# ANALYSIS: China's New 155mm Naval Gun — 200km Range, Built to Invade Taiwan

> The PLAN is testing the heaviest naval artillery system mounted on a modern warship. At 21.8 tons, with a claimed 200km range and stealth turret, it was designed for one mission: breaking Taiwan's coastal defenses before the first amphibious wave hits the beach.

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Analysis
- Published: 2026-06-20
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/analyse-le-nouveau-canon-naval-155-mm-de-la-chine-200-km-de-portee-concu-pour-envahir-ta

## Introduction: Thunder from Dalian

### A prototype that rewrites the rules of naval warfare

In June 2026, the **South China Morning Post** reported that the People's Liberation Army Navy — the **PLAN** — was conducting large-scale testing of a **155-millimeter** naval artillery system, the heaviest caliber ever mounted on a modern combat vessel. The prototype, weighing **21.8 tons**, was manufactured by state defense conglomerate **Norinco**, with serial production completed in March 2025. The stealth-profile turret — designed to reduce radar signature — was photographed aboard the experimental vessel **Wu Yunduo**, a 6,000-ton ship moored at the Liaonan shipyards in Dalian, Liaoning province.

In early May 2026, that same Wu Yunduo put to sea for live-fire testing off Dalian, evaluating fire control accuracy, platform stability, and continuous firing reliability under operational conditions. According to analyses published by Asia Times and several defense observers, the gun could — with precision-guided rocket-assisted munitions — engage targets up to **200 kilometers away**, representing a strategic rupture in Beijing's amphibious fire support capabilities.

### A Pacific alarm that keeps getting louder

The revelation arrives amid escalating military alerts. On June 16, 2026, the Washington Times published a classified report by Admiral **Sam Paparo**, commander of **USINDOPACOM**, addressed to the U.S. Congress: the threat of war with China is intensifying, and the United States must massively accelerate its military acquisitions. Admiral Paparo requested **$67.4 billion** for new missiles, $18 billion to counter Chinese command systems, and $15 billion for a space-based ballistic missile surveillance and warning network.

The convergence of these two facts — a naval supergun designed to shatter Taiwan's coastal defenses, and a U.S. commander sounding the alarm to Congress — traces a strategic reality the West can no longer afford to ignore. **The countdown to 2027 is accelerating.**

*I have to be honest: when I read the technical details of this gun, I felt a chill. Not panic — a sharp awareness that we are witnessing something no one has seen since the Second World War: a military power methodically assembling, piece by piece, the arsenal required to invade a democracy. And the West, meanwhile, is debating budgets and political priorities. That gap concerns me deeply.*

## Anatomy of a Record Weapon: 155mm, Stealth Turret, Strategic Range

### What the technical data reveals

The **155mm caliber** is not chosen at random. It matches exactly the NATO standard used for land-based howitzers — a strategic choice that allows the PLAN to **share munitions and logistics chains** between its naval and ground forces. Norinco already produces millions of 155mm shells annually for the PLA's **PLZ-05** self-propelled howitzers. The naval adaptation thus sidesteps the production bottlenecks that torpedoed the American equivalent — the Long-Range Land Attack Projectile (LRLAP) — whose per-round cost reached between **$800,000 and $1 million** in 2017, forcing the program's cancellation and the conversion of the Zumwalt destroyers into hypersonic missile launchers.

According to Asia Times analyses, with extended-range rocket-assisted munitions, the Chinese gun could reach **200 kilometers** — a claim the same article qualifies with care: comparable ranges in global arsenals remain significantly lower. North Korea's 170mm M-1978 Koksan howitzer achieves only **57 kilometers** with rocket-assisted projectiles, while the Soviet 203mm 2S7 Pion peaks at **47.5 kilometers**. Even the U.S. 155mm AGS aboard the Zumwalt class did not exceed **83 kilometers** with the LRLAP. The 200km claim with smart munitions remains to be demonstrated — but the ambition itself is revealing.

### The stealth turret: a reduced signature to survive

The **stealth turret design** is another strong signal. By reducing the gun's radar signature, the PLAN seeks to extend the survivability of carrier vessels against Taiwan's coastal radars and anti-ship missiles. This logic fits a doctrine of **area control**: allowing PLAN destroyers to operate at a safe standoff distance from enemy coastal batteries while retaining the ability to strike.

