# ANALYSIS: LAVROV AT THE G7 — RUSSIA IS SEARCHING FOR WHAT TRUMP REALLY PROMISED IT

> On June 24, 2026, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov made a statement that reveals less Moscow's strength than its disarray. "We are trying to understand what happened at Évian," he said, referring to the G7 summit held in France. "The Americans have not yet communicated thei

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Analysis
- Published: 2026-06-24
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/analyse-lavrov-au-g7-la-russie-cherche-ce-que-trump-lui-a-vraiment-promis

## Key takeaways

- Lavrov said Moscow is trying to understand what happened at Évian and that the Americans had not yet communicated their conclusions or next steps.
- Macron said Trump acknowledged that Russia is not interested in peace, a "genuine change in approach"; Trump only called for Russia to "pursue peace" and described his talks with Zelensky as "very good."
- Lavrov's appeals to the "Anchorage understandings" are treated as a Russian narrative built on an undocumented 2025 Alaska summit.
- Russia's war objectives are unchanged from 2022, and the author finds no concrete Russian concession in Lavrov's or Putin's statements.
- The author sees Witkoff and Kushner's Moscow visit as the decisive test of whether US policy has shifted.

## Introduction: Moscow's confusion after Évian

### June 24, 2026 — Lavrov scrutinizes Trump

On **June 24, 2026**, Russian Foreign Minister **Sergei Lavrov** made a statement that reveals less Moscow's strength than its disarray. **"We are trying to understand what happened at Évian,"** he said, referring to the **G7** summit held in France. **"The Americans have not yet communicated their conclusions or their next steps to us."** This sentence — attributed to Lavrov and reported by **US News & World Report** on **June 24** — is extraordinarily revealing. The foreign policy chief of a major **nuclear** power publicly admits he does not know what his most important interlocutor has decided. **Moscow** is scrutinizing reports from the G7 in Évian the way an excluded actor searches for clues in a meeting it was not part of.

What Lavrov is specifically trying to understand is simple and crucial: did **American President Donald Trump** genuinely shift his position on **Ukraine** at the G7 in Évian, as French President **Emmanuel Macron** indicated? Macron described what he presented as a **"genuine evolution"** of the American position — **Trump** acknowledging that **Russia** is not interested in peace. If true, it means the diplomatic operating space **Moscow** thought it had is shrinking. If it is an exaggerated formulation by Macron, Moscow can still hope that **Trump** maintains an exploitable ambiguity.

### Macron, Trump, and the thesis of American conversion

The tension at the heart of Lavrov's statement is this: **Trump** called on **Russia** to pursue peace with **Ukraine** after what he described as a **"very good"** dialogue with **Zelensky** at the G7. These statements generated **cautious optimism** among G7 leaders. Macron argued that **Trump** had, during the discussions, acknowledged that **Russia** was not interested in peace — which would represent a significant shift from the earlier American posture that tended to treat both belligerents as equally responsible for the diplomatic impasse. Lavrov immediately questioned this interpretation, seeking to determine whether **Trump's** statements at Évian were substantive or performative.

*Lavrov trying to understand what Trump really said. The most experienced diplomat in the world facing the most unpredictable American president. And both know that in that ambiguity, everything can tip.*

## The Anchorage understandings — a Russian narrative construction

### A summit with no public documents

At the heart of Lavrov's frustration is the question of the **so-called Anchorage understandings** — the agreements the **Kremlin** claims to have reached at the US-Russia summit in **Alaska in August 2025**. Neither the **United States** nor **Russia** published an official communiqué or documents on the outcomes of that summit. This informational vacuum has been systematically exploited by **Moscow** to advance its own interpretations. Russian officials repeatedly cited the **"Anchorage understandings"** as the basis for their understanding of the American position — creating a fictional diplomatic reality in an empty documentary space.

