# ANALYSIS: Kim calls for a destructive posture — the authoritarian axis hardens

> The 25th of June, 2026 marks the 76th anniversary of the start of the Korean War — that invasion of the South by the North that began in 1950 and killed millions. Kim Jong-un chose precisely this date to personally oversee a series of major weapons tests and to deliver a message that is anything but ambiguous: Pyongyang intends to strengthen its "offensive, deadly, and destruct

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Analysis
- Published: 2026-06-28
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/analyse-kim-appelle-a-une-posture-destructrice-l-axe-autoritaire-se-durcit

## Introduction: June 25, a date loaded with intent

### An anniversary transformed into a show of force

The **25th of June, 2026** marks the **76th anniversary** of the start of the **Korean War** — that invasion of the South by the North that began in 1950 and killed millions. **Kim Jong-un** chose precisely this date to personally oversee a series of **major weapons tests** and to deliver a message that is anything but ambiguous: **Pyongyang** intends to strengthen its "offensive, deadly, and destructive posture." The official state news agency **KCNA** reported the following day that the North Korean leader had "expressed great satisfaction" with the results.

The systems tested that day are concrete and terrifying in their implications: an upgraded **240mm 24-tube multiple rocket launcher** equipped with an autonomous precision guidance system and an extended range of **90 kilometers**; a special-mission warhead for a **tactical ballistic missile**; and extended-range shells for a **155mm self-propelled howitzer** reaching **65 kilometers**. Taken together, these systems place all of **Seoul** squarely within their strike envelope.

### Kim's words: a declaration of permanent cold war

**KCNA** quoted Kim declaring: "Our self-defense policy is not simply the reinforcement of mere defensive functions. It is a policy for elevating a deadly and destructive offensive posture so that no enemy dares to confront us." He added: "Keeping our enemies in constant anxiety and fear is itself an important aspect of exercising war deterrence." These formulations are not empty — they reflect a military doctrine that Pyongyang is methodically putting into practice.

Professor **Lim Eul-chul** of Kyungnam University analyzed this sequence for Reuters: these moves reflect "acceleration efforts to fortify the southern border and integrate nuclear and conventional forces." The declared objective is to bring **all of South Korea within striking range** of North Korean forward units.

*Kim chooses the anniversary of a war that killed millions to test missiles designed to strike Seoul. It is rhetoric in action. This is not bluster — it is a calculated strategic demonstration, addressed simultaneously to his own population and to his adversaries.*

## The arsenal in detail: what Kim was testing

### The rocket launcher: 90 km toward the South

The **upgraded 240mm multiple rocket launcher** represents a significant evolution. Its range has been extended to **90 kilometers** from the Military Demarcation Line. For context: the distance from the **DMZ** to the center of **Seoul** is approximately **50 kilometers**. At 90 km, this system reaches **Pyeongtaek** in Gyeonggi Province, where American soldiers are based, and **Cheonan** in South Chungcheong Province. The entire **25-million-person** Greater Seoul metropolitan area falls within that strike envelope.

The key element is the **autonomous precision guidance** integrated into the system. Rockets of this category were traditionally not highly accurate. This upgrade fundamentally changes their operational utility: they can now target specific critical infrastructure — military bases, power facilities, ports — with increased precision.

### The special-mission warhead: targeting US bases

The **special-mission warhead** tested for tactical ballistic missiles was described by **KCNA** as designed for "lethal destruction of critical targets, including enemy airfields, ports, and power facilities." This description matches the infrastructure of American military bases in **South Korea**, most notably **Camp Humphreys** — the largest US military base outside the United States. The **155mm self-propelled howitzer** at 65 km completes this anti-force arsenal with plunging and direct fire capability.

As early as May 2026, **Pyongyang** had tested a mix of tactical ballistic missiles, artillery rockets, and AI-guided cruise missiles. This is not an isolated series of tests — it is a methodical program of modernization of conventional and tactical-nuclear strike capabilities, advancing according to a **five-year defense development plan**.

*What strikes me is the precision with which the systems are designed to strike very real targets: US bases in the South. Kim is not playing symbolic games. He is building a tactical deterrence capability that could, in a conflict, decapitate Allied forces before they have time to respond.*

## The lesson of Ukraine: the return of soldier-instructors

### 10,000 soldiers trained on a real battlefield

The context in which this North Korean military build-up is unfolding is unique in recent history. According to Ukrainian President **Volodymyr Zelensky**, approximately **10,000 North Korean soldiers** are currently deployed in Russia — and they are learning **21st-century warfare** techniques at a pace no simulated exercise could replicate. They are gaining experience with **FPV drones**, long-range precision strikes, electronic warfare, and Russian air defense systems.

