# ANALYSIS: Istanbul 2022, the trap — why Putin's peace is nothing but disguised capitulation

> In diplomacy, ghosts are dangerous. They seem to offer a way out, a solution, a precedent to cling to. In June 2026, Vladimir Putin resurrected one of the most deceptive ghosts of this war: the Istanbul agreements of 2022. The Russian president declared that he was «ready to negotiate» with Ukraine — but only «on the basis» of those agreements, combined with the «Anchorage moda

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Analysis
- Published: 2026-06-28
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/analyse-istanbul-2022-le-piege-pourquoi-la-paix-selon-poutine-n-est-qu-une-capit

## ANALYSIS: Istanbul 2022, the trap — why **Putin**'s peace is nothing but disguised capitulation

## Introduction: the return of a diplomatic ghost

### An agreement that never existed, resurrected as a condition

In diplomacy, ghosts are dangerous. They seem to offer a way out, a solution, a precedent to cling to. In June **2026**, **Vladimir Putin** resurrected one of the most deceptive ghosts of this war: the **Istanbul agreements of 2022**. The Russian president declared that he was «ready to negotiate» with Ukraine — but only «on the basis» of those agreements, combined with the «Anchorage modalities» and the «realities on the ground». For anyone who understands what those formulas actually mean, the translation is immediate: it is a demand for Ukraine's total capitulation, dressed in the vocabulary of peace.

This declaration, relayed by **Ukrainska Pravda** and analyzed by the **Institute for the Study of War (ISW)** on June 23, **2026**, is not a good-faith gesture. It is a test of Western credulity — an invitation to confuse diplomatic form with a substance that has not shifted one millimeter since February **2022**. The analysis below dissects this test, examines what «Istanbul **2022**» actually means, and explains why accepting those terms would be a betrayal of Ukraine and a strategic disaster for the West.

### The context: why **Putin** speaks of peace now

**Putin**'s Istanbul declaration comes in a very specific economic context for Russia: a budget deficit exceeding **80 billion dollars**, exploding military spending, **government bonds** yielding **15 percent**, and an economy the **Kiel Institute** describes as suffering «structural exhaustion». It is no coincidence that the Russian peace discourse intensifies at precisely the moment when economic signals are deteriorating. The Kremlin's calls for «negotiation» have historically been calibrated for two objectives: to relieve military or economic pressure, and to divide the Western alliance by sowing doubts about the feasibility of Ukrainian victory.

In June **2026**, **Putin** is attempting both. The **ISW**, in its June 23 assessment, said it plainly: **Putin**'s and Lavrov's positions do not represent a diplomatic opening. They represent a «reaffirmation of the war aims of **2022**» — that is, Ukraine's total capitulation. Understanding why requires going back to Istanbul, in the spring of **2022**.

*Every time I read «**Putin** ready to negotiate», I have the same reflex: read the conditions he sets very carefully. Invariably, they ask Ukraine to concede everything Russia wants. That is «negotiation» in the same sense that pointing a gun at someone and asking them to sign could be called «dialogue».*

## Istanbul, March–April 2022: what actually happened

### The March–April 2022 talks: the forgotten context

To understand what **Putin** means by «Istanbul agreements», one must recall the context of the March–April **2022** talks. These negotiations, held in **Istanbul** with Ukrainian and Russian delegations, took place in the early weeks of the invasion, while Russian forces were still trying to take **Kyiv** and the **Ukrainian army** had just inflicted a series of stinging defeats on Russian armored columns near the capital. The military balance of power was very different from what it would become.

A preliminary text had been drafted during these talks. That text would have bound Ukraine to **permanent neutrality** (renouncing any NATO membership), a **drastic reduction in its armed forces** (to unilaterally defined levels), and a de facto recognition of Russian control over parts of Ukrainian territory. In exchange, Russia was offering... essentially to halt a war of aggression it had itself illegally launched. This is not a balanced peace agreement: it is the diplomatic formulation of a capitulation.

