strait of Hormuz tolls, but says US might — June 20, 2026](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/6/20/trump-vows-iran-will-not-charge-strait-of-hormuz-tolls-but-says-us-might)

- [C-SPAN / Internet Archive: POTUS Trump Holds News Conference as G7 Summit Concludes — June 20, 2026](https://archive.org/details/CSPAN_20260620_225400_POTUS_Trump_Holds_News_Conference_as_G7_Summit_Concludes)

### Secondary sources

- [FDD: Trump Administration Provides Billions in Unrestricted Oil Sanctions Relief to Iran — June 23, 2026](https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2026/06/23/trump-administration-provides-billions-in-unrestricted-oil-sanctions-relief-to-iran/)

- [Politico: 'VIP pass' — Trump administration mulling how to coax more oil tankers through Hormuz — June 16, 2026](https://www.politico.com/news/2026/06/16/trump-administration-oil-tankers-hormuz-passage-00963910)

- [White House: Fact Sheet Trump-Xi deals including Hormuz agreement — May 2026](https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2026/05/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-secures-historic-deals-with-china-delivering-for-american-workers-farmers-and-industry/)

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Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/analyse-trump-et-les-peages-d-ormuz-quand-l-amerique-reinvente-son-role-mondial