Zelensky warned in an interview with Kyodo News in February 2026: "It is extremely dangerous that they are acquiring knowledge of modern hybrid warfare. They are learning how to counter missiles and drones, from FPVs to long-range. They will bring these skills back to North Korea at a minimum." According to South Korean intelligence, approximately **3,000 soldiers** have already returned to North Korea and become **military instructors**, spreading this expertise throughout the North Korean army.

### Casualties and rapid adaptation

North Korean soldiers have suffered considerable losses in Russia — approximately **2,000 killed and 4,000 to 5,000 wounded** according to South Korean and Ukrainian estimates cited by the **ISW**. Initially disoriented by Ukrainian drones in open terrain, they progressively adapted their tactics: better dispersion, camouflage, anti-drone measures. This adaptation under real-world conditions is precisely what the North Korean army could not have acquired any other way. **Moscow** is providing **Pyongyang** with a free training ground, paid for with Ukrainian blood.

The **ISW**, in its February 17, 2026 report on the Korean Peninsula, noted that North Korean troops in **Kursk** had transitioned to a fire support role — artillery, MLRS, aerial reconnaissance — while continuing to "acquire modern combat experience that North Korea will seek to integrate into its military training programs."

*There is a terrible irony here. Ukraine is fighting for its survival and, in doing so, is involuntarily training the next generation of North Korean soldiers. Every day this conflict continues without resolution, Pyongyang accumulates military capital it will deploy in a future confrontation in Asia. The interconnection of global crises never ceases to strike me.*

## The authoritarian axis: Moscow, Pyongyang and their accomplices

### A mutual defense treaty now operational

The **Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty** signed on **June 19, 2024** between **Vladimir Putin** and **Kim Jong-un** in Pyongyang fundamentally reconfigured the regional and global security dynamic. This treaty included a mutual defense clause obligating each party to provide military assistance "without delay" in the event of aggression. It is now operational, proven by the facts: thousands of North Korean soldiers are fighting alongside the Russian army.

In April 2026, during the visit of Russian Defense Minister **Andrey Belousov** to Pyongyang, the two countries agreed to place their military cooperation on a "stable and sustainable" footing for the period **2027–2031**. This is a long-term commitment, extending well beyond the Ukrainian conflict. The **Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD)** has documented in detail the technology transfers from Russia to North Korea: **electronic warfare** systems, **air defense** systems, support for **satellite launches**, and assistance for the missile program, including upgrades to the **KN-23**.

### Iran and North Korea: the nexus of sanctioned partners

The authoritarian axis is not limited to Moscow and Pyongyang. **Iran** has supplied **Shahed** drones to Russia — drones that have struck Ukraine by the hundreds. Russia in turn has shared military technologies with Tehran. Pyongyang has supplied **artillery shells**, **KN-23 missiles**, **multiple rocket launchers**, and now troops. These countries form a mutual support network that circumvents international sanctions and multiplies their respective capabilities.

**South Korea** estimates that it needs to train approximately **500,000** "drone warriors" in response to this growing threat — a decision announced on **June 26, 2026** by Defense Minister **Ahn Gyu-back**. This massive plan, including the acquisition of more than **20,000 low-cost drones**, is a direct response to the military doctrine Kim is imposing on the region.

*This Moscow-Tehran-Pyongyang axis is the greatest threat to the liberal international order since the end of the Cold War. Not because any one of these regimes is insurmountable — none of them is — but because together, they create an environment where democracies must respond simultaneously on three different fronts. That is precisely the goal.*

## Zelensky and the global alert

### "Incredibly dangerous": the repeated warning

Ukrainian President **Volodymyr Zelensky** has repeatedly stated since late 2024 that the North Korean presence in Russia is "incredibly dangerous" — not only for Ukraine, but for global security. His primary concern is less about the number of soldiers than the **technology transfers** that accompany this alliance.

In return for the deployment of its troops, **Pyongyang** is receiving, according to analysts: **financial assistance** circumventing sanctions, **advanced military technologies** — particularly in the fields of missiles and electronic warfare — **food** and **energy**, and above all that irreplaceable combat experience. The **BBC** estimated approximately **2,300 North Korean soldiers killed** since the start of the deployment — a price that Pyongyang evidently considers acceptable given the benefits obtained.

### Seoul requests the prisoners, Moscow resists

Ukraine currently holds two North Korean soldiers captured in **Kursk** in January 2025. **Ri** (27 years old) and **Paek** (22 years old) have expressed their desire to go to **South Korea**. Seoul officially signaled on **June 23, 2026** that it would accept all North Korean prisoners of war who wish to do so, opposing any forced repatriation to Russia or North Korea. **Russia**, for its part, has quietly but systematically included these two men on its lists of prisoners to be recovered during exchanges with Ukraine.