### Why those talks failed — and who bears responsibility

The Istanbul talks ultimately failed, and a historiographical debate continues over the reasons. Some sources, including statements by Ukrainian officials, indicate that the **discovery of atrocities in Bucha** — whose images went around the world in early April **2022** — made it politically impossible for the Ukrainian government to continue negotiating with Moscow. Other analyses, including that of American diplomat **Fiona Hill**, have suggested Western pressure for Ukraine not to sign on unfavorable terms.

The Russian narrative, by contrast, claims the agreement was nearly finalized and that Ukraine abandoned it under Western pressure — implying that **the West bears responsibility** for the continuation of the war. This narrative is false for two reasons: first, the Istanbul «agreements» were not finalized — they were a preliminary text on which the parties were far from consensus; second, even had an agreement been signed, historical precedents (notably the Minsk I and II agreements) suggest Russia would have used it as a pause to rearm and resume the offensive, as it did in **2014**–**2015**.

*I do not claim the Istanbul talks could never have led anywhere. But the context in which they were held — a Russia still bombing civilians, which had just committed the atrocities of Bucha — made any credible agreement morally impossible. How do you sign peace with people who torture prisoners? I refuse to treat that question as purely geopolitical.*

## What «the basis of the Istanbul agreements» means in 2026

### Decoding Russia's maximum conditions

In **2026**, «negotiating on the basis of the Istanbul agreements» does not mean returning to a preliminary **2022** text to finalize it. It means, according to the **ISW**'s analysis, starting from Russia's maximum demands of 2022 — Ukrainian neutrality, disarmament, recognition of occupied territories — and treating them as the floor of negotiations. In other words: Russia is not proposing to make concessions from a balanced starting position. It is proposing to begin from maximum Ukrainian concessions and to discuss possible marginal adjustments.

This positioning is revealing. In normal diplomacy, two parties that genuinely want peace start with their respective positions and meet somewhere in the middle. Here, Russia demands that the «middle» be what it demanded four years ago, at a moment when it still believed it could conquer Ukraine in a matter of weeks. The fact that the military situation has evolved considerably since then — including significant Russian defeats, Ukrainian gains, and an incomparably stronger Ukrainian army than in **2022** — appears not to modify Russian demands by one iota.

### «Realities on the ground»: a euphemism for illegal occupation

Adding «realities on the ground» as a condition for talks is the most shocking element of **Putin**'s declaration. This formula, apparently neutral and pragmatic, actually means: Russia wants to retain control of the territories it currently occupies — including the four Ukrainian regions it «annexed» in flagrant violation of **international law**: **Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson**. Even without fully controlling these regions militarily, it would have its unilateral annexation recognized as a fait accompli.

The idea that Ukraine should accept this condition is absurd. A victim of aggression is not asked to validate the aggressor's ownership of stolen property as a precondition for settlement. That would be transforming theft into law. It would legitimize the idea that military conquest can create sovereign rights in 21st-century international law. And that is precisely what the **United Nations General Assembly** has rejected in successive resolutions since **2022**.

*The expression «realities on the ground» is the kind of diplomatic euphemism that makes me furious. Translated honestly, it reads: «you must accept that we keep what we stole». If that is what realist diplomacy means, then burn every international law treaty since 1945.*

## ISW analysis: Russia's war aims have not changed

### An assessment without softening

The **Institute for the Study of War (ISW)**, in its assessment of the Russian campaign published on **June 23, 2026**, was particularly explicit on this point. The report notes that the positions expressed by **Putin and Lavrov** in recent declarations are a «reaffirmation of the war aims of **2022**» — namely, Ukraine's total capitulation. The ISW underlines that the formula «negotiate on the basis of Istanbul» does not constitute a diplomatic opening but a reformulation of the initial maximum demands in language that can deceive unprepared Western observers.

This assessment is consistent with the ISW's work since the start of the war: rigorous analysis, based on open-source data, that systematically resists the simplistic narratives of both sides. When the ISW — known for its analytical seriousness — states that **Putin**'s positions represent war aims unchanged since **2022**, this is not a partisan opinion. It is a diagnosis based on analysis of texts, declarations, and observable behaviors.