ZeroHedge, drawing on South China Morning Post analyses, notes that use at distances over 100km would require **drones or other reconnaissance assets** to locate targets, assess damage, and correct fire. This logistical dependence on real-time intelligence is both the system's strength and its vulnerability: formidable when the target acquisition chain functions, exposed when it is disrupted.

*The technical precision of this arsenal fascinates and unsettles me in equal measure. When an authoritarian power reaches this level of refinement in offensive weapon design — integrating logistics, stealth, and range into a single coherent system from the outset — it is planning a real operation, not a theoretical exercise. I am not a military engineer, but the doctrinal coherence of this program goes far beyond a symbolic show of force.*

## The Doctrinal Logic: Naval Artillery vs. Missiles, the Return of the Past

### The magazine depth problem: why missiles are no longer enough

To understand why the PLAN is investing in heavy naval artillery when the rest of the world prioritizes missiles, one must understand the **magazine depth problem**. Johannes Fischbach, in a December 2024 analysis for the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) cited by Asia Times, notes that U.S. Navy Ticonderoga-class cruisers carry **112 vertical launch cells** (VLS), and Arleigh Burke destroyers carry 96. Once those cells are empty at sea, reloading is virtually impossible without returning to port.

The Middle Eastern theater offered a demonstration. Between October 2023 and December 2024, the U.S. Navy fired **168 SM-2, 17 SM-3, and 112 SM-6 missiles** defending Israel against Iranian attacks and countering Houthi strikes in the Red Sea. An SM-2 costs **$2.1 million**, an SM-3 Block IIA reaches **$27.9 million**, and an SM-6 runs to **$9.57 million**. Multiplied across hundreds of launches, financial and logistical exhaustion becomes a major operational constraint. A naval gun, by contrast, can fire hundreds of rounds at a fraction of that cost.

### Naval artillery as a high-volume, low-cost solution

That is precisely the logic Beijing is exploiting. According to ZeroHedge's analysis drawing on SCMP sources, naval artillery can provide **sustained fire volume at significantly lower cost**, making the system attractive for coastal suppression missions, extended operations, and landing force support. The munitions-sharing arrangement with the ground forces — which already produce 155mm shells at scale — further reinforces the program's economic appeal.

A May 2026 report from the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), co-authored by Mark Cancian and Chris Park and cited by Asia Times, warns that it would take **up to two years** to rebuild SM-3 and SM-6 missile stocks depleted during the conflict with Iran. That number lands hard in Washington: if the U.S. Navy entered a Pacific war with an already-depleted arsenal, the PLAN would have a critical window of opportunity that the naval supergun would be designed to exploit.

*This economic asymmetry may be the most troubling piece of the puzzle. China is not merely trying to outmatch the West technologically — it is trying to bankrupt it logistically. By imposing an attrition war where every American missile costs millions and every Chinese shell costs hundreds of dollars, Beijing is betting on exhaustion. That is a brutally rational strategy, and it deserves to be taken far more seriously than it currently is in Western political circles.*

## The Fleet That Will Carry This Gun: 35 Type 052D Destroyers, 10 Type 055 Cruisers

### A platform arsenal already in service

The natural follow-up question concerns integration into the fleet. At this stage, Beijing has not revealed which vessels might eventually carry the new system. But according to Asia Times analyses, the PLAN operates as of June 2026 **35 Type 052D destroyers** and **10 Type 055 cruisers**, currently fitted with 130mm guns. Replacing those weapons with 155mm systems would enable **industrial-scale production** of specialized munitions and avoid the economic pitfalls that doomed the American AGS/LRLAP program.

However, analysts cited by ZeroHedge temper this prospect: the turret's 21.8-ton mass and recoil constraints demand a **full structural overhaul of existing hulls** to absorb firing stresses. It is therefore highly unlikely that the PLAN will install these massive turrets across its entire destroyer fleet. The most probable candidates are **specialized amphibious platforms** — notably the Type 071 amphibious transport dock and the newly launched amphibious carrier Type 076, the Sichuan.

### The Type 076: a long-range landing platform

The **Type 076** represents a qualitative leap in China's amphibious ambitions. Unlike earlier platforms, it is designed to launch aerial drones and carry thousands of soldiers, according to Lowy Institute analyses citing projections for 2035. Installing a 155mm artillery system aboard such a platform would fundamentally transform the landing equation: the vessel could simultaneously transport assault forces and provide **long-range fire support** to neutralize Taiwan's coastal defenses before and during the landing.

