# ANALYSIS: Kostiantynivka, the Donbas Gate That Russia Is Relentlessly Trying to Break

> On June 16, 2026, Ukrainian military analysts from the DeepState group published a terse assessment: the battle of Kostiantynivka is following the "worst-case scenario" for Ukraine. That is not a rhetorical formula. It is a precise operational finding about the speed at which Russian forces are infiltrating the city, the deterioration of Ukrainian defensive positions, and the c

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Analysis
- Published: 2026-06-29
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/analyse-kostiantynivka-la-porte-du-donbas-que-la-russie-s-acharne-a-briser

## Introduction: The City That Cannot Fall

### The worst-case scenario is unfolding

On **June 16, 2026**, Ukrainian military analysts from the **DeepState** group published a terse assessment: the battle of **Kostiantynivka** is following the **"worst-case scenario"** for **Ukraine**. That is not a rhetorical formula. It is a precise operational finding about the speed at which **Russian forces** are infiltrating the city, the deterioration of Ukrainian defensive positions, and the cascading consequences of a potential collapse.

**Kostiantynivka** is described by DeepState as the **"gateway"** to the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk urban zone. If this gateway falls, **"the logistics of the defense forces** in that area would be deeply disrupted," making even the simple maintenance of positions at Kramatorsk **"extremely dangerous."** In geopolitical terms: Kostiantynivka is not just another city in the Donbas. It is a **strategic** lock whose loss would fundamentally alter the balance of the **war**.

### The fortress belt and its vulnerable flank

The **Ukrainian fortress belt** of **Donetsk** — a network of defenses built since 2014, massively reinforced since 2022 — is the backbone of **resistance** in eastern **Ukraine**. **Kostiantynivka** sits at its **southern tip**. Since August 2025, **Russian forces** have launched a specific campaign for the city, after gaining majority control of **Chasiv Yar and Toretsk**.

**ISW** documented the first Russian infiltrations into **Kostiantynivka** as early as **October 2025**. By June 2026, **Russian troops** control or have infiltrated approximately **12.69% of the urban surface area**. That figure is both significant and deceptive: 12.69% is enough to disrupt the **defense** of an entire city, but not enough to claim control. This is the **war** of decimeters, streets, and buildings — the bloodiest and most exhausting form of urban combat.

*There is something unbearable about the logic of urban combat: you fight over percentages of surface area, street codes, abandoned factories. And meanwhile, the city itself disappears — under Russian artillery shells that level buildings to facilitate infantry infiltration. That is the scorched-earth doctrine applied to a city of 60,000 people.*

## The Geography of Battle: What the Map Says

### Kostiantynivka in the Donbas network

Before the **2022 invasion**, **Kostiantynivka** was part of a continuous urban network with **Sloviansk, Kramatorsk, and Druzhkivka** — an **industrial** zone of more than **350,000 inhabitants** in aggregate. Today, after four years of **war**, this zone is the beating heart of the Ukrainian defensive system in eastern Donbas. **Russia** already occupies **80% of the Donbas**; it needs this last node to complete the annexation it unilaterally proclaimed.

The main road between **Kostiantynivka** and the rear cities — Sloviansk, Kramatorsk — runs through **Druzhkivka**, which plays a vital logistical role. Ammunition deliveries, troop rotations, medical evacuations: everything transits through this axis. Reporters from **Le Monde** who covered the area in June 2026 described roads covered with anti-drone netting, columns of **armored vehicles**, a permanent **war** logistics operation running at full capacity in an atmosphere of constant tension.

### The two Russian tactical groups in a pincer

The pressure on **Kostiantynivka** is exercised primarily through two Russian tactical groups. The **"Bakhmut"** tactical group, built around the **3rd Army Corps** under the Southern **Forces** Group, is pushing from the northeast — from Stupochky through Novodmytrivka to the city's northeast, and along the **T-0504 Pokrovsk-Bakhmut road** toward the railway station. The **"Dzerzhinsk"** (Toretsk) tactical group operates within the area of responsibility of the **8th Combined Arms Army**, advancing from Illinivka in the south toward the city's northwest and southwest sectors.