According to **ISW** in its **June 23, 2026** assessment, Russian officials use the absence of public information about that Alaska summit to **falsely present Russia as willing to negotiate**. Lavrov himself let slip, according to **US News**, that the Anchorage summit may have been **"an American tactic to buy time to rearm the Kyiv regime."** This accusation, made on Tuesday — two days before his June 24 statements — reveals that **Moscow** reserves the right to reinterpret Anchorage as a betrayal if the G7 outcome proves unfavorable to its interests.

### Lavrov's Anchorage quote — decoding

Lavrov reported, according to the **US News** transcript, what **Putin** allegedly told **Trump** at the Anchorage summit: **"There are some nuances, but we take responsibility for them; I support your proposals. It was already a compromise. And now we are told: 'Listen, it still hasn't worked — let's offer another concession.'"** This formulation presents **Putin** as the one who made the concession and the Americans as those who keep coming back asking for more. It is a narrative construction aimed at positioning **Moscow** as the cooperative partner and **Washington** as the unstable and capricious interlocutor.

This narrative serves two functions. Internally in **Russia**: showing the Russian public that **Putin** is negotiating in good faith but that the **West** is rebuffing his efforts. Externally: sowing doubt in Western public opinion about American sincerity in negotiations. If enough people in Western capitals believe that **Russia** made concessions at Anchorage and that it is the **West** that torpedoed everything, pressure for **Ukraine** to accept a deal turns against **Kyiv**. This is high-level diplomatic manipulation.

*Putin saying "I support your proposals" with none of it publicly documented. And Lavrov citing that as a historic concession. In a courtroom, that would be called hearsay. In diplomacy, it is called a narrative constructed in a vacuum.*

## What Macron really said — and why it matters

### The French interpretation of Trump's position

Macron declared at the G7 that **Trump** had acknowledged during discussions that **Russia** **is not interested in peace** — a formulation the French president presented as a **"genuine change in approach"** by the **United States**. This statement, reported by **US News**, is significant for several reasons. First, it represents Macron as the interpreter of a shift in Trump's position — which gives him considerable diplomatic influence in reading American policy. Second, it explicitly places **Russia** in the position of the obstacle to peace — a reframing relative to the rhetorical equidistance **Trump** had sometimes maintained.

But how faithfully does Macron's interpretation reflect **Trump's** actual words? **Trump**, for his part, called on **Russia** to **"pursue peace"** with **Ukraine** — a more generic formulation that can be interpreted in multiple directions. He described his dialogue with **Zelensky** as **"very good"** — standard summit rhetoric without precise operational content. Macron may have amplified a more ambiguous Trumpian statement to see a conversion in it, or he may have made public what **Trump** said privately in closed-door meetings. In either case, Lavrov is right to want to know more.

### The Witkoff and Kushner visit to Moscow — the decisive test

To resolve the ambiguity about Trump's real position, Lavrov indicated he was awaiting information from **Trump's** representatives — **Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner** — during their announced visit to **Moscow**. This visit represents the decisive test of the inflection described by Macron. If Witkoff and Kushner arrive in **Moscow** with a message consistent with the Macronian reading — **Russia** is the obstacle to peace, its demands are unacceptable, the United States maintains support for Ukraine — the diplomatic dynamic changes. If, conversely, they arrive with more ambiguous formulations that leave room for Russian interpretations, **Moscow** will know that the "Trump conversion" is more cosmetic than substantive.

The stakes of this visit are therefore colossal. **Witkoff** — Trump's special envoy for the Middle East who got drawn into the Ukraine file — and **Kushner** — Trump's son-in-law with no formal diplomatic experience — are the interpreters of American policy in Moscow's eyes. Their credibility is limited. Their ability to maintain a discourse consistent with **Trump's** statements at the G7 is uncertain. Lavrov, with his decades of diplomatic experience, knows exactly how to read the signals these two envoys will send.