This integration would represent a significant doctrinal break. Under the PLAN's current concept, fire support vessels and amphibious transport vessels fulfill distinct roles. A Type 076 armed with a 155mm gun would merge those two capabilities on a single platform, reducing the fleet footprint required for a large-scale amphibious operation — and thereby reducing the risk of catastrophic losses in the opening hours of a forced landing on Taiwan.

*This is what I call systemic escalation. Every element locks into the next — the stealth turret, the 200km range, the potential integration on the Type 076 — like pieces of a puzzle whose finished image is a successful invasion of Taiwan. I do not claim absolute certainty that Xi Jinping will start a war. But I am convinced that China is building the tool to do so if it decides to. And that gap between "capability" and "intent" is narrowing dangerously.*

## The Declared Objective: Neutralizing Taiwan's A2/AD Networks

### A doctrine of systems destruction

Andrew Erickson and co-authors, in a November 2024 report for the **China Maritime Studies Institute** (CMSI) analyzed by Asia Times, document the PLAN's doctrinal transition: away from traditional coastal bombardment and toward **high-precision, high-volume fire systems** integrated into a broader framework of "systems-destruction warfare." The objective is no longer to destroy beaches but to decapitate command nodes, early-warning radars, and long-range missile batteries.

In this logic, the 155mm gun would play a precise role: enabling PLAN destroyers to remain at **safe standoff distance from Taiwan's anti-ship missiles** while suppressing coastal defenses with sufficient volume and precision to open corridors for amphibious assault waves. According to the CMSI report cited by Asia Times, these systems would be employed from experimental and specialized amphibious platforms, using extended-range and rocket-assisted munitions to strike critical defensive nodes, early-warning radars, and command centers.

### The challenge: locating and suppressing dispersed missile batteries

But the doctrine does not solve all operational problems. Asia Times raises the central question: **can the PLAN locate and suppress Taiwan's dispersed and concealed anti-ship missile batteries?** That is precisely where the supergun's limits lie. According to Taipei Times in March 2026, Taiwan holds approximately **1,000 domestically produced Hsiung Feng II and III missiles**, plus **400 American-made Harpoons** — potentially making Taiwan the country with the highest concentration of anti-ship missiles per square kilometer on earth.

With a range exceeding 100 kilometers for the Hsiung Feng II, approximately 100 kilometers for the supersonic Hsiung Feng III, and up to **148 kilometers** for certain Harpoon variants purchased by Taiwan, these systems can strike PLAN vessels well before they approach firing range. Moreover, in June 2026, Taiwanese President **Lai Ching-te** was pushing to increase spending on domestic drone systems, according to the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), further reinforcing the dispersed and mobile strike capability that is every amphibious planner's nightmare.

*There is a certain irony in the fact that the greatest threat to this Chinese supergun is precisely the kind of asymmetric armament — thousands of mobile, concealed missiles — that the West learned to master by supporting Ukraine. Taiwan has clearly absorbed the lessons of Mariupol and Kherson. The real question is: has China absorbed the Russian lessons? Because Russia also believed it had overwhelming military superiority. Look where it stands now.*

## Admiral Paparo's Alarm: The U.S. Congress Confronts Reality

### An unprecedented classified threat assessment

On June 16, 2026, the Washington Times published excerpts from a classified report by Admiral **Sam Paparo**, USINDOPACOM commander, dated April 6, 2026. This document, intended to guide Congress in drafting the FY2027 defense authorization bill, paints an alarming picture: **"The security environment in the Indo-Pacific is becoming more dangerous,"** writes Paparo, characterized by "increasing risk of confrontation and crisis."

Admiral Paparo requests a total of **$122 billion**, described as "minimum investments needed to maintain credible deterrence and prevail in conflict if deterrence fails." He specifically alerts Congress that the PLA has been ordered to be ready for military action against Taiwan by **2027** — and that the pace of Chinese military modernization is described as a "historic expansion" spanning all branches of the armed forces. The PLAN, the Rocket Force, cyber and space capabilities: everything advances in parallel, at a tempo Washington struggles to match.

### A dangerous disconnect with the Trump administration's approach

Paparo's report creates a **visible tension with the Trump administration's conciliatory posture toward Beijing**. In May 2026, Washington and Beijing announced a "constructive relationship of strategic stability" — diplomatic language suggesting appeasement at the very moment U.S. generals are sounding internal alarms. Paparo himself notes that China interprets this rapprochement as recognition of its growing power.

