# ANALYSIS: Latvia alerts — drones and missiles, the hybrid war has already begun

> Latvia is not a country that cries wolf. It is a NATO and European Union member state, with a civil intelligence service — the SAB (Constitution Protection Bureau) — and a military service that have developed, since reintegration into the Western sphere, recognized expertise in analyzing the Russian threat. When Riga transmits to its allies an assessment that Russia is preparin

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Analysis
- Published: 2026-06-28
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/analyse-la-lettonie-alerte-drones-et-missiles-la-guerre-hybride-a-deja-commence

## Introduction: When Riga says "watch out," the Alliance must listen

### An alert that deserves to be taken seriously

**Latvia** is not a country that cries wolf. It is a **NATO** and **European Union** member state, with a civil intelligence service — the **SAB** (Constitution Protection Bureau) — and a military service that have developed, since reintegration into the Western sphere, recognized expertise in analyzing the Russian threat. When **Riga** transmits to its allies an assessment that **Russia** is preparing hybrid attacks involving drones and missiles against NATO's Eastern Flank, as reported by **Fox News** on **June 22, 2026**, this is not routine communication. It is an alert.

This alert arrives in a context of multiplying signals of concern. **Su-24M** bombers and **Su-30SM2** fighters from **Kaliningrad** are rehearsing strike operations toward the **Baltic**, according to **Army Recognition** of **June 21, 2026**. Western sources are pointing to a possible Russian provocation in the **Baltic states** or in **Poland**, according to **The Guardian** of **June 26, 2026**. And NATO officials admit fearing they can no longer count on American commitment, according to **The Guardian** of **June 27**. Each signal, taken in isolation, is worrying. Together, they compose a picture that decision-makers can no longer ignore.

### Hybrid warfare: not a novelty, but an acceleration

**Russian hybrid warfare** did not begin with the invasion of **Ukraine** in **2022**. It began, at least in its modern form, with the cyberattack against **Estonia** in **2007**, with the annexation of **Crimea** in **2014**, with the intervention in **Syria**, with sabotage operations against industrial installations in Western Europe. What the Latvian alert signals is an intensification and a focusing: **Russia** is preparing hybrid operations specifically targeted at the Alliance's Eastern Flank, with identified military vectors — drones and missiles.

The analysis that follows seeks to understand why **Latvia** is sounding the alarm now, what a hybrid drone-and-missile attack actually means in concrete terms, and what **NATO** can and must do to respond to this threat before it materializes.

*There is something strange about the fact that the countries closest to the Russian threat are systematically the best informed and the least heeded by their major Western allies. Latvia is a few hundred kilometers from the Russian border. We are thousands away. Geography makes a difference in the perception of danger.*

## Anatomy of the Russian hybrid threat in the Baltics

### Drones: a low-cost weapon of terror

Drones have become the weapon of choice in Russia's strategy of harassment of civilian populations and infrastructure destruction. In **Ukraine**, hundreds of Iranian **Shahed-136** drones, renamed **"Geran-2"** by the Russians, have been launched at cities, power plants, water systems, and hospitals. The unit cost of such a drone is approximately **$20,000 to $50,000** — ridiculously low compared to the cost of the defenses required to intercept it.

Deployed against the Baltic states, these same drones or their equivalents produced in **Russia**, **Iran**, or **North Korea** could target critical infrastructure — electrical grids, gas terminals, port facilities, data centers — with potentially considerable economic and psychological impact. **Latvia**, **Lithuania**, and **Estonia** have modern economies highly dependent on their digital infrastructure. A prolonged blackout in any of these capitals would immediately trigger a political crisis.

### Precision missiles: the high-intensity threat

Beyond drones, the threat of precision missiles from **Kaliningrad** is of a different nature entirely. The **Iskander-M** has accuracy in the single-digit meter range and can carry devastating conventional warheads or, in theory, tactical nuclear ones. An **Iskander** strike on a military headquarters, an air base, or a command center in the Baltic states would be an open act of war, not a hybrid operation. But a strike on an ambiguous target — a dual-use civilian-military installation, for example — would reintroduce doubt about attribution and the appropriate response.