These two groups are converging. **ISW** documented that their lead elements were approximately **two kilometers apart** in June. If that distance shrinks to zero, **Kostiantynivka** would face encirclement — a scenario that Ukrainian defenders are doing everything to prevent. The railway station, a critical junction point, has not yet been taken by the Russians, leaving open an essential line of communication.

*Two groups closing to within two kilometers of each other in a city of ruins: that is the mechanics of a vise. Ukraine knows it. Syrskyi knows it. The soldiers in the basements of Kostiantynivka know it. The question is not whether the pressure is real — it is. The question is whether the countermeasures will hold long enough.*

## The History of the Campaign: Progress Paid in Blood

### August 2025: the beginning of a new phase

The Russian campaign for **Kostiantynivka** formally began in **August 2025**, after **Russia** had secured most of **Chasiv Yar** and **Toretsk**. Those two cities had cost **Moscow** a considerable human toll — Toretsk alone absorbed approximately **26,000 Russian soldiers** in losses. But Russia has the cynicism to regard this price as acceptable as long as geographical progress is real.

The first Russian infiltrations into **Kostiantynivka** were documented in **October 2025**. Since then, the advance has been slow, costly, and contested meter by meter. **Russia** had set an **internal deadline of May 2026** for the capture of the city — a deadline it missed, as Ukrainian military authorities noted with satisfaction. That missed deadline is not a definitive success, but it is a sign that **Ukrainian resistance** is working.

### 11,000 Russian soldiers concentrated

**ISW** estimated that **Russia** has concentrated approximately **11,000 soldiers** in the Kostiantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical zone. That is a significant mass — too large to be ignored, not decisive enough to capture the city quickly in the face of determined **defense**. Russian units had been **reconstituted to 80%** according to an **ISW report** of June 6, following losses from the previous phase.

Among the reinforcements, the **70th Motorized Rifle Division** was redeployed to the Kostiantynivka-Chasiv Yar zone from the last quarter of 2025 in preparation for the spring offensive. This redeployment illustrates the priority **Moscow** assigns to this axis — at the expense of other sections of the **front** where troop numbers are therefore reduced. Every soldier sent to **Kostiantynivka** is one not defending Russian positions elsewhere.

*11,000 soldiers for a city of a few square kilometers. Russia sends men into a grinder and calls it an offensive. I do not know what is more stupefying: Moscow's indifference to its own human losses, or the resilience of Ukrainian defenders who keep the front from collapsing against this flood of sacrificed human flesh.*

## Syrskyi's June 19 Visit: A Strong Signal

### The commander-in-chief in the field

On **June 19, 2026**, the commander-in-chief of **Ukrainian armed forces**, General **Oleksandr Syrskyi**, personally visited the **Kostiantynivka** area. He received briefings from brigade commanders and a border guard unit on the operational situation, enemy intentions, and possible evolution scenarios. The commander of the **19th Army Corps**, Brigadier General **Oleksandr Bakulin**, presented the situation to him directly in the city.

These visits by commanders-in-chief to the hottest fronts are rare and deliberate. When **Syrskyi** travels to **Kostiantynivka**, it is a signal on multiple levels: to the **troops** (you matter, we are here), to the allies (the situation is serious but we are taking ownership), and to **Moscow** (we are not yielding). Bakulin formulated his official response with the required precision: **"Russian groups have infiltrated various areas of Kostiantynivka but control no part of the city."**

### The nuance of the battlefield

The distinction between "infiltrating" and "controlling" is fundamental in **urban warfare**. An infiltration is a presence — **soldiers** slipping into buildings, basements, side streets. Control is possession — the ability to hold **territory** against counter-attacks, maintain logistics there, and deny access to the enemy. **Russia** has been infiltrating **Kostiantynivka** since October 2025. It does not yet control it.