The Pentagon is requesting **$1.45 trillion** in its overall budget — including $1.1 trillion in discretionary authorizations and $350 billion in mandatory spending. The Pacific Deterrence Initiative alone absorbs **$10.4 billion**, according to ISW analyses. But even that colossal sum, if not rapidly approved by a Congress paralyzed by political polarization, risks arriving too late to close the capability gaps Paparo identifies — particularly long-range anti-ship missiles and advanced mines designed for the Taiwan Strait.

*What strikes me most about the Paparo report is its tone: not alarmist for spectacle, but of a surgical precision that signals a man who genuinely measures the gap between what his command possesses and what it would need to win. Reading those figures — $67 billion for missiles, $18 billion to counter Chinese command systems — I think of the 1930s, when Churchill cried into the void at Westminster that Germany was rearming. History tends to prove that military Cassandras are usually right.*

## 21st-Century Amphibious Warfare: Drones, Swarms, and Landing Armor

### The autonomous assault ecosystem the PLAN is building

An analysis by the Modern War Institute at West Point, published June 19, 2026 by Joshua Arostegui, reveals the doctrinal depth behind the naval gun program. The 155mm gun is not a standalone weapon: it fits within a completely reimagined **amphibious assault ecosystem**, where autonomous drones, intelligent swarms, and high-speed amphibious vehicles form a multi-layered destruction architecture.

In this concept, PLAN planners envision an **unmanned vanguard wave** composed of surface and submarine drones tasked with detecting, mapping, and neutralizing obstacles and minefields in coastal approaches. Simultaneously, **decentralized drone swarms**, driven by distributed computing algorithms, would be deployed at ultra-low altitude to force Taiwan's defensive radars to reveal themselves, then neutralize those radars through electromagnetic jamming and network penetration. The entire sequence aims to minimize exposure time for armored amphibious vehicles of the **Type-05**, capable of crossing 20 kilometers of open water in 25 to 30 minutes at their top speed of 45 km/h.

### The gun as shield: suppressing defenses before the assault

This is the context in which the 155mm naval gun takes on its full dimension. According to the CMSI report cited by Asia Times, long-range artillery would allow PLAN vessels to **suppress Taiwan's coastal access-denial networks** while remaining outside the firing envelope of land-based anti-ship missiles. In concrete terms: if the gun genuinely reaches 200km, PLAN destroyers could operate from the East China Sea and strike targets in western Taiwan without ever entering the kill zone of Taiwanese Hsiung Feng missiles.

A February 2026 analysis from the Center for New American Security, cited by the Modern War Institute, describes Taiwan's **three defensive layers**: an outer layer of combat drones between 80 and 40km from shore, an intermediate layer of loitering munitions between 40 and 5km, and a final layer of short-range missiles and FPV drones in the last 5km. This "hellscape" architecture was designed to maximize losses in an invasion fleet. A gun with 200km range would allow the PLAN to attack the logistics and command of those defenses from a distance that architecture cannot reach.

*What makes this invasion architecture so frightening is its systemic coherence. Every Taiwanese defensive gap has been studied, every layer of the "hellscape" has been anticipated. The PLAN is not seeking to win by brute force — it is seeking to unbalance Taiwan's defensive system before the first wave touches sand. This approach looks less like Jominian concentration of force and more like a demonstration of operational artificial intelligence. And it gives me a chill.*

## Taiwan's Response: Thousands of Missiles, HIMARS, and a Porcupine Strategy

### The anti-ship arsenal that keeps Beijing up at night

Taiwan is not standing idle. In June 2026, according to Reuters data cited across multiple defense sources, Taiwan holds approximately **1,000 domestically produced Hsiung Feng II and III missiles**, with a projected inventory of **1,850 anti-ship missiles** including American Harpoons. On June 10, 2026, CNN reported that the Taiwanese military had, for the **first time**, fired American HIMARS rockets toward the Taiwan Strait from the island's west coast — a signal addressed simultaneously to Beijing and Washington.