This diplomatic mini-crisis reveals the internal tensions within the Russian-North Korean alliance: **Moscow** must manage **Pyongyang**'s demands regarding the fate of its captured soldiers, while managing its relationship with **Kyiv** in the context of prisoner exchanges. The situation is without precedent in the annals of international humanitarian law.

*These two young North Korean soldiers — Ri and Paek — have become the symbol of a broader reality. They were sent to die in a war that is not theirs, for a regime that treats them as pawns. Their desire to go to South Korea says more about the nature of that regime than any analytical report could.*

## The response of the international community

### The UN powerless, allies fragmented

The **UN Security Council** is structurally blocked on the North Korean question. **Russia** and **China** — permanent members with veto power — oppose any meaningful condemnation resolution. Moscow has even begun **rhetorically opposing sanctions against North Korea**, while simultaneously intensifying its cooperation with Pyongyang in flagrant violation of those same sanctions.

The United States, **South Korea**, **Japan**, and their allies are imposing their own bilateral sanctions and coordinating responses, but without the UN multilateral framework, these measures have limited reach. **Russia** on June 25, 2026 expressed its "concern" over joint US-South Korean activities — a cynical inversion of responsibility that reflects the brazenness of the Moscow regime.

### The FDD sounds the alarm

The **Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD)**, in its analysis published on **June 25, 2026**, documented in detail how Russian security assistance is creating problems on the Korean Peninsula. **Russia** began using North Korean **KN-23** missiles against Ukraine in late **2023** and subsequently **improved their terminal maneuverability** and survivability — improvements whose "production know-how" was then transferred back to **Pyongyang**. This mutually beneficial improvement cycle is deeply troubling.

The **FDD** highlights that **Pyongyang** has already tested more ballistic missiles in **2026** than throughout all of **2025** — an acceleration rate that exceeds previous assessments and signals a political intent to raise the stakes ahead of any resumption of dialogue.

*I will be told that Kim Jong-un is simply trying to negotiate from a position of strength. Perhaps. But when that "position of strength" is measured in missiles pointed at Seoul and soldiers trained in real combat in Ukraine, the risk of miscalculation becomes real. Deterrence is not infallible.*

## South Korea facing the acceleration: adapting deterrence

### Camp Humphreys and American vulnerability

**Camp Humphreys**, the largest American military base outside the United States, is located in **Pyeongtaek** — approximately **70 kilometers** from the Military Demarcation Line (**DMZ**). With the systems tested on **June 25, 2026** — notably the multiple rocket launcher with a range of **90 km** — this base enters the direct North Korean strike envelope. The **28,500 American soldiers** stationed in South Korea are simultaneously a collective defense commitment and a potential target in any conflict scenario.

**South Korea** is responding to this growing vulnerability with a multilayered approach. The **KAMD** (Korea Air and Missile Defense) program integrates **PATRIOT**, **THAAD**, and domestic systems such as the **Cheongung**. The goal is to create an in-depth defense capable of intercepting North Korean ballistic missiles at different altitudes and flight phases. The improved terminal maneuverability of the **KN-23** — made possible by Russian assistance — is putting these systems to a significant test.

### Seoul's offensive deterrence

Alongside missile defense, **South Korea** has developed a **preemptive strike** capability against North Korean launchers and command sites — the **"Kill Chain"** doctrine. This approach rests on early detection of launch preparations and the elimination of threats before they are fired. The announcement on **June 26, 2026** of training **500,000 drone warriors** fits this logic: the Ukrainian drone war has shown that low-cost drones can neutralize costly weapons systems with devastating effectiveness.

This combination of active defense and preemptive strike — complemented by American extended deterrence, including the nuclear umbrella — forms **Seoul**'s comprehensive defense doctrine. The real test will be whether these capabilities evolve as rapidly as the threats documented by **June 25, 2026**. The North Korean acceleration, combined with Russian technology transfers, demands an equally dynamic response.

*Camp Humphreys at 70 km from the DMZ, in the sights of systems Kim just tested — that is the geopolitical reality East Asia must confront. The American presence in South Korea is no longer merely a symbol of commitment. It is a concrete target in Pyongyang's military plans. That must be stated clearly.*

## Pyongyang's agenda: modernize, deter, negotiate from strength

### Kim Jong-un's long-term strategy

The events of **June 25, 2026** fit into a coherent long-term strategy of **Kim Jong-un**. Since assuming power in 2011, Kim has pursued with remarkable consistency a dual objective: develop a credible nuclear arsenal to guarantee regime survival, and modernize conventional forces to maximize strike power in any limited conflict scenario. These two objectives reinforce each other: precise conventional weapons make any "surgical" strike possible, while the nuclear threat discourages any disproportionate response.

