# ANALYSIS: The 2026 Russian offensive — 16 times slower, 19 times more costly per kilometer conquered

> You can debate the ISW methodology's margins of error. You cannot reasonably claim that going from 16 km² per day to 1 km² per day is a measurement gap. It is an operational reality. And that reality

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Analysis
- Published: 2026-07-02
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/analyse-l-offensive-russe-2026-16-fois-plus-lente-19-fois-plus-couteuse-par-kilo

## Key takeaways

- In June 2026, Russia conquered 30.42 km², against 481.25 km² in June 2025, based on ISW data from its July 1, 2026 report.
- The daily rate fell from 16.04 km² to 1.01 km², and first-half 2026 gains were 622.60 km² versus 2,189.87 km² in first-half 2025.
- Using Ukrainian general staff casualty figures, the article calculates 1,298 casualties per km² in June 2026 versus 68 in June 2025, a 19.1-fold increase.
- Russian drone losses reached 60,849 in June 2026 versus 4,581 a year earlier, which the author links to a mass drone doctrine.
- The author attributes the slowdown to Ukrainian resistance, Western equipment, Russian attrition and fortifications, and urges allies to sustain deliveries and sanctions.

## Introduction: when the numbers demolish the narrative of Russian victory

### A comparison that changes everything

In **June 2026**, the Russian army conquered **30.42 square kilometers** of Ukrainian territory. In **June 2025**, it had conquered **481.25 square kilometers**. The difference is **94 percent** — **Russia** is now advancing at less than one-twentieth of last year's pace. The daily rate dropped from **16.04 km² per day** in June 2025 to **1.01 km² per day** in June 2026. These figures, compiled by the **Institute for the Study of War (ISW)** and published in its **July 1, 2026** report, are not Ukrainian propaganda data. They are the result of a rigorous geospatial tracking methodology that follows territorial control lines using verified OSINT sources.

This spectacular slowdown does not mean the war is over, nor that **Russia** has lost. It continues to attack. It continues to kill. But the data tells a story that **Putin** cannot erase through televised declarations: the **spring-summer 2026** offensive is, kilometer by kilometer, the least efficient and most costly since the large-scale war began in **2022**. And the human cost of that inefficiency is catastrophic for **Russia**.

### The method: how the ISW measures this data

The **Institute for the Study of War** compiles territorial control data from commercial satellite imagery, geolocated social media accounts, official Ukrainian and Russian reports, and daily OSINT analysis. Their assessments are published daily. They are not perfect — contested control zones and real-time changes create margins of error — but they constitute the best publicly available database for comparing advance rates. The figures used in this analysis come from the **ISW report of July 1, 2026**, published on **understandingwar.org**.

## The pace of conquest: a 94 percent collapse

### The monthly figures compared

Month-by-month comparison tells a clear trajectory. In **June 2025**, **Russia** conquered **481.25 km²** — its best month since the start of the **2024** offensive. That figure already represented an improvement over previous months and fed narratives about the **"irresistible Russian advance."** In **June 2026**, that figure dropped to **30.42 km²**. For **the first half of 2026** as a whole, **Russia** conquered **622.60 km²** — versus **2,189.87 km²** in the first half of **2025**. Over six months, it seized only **28.43 percent** of the territory it was taking at the same period the year before.

To give a concrete sense of what **30.42 km²** represents: it is a surface area slightly larger than the city of **Paris intra muros**. That is what **Russia** conquered in an entire month of fighting, with an army of several hundred thousand men, at a considerable human cost. The previous year, it was conquering the equivalent of **Paris** every **two weeks**. The slowdown is measurable, precise, and documented.

### Why the pace has collapsed

Several factors explain this slowdown. First, **reinforced Ukrainian resistance**: **Ukraine** received additional shipments of Western equipment since autumn **2025**, including improved air defense systems, precision-guided artillery ammunition, and armored vehicles. Second, **cumulative Russian attrition**: the Russian army has lost a considerable number of soldiers and equipment since **2022**, and the units available for offensive operations are of declining quality. Third, **Ukrainian fortification of defensive lines**: **Ukraine** has invested massively in building defense in depth — trenches, anti-tank obstacles, mine networks — that mechanically slow any offensive advance.