*Witkoff and Kushner in Moscow. Facing Lavrov. I cannot decide whether this is tragic or comic. Probably both. And Ukraine, throughout all this, waits to see whether the United States really holds the line that Macron described.*

## Russian demands remain unchanged despite diplomatic rhetoric

### Neutrality, non-nuclear, recognition of territories

While Lavrov was scrutinizing G7 reports, he also formulated, on **June 23, 2026**, with clinical precision, Russia's **war** objectives: **Ukraine's neutrality, non-nuclear status, elimination of allegedly discriminatory laws** against the Russian language and the Russian Orthodox Church, and recognition of illegal referendums in occupied territories. According to **ISW**, this list is identical to the demands of **2022**. Four years of **war**, and Lavrov repeats the same script.

This maintenance of maximum objectives despite four years of Ukrainian resistance and Western support is not irrational stubbornness — it is strategy. **Russia** maintains its maximum demands because, if ever a deal is struck, it wants to start from the highest possible point. Every concession it might accept would be presented as magnanimity, not retreat. By publicly maintaining its maximum demands, **Moscow** preserves its real negotiating margin while signaling firmness.

### The "Spirit of Anchorage" — the Russian reading of secret agreements

Russian officials regularly reference the **"Spirit of Anchorage"** — an expression designating their interpretation of a potential agreement that would lead to Ukrainian forces withdrawing from the still-controlled areas of the Donbas in exchange for halting Russian military operations elsewhere. According to **US News**, this interpretation represents the **Russian reading** of the Alaska summit — confirmed publicly by neither **Washington** nor **Kyiv**. **Kyiv** has systematically reaffirmed it will cede no territory to **Russia** without resistance.

This fundamental divergence — **Moscow** saying "Anchorage means **Ukraine** abandons the Donbas," **Kyiv** saying "we cede nothing" — illustrates the gulf separating the two belligerents' positions. A deal satisfying both is currently impossible: **Russia** demands territorial concessions that **Ukraine** refuses to make. Any intermediate agreement claiming to bridge this gulf would be either a **Russian victory** disguised as compromise, or an untenable promise from **Kyiv** under external pressure. Neither would be durable.

*The Russian "Spirit of Anchorage" means Ukraine abandons the Donbas. The Ukrainian "Spirit of Anchorage" means a summit that produced no public document. Both sides read the same vacuum and see in it what they want to see. That is what diplomacy in crisis looks like.*

## Lavrov's posture — ten thousand nuances for an immovable position

### The art of appearing flexible without moving an inch

**Sergei Lavrov** is the master of what I would call the rhetoric of mobile inflexibility. He employs an impressive palette of formulations that give the impression of openness — **"we are ready for dialogue,"** **"we are trying to understand,"** **"we maintain our availability"** — without modifying **Moscow's** substantive position one iota. This technique aims to saturate the diplomatic space with "goodwill" signals that Western interlocutors, tired and seeking reasons for optimism, can interpret as openings.

His statement of **June 24, 2026**, reported by **US News**, combines all these techniques: frustration expressed over **sanctions** (showing they have an effect), curiosity about the American position after Évian (showing the importance he places on it), reference to the Anchorage understandings (implicitly validating them as a foundation), and maintenance of the full list of Russian **war** objectives via the June 23 statement. It is a coded message that simultaneously tells its different audiences what it wants them to hear.

### Frustration over sanctions — an involuntary signal of effectiveness

Among Lavrov's statements of **June 24, 2026**, his expressed frustration about **American sanctions** is particularly revealing. He noted that the two nations had not managed to restore direct flights, nor to reach an agreement on the return of Russian diplomatic properties seized by the **United States**. These specific grievances — relatively minor irritants in the overall US-Russia relationship — are foregrounded precisely because they illustrate what Lavrov wants to highlight: even in areas where an agreement would be easy, the **United States** does not ease the pressure.

Lavrov's frustration is itself a sign that **sanctions** are working enough to create friction. A Russia genuinely indifferent to sanctions would not have its foreign minister publicly complaining about unrestored direct flights and seized diplomatic properties. These complaints are foam on the surface of an economic and diplomatic pressure that, cumulatively, is beginning to weigh.