### Lavrov and the reaffirmation of demands

Russian **Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov** accompanied **Putin**'s statements with his own formulations, insisting on the same conditions. Lavrov is an experienced diplomat who perfectly masters the art of saying radical things in moderate language. His statements of June **2026** illustrate that mastery: on the surface, they speak of «dialogue», «mutual security», «Ukrainian neutrality». Underneath, they demand that Ukraine renounce NATO membership permanently, that it disarm to levels defined by Moscow, and that it recognize illegal Russian annexations.

This is not diplomacy. It is propaganda dressed as diplomacy. And that difference carries capital importance for Western decision-makers seeking signals of a genuine Russian will for peace. Such signals do not exist in Lavrov's June **2026** statements. What exists is an invitation to confuse form with substance, the vocabulary of peace with the demands of capitulation.

*Lavrov is to diplomacy what fast-food advertising is to nutrition: it looks like something substantial, but inside there is nothing nourishing. His June 2026 statements are empty text dressed up as a serious proposal. The slightest substantive analysis reveals that immediately.*

## The Minsk precedent: why Russian agreements do not deserve trust

### Minsk I and Minsk II: a lesson in recent history

To assess the credibility of any Russian negotiating proposal, it is essential to recall the history of the **Minsk agreements**. **Minsk I** (September **2014**) and **Minsk II** (February **2015**) were ceasefire agreements negotiated after the first hostilities in the **Donbas**. They provided for a ceasefire, withdrawal of heavy weapons, and a political roadmap for the status of the Donbas.

Neither agreement was respected by Russia. The ceasefire was violated thousands of times. Heavy weapons were not withdrawn. And today, former German Chancellor **Angela Merkel** and former French President **François Hollande** have both publicly declared that the Minsk agreements were, on the Western side, mainly designed to give Ukraine time to strengthen militarily — implicitly admitting they did not believe Russia would truly honor them. If major Western leaders admit that the Minsk agreements were not designed to be respected by Russia, on what basis could one believe an «Istanbul 2.0 agreement» would be?

### The policy of strategic pause

Russia has a documented practice of what military analysts call the **«strategic pause»**: using ceasefires or negotiations to rearm, reposition forces, and prepare the next offensive. This model was applied in **Georgia in 2008**, in the **Donbas in 2014–2015**, and would continue to apply in any peace agreement not guaranteed by robust international verification mechanisms and credible security guarantees for Ukraine.

Yet the «Istanbul agreements» as described by **Putin** in June **2026** contain no mention of such mechanisms. There is no reference to **international security guarantees** for Ukraine comparable to NATO's Article 5. There is no independent verification mechanism. There are only Russian promises — which, historically, are worth less than the paper they would be written on.

*The Minsk agreements were signed with great fanfare. They remained paper. If anyone in Europe proposes to negotiate on the basis of the same trust in Russian promises, I would like them to explain to me what has changed in Russia's behavior to justify renewed trust. I do not hear the answer.*

## Anchorage: the other maximalist mantra

### What the reference to Anchorage means

**Putin**'s declaration references not only «Istanbul» but also the «Anchorage modalities». This reference to **Anchorage** — the Alaskan city where US-China talks were held in March **2021** — is more obscure for most observers, but it is significant. In Moscow's usage, this reference evokes a model of negotiation between «great powers» that would treat Russian interests as equivalent to those of the United States in a recognized «sphere of influence» in Eastern Europe.

In other words: **Putin** aspires to an agreement in which **Eastern Europe** would be treated as a zone of joint Russian-American co-responsibility, in which sovereign states like Ukraine would have no say over their own future. This is a worldview that harks back to the **Yalta agreements of 1945** — one in which great powers decide the fate of small countries without consulting them. That vision is incompatible with contemporary international law, with the principles of sovereignty, and with everything the **liberal international order** has claimed to uphold since **1945**.