This distinction gives Ukrainian forces operational space. As long as the infiltrators do not consolidate their positions, **Ukrainian forces** can continue to counter-attack, clear infiltrated zones, and maintain essential lines of communication. It is exhausting — the **soldiers** of the **19th Army** Corps, the **56th Motorized Infantry** Brigade, and the **156th Mechanized Brigade** pay for it with their physical and mental health — but it is sustainable if support holds.

*I am not in a position to assess the reality of the ground centimeter by centimeter. But I can read ISW assessments, DeepState reports, Le Monde's coverage — and what I see is coherent: a city still holding, at the cost of considerable human effort, against an army that does not hesitate to level buildings to clear the way for its infantry.*

## The Fortress Belt: What Still Protects Northern Donetsk

### A network of defenses built since 2014

The Ukrainian **fortress belt** of **Donetsk** represents twelve years of defensive investment, accelerated since 2022. It includes trenches, bunkers, anti-tank obstacles, and fortified positions interlocked across several depths. This infrastructure is what has allowed **Ukraine** to withstand the most intense Russian offensive effort in modern history, with Russian losses unprecedented since the Second World War.

**Kostiantynivka** sits at the **southern tip** of this belt. The fact that Russians have taken ten months (August 2025 to June 2026) to infiltrate less than 13% of a city they have been progressively leveling is, paradoxically, an illustration of the effectiveness of **Ukrainian defense**. It is not a victory — it is a delay imposed on the aggressor at the cost of immense sacrifice.

### Why the fortress belt remains out of reach

ISW has maintained a consistent assessment: Russian forces at Kostiantynivka are making tactical gains but **cannot reach the fortress belt** in its main configuration to the north and west. Russian logistical constraints, Ukrainian counter-attacks in other sectors (notably near **Borova**, which have forced Russian detachments to arbitrate between defense and attack), and the limits of available combat power prevent an operational breakthrough.

The **3rd Army Corps northeast of the city** is still trying to dislodge Ukrainians from **Chasiv Yar** — and as long as it fails, encirclement of Kostiantynivka from the north remains impossible. Ukraine has held Chasiv Yar for more than two years, despite considerable pressure. That is remarkable resilience that denies Moscow the envelopment maneuver it needs.

*The fortress belt is not magic. It is made of concrete, steel, blood, and time. The fact that it is still holding in June 2026, after four years of war, proves that the defensive investment Ukraine made since 2014 was right and necessary. One can only hope the West draws that lesson for its own defense infrastructure.*

## The Humanitarian Situation: Living Under the Bombs

### A city being progressively razed

Correspondents from **Le Monde** who covered the region in June 2026 describe the concrete reality of positional warfare in the Donbas: roads covered with anti-drone netting, armored vehicles fitted with improvised metal cages, medical posts relocated urgently because their previous positions had become too dangerous. In **Kostiantynivka itself**, the Russians are leveling buildings with artillery and guided aerial bombs, creating rubble that paradoxically facilitates infantry infiltration.

This Russian doctrine of the **"razed city"** — systematically employed at **Mariupol, Bakhmut, Avdiivka, Toretsk**, and now Kostiantynivka — transforms urban areas into lunar landscapes where classical building defense becomes impossible. Ukraine must then defend ruins, with the same human losses but in an even more difficult environment. It is a barbaric strategy that works slowly but works.

### Soldiers at the end of their rope

Military doctor **Yuriy**, head of a stabilization medical unit within the **81st Air Mobile Brigade**, described the soldiers returning from the front at Kostiantynivka and the adjacent zone: **"They are exhausted — physically, but also mentally."** Weight loss, extreme fatigue, neglected injuries, psychological trauma accumulated after months under bombardment — that is the portrait of an entire generation of Ukrainian fighters.

This human reality is sometimes obscured by tactical assessments. The percentages of controlled territory, the kilometers gained or lost — all of it ignores the fact that every figure represents human beings in conditions that exceed what most Western societies can imagine. Inadequate troop rotation, deployment periods that stretch too long, a shortage of replacement personnel: these are the real gaps in the Ukrainian defensive system that military aid figures do not directly address.