*Lavrov complaining about unrestored direct flights. Russia sending 53 soldiers to their deaths at Kostiantynivka every day, and Lavrov talking about direct flights. These two realities coexist in Russian diplomacy. One is visible externally. The other happens in the shadows.*

## Trump and Ukraine — strategic ambiguity or sincere incomprehension?

### Trump facing the Ukraine file — a policy without a doctrine

The central problem in Russia's reading of American positions after the **G7 in Évian** is that Trump's Ukraine policy is not a coherent doctrine — it is an accumulation of reactions to events, personal impulses, and domestic political calculations. Trump has said contradictory things about Ukraine since returning to power: he evoked the "stupid war," expressed sympathy for Zelensky during their G7 meeting, called on Russia to make peace, and signed decrees that maintain the general framework of American support for Ukraine.

This incoherence is destabilizing for all actors in the conflict. For Ukraine: impossible to plan long-term if American support can change with presidential mood. For Russia: impossible to calibrate a diplomatic strategy on a constantly moving target. For European allies: obligation to maintain their own guarantees without being able to unconditionally count on Washington. This incoherence is not weakness — Trump can sometimes use it as a pressure lever. But it creates a structural uncertainty that all actors must integrate into their calculations.

### The importance of the G7 as a collective signal

In this context of American ambiguity, the **G7** plays a collective consolidation role. By bringing together under a single communiqué the American, British, European, Canadian, Japanese, and Italian positions, the G7 creates a framework that constrains American policy more than a bilateral statement would. Even if Trump is ambiguous bilaterally, it is harder to disassociate from a joint G7 text without a visible diplomatic cost.

G7 coordination on sanctions — with Canada and the United Kingdom reaching **600 sanctioned vessels** at the Évian summit — illustrates this dynamic. Trump may personally be more ambiguous about sanctions than his allies. But the G7's collective mechanics maintain an action framework that Russia must confront as an alliance, not as separable actors. Lavrov is right to scrutinize the G7 carefully: that is where real international policy is built, beyond individual declarations.

*The G7 is the structure that holds Trump within a collective framework. Without the G7, Trump would be free to improvise. With the G7, even his improvisations must accommodate a collective architecture. That is the real value of these summits — not the communiqués, but the institutional constraint they represent.*

## The question of American weapons in Europe for Ukraine

### A Lavrov line that says a great deal

In his **June 24, 2026** statements, Lavrov pointed to a specific element that deserves attention: the United States places no restrictions on weapons it provides to **European nations for Ukraine**. This remark, which might seem innocuous, is in reality an implicit demand: Lavrov is suggesting that genuine American de-escalation would include restrictions on these weapons deliveries. In other words, Moscow seeks to negotiate not only a halt to combat in Ukraine, but the end of Western military support for Kyiv.

This demand is consistent with the Istanbul protocols — which would prohibit Ukraine from receiving foreign weapons — but it goes even further: it aims to obtain an agreement that binds **donor** governments to cease their deliveries. It is an objective that goes far beyond a ceasefire — it is a demand for Western disengagement from Ukraine's defense. If Witkoff and Kushner arrive in Moscow with concessions in this area, that would be the most alarming possible signal for Kyiv and its European allies.

### The Ukrainian position on weapons deliveries

For **Zelensky**, weapons deliveries are not negotiable in ceasefire talks. They are the very condition that makes a ceasefire credible: without continued armament, Ukraine cannot defend itself if Russia resumes operations. The Ukrainian argument is simple: a ceasefire without weapons is an open invitation to the next offensive. The experience of **Minsk** confirms this — ceasefires without real guarantees served as pauses for Russia to reinforce its positions.

Ukraine's line is therefore firm: weapons deliveries are a bilateral matter between Ukraine and its partners, not a variable in a ceasefire agreement with Russia. Allowing Moscow to dictate the conditions of weapons deliveries through a diplomatic agreement would amount to recognizing Russia's right of veto over the foreign policy of sovereign countries that choose to support Ukraine. That is unacceptable.