### The Russian MFA: a third mantra that completes the picture

The **Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)** added its own layer of conditionality to **Putin**'s statements. MFA spokespersons repeated the habitual demands for Ukraine's «denazification» — a propaganda term that in practice means replacing the democratically elected Ukrainian government — and «demilitarization», which means disarming Ukraine to levels incapable of defending against future Russian aggression. These demands constitute the Kremlin's third «maximalist mantra», the one that makes any agreement on Russian terms not merely inequitable but dangerously absurd for Ukraine's long-term security.

A country «demilitarized» and «denazified» in Russian terms would be a country unable to defend itself against the next act of aggression and governed by a pro-Russian government imposed from outside. That is not peace. That is annexation by another route. And that is what the ISW confirms in its analysis of the «**2022** war aims» that remain unchanged.

*«Denazification» is one of the most perverse concepts in Putinist propaganda. Applying the term «Nazi» to a country whose president is a Jewish man whose family perished in the Holocaust is an insult to history, a deliberate falsification, and a brazen lie. Repeating this demand in 2026 says everything about the sincerity of Russian intentions.*

## Zelensky facing Russian conditions: the red line that will not move

### The Ukrainian position: no disguised capitulation

**Volodymyr Zelensky** responded to **Putin**'s Istanbul statements with a clarity that many Western diplomats struggle to display. Ukraine will not negotiate on the basis of conditions that imply renouncing its territorial sovereignty, limiting its defensive armed forces, or recognizing illegal Russian annexations. This position is not intransigence — it is the expression of fundamental rights recognized by international law.

What is often forgotten in discussions about «negotiations» is that Ukraine did not start this war. It is enduring it. It is defending its territory, its citizens, and its right to exist as a sovereign state. Asking Ukraine to accept «compromises» on these fundamental points amounts to asking a victim of aggression to pay part of the bill. That is not a model of conflict resolution with any grounding in international law or morality.

### The Ukrainian peace formula as a counterpoint

Ukraine's ten-point **«peace formula»**, presented by Zelensky at multiple international forums, offers a serious alternative framework: withdrawal of Russian forces from internationally recognized Ukrainian territory, **justice** for documented war crimes, **release of all prisoners**, **nuclear safety**, and **robust security guarantees** for Ukraine. This formula is grounded in international law. It is not perfect — no peace solution ever is — but it starts from the principle that Ukraine has rights that Russia is bound to respect, not concessions to be granted.

The contrast between the Ukrainian «peace formula» and the Russian conditions based on Istanbul is revealing: one starts from the rights of the victim state, the other from the demands of the aggressor state. When certain Western commentators suggest «meeting both parties halfway», they are actually suggesting Ukraine should renounce half its fundamental rights to satisfy an aggressor. That is not pragmatism. It is encouraged surrender.

*Zelensky's peace formula is reasoned, grounded in law, and serious. The fact that it receives less media attention than **Putin**'s rhetorical provocations says something troubling about how we cover this war. Substance versus form: Ukrainian substance wins every time.*

## The prisoner exchange as the only functioning channel

### The 76th exchange: 160 Ukrainians freed

Against this backdrop of total diplomatic deadlock on fundamental questions, there is one channel that still functions: **prisoner-of-war exchanges**. On **June 26, 2026**, according to the **Kyiv Independent** and **Interfax-Ukraine**, a **76th exchange** took place, freeing **160 Ukrainian prisoners** held by Russia. Since the start of the war, more than **9,500 Ukrainians** have been freed through such exchanges, and **1,596 since the start of 2026** according to the official Ukrainian count.

These exchanges, mediated by the **United Arab Emirates** — one of the few countries maintaining open channels with both parties — represent the only domain in which a form of reciprocity between Kyiv and Moscow is still observable. They do not constitute peace diplomacy in the strict sense: they do not change positions on fundamental questions. But they have immense humanitarian value for the families of prisoners and send an important political signal: both parties still accept cooperating on individual human cases.