*We talk about billions of dollars, Patriot missiles, F-16s. We rarely talk about the soldiers returning from Kostiantynivka with months of Donetsk in their eyes. These men and women are the human variable that all tactical analyses eventually ignore. I refuse to ignore them.*

## Russian Doctrine at Kostiantynivka: Patience as Strategy

### Small assault groups, day after day

Russian tactics at Kostiantynivka are documented with precision by ISW and confirmed by the commander of the 19th Ukrainian Corps: Russian forces advance in **small assault groups**, probing for weak points, slipping through breaches, attempting to **bypass and consolidate behind Ukrainian defensive lines**. The combined movement of infantry on foot and motorcyclists seeking to reach as far as possible creates multiple simultaneous pressure points.

Lieutenant Colonel **Mykhailo** (callsign "Adam"), 28 years old and commanding a unit in a sector facing Sloviansk, described what his forces do every day: **detecting small groups of Russian soldiers attempting to slip through Ukrainian lines**. Infiltrations occur every day, typically groups of two or three men. Sometimes these attempts are accompanied by motorized assaults. The objective is to disperse Ukrainian attention across multiple sectors to reduce battlefield surveillance effectiveness.

### Numerical superiority as a weapon

What Syrskyi summarized during his visit: Russian forces demonstrate **numerical superiority in manpower** and ignore their losses. They advance in small assault groups, probing for weaknesses in defenses. **"We detect these intentions in a timely manner, conduct active defense, and inflict significant losses on the enemy,"** he stated. That official response is true — and insufficient if Ukrainian losses cannot be compensated at a comparable rate.

The losses-to-advances ratio is brutal on both sides at Kostiantynivka. The most serious estimates suggest Russia loses several soldiers for every square meter gained. But Russia has human reserves — recruited, forcibly mobilized, or mercenaried — that Ukraine cannot match by population. That is the fundamental asymmetry that explains why Ukrainian defense, however heroic, cannot rest on human resistance alone.

*Russia uses its own soldiers as ammunition. That is literally its doctrine: send waves of infantry until the defense collapses, accept astronomical losses because domestic propaganda can hide them. Against this barbaric logic, the only answer that holds over the long term is technological: drones, precision artillery, deep strikes. Not bodies against bodies.*

## Ukrainian Counter-Attacks: Holding the Initiative Where Possible

### The clearing of Dovha Blaka

While the Russians push into Kostiantynivka, Ukrainian forces managed to **clear the village of Dovha Blaka**, southwest of the city, of Russian infiltrators who had taken up positions there. This local operation illustrates the Ukrainian doctrine of active defense: not merely holding but seizing the initiative when opportunity arises to reduce Russian angles of attack.

Similar counter-attacks occurred in the **Borova** sector to the north, forcing Russian units of the Western Forces Group to arbitrate between defending their positions and continuing their advance toward Sloviansk. Every successful Ukrainian counter-attack is not only a tactical gain — it is a consumption of Russian reserves that will not be available for Kostiantynivka.

### Deep strikes as a force multiplier

ISW notes that Ukraine is simultaneously conducting a **strike campaign against Russian logistical and transport lines**, including against fuel transiting through the Kerch Strait. These strikes aim to degrade Russia's ability to sustain its ground operations in Donetsk. If the supply routes for Russian artillery are interrupted, Russian positions at Kostiantynivka run short of ammunition — and the infantry waves advance without the fire support that allows them to reduce Ukrainian defenses.

The same logic underlies the **Flamingo strikes** on weapons factories in Volgograd: with every Iskander factory degraded, every fuel depot destroyed, every logistics convoy stopped, a little less firepower arrives at the front. This strategy of systematic degradation is slow, but it is real.

*The battle at Kostiantynivka is not only won at Kostiantynivka. It is also won at Volgograd, with Flamingo missiles. It is won in Brussels, with Ramstein's $1.7 billion. It is won in Washington, with discussions over production licenses. The battle is everywhere simultaneously — and that is something the Russians failed to grasp when they invaded in 2022.*

## The Sloviansk-Kramatorsk Stakes: Why Everything Changes

### The last Ukrainian urban zone in Donetsk

**Sloviansk, Kramatorsk, Druzhkivka, and Kostiantynivka** form what remains of Ukrainian urban presence in Donetsk. These four cities represent the command, logistics, and population center of the entire eastern defense. Their inhabitants — those who have not fled — live under drones, in basements, with daily commutes that can turn lethal.

