# ANALYSIS: The Refinery War: How Ukraine Is Turning Russian Oil Into an Achilles' Heel

> On June 25, 2026, Ukrainian drones traveled more than 1,300 kilometers to strike the Bashneft refineries in Ufa, in the Bashkortostan region, hitting two of the three plants at one of Russia's largest petrochemical hubs. This was not a prestige raid. It was the most spectacular expression of a deliberate, patient, and coherent Ukrainian strategy: targeting Russia's oil and logi

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Analysis
- Published: 2026-06-28
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/analyse-la-guerre-des-raffineries-comment-l-ukraine-transforme-le-petrole-russe

## Introduction: striking where it truly hurts

### A precision strategy aimed at Russia's industrial heartland

On **June 25, 2026**, Ukrainian drones traveled more than **1,300 kilometers** to strike the **Bashneft** refineries in **Ufa**, in the **Bashkortostan** region, hitting two of the three plants at one of Russia's largest petrochemical hubs. This was not a prestige raid. It was the most spectacular expression of a deliberate, patient, and coherent Ukrainian strategy: targeting Russia's oil and logistics infrastructure — the real fuel that powers **Vladimir Putin**'s war machine.

The same week, the main refinery in Moscow's **Kapotnya** district was struck for the second time in seven days. Industry experts quickly confirmed that the facility would likely not return to normal operations before **2027**. **Russia** is now considering **importing fuel by sea** to compensate. A hydrocarbon-exporting country forced to import gasoline for its own population and armed forces: that is the image Ukraine's strategy is working to project to the world.

### Zelensky and the 40-day operation: doctrine in action

On **June 26, 2026**, **Volodymyr Zelensky** announced a **40-day pressure operation** targeting Russian military logistics and infrastructure, with repeated strikes on **Moscow** and **Crimea**. This was not a tactical improvisation: it was the formalization of a doctrine refined over several months — the doctrine of **capability denial**, stripping the Russian army of the resources it needs to sustain its combat tempo.

This approach is both militarily rational and politically powerful. Militarily, it forces **Russia** to devote considerable resources to defending its rear areas, repairing damaged infrastructure, and reorganizing supply chains. Politically, it demonstrates to the Russian population and to the world that this war is not exclusively a Ukrainian reality: it is striking the economic and industrial heart of **Russia** itself.

*What Zelensky is doing with the refineries is applying a simple economic principle to warfare: if you want to weaken your adversary, hit his revenues and his logistics, not just his front-line forces. Putin built his empire on oil and gas. Ukraine is turning that dependency back at him like a weapon. It is elegant in its brutality.*

## Ufa, Kapotnya, Moscow: the geography of the strikes

### Ufa, 1,300 kilometers from the front: the technical feat

The strike on the **Ufa** refineries represents a qualitative leap in **Ukraine**'s deep-strike capabilities. **Ufa** is the capital of **Bashkortostan**, a region deep inside **Russia**, far from any front line, which Russian military planners had until now considered completely secure. Reaching that target at more than **1,300 kilometers** from Ukrainian territory, with drones precise enough to hit specific installations within an industrial complex, reveals Ukrainian capabilities that Moscow had clearly underestimated.

The **Bashneft** refineries in **Ufa** processed a significant share of Russian oil destined for the domestic market and for export. The two plants hit represent a refining capacity that **Russia** will not easily replace in the short term. The geography of this strike sends a message to Russian oil companies and to their remaining foreign partners: no installation is now beyond reach.

### Kapotnya: striking Moscow twice in one week

The **Kapotnya** refinery, in the southeastern district of **Moscow**, was one of the last major refineries still operating to directly supply the Russian capital. Putting it out of service for at least a year creates a real logistical problem for **Russia**: where does the gasoline for **Moscow**'s vehicles come from? Where does the jet fuel for the region's airports come from? These questions, seemingly prosaic, carry deep economic and political implications in a capital whose population is not fighting the war, but whose passive support remains necessary to **Putin**.

Striking **Moscow** — even its industrial outskirts — is also an act of strategic communication. It shatters the sense of invulnerability the Kremlin has carefully cultivated since the war began. The Moscow population, warm in its apartments while soldiers die thousands of kilometers away, is beginning to see, smell, and feel the consequences of the war. That is uncomfortable for the Kremlin. Very uncomfortable.