It is in this space of ambiguity that Russian strategy seeks to operate. Strike hard enough to cause fear. Strike ambiguously enough to paralyze the Allied response. Use the **14 to 16 hours** of political deliberation within **NATO** to consolidate a gain before the response comes. This scenario is not hypothetical: it is what Russia did, on a different scale, in the first hours of the Ukrainian invasion in **2022**.

*The real innovation of Russian hybrid warfare is the use of ambiguity as a weapon. Not accidental ambiguity, but ambiguity deliberately constructed to paralyze the adversary's response. It is strategically brilliant, and it is morally odious. Because ambiguity costs human lives in the targeted countries.*

## Why now: the timing of the Latvian alert

### Growing pressure on the Russian army in Ukraine

The timing of the Latvian alert is probably not a coincidence. In **June 2026**, the Russian army in **Ukraine** is operating under growing difficulty. Russia's budget deficit tops **$80 billion**, according to **United24 Media** of **June 23, 2026**. War spending is increasing by **4 to 5 additional trillion rubles** in **2026**, according to **Bloomberg** via **Ground News** of **June 23**. The Russian economy is showing signs of **"structural exhaustion,"** according to the Kiel Institute cited by the **Foreign Affairs Forum** of **June 23**.

A regime under military and economic pressure often seeks to compensate with successes elsewhere. A provocation in the Baltics — ambitious enough to be presented as a victory to the Russian population, limited enough to avoid a full **NATO** military response — could seem a tempting option for **Putin**. Latvian intelligence services have very likely detected planning signals in that direction.

### The diplomatic calendar as a window of opportunity

The **NATO** summit in **Ankara** on **July 7 and 8, 2026** also represents a paradoxical window of opportunity for **Russia**. On one hand, the summit will reinforce Allied cohesion and potentially harden defense commitments. On the other, in the days preceding the summit, the attention of leaders and media is concentrated on diplomatic preparations, creating a window during which a Russian action could sow maximum confusion.

An incident in the Baltics between now and **July 7** would force the summit agenda, divide the Alliance on the response to give, and place leaders in the uncomfortable position of simultaneously managing a real crisis and negotiating long-term objectives. That is exactly the type of disruption Russian strategy seeks to provoke.

*I do not claim to know what Putin decides in his Kremlin office. But if I were a Russian strategist seeking to destabilize the Alliance at the most inopportune moment, I would choose the days before the Ankara summit. Sometimes, strategic logic speaks for itself.*

## The Baltic and Baltic response: between resilience and calls for help

### What the Baltic states are already doing

Faced with the Russian hybrid threat, the Baltic states have not waited for their allies' help to act. **Estonia** has developed the concept of **"total defense society"** — an approach that involves all civil, governmental, and military institutions in defense preparation. **Lithuania** reintroduced mandatory military service in **2015** and continues to expand it. **Latvia** is massively investing in its national guard and cyber defense capabilities.

These three countries have also developed civil resilience plans specifically designed to withstand hybrid attacks: energy storage, evacuation plans, alternative communication networks, government continuity procedures in the event of a cyberattack. This level of civil preparedness has no equivalent in most Western European countries, which have never seriously had to contemplate their own territory as a combat zone.

### What they need from their allies

Despite their impressive efforts, the Baltic states know they cannot face a large-scale Russian hybrid attack alone. They need the physical presence of allies — not the current symbolic battle groups, but full brigades with their support systems — for deterrence to be credible. They need missile defense systems deployed on their soil, capable of intercepting both drones and **Kaliningrad**'s missiles. And they need clear assurances about the Alliance's response in the event of an ambiguous hybrid incident.