DeepState was explicit: if Kostiantynivka falls, the situation at Kramatorsk **"becomes extremely dangerous."** And if Kramatorsk becomes untenable, the entire logistical structure of Donetsk's defense collapses. That is not an imminent scenario — Ukraine is still holding — but it is the scenario Moscow is working to realize, and that Kyiv must prevent at all costs.

### Russia claiming all of Donetsk

Vladimir Putin unilaterally annexed **Donetsk (along with Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson)** in September 2022, without that corresponding to any territorial control reality. He now demands that these regions — which he does not fully control — be recognized as Russian territory in any peace negotiation. That is a condition **Ukraine cannot accept** — constitutionally, morally, or strategically.

This impossible demand is the core of the diplomatic impasse. As long as Putin maintains this requirement and Ukraine legitimately rejects it, the war will continue. The battle of Kostiantynivka is not only a battle for a city — it is the battle to determine whether Russia can impose its conditions through brute force.

*Putin is demanding what he has not taken. He wants the world to grant him a Donetsk he has not yet conquered. That is the most costly geopolitical bluff in human lives of this century. And every Ukrainian soldier who holds Kostiantynivka one more day is an answer to that bluff.*

## The Spring-Summer 2026 Offensive: A Progress Report

### Lyman, Kostiantynivka, Pokrovsk: three axes, zero breakthrough

Russia's spring-summer 2026 offensive was launched on several simultaneous axes. Around **Lyman**, mechanized assaults signaled the intention to advance on Sloviansk from the northeast — they produced no significant gains, according to ISW. The **Western Forces Group** lacks the combat power needed to push simultaneously toward Sloviansk from Kupiansk and toward Borova.

The **Southern Forces Group**, concentrating its efforts on Kostiantynivka, made tactical gains in the city but did not achieve its operational breakthrough objective. The **51st and 8th Combined Arms Armies** lack the troop numbers needed to conduct simultaneous offensive operations in multiple directions. ISW noted that Russia **lacks the necessary troop concentrations** to deliver on its offensive ambitions across multiple fronts simultaneously.

### What the progress report tells us about what comes next

On **June 27, 2026**, ISW noted that Russian forces had continued offensive operations in the Kostiantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical zone but **had not advanced**. That is a stable day — neither a spectacular Ukrainian victory nor a Russian breakthrough. The reality of this war is that stable days are Ukrainian victories, because they contradict the Russian narrative of inexorable progress.

Summer 2026 is shaping up as an endurance test. Russia will continue to push, to send infantry waves, to probe for gaps. Ukraine will continue to defend, to counter-attack locally, to strike deep, and to ask more of its allies. The outcome of this test depends on factors beyond the battlefield: the continuity of Western aid, Ukrainian moral resilience, and Moscow's ability to maintain its tempo despite colossal losses.

*I do not know who will win the battle of Kostiantynivka. I do know that Ukraine is fighting it with a courage that deserves all the support it is asking for. And I know that if the West turns away now — absorbed by Iran, American midterms, or its own internal crises — the consequences will be felt well beyond Ukraine's borders.*

## Lessons from Kostiantynivka for Western Military Doctrine

### Urban combat in the 21st century

The battle of Kostiantynivka is writing new chapters of military doctrine for Western armies. The **role of drones in permanent surveillance**, the doctrine of small assault groups in dense urban terrain, the impact of deep strikes on offensive logistics, the value of long-prepared fortifications — all of this is being observed, studied, and integrated by NATO military planners.

Officers from numerous allied nations are in Ukraine — in training, observation, coordination roles. They bring home lessons that modify training doctrines, procurement procedures, and tactical frameworks. The war in Ukraine is the largest source of real operational data since the great wars of the **20th century**.