*I take no pleasure in industrial destruction for its own sake. But I refuse the hypocrisy of a position that would condemn Ukrainian strikes on Russian refineries without condemning with equal force the Russian strikes on Ukrainian cities that happen every single day. Ukraine hits military-industrial infrastructure. Russia hits maternity wards and markets. The moral difference is absolute.*

## The Russian oil economy: a giant with feet of clay

### Russia's structural dependence on hydrocarbons

**Russia** derives between **40 and 50%** of its budget revenues from the extraction and export of hydrocarbons. This dependence is both its strength — it has enabled Moscow to finance a costly war despite sanctions — and its fundamental weakness. When oil prices fall or refining facilities are damaged, the consequences for the Russian budget are immediate and severe.

Russia's budget deficit already exceeded **80 billion dollars** by June 2026, according to data published by **United24 Media**. Military spending was set to increase by an additional **4 to 5 trillion rubles** in 2026. Meanwhile, Ukrainian strikes on refineries are reducing export capacity, compressing tax revenues at the precise moment Moscow needs its petrodollars most. This is a financial vise that **Ukraine** is deliberately tightening.

### The global oil market and the effects of the strikes

International oil markets have watched the strikes on Russian refineries with heightened attention. **Russia** remains one of the world's largest oil producers, and any disruption to its refining capacity has implications for global markets. However, the effect on world prices has so far been more psychological than real, partly because **Russia** exports primarily crude rather than refined products.

But the domestic effect is very real. Russia is, for the first time, considering **importing gasoline by sea** to compensate for lost capacity. This decision, if confirmed, will be a major symbolic turning point: a country that boasted of its energy self-sufficiency now dependent on imports for its domestic market. Russian energy companies, the regions, the transport sector — all are absorbing the consequences of this new reality.

*The image of Russia importing gasoline is the most telling symbol of what Ukrainian strikes are accomplishing. Putin built his legitimacy on Russia's energy power. Ukraine is demonstrating that this power has cracks — and that those cracks are exploitable. That is strategy in the noblest sense of the word.*

## Ukraine's deep-strike doctrine: evolution and logic

### From reactive defense to strategic offense

Ukraine's capacity to strike deep into Russian territory has evolved spectacularly since the start of the war. In the early months, **Ukraine** was essentially in a defensive posture, trying to contain the Russian advance. Progressively, with Western assistance and the development of domestic capabilities, Kyiv acquired the means for an **asymmetric strategic offensive**: unable to compete with Russia head-on in terms of manpower and heavy equipment, Ukraine bet on precision, technological ingenuity, and deep-strike capability.

Ukrainian drones are the emblem of this doctrine. Manufactured domestically in growing quantities, at a unit cost infinitely lower than Russian counter-drone defense systems, they allow **Ukraine** to reach targets at distances and with a precision that Western analysts would not have credited it with two years ago. The strike on **Ufa** at over **1,300 kilometers** is not an isolated achievement: it fits into a continuous progression of Ukrainian technical capabilities.

### The 40-day operation: method and ambitions

**Zelensky**'s **40-day pressure operation** targets specifically Russian military logistics and infrastructure. Refineries are a priority target, but not the only one. Military fuel depots, command centers, railway junctions, logistics bridges, **Crimea**'s port terminals — everything that allows the Russian army to be resupplied, equipped, and reinforced is a legitimate target under this doctrine.

The strategic objective of this operation is twofold: first, to degrade Russian operational capabilities at the front by disrupting their logistics; second, to force **Russia** to disperse its air defense systems — currently concentrated on protecting major cities — in an attempt to cover an immense territory of potential targets. It is constant pressure across the entire Russian logistics arc, from **Crimea** to **Bashkortostan**.

*Forty days. That is the duration Zelensky chose for his maximum-pressure operation. It is not arbitrary: long enough to produce cumulative effects, short enough to maintain operational intensity without exhausting available resources. That is military command with a strategic consciousness that Putin, for his part, has never truly demonstrated.*

## The limits and risks of the strategy

### The Russian response: escalation and adaptation

**Russia** has not remained passive in the face of strikes on its refineries. It has intensified its own strikes on Ukrainian energy infrastructure, attempting to impose a symmetrical cost on **Kyiv**. Ukrainian cities regularly endure massive missile and drone attacks targeting power plants, substations, and distribution networks. This infrastructure war is brutal for civilian populations on both sides, but it is fundamentally asymmetric: **Ukraine** receives Western assistance to rebuild and defend its networks, while Russia must finance its own repairs alone.