*Lavrov wants weapons deliveries stopped through a peace agreement. That is not a peace demand. It is a demand for soft capitulation — obtaining through a signature what his army cannot obtain on the battlefield. I am not surprised. I am exhausted at not being surprised.*

## Russian frustration as a diplomatic signal

### When Lavrov complains, it means it is working

Beyond the goodwill rhetoric, Lavrov's statements of **June 24, 2026** betray a real frustration. The fact that he is trying to understand what Trump said at Évian, the fact that he recalls that the Anchorage understandings were not honored, the fact that he complains about direct flights and diplomatic properties — all of this indicates that Moscow is feeling the pressure. When Russian diplomacy is working in its favor, it does not need to express frustration — it advances its positions of strength.

Lavrov's current frustration is, paradoxically, good news for those who support Ukraine. It indicates that Western pressure — sanctions, military support, G7 unity — is producing effects significant enough that Moscow feels the need to comment on them publicly. An indifferent adversary does not express frustration. It acts. Lavrov talking about unrestored direct flights is Lavrov with no victory to announce.

### The two weeks that will decide

The announced visit of **Witkoff and Kushner to Moscow** in the days following the G7 in Évian represents an inflection point. If these envoys convey to Lavrov a message consistent with the Macronian interpretation — Russia is the obstacle, its demands are unacceptable, the United States maintains support for Ukraine — then Moscow's diplomatic operating space narrows further. If, conversely, Witkoff and Kushner arrive with ambiguous formulations or suggestions of Ukrainian concessions, Lavrov will know exactly how to exploit those signals.

The two weeks following the **G7 in Évian** could define the diplomatic trajectory of the conflict for the coming months. It is not excessive to state it that way. The current dynamic — Russia maintaining its maximum demands, Ukraine holding the front, the West maintaining pressure — is fragile in both directions. An American decision to push Ukraine toward concessions would change everything. An American decision to maintain firmness would also change everything, but in the other direction.

*Two weeks that could change everything. That is the paradox of this war: years of Ukrainian resistance can be affected by fifteen days of ambiguous diplomacy. And that is why G7 unity, despite its imperfections, remains the most reliable protection for Ukraine.*

## Russia's reading of the G7 — what Moscow hopes to find in the communiqués

### Searching for cracks in Western unity

Moscow reads every G7 communiqué with an eye trained to detect cracks in Western unity. A slightly softer formulation on sanctions. An ambiguous passage on the conditions for a ceasefire. An omission on security guarantees for Ukraine. Every ambiguity is a potential opening that Russian diplomacy can exploit to advance its positions. And the G7 — bringing together countries with partially divergent interests, leaders with different domestic constraints, relationships with Trump that vary — inevitably produces collective texts that cannot be perfectly precise on all subjects.

The question Lavrov is asking — **"What really happened at Évian?"** — is exactly the right question from Moscow's perspective. If Trump's statements at the G7 reflect a hardened position toward Russia, Moscow must adapt its diplomatic strategy. If they are a performance for the allies without substantive content, Moscow can maintain its course. The truth — which Lavrov is waiting for Witkoff and Kushner to provide — is somewhere in between.

### The trap of Russian "goodwill"

While Lavrov was seeking to understand Trump's position, Putin was maintaining his own rhetoric of **"willingness for peace"** — articulated on **June 23, 2026** on the basis of the Istanbul protocols. The system is well-oiled: Lavrov plays the role of the diplomat concerned with understanding, seeking dialogue, expressing measured frustration. Putin plays the role of the leader willing for peace but maintaining firm conditions. And together, they create an image of Moscow as a reasonable actor blocked by Ukrainian-Western intransigence.

This image is contradicted by ISW data — demands maintained since 2022, refusal of any reciprocal compromise, disinformation efforts, the ongoing strikes on Ukrainian civilians. But the image sometimes prevails over reality in the fast-moving news cycle. That is why it is indispensable to clearly name what Lavrov's and Putin's statements mean — not to pretend a false equidistance between positions that are not equivalent.