### The necessity of industrial defense autonomy

What Kostiantynivka also teaches is the **necessity of defense industrial autonomy**. A Ukraine that manufactures its own Flamingo missiles, produces drones locally, develops its own doctrines — this Ukraine is more resilient than the Ukraine of 2022 that depended entirely on Western deliveries. The Ukrainian model of dispersed and adaptive defense industry is a lesson for any country that takes its national security seriously.

NATO allies who see in Kostiantynivka only a Ukrainian problem are mistaken. What is at stake is a test of the founding principles of collective security: can democracies sustain support over time for a country resisting large-scale aggression? Every missile delivered through Ramstein, every drone funded by the British ERA, every Belgian F-16 is a partial answer to that question.

*The battle of Kostiantynivka has been going on for ten months. It may continue for months more. Every stable day is a victory of Ukrainian resistance against Russian imperial logic. What the West can do is ensure Ukraine does not run short of what it needs to hold each additional day.*

## War Fatigue as a Strategic Factor

### On the Ukrainian side: resistance or exhaustion?

The question of **war fatigue on the Ukrainian side** is sensitive but must be asked honestly. Opinion surveys in Ukraine show a determination to defend the country that remains very high — but also growing fatigue, a demand for troop rotation, an expectation of concrete results. The men returning from Kostiantynivka with months of front in their eyes cannot return there indefinitely without support.

The lack of additional mobilization, debates over conscription age, delays in rotations — these are signals of a society trying to preserve its human resources while maintaining its defense. Zelensky navigates these waters with remarkable political precision: asking enough of his people to hold, without asking too much so as not to fracture social cohesion. That balance is impossible to maintain indefinitely without victories.

### On the Russian side: silent mobilization continues

Russia, for its part, continues its **silent mobilization**: prisoner recruitment, short-term contracts, pressure on peripheral regions, recourse to North Korean fighters according to some sources. Putin avoids an official general mobilization that could shake his domestic support — but he maintains a sufficient stream of replacements to continue operations.

This demographic asymmetry — Russia 145 million, Ukraine 35 million — is a reality that does not disappear. It is partially compensated by technology, motivation, and Western support. But over time, if the war continues for several more years without a decisive victory, the demographic question will return to the center of the strategic debate.

*I refuse to conclude that Ukraine will lose because it is smaller. Ukrainian resistance since 2022 has defied all predictions. But I also refuse to ignore the realities: the West must invest more so that technology and support compensate for the human asymmetry. That is not optional.*

## Complementary Analysis: Dimensions and Perspectives

### Structural factors that are often overlooked

Any analysis of this situation would benefit from integrating the structural dimensions operating behind the immediate events. **Long-term dynamics** — economic, demographic, technological — shape the context in which political and military decisions are made. Ignoring these dimensions means analyzing the surface without understanding the underlying reality.

These structural factors are not theoretical abstractions — they translate into very concrete constraints for decision-makers. **Defense industrial capacity**, ammunition stockpiles, the availability of qualified human resources, the state of public finances: these are material realities that determine the real options available, independently of stated intentions.

### What the broader geopolitical context reveals

This situation fits within a geopolitical context broader than the war in Ukraine alone. The great-power competition — between **the West on one side**, and Russia, China, Iran and their allies on the other — fundamentally structures the dynamics under observation. Understanding this backdrop is indispensable for assessing the real stakes.

Decisions that appear tactical on the surface are often strategic in depth. **What is being decided today** in Western capitals, on Ukrainian battlefields, and in negotiating rooms does not concern only Ukraine — it concerns the global security architecture that will emerge from this period of turbulence.

*In analyzing these complementary dimensions, I am struck by the density of overlapping stakes. This war is not a local crisis — it is a stress test for the liberal world order. The result of this test will determine the rules of the geopolitical game for decades to come. That is not a metaphor. It is a reality the current leaders carry on their shoulders.*

*In concluding this analysis, one conviction stands out: the stakes described here go beyond current-events commentary. They engage our conception of what the West wants to be in the world — and our willingness to defend that conception with the necessary means, not merely with good intentions.*

## Complementary Analysis: Dimensions and Perspectives

### Structural factors that are often overlooked

Any analysis of this situation would benefit from integrating the structural dimensions operating behind the immediate events. **Long-term dynamics** — economic, demographic, technological — shape the context in which political and military decisions are made. Ignoring these dimensions means analyzing the surface without understanding the underlying reality.