There is also a risk of escalation that **Ukraine** and its Western partners must manage carefully. If Ukrainian strikes hit Russian civilian infrastructure in the strict sense — and there is a gray area between dual-use military-civilian oil infrastructure and purely civilian targets — Moscow has a pretext for rhetorical and potentially operational escalation. The Kremlin already systematically employs the vocabulary of "**Ukrainian terrorism**" to describe any strike on its territory.

### The political constraints of Western aid

Ukraine's deep-strike strategy depends partly on equipment and intelligence provided by **Western allies**. Some of those allies imposed restrictions on the use of their equipment for strikes inside Russia — restrictions that have gradually evolved, but which still create operational complexities for **Ukraine**. The question of use-of-force restrictions on Western weapons remains a sensitive subject in **NATO** corridors.

The **Trump** administration is watching these developments with particular attention. If Washington were to conclude that Ukrainian deep strikes carry an unacceptable escalation risk, the pressure on **Kyiv** to moderate its strategy could be significant. That is a sword of Damocles **Ukraine** knows well and must factor into its operational planning.

*I find it hypocritical when certain Western allies finance Ukrainian drones that strike refineries 1,300 kilometers away while publicly fretting about escalation. If you believe Ukraine has the right to defend itself — and it does — then accept the logical consequences of that support. Perpetual half-measures serve neither Ukraine nor Western credibility.*

## The impact on Russian military logistics

### Fuel and armaments: the chain of dependency

Every modern army is fundamentally a **fuel machine**. Tanks, aircraft, missiles, supply vehicles — everything depends on a continuous logistics chain of fuel. The Russian army consumes considerable quantities of fuel every single day. Disrupting the refineries that supply this consumption is to directly disrupt the Russian army's capacity to maintain its operational tempo.

Military analysts estimate that **Russia** has had to significantly reorganize its fuel supply chains since the **2024–2025** strikes on its refineries. Fuel depots have been moved further east, alternative supply routes have been developed. But every reorganization takes time and costs resources. And every new deep strike, like the one on **Ufa**, puts in question the new logistical arrangements Russia believed it had secured.

### The effects on military-industrial production

Beyond fuel for vehicles, Russian refineries produce raw materials essential to the defense industry: solvents, plastics, lubricants, chemical components used in the manufacture of explosives and military equipment. Disrupting refining capacity therefore affects not only the mobility of Russian forces, but potentially also the capacity for arms production itself.

It is difficult to precisely assess the impact on Russian arms production, which maintains strategic reserves of raw materials. But the accumulation of pressures — sanctions on the import of components, strikes on industrial infrastructure, skilled labor shortages caused by massive military casualties — creates structural tensions that the Russian war economy is struggling to absorb simultaneously.

*Ukraine's strategy of striking refineries reflects an understanding that modern war is also won in factories, depots, and pipelines. Putin himself demonstrated that truth by striking Ukrainian energy infrastructure from day one. Ukraine is returning the lesson with growing precision. Poetic justice, if war can ever have any poetry at all.*

## Crimea in the crosshairs: pressure on two fronts

### The peninsula as symbol and as military target

**Zelensky**'s **40-day operation** also targets **Crimea** — the peninsula **Russia** illegally annexed in **2014** and transformed since into an advanced military base. Strikes on **Crimea** have both a military and a symbolic dimension: they demonstrate that the peninsula is not a secure sanctuary for the Russian military, and they degrade the capabilities of Russian aviation and naval forces based there.

**Crimea** is also a critical logistics hub for Russian forces deployed across southern **Ukraine**. Strikes on the **Kerch Bridge**, on **Sevastopol**'s port terminals, on fuel and ammunition depots across the peninsula have all had the effect of complicating and lengthening Russian supply lines. Every successful strike in Crimea forces Russia to find alternative routes — longer, costlier, more vulnerable.

### The implications for a potential negotiation

The military pressure **Ukraine** maintains on Russian infrastructure, including in **Crimea**, also has a diplomatic dimension. It signals to **Moscow** — and to any potential mediators — that **Ukraine** is not negotiating from a position of weakness, even after more than two years of total war. Zelensky refuses to enter talks from a position of operational weakness, and his deep-strike strategy is a tool for maintaining that power balance.