The alert launched by **Latvia** is also an implicit request for attention. By making their threat assessment public, the Latvians place their allies in a position where not acting becomes a form of deliberate — and documented — choice. The **European Parliament** briefing of **June 26, 2026** on the **Ankara** summit explicitly includes the hybrid threat on the Eastern Flank among priority topics. The message has been received, at least formally.

*There is a deep moral asymmetry in the fact that countries of two million inhabitants like Estonia or Latvia spend 3 to 4% of their GDP on defense, while countries of 60 or 80 million in Western Europe struggle to reach 2%. This asymmetry is not only unfair. It is dangerous for everyone.*

## The drone defense challenge: a technological war to win

### Intercepting hundreds of drones simultaneously

The **drone war** in **Ukraine** has revealed a major technical challenge: traditional missile defense systems, designed to intercept high-speed ballistic missiles, are not optimal for shooting down hundreds of slow and cheap drones. A **Patriot** firing a **$3 million** round to shoot down a **$20,000** drone is not a viable equation at scale.

**Ukraine** has developed alternative methods — anti-aircraft guns, low-power lasers, electronic jamming systems, interceptor drones — to address this challenge. These experiences have inestimable value for **NATO**'s defensive planning. The Baltic states, in cooperation with allies, are developing and deploying counter-drone systems. But as of **June 2026**, this capability remains insufficient to handle a saturation attack.

### Electronic warfare as the first line of defense

Against drones, **electronic warfare** is often the first and most effective response. Jamming the **GPS** signals and communications of drones can blind them or divert them from their targets. The **Baltic states**, and **Estonia** in particular with its cybersecurity expertise, have developed capabilities in this domain. But **Russia** is simultaneously developing inertial guidance systems for its drones, making GPS jamming less effective.

This is a permanent technological race, and one the West can win if investments are sufficient and coordinated. The tens of billions in new defense contracts that **Rutte** promises for the **Ankara** summit must include a significant share dedicated to counter-drone systems and electronic warfare. This is no longer a niche capability: it is a survival capability for the Baltic states.

*The drone war has taught us something fundamental: asymmetric threats are no longer the preserve of non-state actors. A great power like Russia uses low-cost drones to exhaust its adversaries' defenses. It is cynical, it is effective, and it demands a technological response commensurate with the challenge.*

## Electronic warfare and jamming: a double-edged weapon

### GPS jamming as a hybrid warfare instrument

**Russia** has developed an **electronic warfare** capability recognized as one of the most sophisticated in the world. From **Kaliningrad**, systems like the **Murmansk-BN** can jam communications across hundreds of kilometers, disrupting the navigation systems of aircraft, guided missiles, and drones. This capability has been used in **Ukraine** to temporarily neutralize Western **GPS**-guided weapons systems. It can be deployed against the Baltic states with equal effectiveness.

GPS jamming affects not only military systems but also critical civilian infrastructure: commercial aviation, maritime navigation, electrical grid synchronization systems. Jamming incidents have been documented in **Finland**, **Estonia**, and Scandinavian countries in recent years — attributed to Russian operations from **Kaliningrad** or from bases in **Russia**. These incidents constitute the least visible but potentially most disruptive form of Russian hybrid warfare.

### Counter-electronic warfare: an urgent investment

The response to the Russian electronic warfare threat requires developing and deploying **counter-electronic warfare** capabilities — systems capable of locating jamming emitters and neutralizing them, hardening critical systems against jamming through alternative navigation means, and maintaining communications in a contested electromagnetic environment. These capabilities are complex, costly, and require specialized expertise that not all allies possess equally.

The **Alliance** has capabilities in this domain — the **United States**, the **United Kingdom**, and certain European allies have significant capacities — but they are not systematically shared or integrated into a common doctrine for Eastern Flank defense. A targeted investment in counter-electronic warfare capabilities for the Baltic states, with active sharing of Allied know-how, should be among the concrete commitments of Ankara.