*Lavrov trying to understand. Putin "ready for peace." Two faces of the same posture constructed for the tired Western audience. And behind the cameras, the strikes continue, Kostiantynivka bleeds, and the Istanbul protocols remain on the table as an ultimatum disguised as an opening.*

## What Lavrov's statement reveals about Russia's real position

### A Russia that waits — and searches

Lavrov's statement of **June 24, 2026** reveals a Russia in a less assured position than it publicly projects. It is waiting to understand what the Americans have actually decided. It is frustrated by sanctions it calls insignificant but that annoy it enough to warrant official complaints. It maintains its maximum demands while actively seeking signals of American openness. This is not the posture of a country confident in its imminent victory — it is that of a country managing an increasingly difficult situation and seeking a diplomatic exit that preserves its territorial acquisitions without reciprocal concession.

This reading is consistent with military data: a Russian advance rate in free fall in 2026, massive casualties on the Kostiantynivka axis, an economic infrastructure under growing pressure. Putin needs a deal that allows him to claim some form of victory — but that does not force him to return territories or accept restrictions on his own forces. The Istanbul protocols meet this need. Ukrainian resistance and G7 unity prevent him from imposing it.

### Realism as the only response to manipulation

The appropriate response to Lavrov's statement is neither naive optimism nor paralyzing pessimism. It is documented realism: clearly identifying what Russia is asking for, what it is prepared to give, and what Ukraine and the West can accept without compromising European security. On that basis, the conclusion is clear: current conditions do not allow a deal that simultaneously satisfies Ukrainian minimum requirements and Russian maximum demands. The gap between the two is too large.

What can change this calculus: either significant military advances that alter the balance of forces, or an economic and diplomatic pressure intense enough to convince Putin that his maximum objectives are unachievable at an acceptable cost. Neither of these conditions is met as of **June 24, 2026**. The war continues. Lavrov searches. And the answer that Witkoff and Kushner bring to Moscow will be the next page of this conflict.

*Lavrov searches. Witkoff will respond. And Ukraine waits to see whether its allies hold the line Macron described or whether they suddenly hand it the burden of new concessions. That is geopolitical mechanics in all its brutality.*

## China's role in the Russian-American diplomacy

### Xi Jinping and Trump's summit in Beijing

**Donald Trump** met Chinese President **Xi Jinping** in **Beijing** in June 2026 for a deal aimed at reducing mutual tariffs, according to information published in the international press. This meeting fits into a dynamic where China simultaneously manages its relationship with the United States (commercial and strategic) and its no-limits partnership with Russia (strategic and economic). These two dimensions are difficult to reconcile: China is a major buyer of sanctioned Russian oil and a supplier of dual-use technologies for the Russian military — placing it in contradiction with its commercial relationships with G7 countries that sanction that same Russia.

The Trump-Xi meeting in June 2026 adds a further dimension to Lavrov's reading of the G7 in Évian. If Trump is normalizing his commercial relationship with China — the main route for circumventing Russian sanctions — this potentially signals that pressure on Beijing to respect sanctions will not be intensified. This signal is favorable to Moscow: if China can continue importing Russian oil and supplying dual-use technologies without serious American sanctions, then Russia's bypass architecture remains functional.

### The Moscow-Beijing-Washington triangulation

The geopolitics of this conflict involve a complex triangulation between **Moscow, Beijing, and Washington**. Russia needs China as an indispensable economic partner to survive the sanctions. China needs Russia as a strategic buffer against NATO and as a raw materials supplier. The United States wants simultaneously to contain China and manage the Ukraine conflict — two objectives that can enter into tension. If Washington is too severe with Beijing over Russian sanctions, China may accelerate its rapprochement with Moscow. If Washington is too lax, Russia's shadow fleet continues operating with Beijing's implicit complicity.

This triangulation partly explains the ambiguities of Trump's policy. Trump is negotiating a commercial deal with Xi while officially maintaining sanctions against Russia. He seeks to separate the two files — trade with China, pressure on Russia — even though on the ground these two files are linked by the supply chain that Canada's **June 12, 2026** sanctions partially targeted by designating Chinese companies.