**Putin**'s declarations about his supposed willingness to negotiate "on the basis of the 2022 Istanbul agreements" — meaning on the basis of total Ukrainian capitulation — show that **Moscow** is not yet sufficiently pressed by the war's costs to offer acceptable terms. Ukraine's strategy is precisely to raise those costs until **Putin**'s cost-benefit calculation changes.

*Some Western commentators grow impatient and call for immediate negotiations. I understand that human impatience in the face of horror. But negotiating from a position of weakness is ratifying an act of aggression. Ukraine strikes Russian refineries precisely so it does not have to negotiate from weakness. It is a peace strategy dressed as a war strategy.*

## The Russian oil industry in 2026: assessing the damage

### A sector under pressure on three simultaneous fronts

Russia's oil industry is under pressure on three simultaneous fronts in **2026**. First, **Western sanctions** that limit access to advanced drilling and refining technologies, progressively reducing the efficiency of existing facilities and making the development of new fields difficult. Second, **Ukrainian strikes** on refineries, which have reduced domestic processing capacity. Third, **global markets**, where Russia must sell its oil at significant discounts to Asian buyers — primarily **China** and **India** — who have understood their negotiating leverage.

This triple squeeze has not yet caused a collapse in Russian oil production — the **IMF** and the **Kiel Institute** are clear on this point: Russia's economy has serious problems but is not about to collapse in the short term. However, the accumulation of these pressures progressively erodes **Moscow**'s financial room for maneuver. And Ukrainian strikes on refineries add an operational dimension to this picture that sanctions alone could not reach.

### The structural resilience of the Russian war economy

Honesty is required: **Russia** has shown a degree of economic resilience that surpassed the predictions of many Western analysts in 2022. Its economy has adapted, its trade routes have redirected toward **Asia**, its strategic industries have maintained production through parallel imports of components. The budget deficit is real and painful, but **Russia** has reserves and can mobilize internal resources.

However, this resilience has limits. The Russian war economy is currently operating under growing strain: every additional ruble spent on defense is a ruble less for social services, civilian infrastructure, and civil servants' salaries. Russian regions are accumulating debt at alarming levels. Inflationary pressure is significant. Interest rates are extremely high. This is not a healthy economy; it is an economy on a military drip, holding together because **Putin** controls information and suppresses all dissent.

*Do not underestimate the Russian economy — but do not overestimate it either. The uncomfortable truth is that it can hold on for a long time yet if the West maintains its support for Ukraine at the current level but goes no further. Refinery strikes are useful; they are not sufficient on their own. A sustained, coordinated effort is needed across every front: military, economic, diplomatic.*

## Western aid and the question of deep-strike weapons

### What Ukraine uses and where it comes from

The drones striking Russian refineries at **1,300 kilometers** are primarily Ukrainian — designed, manufactured, and operated by **Ukraine**. This is a crucial point, often overlooked in Western public debate. **Ukraine** did not wait for its allies' permission to develop long-range strike capabilities: it built them itself, with limited resources, remarkable ingenuity, and a will to prevail that nothing has extinguished.

Cruise missiles provided by the **United States**, the **United Kingdom**, and **France** have also played a role in deep strikes, but under restrictions that have been progressively relaxed. The **Trump** administration has maintained most of the lethal aid programs inherited from its predecessor, even as the political communication has shifted in register. The practical result is that **Ukraine** today has a broader and more capable range of deep-strike tools than at any previous point in the war.

### Ukraine's drone manufacturing industry: a wartime success story

Ukraine's drone manufacturing industry is perhaps one of the most remarkable stories of this war. Starting from almost nothing, **Ukraine** has built in a few years an industry capable of producing thousands of drones per month across all categories — reconnaissance, attack, electronic warfare. This industry operates as a distributed network, with workshops spread across the country to avoid destruction in a single strike.

This industrial success story also has post-war implications. When peace returns — and it will return — **Ukraine** will possess a domestic technology base in autonomous systems that will open considerable economic and export opportunities. The war will have produced at least this paradoxical effect: forcing **Ukraine** to develop technological capabilities it would never have developed in peacetime.