**Pyongyang**'s **five-year defense development plan**, progressively revealed since 2021, calls for the development of hypersonic missiles, tactical nuclear-propulsion submarines, advanced reconnaissance drones, and miniaturized nuclear warheads to equip a broader range of delivery vehicles. Each public test — such as the one on **June 25, 2026** — is a demonstration of progress toward these objectives, addressed simultaneously to the United States, South Korea, and the North Korean population itself.

### The potential negotiation window

**Kim Jong-un** is not only seeking to deter — he is seeking to negotiate from a position of strength. Historically, North Korean escalation phases often precede calculated diplomatic openings. The question is not whether **Pyongyang** will engage in dialogue with **Washington** or **Seoul** again, but on what terms. With a modernized conventional arsenal, soldiers hardened to modern warfare techniques, and Russian technology transfers accelerating its programs, Kim is in a position to demand more than he could in 2018–2019 during the summit period with **Donald Trump**.

The international community must decide whether it prefers to manage a **stronger North Korea** within a dialogue framework, or whether it allows the status quo of permanent escalation to continue. This question is uncomfortable, and there is no easy answer. What the events of **June 25, 2026** make clear is that the status quo option is becoming increasingly costly as **Pyongyang** improves its capabilities.

*I am not advocating concession to Kim Jong-un. I am acknowledging a reality that democrats find uncomfortable: ignoring Pyongyang has not slowed its military program. Sometimes, diplomacy with regimes one despises is the only available tool to slow an arms race. That is a difficult choice, not a betrayal of values.*

## Conclusion: The axis does not stop itself

### Systematic hardening, not accidental

The events of **June 25, 2026** are not an isolated episode. They fit into a coherent and deliberate trajectory: **Kim Jong-un** is modernizing his arsenal, forging an operational military alliance with **Moscow**, integrating lessons from the Ukrainian conflict, and categorically refusing any dialogue with **Seoul** or **Washington**. Meanwhile, **Putin** fuels this axis with technology, experience, and legitimacy. **Iran** watches and participates in its own way. **China** maintains a benevolent complicity.

### Democracy must respond with coherence

*What deeply concerns me is the disproportion of agendas. The authoritarian axis has a long-term, coordinated, patient vision. The democracies react piecemeal, divided among their own immediate interests. As long as this asymmetry persists, Pyongyang, Moscow, and Tehran will keep advancing their pawns.*

**Seoul**'s response with its **500,000 drone warriors** is an encouraging sign of strategic seriousness. NATO allies must understand that the threats in **Europe** and in **East Asia** are now structurally linked — North Korean weapons are killing Ukrainians, North Korean soldiers are learning to fight in Europe. A region-by-region fragmented response is a losing response. **The authoritarian axis** must be countered with a cohesion equal to its own.

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

## Sources

### Primary sources

- [Washington Post — Kim Jong Un watches weapons tests and calls for deadly and destructive military posture — June 25, 2026](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2026/06/25/north-korea-kim-weapons-missiles-south/e03fb72a-70ef-11f1-8730-e7fd0e2a6404_story.html)

- [US News & Reuters — North Korean Leader Kim Oversees Weapons Tests — June 26, 2026](https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2026-06-25/north-korean-leader-kim-oversees-weapons-tests-kcna-reports)

- [Chosun Ilbo — Kim Jong-un Tests New Rocket, Missile Systems on 6·25 Anniversary — June 26, 2026](https://www.chosun.com/english/north-korea-en/2026/06/26/XU2RHJRSLZAPDBVFUB7ULEBFYM/)

- [Foundation for Defense of Democracies — Russian security assistance creates problems on Korean Peninsula — May 7, 2026](https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2026/05/07/russian-security-assistance-is-creating-problems-on-the-korean-peninsula/)

### Secondary sources

- [Institute for the Study of War — Korean Peninsula Update, February 17, 2026](https://understandingwar.org/research/china-taiwan/korean-peninsula-update-february-17-2026/)

- [Ukrinform — Ten thousand North Korean soldiers in Russia, Zelensky says — February 20, 2026](https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-ato/4093539-ten-thousand-north-korean-soldiers-currently-stationed-in-russia-zelensky-says.html)

- [New Indian Express/AP — North Korea conducts major weapons tests, Kim calls for stronger offensive posture — June 26, 2026](https://www.newindianexpress.com/world/2026/Jun/26/north-korea-conducts-major-weapons-tests-kim-calls-for-stronger-offensive-posture)

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Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/analyse-kim-appelle-a-une-posture-destructrice-l-axe-autoritaire-se-durcit