## The human cost: 19 times more expensive per square kilometer

### The most brutal calculation of this war

Data on Russian losses documented by the Ukrainian general staff allows a revealing calculation. In **June 2026**, **Russia** suffered **39,490 casualties** (killed and seriously wounded) to conquer **30.42 km²**. That represents **1,298 casualties per square kilometer conquered**. In **June 2025**, the same calculation yielded **68 casualties per square kilometer**. The advance has therefore become **19.1 times** more costly in human lives per unit of territory gained in one year.

These casualty figures come from the daily bulletins of the **Ukrainian Armed Forces general staff**. They are not independently verifiable in their entirety — **Russia** publishes no reliable casualty data, and the battlefields are difficult to access. But independent analysts, Western intelligence organizations, and investigative journalists have repeatedly corroborated the order of magnitude of these figures, even where precise totals diverge. The scale of magnitude is reliable; the exact figure down to the individual soldier is not.

### The 19x multiplier in historical context

A **19-fold increase** in human cost per square kilometer in one year is an extraordinary military phenomenon. For comparison, the most costly battles of **World War I** involved high casualty ratios, but on static fronts. An army that is advancing — however slowly — while multiplying its cost per unit of progress by 19 suggests a deep degradation of its offensive capabilities. The combination of reinforced resistance, fortified terrain, and assault units of declining quality mechanically produces this cost inflation.

What these figures suggest about the sustainability of the Russian offensive is troubling for **Moscow**: if the loss rate holds at the **June 2026** level (**39,490/month**), **Russia** incurs approximately **473,000 casualties per year** for a territorial gain that, if maintained at the **June 2026** rate, would represent only **365 km²** annually. That is mathematically unsustainable without a radical increase in Russian mobilization capacity.

## The drones: Russian losses explode to 13 times the 2025 level

### 60,849 drones lost in a single month

ISW data on Russian equipment losses reveals a specific explosion: in **June 2026**, **Russia** lost **60,849 drones** (UAVs) — versus **4,581 in June 2025**. That is a multiplier of **13.3 times** in one year. This dramatic increase reflects two simultaneous dynamics: intensified Russian use of drones in offensive operations, and the corresponding improvement in Ukrainian drone interdiction capabilities. The two go hand in hand in a symmetric escalation loop.

To put that figure in context: **60,849 drones** lost in a month represents more than **2,000 drones per day**. This reflects the operational density of drones in this phase of the war — reconnaissance drones, FPV attack drones, Shahed kamikaze drones, interceptor drones. The Ukrainian-Russian drone war now sees daily losses that exceed the total stockpile of most of the world's armies.

### Artillery and vehicles: other rising losses

Russian artillery losses have also increased, though in smaller proportions: **2,053 units in June 2026** versus **1,243 in June 2025**, a **65 percent** increase. Vehicle and logistics equipment losses were more pronounced: **12,867 in June 2026** versus **3,395 in June 2025**, a multiplier of **3.8 times**. These figures suggest that **Russia** continues to engage its equipment massively in offensive operations, but at higher destruction rates than in **2025**.

The combination of high human casualties, massive drone losses, and significant equipment losses paints the portrait of an army advancing more slowly, losing more, and consuming its resources at an accelerating rate. The question posed by this data is not **"is Ukraine winning?"** but **"how long can Russia sustain this rate of consumption before reaching its capacity limits?"**

## Drone attrition: the imbalance that defines 2026

### Why losing 60,000 drones a month is strategically different

The loss of **60,849 drones** in a month by **Russia** is not merely a materiel destruction statistic. It reveals a doctrine: **Russia** uses cheap drones in mass to saturate Ukrainian defenses, compensate for the degradation in the quality of its infantry units, and reduce its soldiers' exposure to direct Ukrainian fire. This **compensatory drone mass doctrine** has a cost: production lines working at full capacity, component imports requiring sanctions circumvention, and dependence on partners like **Iran** and **North Korea** to maintain volumes.

**Ukraine**, for its part, has developed its own drone production at a remarkable pace. The **Zelensky** government set targets of producing **1,000 interceptor drones per day**. The Ukrainian defense industry delivered hundreds of thousands of **FPV drones** in **2025-2026**. What this means in the figures: the **60,849 Russian drones lost in June 2026** were, in a significant proportion, intercepted or neutralized by Ukrainian drones themselves — creating a drone-on-drone war whose intensity has no historical precedent.