*I am genuinely in awe of what Ukrainian engineers and technicians have accomplished. Under bombardment, in a country at war, they have built a high-technology industry. That is human ingenuity at its best, employed unfortunately for necessary destructive ends. If the world were just, those same talents would be building hospitals and solar power plants.*

## Sanctions and strikes: a two-legged strategy

### The complementarity of the two approaches

**Economic sanctions** and **Ukrainian military strikes** on Russian infrastructure are two legs of the same strategy of attrition. Sanctions limit **Russia**'s ability to repair and modernize its industrial facilities by cutting off access to Western technologies and spare parts. Ukrainian strikes damage those same facilities directly. The combination creates a multiplier effect: a damaged refinery that cannot be repaired for lack of spare parts stays offline longer than one merely damaged.

The **European Union** has maintained and reinforced its sanctions arsenal, with the **21st package** proposed in June 2026 and an extension of existing sanctions through **2027**. The sanctions regime now extends to the banking, energy, technology, transport, and cryptocurrency sectors. This cumulative economic pressure, combined with Ukrainian strikes, represents the growing cost **Putin** pays for his war of aggression.

### Leaks in the sanctions regime

The sanctions regime is not perfect. Third-party countries serve as parallel import routes for sanctioned goods, notably electronic components and dual-use products. **Turkey**, the **United Arab Emirates**, and certain **Central Asian countries** have played this intermediary role, sometimes despite Western diplomatic pressure. These leaks reduce the effectiveness of sanctions without nullifying them.

Plugging these leaks is an ongoing diplomatic effort that the **United States** and the **European Union** pursue with mixed results. Secondary sanctions — which punish third-party entities helping Russia circumvent primary sanctions — are a powerful tool, but diplomatically costly, as they create tensions with countries the West also needs as partners on other files.

*Yes, the sanctions leak. No economic measure is ever perfect. But "imperfect" does not mean "useless." Sanctions have deprived Russia of billions of dollars in revenue and of access to critical technologies. Without them, Russia's military-industrial capacity would be significantly stronger. Criticizing them because they are not perfect is the enemy of the good.*

## What the 40 days could accomplish

### The measurable objectives of the operation

**Zelensky**'s **40-day operation** has objectives that analysts can attempt to measure: a reduction in the rate of Russian strikes on Ukrainian cities if Russian munitions are disrupted, degradation of Russian logistical capacity on certain front axes, creation of uncertainty in Russian operational planning. These effects may not be spectacular in the short term, but they accumulate.

The **40 days** cover a critical period running up to the **NATO Ankara summit** of **July 7–8, 2026**. It is entirely plausible that the operation is also calculated to demonstrate to Western allies gathered at the summit that **Ukraine** remains an active, capable, and determined partner deserving of their continued support. Strategic communication is an integral part of Ukraine's doctrine, and on that front, **Zelensky** is a master.

### The risks of spreading effort too thin

There is an inherent risk in a deep-strike strategy that is too dispersed: diluting available resources across too many targets, without a decisive effect on any of them. Ukrainian drones are not unlimited; precision munitions are expensive and sometimes constrained by the production capacity of Western partners. Concentrating strikes on the highest-impact targets — critical logistics nodes rather than symbolic ones — is the permanent challenge of Ukrainian operational planning.

The **40 days** will succeed if, at their conclusion, **Ukraine** can demonstrate a measurable degradation of Russian logistical capabilities on at least two or three front axes. That is an ambitious but achievable objective. What **Zelensky** has shown throughout this war is that his forces are capable of accomplishing what no one expects.

*Forty days of intensive operations are also forty days of exhaustion for the Ukrainian soldiers who plan, operate, and maintain these systems. Behind every spectacular refinery strike 1,300 kilometers away, there are teams working through entire nights, risking their lives if their positions are discovered. This human dimension is often forgotten in the enthusiasm for operational results.*

## The international reaction: who supports what

### Western support for Ukraine's strategy

Most Western allies tacitly, if not explicitly, support Ukraine's deep-strike strategy. The progressive lifting of restrictions on the use of Western weapons for strikes inside Russian territory has been the most concrete signal of that support. The **United Kingdom**, then **France**, then eventually the **United States** under certain conditions, all loosened their initially restrictive positions.