*Electronic warfare is the most invisible and perhaps the most dangerous form of hybrid warfare. You do not see it, you do not hear it, it does not explode. It silently paralyzes the systems on which modern societies depend. Investing in counter-electronic warfare is not glamorous. It is vital.*

## Belarus: the eastern flank of the Eastern Flank

### Lukashenko, satellite and threat multiplier

The Russian threat against the Baltic states does not come only from **Kaliningrad**. It also comes from **Belarus**, whose dictator **Alexander Lukashenko** has definitively anchored his country to **Russia** since crushing the protests of **2020**. Belarusian territory served as a staging ground for the Ukrainian invasion of **2022** — Russian columns attempted to march on **Kyiv** from **Belarus**. That same territory can serve as a launching point for military pressure against **Lithuania** or **Poland**.

The strategic depth that **Belarus** provides **Russia** is considerable. It reduces the warning time available to **NATO** in the event of an attack, multiplies the possible directions of attack, and allows **Russia** to threaten simultaneously the **Suwalki Corridor** from the north and **Poland** from the east. The forced reintegration of **Belarus** into the Russian orbit is one of the most significant strategic gains **Putin** has achieved since **2020**, and one of the most concerning factors for the security of the Alliance's Eastern Flank.

### Belarusian resistance: a factor not to be overlooked

**Belarus** is not a uniformly pro-Russian population. The massive protests of **2020** showed that a large portion of Belarusian society aspired to democracy and rapprochement with **Europe**. Hundreds of thousands of Belarusians have fled abroad since the crackdown. Resistance networks continue to operate despite repression. This internal resistance is a potential strategic asset for the **West** — even if its capacity to influence **Lukashenko**'s military decisions is, in the short term, very limited.

Solidarity with Belarusian civil society is a dimension often forgotten in European security policy. Supporting Belarusian exiles, maintaining information channels toward the Belarusian population, refusing to normalize the **Lukashenko** regime: these are long-term measures that keep alive a possibility of political change in **Minsk** — change that, if it occurred, would radically alter the strategic geography of the Russian threat against the Baltics.

*Belarus is an actor often forgotten in the discussion about the Russian threat to the Baltics. But Lukashenko has transformed his country into Putin's rear base. As long as Minsk is an extension of Moscow, NATO's Eastern Flank is threatened from two sides. That is not the same as being threatened from one. Geography matters.*

## Prisoner exchanges and the human dimension of the conflict

### 160 Ukrainians freed: every exchange counts

While strategists debate billions of dollars and weapons systems, women and men continue to emerge from Russian captivity thanks to prisoner exchanges. The **76th exchange**, carried out on **June 26, 2026**, enabled the return of **160 Ukrainian prisoners of war**, according to the **Kyiv Independent**. In **2026**, **1,596 Ukrainians** have returned home, and more than **9,500 since 2022**, thanks notably to the mediation of the **United Arab Emirates**.

These figures deserve to be recalled in an article about the Baltic threat. Because they say something essential: the hybrid warfare that **Russia** is preparing against the Baltics would, if it materialized, be a war with prisoners, civilians taken hostage, people tortured and humiliated. This is not a geopolitical abstraction. It is what happens to human beings when strategic algorithms decide their fate. Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania know this. That is why they are sounding the alarm.

### The diplomacy of Ukrainian resistance

**Ukraine**'s capacity to maintain regular prisoner exchanges, to negotiate with international mediation, to sustain an active diplomatic presence despite a total war on its territory is remarkable. It is the sign of a functioning state, with clear human priorities, that refuses to leave its soldiers and civilian prisoners in Russian jails without fighting for them by every available means.

This Ukrainian institutional resilience is one more reason to believe that defending **Ukraine** is worth the political and military investment the **West** devotes to it. A country capable of maintaining democratic institutions, prisoner exchanges, and active diplomacy in the midst of total war deserves to be defended not only out of strategic interest but also out of respect for its values. And defending the Baltic states, facing the same Russian threat, merits the same commitment.