That demonstration fits a logic of asymmetric deterrence. HIMARS — **High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems** — are precisely the weapons that allowed Ukraine to destroy Russian ammunition depots over 80km away, locally reversing the balance of war. With ATACMS range of **300 kilometers**, Taiwan's HIMARS can strike targets in Fujian province on the Chinese mainland directly facing Taiwan. In December 2025, Washington had announced the sale of **82 additional HIMARS systems**, 420 ATACMS missiles, and more than 1,200 GMLRS rocket pods to Taiwan — the largest U.S. arms sale to Taiwan in history.

### The porcupine strategy: making invasion too costly

Taiwan's logic rests on what is called the "**porcupine**" strategy: make an invasion so costly in lives and materiel that Beijing will never dare pull the trigger. The Wall Street Journal reported on June 10, 2026 that 32 rockets were fired during the HIMARS exercise from an area near a river estuary on Taiwan's west coast — a zone specifically identified as a potential entry point for Chinese invasion forces. This was not a routine exercise; it was a message: **we know where you would land, and we can hit you there.**

Taiwan also approved in May 2026 a **supplemental defense budget of $25 billion** (NT$780 billion), intended to fund HIMARS, Javelin, TOW 2B, and M109A7 systems from the December 2025 American sale. According to ISW analyses, the general 2026 defense budget allocates **NT$561.4 billion** (approximately $17.8 billion) to Taiwan's Ministry of National Defense — an increase of roughly **20%** over the 2025 allocation.

*Taiwan surprises me, and I have to admit it. For decades, the island lived under America's implicit protection without truly fighting for its own defense. That is no longer the case. The HIMARS firing into the Strait on June 10, 2026 is a symbolic and strategic turning point. It is Taiwan saying: we are not waiting for you with our arms folded. That is a posture I find not only reasonable, but necessary — and one that Europe, facing Russia, would do well to study.*

## The American Comparison: The Zumwalt Program's Failures as a Lesson

### How America abandoned long-range naval artillery

The failure of the American **AGS/LRLAP** program (Advanced Gun System / Long-Range Land Attack Projectile) is both a lesson and a warning. The stealthy **Zumwalt**-class destroyers — only three were built — had been designed for long-range coastal bombardment using a 155mm shipboard gun. But the cost of specialized LRLAP munitions exploded: between **$800,000 and $1 million per round** in 2017 dollars, making the program economically unsustainable. The U.S. Navy abandoned the AGS and converted the Zumwalts into hypersonic missile launchers.

China has clearly studied that failure. Its strategy of standardizing 155mm munitions — building on the industrial production already established for the PLZ-05 land howitzers — is designed precisely to avoid the trap of the ultra-costly specialized round. ZeroHedge, drawing on SCMP analyses, underlines that **this logistical interoperability with army munitions** constitutes potentially the decisive competitive advantage of the Chinese program over its abandoned American counterpart.

### America pivots to hypersonic missiles while China returns to guns

There is a deep geopolitical irony in this divergence of approaches. While the U.S. Navy invests tens of billions in hypersonic missiles — notably the **CPS** (Conventional Prompt Strike) planned for the converted Zumwalts — the PLAN is returning to a technology more than a century old, refined with precision-guided munitions. Asia Times explicitly notes this contrast: the American decision to repurpose the Zumwalts **as hypersonic launchers** represents a costly technological bet, while Beijing wagers on a pragmatic, proven, and economically viable solution.

Paparo's April 2026 report illustrates this arms race: the U.S. Navy needs advanced **Mk. 48** torpedoes, **JASSM-ER** missiles, long-range anti-ship **LRASM** missiles, **Maritime Strike Tomahawks**, and **PrSM** missiles — all of them in massive quantities. Whether American industrial capacity can produce them fast enough to maintain a credible advantage over the PLAN remains one of the most pressing strategic questions of the decade.

*I often think of Churchill's formula: "Democracies always do the right thing, but only after exhausting every other option." America built the Zumwalts, abandoned their gun, and is now trying to fill the capability gap that decision created — while China, patiently, builds what America chose not to. There is nothing inevitable about this Western lag. But it demands a political will I do not yet see with sufficient clarity.*

## The 2027 Countdown: What the PLA Has Been Ordered to Do

### Xi Jinping and the target date for taking Taiwan

Admiral Paparo wrote it in black and white in his April 2026 report to Congress: **the PLA has been ordered to be ready for military action against Taiwan by 2027.** This is not an analyst's speculation; it is the assessment of the senior U.S. military commander responsible for the Pacific theater, transmitted to Congress in a 221-page document intended to guide defense spending. The 2027 date has been raised repeatedly by American officials, including former CIA Director Mike Pompeo, but this is the first time it appears in an official regional command report with such precision.