This support is not unanimous in its modalities. Some allies remain concerned about escalation risks and prefer careful public formulations even when they support **Ukraine** in practice. This dissonance between public statements and actual support is a constant of allied policy that sometimes frustrates **Kyiv**, but which **Ukraine** has learned to manage with pragmatism.

### China's ambiguous position and the Global South

**China** has rhetorically condemned Ukrainian strikes on Russian territory while maintaining its commercial relationship with Moscow, which represents a lifeline for the Russian economy. Beijing positions itself as a potential mediator while objectively contributing to **Russia**'s capacity to continue the war. This hypocritical stance is noted and documented by Western chancelleries.

In the "**Global South**," reactions to Ukrainian strikes on Russian refineries vary. Some oil-producing countries are watching with interest the impact on Russian production, which can affect global prices. Others, who buy Russian oil at a discount, have an interest in the continuity of Russian exports. These conflicting interests explain the absence of unanimous condemnation of Russian actions in international forums.

*China condemning Ukrainian strikes while selling dual-use components to Russia: that is what I call a foreign policy with no moral backbone. Beijing knows exactly what it is doing. It is choosing its immediate profits over global stability. It is a short-term calculation that will ultimately cost it dearly.*

## The future of deep strikes: capabilities and constraints

### The next technological thresholds

Ukraine's drone industry is constantly working to improve its capabilities. The next technological thresholds include drones with even greater range, navigation systems more resistant to Russian electronic jamming, and more precise and powerful warheads. Each generation of Ukrainian drones corrects the weaknesses identified in previous missions.

The question of **range** is central. If drones can reach **Ufa** at **1,300 kilometers**, what are the next potential targets? Installations even further east? Railway hubs in **Siberia**? Russia must defend a vast territory with a limited number of air defense systems. The greater Ukraine's range grows, the more the Russian defensive dispersal required becomes mathematically impossible to sustain.

### Long-term geopolitical constraints

The deep-strike strategy will remain constrained by the political dynamics of the Western coalition supporting **Ukraine**. The **NATO Ankara summit** will be a moment of calibration: how far are the allies prepared to go in supporting a Ukrainian offensive strategy? The answer depends largely on the position of the **Trump** administration, whose signals on this specific point have been contradictory.

Over the long term, the viability of the deep-strike strategy also depends on **Ukraine**'s capacity to maintain its drone production against Russian attempts to target the Ukrainian defense industry. It is a permanent duel between Ukraine's ability to disperse and protect its production, and Russia's ability to locate and destroy those facilities. **Ukraine** has so far managed to maintain — and even increase — its production despite these attempts.

*What the refinery war ultimately illustrates is that technology and strategic intelligence can partially compensate for numerical inferiority. Ukraine cannot beat Russia in shell counts. It can beat it in precision, ingenuity, and the capacity to hit where it truly hurts. That is its doctrine. And so far, it is working.*

## Russian resilience: repair and workaround capabilities

### How Russia attempts to repair its damaged refineries

Faced with repeated Ukrainian strikes on its oil infrastructure, **Russia** has developed adaptation strategies that the West must monitor closely. Reports from **Reuters** cited by **Militarnyi.com** indicate that the **Moscow refinery** struck in May 2026 is unlikely to resume full operations before **2027** — a significant loss of capacity. But Russia has simultaneously sought to import more refined petroleum products from **China**, **India**, and other markets to offset the domestic production losses.

This workaround strategy has its limits. Importing refined products costs more than domestic production. It creates a logistical dependency on suppliers who might themselves face Western diplomatic pressure. And it ties up foreign exchange reserves that **Russia** would prefer to conserve for financing its military imports. **Every damaged refinery** is therefore a permanent cost — not merely a temporary loss — on the economic ledger of **Putin**'s war.

### Oil sanctions and strikes: combined effects

The effectiveness of Ukraine's refinery-strike strategy is amplified by the Western sanctions regime on Russian oil. The **$60 price cap** imposed by the **G7** on Russian crude — even imperfectly applied — reduces **Moscow**'s oil revenues. Strikes on refineries reduce the capacity to turn that crude into higher-value products. The combined effect of both pressures exceeds the sum of their parts: **Russia** is selling cheaper and can refine less.