### Industrial implications for Russia

**Russia**'s ability to sustain production of **60,000+ drones per month** depends on a complex supply chain including electronic components, motors, navigation systems, and raw materials. Some of these components come from **China** despite secondary sanctions risks. Another portion is produced domestically in factories retooled for military production. The **Alabuga Special Economic Zone** in **Tatarstan** — the **Geran-2** production site that **Operation Black Spark** infiltrated — represents one of the key nodes in this chain.

Western sanctions on semiconductors and electronic components have created real difficulties for this chain, but not breaks. **Russia** has found workarounds through third-party countries — **Turkey**, **UAE**, **Armenia**, **Kazakhstan**. The firmness of Western partners in cutting these bypass routes will largely determine Russia's ability to maintain its drone production pace.

## The first-half comparison: 2026 vs. 2025

### H1 2026 vs. H1 2025: less than a third of the territory

The full first-half analysis confirms the trend: **Russia** conquered **622.60 km²** in the first half of **2026**, versus **2,189.87 km²** in the first half of **2025**. Over six months it seized only **28.43 percent** of the territory it was taking at the same period a year earlier. This semester comparison is important because it smooths out monthly variations and offers a more stable view of the structural trend.

The structural trend is clear: the Russian offensive is losing force. This does not mean **Russia** is no longer advancing — it is. It means it is advancing at a pace that cannot, given documented losses, produce rapid territorial victory. An adversary that can maintain its current resistance level — and continues to receive necessary Western support — can, according to this data, exhaust Russian offensive capabilities before they reach their stated objectives.

### What the trend implies for peace planning

This data has important implications for the diplomatic negotiations taking shape or that some actors are seeking to accelerate. A negotiated peace agreement in the coming months — before current trends have had time to produce more marked exhaustion of the Russian offensive — locks in a balance of power that remains territorially unfavorable to **Ukraine**. Waiting for these trends to produce their full strategic effect — which may take months or years — exposes **Ukraine** to considerable additional human and economic costs.

This tension between **"continue to reverse the balance of power"** and **"negotiate now to save lives"** is the central strategic question of summer **2026**. The **ISW** data on the Russian slowdown supports the arguments for the first option. Data on Ukrainian casualties — which this text does not cover in detail, for lack of comparable verifiable sources — supports the arguments for the second. Both perspectives are legitimate. The data alone does not resolve the political question.

## Russian losses in context: what the figures conceal

### The reliability of Ukrainian casualty figures

The **39,490 Russian casualties** from **June 2026** are the **Ukrainian general staff**'s figures. Their reliability is the subject of legitimate debate. The **Ukrainian general staff** has an interest in presenting high Russian casualty figures to sustain domestic morale and international support. Independent estimates of Russian losses — based on cemetery analysis, prisoner testimony, and OSINT data on burials — generally converge toward orders of magnitude consistent with Ukrainian figures, though precise totals remain impossible to independently verify.

This text maintains Ukrainian figures as its working basis while explicitly noting they are not verifiable to the last individual. What is verifiable: the scale of magnitude of Russian losses is considerable, documented by multiple independent sources converging on estimates in the same range. Precision down to the individual soldier is not achievable; the scale of attrition is indisputable.

### What Russia's official figures don't say

**Russia** publishes casualty figures that are massively understated relative to independent data. Official Russian statements on military casualties cite figures that represent a tiny fraction of what independent OSINT analyses — compiling local death announcements, obituaries in regional media, civil registry data — suggest. Independent Russian journalists — several of whom have been imprisoned or forced into exile for attempting to compile this data — have documented totals far higher than official announcements.

Russia's silence on its real losses is itself a data point. An army that is winning easily does not need to hide its casualties. An army that loses **39,000 men per month** for fewer than **31 km²** has every reason to conceal that reality from its own population.

## What this data means for Ukraine and its allies

### The strategic window: sustaining the pressure

The **ISW** data on the slowdown of the Russian offensive in **2026** creates a strategic window that **Ukraine** and its allies must use correctly. This window does not close automatically: the current slowdown is the result of concrete factors — Ukrainian fortifications, Western equipment, attrition of first-line Russian offensive units — that took time to produce their effects. If these factors are maintained or intensified, the trend can continue.