*Trump negotiating tariffs with Xi while Chinese companies supply Russia with the components of its missiles. Strategic consistency is not this administration's strong suit. But sometimes, inconsistency can be exploited as a form of pressure — provided one knows what one is doing. Is that the case here? I am not certain.*

## What Lavrov did not say — revealing silences

### Not a word about possible Russian concessions

In all of Lavrov's statements from **June 23 and 24, 2026** documented by **ISW** and **US News**, one searches in vain for a concrete Russian concession. No proposal for withdrawal from certain territories. No acceptance of a limitation on Russian forces as a reciprocal for the limitations demanded of Ukraine. No opening on security guarantees for Kyiv. No discussion of illegal referendums that might be reconsidered. Nothing.

The list of Russian demands is long and precise. The list of Russian concessions is empty. That is the fundamental asymmetry every serious negotiator must name. A peace agreement is a document in which both parties make mutual concessions. What Russia is currently proposing — via the Istanbul protocols and Lavrov's statements — is a document in which Ukraine makes all the concessions and Russia makes none. This is not a negotiating baseline. It is a list of demands.

### The next step — and why the West cannot afford to miss it

The next step is not mysterious. It is the Witkoff and Kushner visit to Moscow, which will reveal whether American policy after the G7 in Évian is consistent with the Macronian interpretation or more accommodating toward Russian demands. It is the **UN Security Council** vote on a ceasefire resolution, which will test whether Russia uses its veto to block an agreement or supports it on its own terms. It is the continuation of Western support for Ukraine — military, financial, diplomatic — which determines the conditions under which any eventual agreement could be negotiated.

The West cannot afford to miss this moment. Not because Ukraine is an abstract symbol, but because what is unfolding in Ukraine determines Europe's security order for the coming decades. If Putin obtains through diplomacy what his army can no longer obtain on the ground, every regional actor in Europe — from the Baltics to Poland, from Finland to Romania — will have to recalculate its own security in a context where aggression pays if sustained long enough.

*Not a single Russian concession in Lavrov's and Putin's statements. Not one. And some in the West still talk about "finding common ground." With what? On what basis? An agreement requires two parties ready to give something. Here, there is only one.*

## Canada's position in this diplomatic picture

### Ottawa as a consistent actor in the alliance

In the post-G7 Évian diplomatic confusion, **Mark Carney's** Canada stands out through a consistency that other partners do not always have. The **162 new sanctions** of June 12, 2026, announced during a direct meeting with Zelensky, send an unambiguous message: Ottawa does not believe in the **"Spirit of Anchorage"** as the basis for an acceptable agreement. Canada supports Ukraine militarily, financially, and diplomatically — and its sanctions are the economic arm of this policy.

This Canadian consistency matters all the more because it can partially compensate for American ambiguities. When Washington sends mixed signals, the clarity of Ottawa, London, Paris, and Berlin becomes more precious. G7 unity is a collective good that every actor contributes to maintaining — and that every defection weakens. Canada, under Carney, chooses to contribute rather than benefit from ambiguities.

### What Lavrov reads in Canadian support

Lavrov reads Canadian actions with precision. The 162 new designations of June 12 — targeting the shadow fleet, maritime insurers, Chinese dual-use technology companies, Russian exchanges — tell him that the G7 alliance maintains its cohesion on the economic file even if the political file produces ambiguities. This signal matters: sanctions are not easing, they are intensifying. And as long as this signal remains consistent, Moscow's operating space for obtaining diplomatic concessions through attrition is limited.

What Lavrov hopes for — and what Russian strategy seeks to provoke — is exactly the opposite: that diplomatic fatigue produces divergences in the alliance, that some members begin to ease their sanctions to regain access to the Russian market, that others pressure Kyiv to accept Russian terms in exchange for a "peace deal." This crack in the alliance would be Moscow's real diplomatic victory. That is precisely what Canada's 162 June 12 designations prevent, at their level.