The economic data from **June 2026** reflects this pressure. Russia's budget deficit exceeds **80 billion dollars** according to available estimates. **Russian government bonds** have tanked in the face of the Kremlin's plans to massively increase military spending. The combination of sanctions, infrastructure strikes, and an over-stimulated war economy creates a cumulative pressure that, even if it is not catastrophic in the short term, structurally undermines **Putin**'s capacity to finance his war over the long haul.

*Ukraine's strategy of targeting refineries is not spectacular. It does not generate the dramatic explosion images that social media consumes voraciously. It works in the shadows — on accounting ledgers, on logistics circuits, on industrial capacities. That is precisely why it is effective. Modern wars are often won less on the field of armies than on the field of economies. Ukraine has understood that. Putin understands it too — and that is what truly worries him.*

## Conclusion: a strategy redefining modern warfare

### What the refineries reveal about twenty-first-century war

Ukraine's refinery war illustrates a profound transformation of modern conflict: the ability of small, technologically innovative states to inflict disproportionate economic and industrial costs on larger but less agile adversaries. This asymmetry is not new in military history, but it reaches a new dimension with long-range autonomous systems. **Ukraine** is writing the tactical manuals that the world's military academies will study in twenty years.

Striking the **Ufa** refineries at **1,300 kilometers**, hitting **Kapotnya** in **Moscow** for the second time in a week, launching a **40-day** maximum-pressure operation — all of this declares that **Zelensky**'s **Ukraine** has not resigned itself to the role of victim. It has chosen the role of strategic combatant, and it owns that role with a determination that commands respect.

### What is at stake for the West and for peace

**Putin** thought **Ukraine** would capitulate in a matter of days. Two years later, Ukrainian drones are striking his refineries in the heart of Siberia. If that does not prove the inanity of his original calculation, I do not know what would. For the West, what is at stake is sustaining this strategy until the cost of war becomes unbearable for **Moscow**. The refinery war is not the end of the war. But it may be the beginning of the end of Putin's illusions.

Peace will not come from Ukrainian weakness. It will come, if it comes, from Russian clarity about the impossibility of winning. Every refinery strike contributes to that clarity. It is brutal. It is necessary. And it is legal.

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

*I must be honest about a limit in my analysis: the data on the actual capacity of damaged Russian refineries, on lost production volumes, and on repair costs is fragmentary and often comes from Ukrainian or Western sources that have an interest in presenting the strike strategy as effective. I try to triangulate with independent sources, but the fog of economic warfare makes certainty elusive. I have relied on Reuters and Militarnyi data — they seem solid to me, but I may be wrong on the orders of magnitude.*

## Sources

### Primary sources

- [Ukrainian drones travel 1,300 km to strike Bashneft refineries in Ufa — Euromaidan Press, June 25, 2026](https://euromaidanpress.com/2026/06/25/drones-flew-1300-km-to-russias-ufa-then-struck-bashneft-refineries/)

- [Moscow refinery unlikely to resume operations before 2027, Russia considering sea imports — Militarnyi / Reuters, June 24, 2026](https://militarnyi.com/en/news/moscow-refinery-unlikely-to-resume-operations-after-drone-strikes-until-2027-reuters/)

- [Moscow Kapotnya district drone strike, second time in one week — Newsweek, June 25, 2026](https://www.newsweek.com/putin-russia-oil-gold-ukraine-war-12118804)

- [Zelensky announces 40-day pressure operation on Russian logistics — 1lurer.am / RBC-Ukraine, June 26, 2026](https://www.1lurer.am/en/2026/06/26/Russia-and-Ukraine-carried-out-prisoner-exchange-on-principle-of-160-for-160/1536874)

### Secondary sources

- [Russia's budget deficit tops 80 billion dollars — United24 Media, June 23, 2026](https://united24media.com/world/russias-budget-deficit-tops-80-billion-despite-kremlin-stability-claims-20083)

- [EU maintains full Russia economic sanctions wall through 2027 — Euromaidan Press, June 26, 2026](https://euromaidanpress.com/2026/06/26/trade-banks-energy-crypto-the-eu-keeps-its-full-russia-economic-sanctions-wall-standing-to-2027/)

- [Russia's war economy has problems but is not about to crash — The Economist, June 22, 2026](https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2026/06/22/russias-war-economy-has-problems-but-is-not-about-to-crash)

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Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/analyse-la-guerre-des-raffineries-comment-l-ukraine-transforme-le-petrole-russe