What can close this window: a failure of Western support (delays in ammunition deliveries, downward revision of financial aid, political pressure for premature concessions), a Russian success in mobilization (new recruitment waves, improved unit quality through accelerated training), or a Ukrainian breakdown in ammunition or critical equipment supply. None of these scenarios is inevitable. All are possible.

### The concrete requirements this analysis demands

This military data has direct political implications for **Ukraine**'s allies. First, maintain artillery ammunition deliveries at a rate that allows **Ukraine** to continue inflicting documented losses. Second, accelerate delivery of anti-drone systems — notably the **Gepard**, **IRIS-T**, and equivalent systems — to maintain Russian drone interception rates at their current level. Third, maintain and strengthen sanctions on electronic components, targeting third-party countries enabling circumvention and applying secondary sanctions to identified facilitating companies.

These measures do not guarantee Ukrainian victory. They ensure that the trend documented by **ISW** — slowdown of Russian advance, rising cost per kilometer — can hold long enough to alter **Moscow**'s strategic calculation. That is the logic of accumulated pressure: not a knockout blow, but an attrition that makes the cost of continuing the war greater than the cost of an honest negotiated exit.

## The geography of the slowdown: where Russia has stalled

### The Donbas as the primary attrition zone

Most gains and losses are concentrated in the **Donbas** — the **Donetsk** and **Luhansk** regions. That is where the Russian army pushes hardest and where Ukrainian resistance is most intense. The villages that change hands — often devastated before being finally taken or retaken — illustrate the pure war of attrition character of this phase of the conflict. Each village costs hundreds of lives for a few dozen meters of trenches.

The geography of this zone is particularly difficult for offensive operations: relatively flat terrain but densely fortified by four years of war, extensive minefields, dense surveillance systems (drones, sensors), and a Ukrainian defense that has had time to adapt to every Russian tactic. It is in this environment that the Russian cost multiplier exploded. This is no surprise to military analysts — it is confirmation of a logic that fortifications always impose on offensive forces.

### Zones of relative stabilization

To the west and north of the main combat zone, front lines have moved relatively little in **2026**. **Russia** has not attempted to relaunch major offensives toward **Kharkiv** or other sectors since the **2024-2025** attempts that were repelled at high cost. This geographic concentration of the Russian offensive on the **Donbas** reflects both logistical constraints — that is where Russian supply lines are shortest — and stated political objectives — **Putin** having formally annexed these regions in **2022**.

The relative stabilization of other front sectors frees up Ukrainian defensive resources that can be redeployed toward maximum pressure zones. That is an operational advantage that the geographic concentration of the Russian offensive offers **Ukraine** — an advantage the Ukrainian general staff is seeking to exploit to the fullest.

## What Putin can no longer claim: the narrative of inevitable victory

### Russian propaganda against the data

The **Putin** regime has built, since **2022**, a narrative of inevitable victory: the **West** will eventually tire, **Ukraine** will run out of fighters, sanctions will collapse, and **Russia** will achieve its objectives. The **ISW** data for the first half of **2026** undermines every pillar of that narrative. The **West** is maintaining its support. **Ukraine** is resisting with growing effectiveness. Sanctions have been partially circumvented, but they have imposed real costs on the Russian economy. And the Russian army is advancing at only one-fifth of its **2025** pace.

This does not mean **Putin** will stop or negotiate on Ukrainian terms. Authoritarian regimes can sustain costly, losing wars far longer than liberal democracies would — suppression of internal opposition and media control shield leaders from the electoral consequences of their military failures. But the data creates a reality that propaganda cannot erase indefinitely, inside **Russia** or beyond.

### The signal sent to China and Iran

This data has implications that reach beyond the Ukrainian theater. **China**, watching Russian military performance closely, draws lessons for its own strategic calculations regarding **Taiwan** and the **South China Sea**. A Russian army proving less effective than expected, at a human and economic cost far higher than anticipated, sends an ambiguous signal to **Beijing** about the benefits of military adventurism against adversaries resolute and backed by the **West**.

Similarly, **Iran** and **North Korea** — which provide weapons and industrial support to **Russia** — are observing that this investment in sustaining the Russian offensive is yielding increasingly disappointing returns. Iranian **Shahed** drones are being intercepted en masse; North Korean ammunition is being consumed at rates exceeding production capacity. These partners are measuring the return on their investment. If the current trend holds, that calculation may shift.