### What the exchanges reveal about the margins of diplomacy

The existence of these exchanges reveals that indirect channels of communication — via the UAE or other intermediaries — still function. It also reveals that Russia chooses to participate in these exchanges not out of humanism but out of political calculation: it releases Ukrainian prisoners in exchange for its own soldiers, thereby maintaining a parity that allows it to claim diplomatic good faith at minimal cost.

What these exchanges do not reveal, however, is any flexibility on the central political questions. Russia can simultaneously participate in prisoner exchanges and maintain peace conditions that amount to Ukrainian capitulation. These two behaviors are not contradictory — they reflect a strategy that compartmentalizes humanitarian dossiers from the political one in order to maximize communications benefits while preserving its war positions.

*I salute these exchanges unreservedly. Each prisoner freed is a life snatched from the hell of Russian jails, documented as places of systematic torture. But I refuse to let these exchanges serve to launder Russia's diplomatic positions. The devil is in the dissociation of files.*

## Security guarantees: the true heart of the matter

### Why Ukraine cannot accept neutrality without guarantees

One of the central elements of Russia's Istanbul demands is **Ukrainian neutrality** — a permanent renunciation of NATO membership. The Russian argument is that NATO enlargement toward Ukraine is unacceptable for Russian security. That argument is diplomatically presented as reasonable. It is not, for one fundamental reason: a state claiming to be «threatened» by a neighbor joining a defensive alliance has no legitimate security to invoke unless it has not itself committed aggression against that neighbor. And that is precisely what Russia has done.

More concretely: if Ukraine were to accept permanent neutrality, who would guarantee its security against future Russian aggression? The **1994 Budapest Memorandum** provided such guarantees in exchange for Ukraine's nuclear disarmament — and those guarantees were violated without consequences for their signatories, including Russia itself. A second memorandum, based on the same trust in Russian promises, would be a cruel joke. The only real guarantee for Ukraine is membership in a collective defense alliance — that is, NATO.

### The dilemma for Western guarantors

What **Putin**'s Istanbul declaration deliberately ignores is that the question of Ukrainian security guarantees is also a question for **Western partners**. If Ukraine accepts unguaranteed neutrality, Western countries find themselves in an impossible position: having encouraged Ukraine to hold, without giving it the means to defend itself durably, and without admitting it into the only security structure that could genuinely protect it. That is not a tenable position, morally or strategically, for **Europe or the United States**.

The real negotiation that must take place — if serious talks ever begin — is a negotiation on security guarantees for Ukraine, not on the conditions of its disarmament and neutralization. That is the terrain on which Western diplomacies must insist, rather than allowing the frame of the discussion to be defined by the aggressor's maximum demands.

*The Budapest Memorandum is the most important and least learned historical lesson of this war. Ukraine gave up its nuclear weapons in exchange for security guarantees. Those guarantees were trampled. Who can seriously propose a second Budapest memorandum without it being a bloody joke?*

## The 40-day pressure campaign and the message to Moscow

### Zelensky responds to Russian demands with strikes

Ukraine's response to **Putin**'s Istanbul statements is not only diplomatic. It is also military. **Zelensky**'s announcement of a **40-day pressure campaign** targeting Russian military and logistical infrastructure — with repeated strikes on deep-territory sites — is, among other things, a message sent directly to Moscow and to Western capitals: Ukraine will not negotiate under duress, and it has the capabilities to make the costs of continuing the war felt.

This strategy of «peace through strength» is the only one that makes sense in the current context. A militarily weakened Ukraine, forced to negotiate from a position of weakness, would obtain at best the Istanbul conditions — that is, progressive capitulation. A Ukraine that maintains military pressure, that strikes Russian oil infrastructure at **1,300** km from the front line, that demonstrates persistent offensive capability, arrives at any negotiating table — if serious talks ever open — with a very different power dynamic.