*Each Ukrainian prisoner who comes home is a modest and immense victory at the same time. Those 160 men and women freed on June 26, 2026 have families, homes, lives to rebuild. War is made up of these individual stories that strategic statistics never tell. They deserve to be recalled.*

## Conclusion: The Latvian alert — an opportunity not to be squandered

### Turning the alert into collective action

The alert launched by **Latvia** in June **2026** is an opportunity. Not an opportunity to panic, but an opportunity to finally take the measures that should have been taken years ago. The **Ankara** summit can be the moment when **NATO** shifts from symbolic defensive posture to real defensive posture: permanent brigades in the Baltics, deployed missile defense systems, rapid hybrid incident attribution protocols, clear and pre-approved rules of engagement.

**The hybrid war has already begun**. The sabotaged cables in the **Baltic**, the repeated cyberattacks, the drones violating European airspaces, the disinformation operations — all of this constitutes an ongoing war. The difference between the current situation and a dramatic escalation is the robustness of the Allied response. The clearer and more credible this response, the less tempting escalation will be for Moscow.

### What Latvia is really telling us

The Latvian alert says something deeper than just the immediate military threat. It says that countries that are supposed to be part of a collective defense alliance still feel insufficiently protected, four years after a war broke out on their doorstep. It says that the solidarity mechanics of **NATO** do not yet function automatically enough to effectively deter **Russia**.

That is Latvia's real message. Not just "watch out for the drones." But "are we truly in the same Alliance, or are you watching from a distance hoping it happens to us rather than to you?" The answer to that question will be given at **Ankara** — and it will be judged by Latvians, Estonians, and Lithuanians by actions, not words.

*The Latvian alert is a strategic gift. It gives us time to prepare, to reinforce defenses, to consolidate Allied cohesion before the threat materializes. This time is precious. Let us not waste it in budget debates that mask an absence of political will. Let us act while we still have the freedom to choose.*

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

## Sources

### Primary sources

- [Fox News: Intelligence warns of Russian hybrid attacks on NATO's Eastern Flank — June 22, 2026](https://www.foxnews.com/world/russia-preparing-hybrid-attacks-natos-eastern-flank-intelligence-warns)

- [Army Recognition: Russia rehearses Baltic strike operations from Kaliningrad — June 21, 2026](https://www.armyrecognition.com/news/aerospace-news/2026/russia-rehearses-baltic-strike-operations-from-kaliningrad-with-su-24m-bombers-and-su-30sm2-fighters)

- [The Guardian: Russia preparing a possible provocation in the Baltic states — June 26, 2026](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/jun/26/russia-provocation-baltic-states-poland)

- [The Guardian: NATO leaders fear they can no longer count on the United States — June 27, 2026](https://www.theguardian.com/world/ng-interactive/2026/jun/27/nato-leaders-fear-they-can-no-longer-rely-on-us-help-if-russia-attacks-trump-eastern-europe)

### Secondary sources

- [United24 Media: Russia's budget deficit tops $80 billion — June 23, 2026](https://united24media.com/world/russias-budget-deficit-tops-80-billion-despite-kremlin-stability-claims-20083)

- [European Parliament EPRS: Briefing on the NATO Ankara Summit — June 26, 2026](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2026/789355/EPRS_BRI(2026)789355_EN.pdf)

- [Swedish Government: Gdansk Declaration — June 25, 2026](https://regeringen.se/rattsliga-dokument/sveriges-internationella-overenskommelser/2026/06/joint-declaration-from-leaders-meeting-in-Gdansk/)

- [Ground News/Bloomberg: Russia to increase war spending by 4-5 trillion rubles — June 23, 2026](https://ground.news/article/bloomberg-russia-to-increase-war-spending-by-an-additional-45-trillion-rubles-in-2026)

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Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/analyse-la-lettonie-alerte-drones-et-missiles-la-guerre-hybride-a-deja-commence