In this context, the sea trial of the 155mm naval gun in May 2026 is not a long-term R&D program: it is the final sprint toward operational deployment. The prototype's production was completed in March 2025, sea trials were conducted in May 2026, and the PLAN has a fleet of 35 Type 052D destroyers and 10 Type 055 cruisers as potential deployment platforms. **The timeline is tight, but it is consistent with a 2027 objective.**

### The denial deterrence strategy: America's bet

Facing this countdown, Admiral Paparo advocates a strategy of **deterrence by denial** — the idea that American and allied forces must demonstrate a concrete capacity to prevent the PLAN from achieving its military objectives, rather than simply threatening punitive retaliation after the fact. This strategy rests on the deployment of thousands of low-cost drones in the Taiwan Strait — what Paparo has publicly called the **"hellscape"** — combined with long-range missiles, advanced mines, and a dispersed basing infrastructure across the island chain.

The Pentagon plans to deploy offensive missiles at Guam, including the **Typhon Mid-Range Capability** (Tomahawk missiles with 1,900km range) and **Dark Eagle** (long-range hypersonic missile capable of striking China from Guam). Construction of the **Guam Defense System** (GDS), estimated at $909 million, is designed to counter China's DF-26 missiles — dubbed the "Guam killers" — which the Pentagon confirms China continues to produce in growing numbers.

*The 2027 countdown is the detail that mainstream media has not yet truly absorbed into its coverage. People still speak of "tensions in the Strait" as if it were a geopolitical abstraction. But when the most senior American military commander in the Pacific writes to Congress that the PLA has a deadline to be ready to attack, this is no longer a tension — it is a calendar. The difference is fundamental for anyone who wants to understand what is really happening in the Asia-Pacific.*

## The PLAN by the Numbers: The World's Largest Navy and Its Operational Limits

### A record fleet, but persistent doctrinal gaps

The PLAN is, in ship count, **the world's largest navy** since roughly 2015–2016, according to Naval Review analyses in June 2026. It operates three aircraft carriers, with a potential fourth, possibly nuclear-powered, under construction. The DF-21 and DF-26 anti-ship ballistic missiles — dubbed respectively the "carrier killers" and "Guam killers" — form the spearhead of a maritime interdiction strategy designed to keep American carriers more than 2,500 to 3,000km from China's shores.

Yet the PLAN suffers from a persistent gap that the 155mm gun is designed precisely to fill: the **lack of sustained, low-cost fire support capacity** for amphibious operations. Its Type 055 and Type 052D destroyers, impressive as they are in missiles and integrated combat systems, are equipped with 130mm guns of limited range — weapons designed for naval engagement and close defense, not for systematic coastal bombardment at depth. Moving to 155mm represents a fundamental doctrinal shift: it signals that the PLAN is seriously preparing for **long-range coastal artillery suppression**, a capability essentially absent from its current arsenal.

### Control of the littoral: the strategic prerequisite

But even with a 200km-range gun, the PLAN faces a fundamental challenge: to deploy its artillery effectively in support of an amphibious landing, it must first **establish localized maritime control around Taiwan.** That precondition means neutralizing Taiwan's submarines, suppressing coastal anti-ship batteries, and securing access corridors for amphibious transport vessels. This is precisely the heart of Taiwan's A2/AD strategy: make that localized maritime control so costly that the PLAN cannot sustain it long enough to complete an amphibious operation.

Asia Times draws a revealing comparison with the Israel-Iran conflict: even the United States, with the world's most sophisticated arsenal, struggled to fully suppress Iranian drone and missile forces deployed in asymmetric posture. If the PLAN encounters comparable difficulties against Taiwan's dispersed and mobile arsenal, the 155mm gun — however powerful — will not be sufficient to guarantee the suppression of Taiwan's coastal defenses in the critical opening hours of a landing.