### Time as a strategic factor

**Time** is central in this strategic equation. **Putin** is betting that time works for him: that Western fatigue sets in, that aid to Ukraine dries up, that political divisions in Europe and the United States weaken support for Kyiv, and that Ukraine will ultimately be forced to accept his conditions. That is why he speaks of peace now — not because he genuinely wants peace, but because he wants to freeze a military situation that is currently unfavorable to him on certain fronts.

Ukraine and its allies must understand this temporality and act accordingly. Every month that sanctions bite harder, every month that the Russian economy weakens, every month that Russian military spending digs an unsustainable deficit — all of this deteriorates **Putin**'s position and improves Ukraine's in any future serious negotiation. Time is not neutral. One must decide whether it works for or against justice.

***Putin** is playing a long chess game. The problem is that while he moves his diplomatic pawns, people are dying. Peace is not a chess game. It has a human cost that geopolitical calculations never measure. I refuse to let that dimension disappear behind strategic abstractions.*

## What the West must understand to avoid falling into the trap

### Distinguishing signals of genuine Russian willingness for peace

How can Western decision-makers distinguish a genuine Russian signal of willingness for peace from a diplomatic maneuver? The ISW's analysis provides a useful framework: genuine willingness for peace manifests through **concrete, verifiable proposals**, a disposition to make real concessions on one's own positions, and behaviors consistent between public declarations and military actions. Yet Russian forces continue to attack Ukrainian civilians, strike infrastructure, and advance where they can along the front line. These behaviors are not compatible with sincere willingness for peace.

True signals of a Russian opening would look like: a demonstrable unilateral ceasefire maintained over time, a disposition to discuss a timeline for withdrawing Russian forces from occupied Ukrainian territories, or acceptance of a credible international verification mechanism. These signals do not exist in the June **2026** declarations. What exists is recycled diplomatic verbiage asking Ukraine to capitulate under the guise of «peace».

### The risk of Western pressure on Ukraine to accept

The real danger is not that Ukraine accepts the Istanbul conditions — it will not. The real danger is that **Western partners**, under the influence of sanctions fatigue, domestic pressures, or a certain reading of their short-term interests, begin to exert pressure on Kyiv to «accept a compromise». That scenario — a Ukraine pushed by its allies to sign an agreement presented as «realistic» but amounting to partial capitulation — would be the most destructive of all. It would betray Ukraine, send a catastrophic signal to every state potentially targeted by future aggression, and validate the Putinist doctrine that force creates rights.

Western leaders must have the analytical clarity to see what the ISW, the Baltics, and the Ukrainians themselves see: **Putin**'s «Istanbul agreements» are not a path toward peace. They are a path toward Ukrainian capitulation that Russian propaganda would transform into victory. **The trap is visible. One simply must refuse to fall into it.**

*I think of those well-intentioned Westerners who, comfortable drawing rooms, speak of «pragmatism» and «realistic negotiations». I ask them one simple question: if Ukraine signs the Istanbul agreements on **Putin**'s terms, how many years before the next Russian attack? Two years? Five years? I do not hear a satisfactory answer.*

## The 9,500 prisoners: the only possible ground for trust

### Building on exchanges toward something more solid

If one must seek a terrain on which a minimal trust between Kyiv and Moscow can be built, it is that of **prisoner-of-war exchanges**. Since **2022**, more than **9,500 Ukrainians** have been freed. That is **9,500** people reunited with their families, **9,500** stories of survival in conditions of documented illegal detention and inhumane treatment. These exchanges prove that practical cooperation mechanisms, even in a state of war, are possible when both parties find an interest in them.

Building on this precedent — while never confusing it with an opening on fundamental political questions — could form the basis of an approach that preserves both the integrity of Ukrainian positions and concrete humanitarian advances. That is, in fact, what the mediation of the **United Arab Emirates** has managed to do: maintain a humanitarian channel without compromising the political positions of either party.

### The limits of this partial trust

But this partial trust, built around prisoner exchanges, cannot be extrapolated to fundamental political questions. The history of the Minsk agreements shows that Russia can respect humanitarian arrangements while violating political ones. The separation of files — humanitarian on one side, political on the other — is intentional in Russian strategy. It allows maintaining a facade of cooperation without conceding on the questions that truly matter.