*Carney in Évian, with Zelensky, announcing 162 new sanctions. And Lavrov scrutinizing the reports to find whether Trump really changed. These two realities say the same thing: the alliance holds, but American ambiguity is a crack Moscow is trying to widen.*

## Provisional conclusion: diplomacy in suspension

### Everything awaits Witkoff and Kushner

As of **June 24, 2026**, the diplomacy around the Ukraine conflict is in suspension. Lavrov is waiting to understand what Trump has truly decided. Ukraine is waiting to see whether the United States maintains the firmness described by Macron. Europe awaits the next American decision. And Putin maintains his maximum demands, continues his strikes on Ukrainian cities, and publicly presents his **"willingness for peace"** as if the two things were not contradictory.

In this suspension, the role of the G7 — and of each member who maintains its consistency — is to not let ambiguity take hold. To clearly name that the Istanbul protocols are a capitulation demand. To maintain sanctions. To support Ukraine militarily. And to wait for the Witkoff and Kushner visit to Moscow to finally reveal whether Évian's statements were an inflection or a performance.

*Diplomacy in suspension. Waiting for Witkoff. Waiting for Kushner. Waiting for Trump. Ukraine, meanwhile, does not wait — it holds the front. And perhaps that is the most important diplomatic statement: Ukrainian soldiers holding while diplomats figure out what to decide.*

## Conclusion: Lavrov searches, Ukraine resists

### What June 24, 2026 says about the state of the world

Lavrov's statement of **June 24, 2026** is, ultimately, an image of the state of the world at this moment in the war. A Russia maintaining its maximum demands, bleeding on the ground at **53 casualties per day** at Kostiantynivka, actively searching for an American signal it could exploit diplomatically. A Ukraine that holds, counter-attacks south of Kostiantynivka, whose UN representative warns that its patience is not infinite. A G7 that produced encouraging statements at Évian but whose cohesion over the coming weeks remains to be confirmed.

In this picture, the West's responsibility is clear: maintain pressure, support Ukraine, refuse formulations that would legitimize the Istanbul protocols, and demand from its own representatives — including Witkoff and Kushner — consistency with the G7's Évian positions. That is the minimum the situation demands. And that is exactly what Lavrov hopes not to see.

*Lavrov looks for cracks. Carney fills one with 162 sanctions. Macron patches another with his public interpretation of Trump. And Zelensky, for his part, has held the line for 1,582 days. The contrast is total — and revealing of who has truly chosen their side in this conflict.*

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

## Sources

### Primary sources

- [US News & World Report — Russia wants to know if Trump has shifted his stance on Ukraine after G7, Lavrov says — June 24, 2026](https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2026-06-24/russia-wants-to-know-if-trump-has-shifted-his-stance-on-ukraine-war-after-g7-lavrov-says)

- [ISW — Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 23, 2026 (Lavrov statements, Anchorage understandings, Russian war objectives)](https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-23-2026)

- [The Guardian — "Our patience is not endless" — Kyiv signals peace offer may expire — June 23, 2026](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/jun/23/ukraine-war-briefing-our-patience-is-not-endless-kyiv-signals-peace-offer-may-expire)

### Secondary sources

- [Euromaidanpress — Canada hits Russia with new sanctions at G7 — June 16, 2026](https://euromaidanpress.com/2026/06/16/canada-hits-russia-with-new-sanctions-at-g7-a-day-after-lavra-strike/)

- [ISW — Fact sheet on the 2022 Istanbul protocols — February 24, 2025](https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/fact-sheet-istanbul-protocol-draft-document-of-april-15-2022/)

- [RBC-Ukraine — ISW reveals why Russia keeps dragging out peace negotiations — May 30, 2025](https://newsukraine.rbc.ua/news/isw-reveals-why-russia-keeps-dragging-out-1748589495.html)

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Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/analyse-lavrov-au-g7-la-russie-cherche-ce-que-trump-lui-a-vraiment-promis