*This is the paradox at the heart of this entire analysis: the more I read about the PLAN's capabilities, the more I realize that Taiwan is simultaneously extremely vulnerable AND surprisingly difficult to invade. The vulnerability stems from the disproportion of forces and the geography — a flat island, limited beaches, well-known approach routes. But the difficulty stems precisely from Taiwan's arsenal, which was designed to turn those approaches into kill zones. I do not know who would win such a war. And that is precisely why it must not begin.*

## Espionage, Sabotage, and Gray-Zone Warfare: Pressure Before the Assault

### Gray-zone operations that precede invasion

According to the ISW in its June 18, 2026 update, China is conducting multidimensional pressure on Taiwan that goes far beyond weapons accumulation. On June 16, 2026, China deployed the research vessel **Xiang Yang Hong 22** — escorted by two Chinese coast guard vessels — to conduct a "marine environment survey" in disputed waters east of Taiwan from June 16 to 18. The data collected on undersea conditions — marine chemistry, hydrometeorology — has critical applications for submarine navigation and underwater detection in the Bashi and Miyako channels, chokepoints China would need to control during a blockade or invasion.

Meanwhile, Taiwan faces systematic infiltration. According to the same ISW report, Taiwan's **Control Yuan** dismissed and sentenced a former colonel from the Air Force Academy to 11 years in prison for ties to a Chinese espionage network. The officer had received NT$1.341 million (approximately $42,000) from a Chinese intelligence agent and had transmitted sensitive information on Taiwan Air Force exercises, the scope of Taiwan-U.S. cooperation missions, and military personnel data. This is the invisible dimension of invasion preparation: understanding the defenses from the inside before striking from the outside.

### Cognitive warfare and the erosion of internal cohesion

Admiral Paparo also noted in his report that China's strategy is not limited to direct military threats. It includes what he calls **"gray zone" activities**: lawfare, economic coercion, and information warfare — actions that exert significant pressure on regional allies and partners. In Taiwan, this gray war manifests notably through the obstruction of defense spending by opposition parties: according to the ISW, the **Kuomintang and the Taiwan People's Party** have blocked the Lai administration's efforts to increase funding for critical defense measures, including the development of a domestic drone industry.

Beijing has absorbed a lesson from Sun Tzu that democracies sometimes struggle to internalize: wars are often won or lost before the first shot is fired. A Taiwan whose defense budget is blocked by political opposition, whose military secrets evaporate into espionage networks, and whose society is saturated with disinformation is an easier target than a united, armed, and resolute Taiwan. **The real battle for Taiwan is fought as much in the chamber of the Legislative Yuan in Taipei as in the waters of the Strait.**

*I confess a growing frustration at what I observe in democracies confronting authoritarian threats. In Taiwan as in Ukraine, opposition parties funded or influenced by hostile foreign powers become the enemy's best allies — without firing a single shot. This is not a new phenomenon, but its scale and sophistication in 2026 exceed anything we have previously seen. Democracies must find ways to protect themselves from this interference without turning into authoritarian regimes. That is the most difficult — and most necessary — balance of our era.*

## The West Confronts the Threat: Gaps, Urgencies, and Contradictions

### Regional allies facing a degraded environment

The Paparo report does not merely describe the Chinese threat — it reveals the gaping holes in American alliance readiness across the Pacific. Among the urgent priorities: reinforcing military infrastructure in Hawaii, Guam, and on islands like Wake, Palau, Tinian, and Yap; building an operational base in Japan for **extra-large unmanned underwater vehicles**; and the $909 million installation for the **Guam Defense System**, capable of countering Chinese ballistic, hypersonic, and cruise missiles.

In the immediate term, Paparo requests new advanced mining systems — notably **Quickstrike** ($531 million) and **Hammerhead** — capable of neutralizing submarines and surface vessels in the shallow waters of the Taiwan Strait. These mines were explicitly designed to block the passage of China's amphibious fleet. He also requests **Quicksink** ($453 million), a modified JDAM bomb that acquires anti-ship capabilities by detonating beneath enemy vessels' keels. Each element of this arsenal corresponds to a specific PLAN capability that Paparo is seeking to counterbalance.

### Europe in the equation: what the Pacific means for global security

Europe, absorbed by the war in Ukraine and its own rearmament challenges, sometimes underestimates the significance of the Indo-Pacific theater for its own security. Yet **global supply chains**, undersea communication cables, energy flows, and trade that sustain European economies run largely through the Pacific straits China seeks to control. A conflict in the Taiwan Strait would be economically devastating for Europe, independent of any direct military intervention.

China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea now form a mutual assistance axis that challenges the liberal international order on multiple theaters simultaneously. Arming Ukraine, defending Taiwan, deterring Iran, and monitoring Pyongyang are not separate objectives: they are the fronts of a single war for **the survival of the rules-based international order** that democracies built since 1945. Europe must understand that its security and prosperity are inseparable from the outcome of this confrontation.