## The limits of this analysis: what the data cannot say

### The Ukrainian human factor

This analysis has focused on data about the performance of the Russian offensive. It is incomplete without a parallel assessment of Ukrainian costs — human losses, unit exhaustion, civilian war fatigue, economic pressure. This Ukrainian data is less publicly accessible and is subject to understandable confidentiality in a wartime context. What available reports suggest: **Ukraine** has also suffered significant losses, and its army faces real challenges in recruiting and replacing casualties.

The complete picture is therefore: a Russian army exhausting itself at a documented rate, facing a Ukrainian army resisting effectively but at costs we cannot quantify with the same precision. **ISW** data on Russian territorial gains tells us how much **Russia** is advancing. It does not tell us how much it costs **Ukraine** to stop it. This analytical asymmetry must be honestly acknowledged.

### Unanticipated disruption scenarios

Linear projections of current trends have a well-known limit: wars experience unanticipated disruptions. A political collapse in **Russia**, a significant technological or tactical breakthrough, an abrupt shift in US policy, a peace agreement imposed by external pressure — all these scenarios can interrupt the current trajectory unpredictably. Trend analysis is useful for understanding where things stand today and what the recent past projects. It does not predict the future.

This text makes no claim to prophecy. It makes a claim to a precise, documented reading of what the figures available as of **July 1, 2026** reveal about the state of the Russian offensive. Those figures are substantial and significant. They deserve to be taken seriously by decision-makers — in **Europe**, in **North America**, in the capitals still hesitating over the depth of their commitment to **Ukraine**.

## The sustainability argument: can we support Ukraine long-term

### The question dividing the allies

The debate among **Ukraine**'s allies is increasingly focused on long-term sustainability of support. Defense budgets, ammunition stocks, industrial capacity to produce replacements: these constraints are real. The **United States** has increased production of certain munitions, but industrial lead times run to months and years. European countries have made considerable but uneven efforts. The question **"how long can we hold?"** is being asked in every allied capital.

**ISW** data contributes an argument to this discussion: the current trajectory, where **Russia** exhausts itself at **19 times the human cost** per kilometer conquered compared to **2025**, suggests that Western support is producing measurable effects. This is not a war without results. Western equipment deliveries translate into higher Russian casualty rates and smaller Russian territorial gains. The sustainability equation is not posed in a vacuum — it is posed in the context of a trend that currently favors **Ukraine**.

### Ukrainian drone production as a key variable

One of the most promising factors in the sustainability equation is the scale-up of Ukrainian drone production. **Ukraine** now produces hundreds of thousands of **FPV drones** per year, at unit costs far below imported systems. If this production capacity can be sustained and developed, it reduces **Ukraine**'s dependence on Western deliveries for the most intensively consumed combat systems. The naval **MOBIDIK**, the Ukrainian **Shahed-238**, and infantry FPV drones represent a trend toward industrial autonomy that allies should actively fund and encourage.

This progressive autonomy is strategically sound for two reasons: it reduces the delays and political friction linked to allied delivery decisions, and it creates a post-war Ukrainian industrial base capable of sustaining the defense of a country that, whether or not it joins **NATO**, will need to defend itself in a neighborhood that will remain dangerous.

## Numbers as an act of intellectual resistance

### What data analysis accomplishes

Analyzing **ISW** data with precision — resisting both the Russian narrative of inevitable victory and the narrative in some pro-Ukrainian circles of imminent victory — is an act of intellectual resistance I consider necessary. These figures tell a complex story: **Russia** is still advancing, but ever more slowly and at an ever more prohibitive cost. **Ukraine** is resisting effectively, but in a war of attrition that consumes human and material resources at a rate unsustainable for both parties.

What this data implies for Western policy is clear: maintaining support for **Ukraine** is the strategy that produces the most favorable results according to available data. Not because it is comfortable or cost-free. Because the numbers show it. And in defense policy as elsewhere, it is better to be guided by verifiable data than by short-term political calculations.