Smart diplomacy consists of using prisoner exchanges for what they are — precious humanitarian acts — while never allowing them to serve to legitimize unacceptable political positions. This is a difficult balancing act, but **Zelensky and his teams** have demonstrated over four years that they can maintain it. With the support of their allies, they can continue.

*These 9,500 freed prisoners represent something no diplomatic communiqué can capture: the human face of the war. Each return is a victory snatched from the absurdity of the conflict. I am wary of people who can talk about geopolitics without ever thinking of those faces.*

## Toward authentic diplomacy: prerequisites

### What would make serious negotiations possible

For genuinely authentic peace negotiations — as opposed to the current rhetorical maneuvers — to become possible, certain prerequisites must be met. On the Russian side: abandonment of demands for Ukraine's neutralization and disarmament as preconditions, a recognition that illegal annexations cannot be the starting point for negotiation, and a cessation of strikes on civilians and non-military infrastructure. On the Western side: a firm commitment not to pressure Ukraine into accepting unacceptable conditions, and the provision of robust security guarantees that would make Ukraine confident in any future agreement.

These conditions are not met in June **2026**. They likely will not be until the Russian economic and military situation deteriorates sufficiently for the cost-benefit calculus of the war to change radically in **Putin**'s mind. In the meantime, the best policy is to maintain pressure — economic, military, diplomatic — and to categorically refuse to let the frame of any negotiation be defined by the terms of Istanbul.

### The role of allies in defining the framework

Ukraine's Western allies bear an essential responsibility in this process: **refusing to legitimize the Istanbul conditions** as a basis for negotiation. Every time a Western leader mentions Istanbul without immediately specifying that those conditions amount to Ukrainian capitulation, they inadvertently reinforce the Russian position. Linguistic clarity is a first-rate diplomatic tool. **Calling a trap a trap is already half of not falling into it.**

*Diplomacy has its own timing. What seems immobile can move very quickly when conditions change. I do not lose hope — but I refuse the facade optimism that ignores the depth of the obstacles.*

## The prisoners of Istanbul: Ukrainians paying the price of the diplomatic deadlock

### 9,500 freed and thousands still waiting

The **76th prisoner exchange** of **June 26, 2026**, which freed **160 Ukrainians** according to the **Kyiv Independent**, tragically illustrates the paradox of the global diplomatic deadlock. While **Putin** speaks of «negotiation on the basis of Istanbul» — conditions that amount to Ukrainian capitulation according to the **ISW** — Ukrainian prisoners are being held in documented conditions of inhumane treatment. These two realities cannot be dissociated in the analysis of the diplomatic situation.

More than **9,500 Ukrainians** have been freed since the start of the war through these exchanges, according to **Interfax-Ukraine**. That is remarkable. But thousands remain detained. And every month that the general diplomatic impasse continues is another month in captivity for those whose names have not yet appeared on an exchange list. The connection between the deadlock in substantive negotiations and the fate of prisoners is direct.

### The Minsk agreements as a warning for any future agreement

The discussion of the «Istanbul agreements» must be conducted with the history of the **Minsk I and II Agreements** firmly in mind. These agreements, signed in **2014** and **2015**, provided for ceasefires, heavy weapons withdrawals, and a political roadmap for the **Donbas**. Neither was respected by Russia. **Angela Merkel** and **François Hollande** publicly admitted that these agreements were primarily aimed at giving Ukraine time to strengthen militarily.

This lesson is fundamental: Russia has a documented practice of using peace agreements as **strategic pauses** to rearm. An «Istanbul agreement» signed on **Putin**'s terms would be Minsk III — a pause before the next offensive. The guarantee against this scenario is not Russian good faith, which was exhausted long ago. It is a robust international verification mechanism and concrete security guarantees for Ukraine.