*I end this analysis with a conviction I find hard to soften: we are living, right now, through the last years of relative peace in the Asia-Pacific. I am not saying war is inevitable — I am saying the window to avoid a catastrophe is closing rapidly. The West still holds the tools — economic, military, diplomatic — to maintain deterrence. But it must deploy them now, with consistency and long-term vision, not with the hesitations and compromises that allowed the Russian aggressor to spiral out of control in Ukraine. If Taiwan falls, it is not only a democracy of 23 million people that disappears — it is the signal that the rules of the international game have no more guardians.*

## Conclusion: A Gun as a Barometer of Intent

### Beyond the technical: what this program reveals about Beijing's intentions

The 155mm naval gun is not, in itself, a decisive weapon. Its claimed performance of 200km with smart munitions remains to be confirmed under real operational conditions. The PLAN still needs to solve fundamental problems of localized maritime control, real-time target acquisition chains, and the suppression of Taiwan's dispersed anti-ship batteries before this gun can play the role for which it was designed. But this program is an **intent barometer** of startling clarity: a power that invests in long-range naval artillery specifically calibrated for amphibious support is planning an amphibious operation. That is the elementary logic of military doctrine.

The 2027 window identified by Admiral Paparo creates a calendar pressure that Western and Taiwanese governments cannot ignore. Every month that passes without closing the American capability gaps — long-range missiles, mines, drones — is a month during which the PLAN advances toward full operational readiness. The good news is that Taiwan appears to have understood the urgency: the HIMARS firing into the Strait on June 10, 2026, and the approval of a $25 billion supplemental defense budget in May signal an unprecedented political resolve.

### Deterrence is not guaranteed — it is built

Deterrence is not a natural state of international relations: it is a fragile construction that requires permanent investment, strategic consistency, and the political will to assert it. China is testing the limits of that construction right now — with military exercises, spy research vessels, espionage networks inside Taiwan's armed forces, and a naval supergun that changes the parameters of amphibious landing. The adequate response is not reckless escalation, but it is not diplomatic complacency either. **It is armament, cohesion, and clarity.** Three qualities democracies must find within themselves before it is too late.

### Primary Sources

[Asia Times — China's new naval supergun trained on Taiwan's shielded shores (Gabriel Honrada) — June 17, 2026](https://asiatimes.com/2026/06/chinas-new-naval-supergun-trained-on-taiwans-shielded-shores/)

[Washington Times — Indo-Pacific Command chief sounds alarm on China war threat (Bill Gertz) — June 16, 2026](https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2026/jun/16/indo-pacific-command-chief-sounds-alarm-china-war-threat-private/)

[South China Morning Post — China's navy has missiles and drones. Why is it bringing back the big guns? (Liu Zhen) — June 13, 2026](https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3356887/chinas-navy-has-missiles-and-drones-why-it-bringing-back-big-guns)

### Secondary Sources

[ZeroHedge — China Revives Heavy Naval Firepower With New 155mm Gun That Could Support Attack on Taiwan — June 16, 2026](https://www.zerohedge.com/markets/china-revives-heavy-naval-firepower-new-155mm-gun-could-support-attack-taiwan)

[Modern War Institute (West Point) — Systems Over Steel: How China is Redefining Amphibious Armor Survivability (Joshua Arostegui) — June 19, 2026](https://mwi.westpoint.edu/systems-over-steel-how-china-is-redefining-amphibious-armor-survivability/)

[Institute for the Study of War — China and Taiwan Update, June 18, 2026 (Adam Grace) — June 18, 2026](https://understandingwar.org/research/china-taiwan/china-taiwan-update-june-18-2026/)

[CNN — Taiwan test-fires US-supplied HIMARS rockets toward the Taiwan Strait for the first time — June 10, 2026](https://www.cnn.com/2026/06/10/asia/taiwan-test-fires-rockets-china-intl-latam)

[Wall Street Journal — Taiwan Test-Fires U.S.-Supplied Missile Launcher Toward China — June 10, 2026](https://www.wsj.com/world/china/taiwan-test-fires-u-s-supplied-missile-launcher-toward-china-c23b4f44)

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

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Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/analyse-le-nouveau-canon-naval-155-mm-de-la-chine-200-km-de-portee-concu-pour-envahir-ta