### What June 2026 will remain in the history of this war

The month of **June 2026** will remain in the history of this war as the month when data compellingly confirmed the inflection point of the Russian offensive. **30.42 km²** conquered versus **481.25 km²** a year earlier. **39,490 casualties** for those **30 km²**. **60,849 drones lost**. These figures, compiled by a serious organization using rigorous methodology, are the factual record of an army that continues to attack but whose offensive capability is eroding, measure by measure.

**Volodymyr Zelensky** and the Ukrainian armed forces deserve to have this data stated clearly — not to fuel premature triumphalism, but to show that their extraordinary resistance since **2022** is producing documented results. Their fight is effective. It deserves to be supported to its full measure.

## Signals to watch: indicators of a possible turning point

### What could shift the trajectory upward for Ukraine

Several developments could accelerate the documented trend favorably for **Ukraine**. A first indicator would be a significant increase in deliveries of long-range artillery systems — notably **ATACMS** and their European equivalents — which would allow deeper strikes on Russian ammunition depots behind the lines. These deep logistical strikes would reduce the pace of Russian artillery fire, the factor that best compensates for the degradation of Russian offensive infantry.

A second indicator would be increased pressure on the Russian electronic component supply chain, through stricter secondary sanctions targeting Chinese and Turkish companies supplying banned components. If the production rate of **Geran-2** and **Geran-3** drones could be reduced by **30 to 40 percent**, it would significantly ease pressure on Ukrainian air defense and free resources for other sectors. These levers exist. They are not yet fully activated.

### What could weaken the Ukrainian trend

Conversely, several developments could degrade **Ukraine**'s position. A reduction in US military support — a scenario dependent on political decisions in **Washington** that are difficult to anticipate precisely — would create immediate pressure on Ukrainian ammunition stocks. A new Russian mobilization wave, if accompanied by more serious training of recruits than previous waves received, could improve the quality of offensive units. And fatigue in European public opinion, if it translated into budget restrictions, would reduce European countries' capacity to maintain their current commitments.

These risks are real and must be monitored. Decision-makers relying on current favorable data must not conclude that the trajectory is guaranteed without continued effort. Military trends are not immutable natural forces — they are the result of continuous human decisions, on both sides of the conflict and in allied capitals. That is precisely why ongoing analysis has value: it allows decisions to be adjusted before trends reverse.

## Conclusion: what July 2026 demands from Ukraine's allies

### The three decisions this analysis requires

In light of **ISW** data for the first half of **2026**, three decisions are required of **Ukraine**'s allies. First, maintain equipment and ammunition deliveries at the current rate or above — the slowdown in Russian advance is the direct result of those deliveries and cannot be taken for granted. Second, strengthen sanctions on electronic components used in Russian drone production, targeting sanctions-circumvention routes through third-party countries with effective secondary sanctions. Third, invest in Ukrainian production capacity for drones and defense systems, to reduce long-term dependence on external deliveries.

These three measures are consistent with the data. They require no new complex geopolitical assessments. They require continuity, budgetary discipline, and the political will to hold course in an environment where pressures for quick, dishonorable compromises are real.

### One final figure to remember

**16 times slower. 19 times more costly per kilometer.** These two multipliers summarize the state of the Russian offensive in **June 2026** compared to **June 2025**. They do not announce Russian defeat. They document a trend that, if supported by the right political and military decisions, can lead to the cost of the war becoming unbearable for **Putin** before it becomes unbearable for **Ukraine**. That is the logic of resistance. And the numbers, today, confirm it.

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

## Sources

### Primary sources

- [ISW — Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment July 1, 2026 — July 1, 2026](https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-1-2026/)

- [Euromaidanpress — Data on Russian advance and losses — July 2026](https://euromaidanpress.com/)

- [Daily Kos Community — Ukraine War Data Analysis H1 2026 — July 1, 2026](https://www.dailykos.com/stories/2026/7/1/800063677/community/1589/)

### Secondary sources

- [Reuters — Russia pounds gates of Ukraine's fortress belt — June 29, 2026](https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-pounds-gates-ukraines-fortress-belt-2026-06-29/)

- [Newsmax — Russia-Ukraine war update — July 1, 2026](https://newsmax.com/newsfront/russia-ukraine-war/2026/07/01/id/1261526/)

- [Kyiv Independent — Conflict coverage — July 2026](https://kyivindependent.com/)

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Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/analyse-l-offensive-russe-2026-16-fois-plus-lente-19-fois-plus-couteuse-par-kilo