These structural factors are not theoretical abstractions — they translate into very concrete constraints for decision-makers. **Defense industrial capacity**, ammunition stockpiles, the availability of qualified human resources, the state of public finances: these are material realities that determine the real options available, independently of stated intentions.

### What the broader geopolitical context reveals

This situation fits within a geopolitical context broader than the war in Ukraine alone. The great-power competition — between **the West on one side**, and Russia, China, Iran and their allies on the other — fundamentally structures the dynamics under observation. Understanding this backdrop is indispensable for assessing the real stakes.

Decisions that appear tactical on the surface are often strategic in depth. **What is being decided today** in Western capitals, on Ukrainian battlefields, and in negotiating rooms does not concern only Ukraine — it concerns the global security architecture that will emerge from this period of turbulence.

*In analyzing these complementary dimensions, I am struck by the density of overlapping stakes. This war is not a local crisis — it is a stress test for the liberal world order. The result of this test will determine the rules of the geopolitical game for decades to come. That is not a metaphor. It is a reality the current leaders carry on their shoulders.*

## Conclusion: Kostiantynivka Holds, But for How Long?

### A lock Ukraine cannot afford to lose

The battle of Kostiantynivka is one of the most significant of the war since the battle of Bakhmut in 2022–2023. If the city falls, the geostrategic consequences would be profound: major logistical disruption for Donetsk's defense, increased pressure on Kramatorsk and Sloviansk, and — perhaps most dangerously — a psychological signal that Ukrainian resistance has its limits.

For now, the lock holds. The railway station has not been taken. The two Russian tactical groups have not linked up. The fortress belt remains out of operational reach. Syrskyi went to see in person. Ukrainian brigades are counter-attacking where they can. That is insufficient for a victory — but it is sufficient for a resistance.

### What the West must understand

The **35th Ramstein meeting**, the **150,000 British-funded drones**, the **7 Belgian F-16s**, the **$540 million for ammunition** — all of it is directly connected to Kostiantynivka. Every shell delivered, every operational drone, every active Patriot missile is a factor keeping a Ukrainian city standing against 11,000 determined Russian soldiers. The West is funding the resistance of a city. It should be aware of that at every meeting, every budget vote, every strategic arbitration.

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

## Sources

### Primary sources

- [EuroMaidan Press — ISW: Russia gains ground in Kostiantynivka but Fortress Belt stays out of reach — June 11, 2026](https://euromaidanpress.com/2026/06/11/isw-russia-gains-ground-in-kostiantynivka-but-fortress-belt-stays-out-of-reach/)

- [RBC Ukraine — Russian forces intensify pressure on Kostiantynivka, ignoring losses — June 19, 2026](https://newsukraine.rbc.ua/news/russian-forces-intensify-pressure-on-kostiantynivka-1781891309.html)

- [ISW — Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 21, 2026 — June 21–22, 2026](https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-21-2026/)

### Secondary sources

- [Le Monde — Ukraine's Donbas rear area, from Sloviansk to Kramatorsk, is under constant Russian pressure — June 26, 2026](https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2026/06/26/ukraine-s-donbas-rear-area-from-sloviansk-to-kramatorsk-is-under-constant-russian-pressure_6754889_4.html)

- [ISW — Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 27, 2026 — June 27, 2026](https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-27-2026/)

- [Kyiv Independent — UK to send Ukraine 150,000 drones, air defense systems — June 18, 2026](https://kyivindependent.com/uk-to-send-ukraine-150-000-drones-air-defense-systems-in-1-billion-package-funded-by-proceeds-from-immobilized-russian-assets/)

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Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/analyse-kostiantynivka-la-porte-du-donbas-que-la-russie-s-acharne-a-briser