*Istanbul, Minsk, Budapest — every time Russia made a peace promise, it broke it when convenient. I cannot write about diplomacy around this conflict without naming that reality. This is not anti-Russianism — it is historicism. Past behavior is the best predictor of future behavior.*

## Conclusion: the Istanbul trap must not spring shut

### Diplomatic lucidity against rhetorical maneuver

Peace is a noble and necessary objective. Ukraine wants peace — but a just, durable peace that guarantees its sovereignty and security, not a peace that would in reality validate an illegal act of aggression. The «Istanbul agreements» proposed by Putin are not a path toward that peace. They are a rhetorical trap designed to divide the Western alliance and to legitimize Russian war aims unchanged since **2022**.

The ISW's analysis, the positions of the Baltic states, and an honest reading of Lavrov's and Putin's declarations all lead to the same conclusion: Russia's maximum conditions remain Russia's maximum conditions, whatever diplomatic packaging one wraps them in. Analytical clarity is the first line of defense against this manipulation. **Ukraine deserves allies who make that analytical effort and who refuse to let the language of peace cover the logic of capitulation.**

### What justice demands

Beyond strategy, there is justice. Justice demands that the aggressor answer for its acts before the victim concedes anything. It demands that the documented crimes at **Bucha, Mariupol, Kherson**, and hundreds of other locations not be erased by an agreement signed under pressure. It demands that **Ukrainian prisoners** still detained in Russia in conditions human rights organizations describe as torture be freed — not used as bargaining chips in a negotiation they bear no responsibility for.

The Istanbul trap must not spring shut. History, justice, and European security demand this with equal insistence. **Ukraine has the right to choose its future. Putin does not have the right to steal it — neither by arms nor by capitulation diplomacy.**

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

*The numbers speak for themselves, but one must know how to read them. Behind every economic data point, behind every statistic on sanctions or prisoners, there are real political decisions and concrete human lives that Excel spreadsheets never fully capture.*

## Sources

### Primary sources

- [Ukrainska Pravda — Putin ready for talks on basis of 2022 Istanbul agreements — June 23, 2026](https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2026/06/23/8040766/)

- [ISW — Russian offensive campaign assessment: reaffirmation of 2022 war aims — June 23, 2026](https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-23-2026/)

- [Kyiv Independent — 160 Ukrainian POWs released in 76th prisoner exchange — June 26, 2026](https://kyivindependent.com/160-ukrainian-pows-released-from-russian-captivity-in-latest-exchange-zelensky-says/)

- [Interfax-Ukraine — 1,596 Ukrainians repatriated since the start of 2026 — June 26, 2026](https://en.interfax.com.ua/news/general/1180132.html)

- [Meduza — Putin says Russia ready to negotiate on basis of 2022 Istanbul agreements — June 23, 2026](https://meduza.io/en/news/2026/06/23/putin-says-russia-ready-to-negotiate-with-ukraine-on-the-basis-of-the-istanbul-agreements-of-2022)

### Secondary sources

- [RBC-Ukraine — Details of the 160-for-160 exchange between Ukraine and Russia — June 26, 2026](https://newsukraine.rbc.ua/news/ukraine-and-russia-complete-third-phase-of-1782478036.html)

- [1lurer.am — Russia and Ukraine carry out 160-for-160 prisoner exchange — June 26, 2026](https://www.1lurer.am/en/2026/06/26/Russia-and-Ukraine-carried-out-prisoner-exchange-on-principle-of-160-for-160/1536874)

- [United24 Media — Russia's budget deficit tops 80 billion dollars despite Kremlin stability claims — June 23, 2026](https://united24media.com/world/russias-budget-deficit-tops-80-billion-despite-kremlin-stability-claims-20083)

- [Foreign Affairs Forum / Kiel Institute — Russia's war economy: structural exhaustion — June 23, 2026](https://www.faf.ae/home/2026/6/23/russias-war-economy-has-problems-but-is-not-about-to-crash-vladimir-putin-is-still-able-to-fund-his-aggression)

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Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/analyse-istanbul-2022-le-piege-pourquoi-la-paix-selon-poutine-n-est-qu-une-capit