# ANALYSIS: Hormuz, the strait that shakes the world: decoding the US-Iran $300-billion deal

> The Strait of Hormuz. Twenty-one kilometres at its narrowest point. Two two-mile-wide shipping lanes. And yet this tiny passage between Iran and Oman represents one of the most critical economic arteries on the planet: approximately 20% of all the world's oil and 30% of the world's liquefied natural gas transit through these waters every day. When Tehran murmurs that it might c

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Analysis
- Published: 2026-06-28
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/analyse-hormuz-le-detroit-qui-fait-trembler-le-monde-decryptage-de-l-accord-us-i

## Key takeaways

- The Strait of Hormuz carries about 20% of the world's oil and 30% of its LNG, which explains why the roadmap matters for global markets.
- The 14-point memorandum, as reported by Ground News, is criticised as ambiguous on who finances the $300 billion, on timelines and on verification.
- The US and Iran gave contradictory accounts of nuclear inspections, and Rubio stated there can be no "tolls" in the strait.
- The author argues that the IRGC's role, Israel's likely opposition and US domestic politics are major obstacles to implementation.
- The author expects a negotiating extension rather than a final deal by about August 20, 2026, and sets three conditions: full IAEA access, dismantlement or freeze of enrichment, and snapback sanctions.

## Introduction: One strait, one deal, and a world holding its breath

### Twenty-one kilometres that shake the global economy

The **Strait of Hormuz**. Twenty-one kilometres at its narrowest point. Two two-mile-wide shipping lanes. And yet this tiny passage between **Iran** and **Oman** represents one of the most critical economic arteries on the planet: approximately **20% of all the world's oil** and **30% of the world's liquefied natural gas** transit through these waters every day. When **Tehran** murmurs that it might close **Hormuz**, oil prices spiral, maritime insurance premiums explode, and finance ministers in capitals thousands of kilometres away begin to sweat.

It is in this context that on **June 21, 2026**, according to **WWNO/NPR**, the **United States** and **Iran** concluded a **"roadmap"** for a final deal to be negotiated within **60 days**, including a direct communication line on **Hormuz**. The talks were held in **Switzerland**, with mediation from **Pakistan** and **Qatar**. A **memorandum of understanding** known as the "Islamabad" MOU was reportedly drafted, providing for **$300 billion** in Iranian reconstruction, the reopening of the strait to free international navigation, and the lifting of the blockade. **On paper, this looks like a historic breakthrough. In the reality of nuclear negotiations with Tehran, it is often the beginning of a new chapter of mistrust.**

### What the deal claims to resolve — and what it leaves intact

The **60-day roadmap** aims to resolve one of the most intractable files in international diplomacy for decades: the Iranian nuclear programme, the economic sanctions strangling **Iran**, and freedom of navigation in the **Strait of Hormuz**. These three elements are deeply interconnected. **Tehran** has used the threat of closing **Hormuz** as leverage in nuclear negotiations. **Washington** has used sanctions as pressure to force **Iran** to the table. And the entire world has been held hostage between these two postures.

But in the very first hours following the announcement, disagreements surfaced. According to **Al Jazeera** on **June 24, 2026**, the **United States** and **Iran** offered **contradictory accounts** of what was agreed on nuclear inspections. Secretary of State **Rubio** declared there can be no "tolls" in the strait. **Tehran** maintains a different interpretation of what was agreed. **A peace deal that looks like a victory for all can very quickly turn into an interpretive dispute that serves the interests of those who want it to fail.**

*I must confess something: I am deeply suspicious of any deal with Iran that presents itself as a "breakthrough" in the first 48 hours. The history of Iranian nuclear negotiations is a succession of dashed hopes, ambiguous texts interpreted differently by each party, and crises that restart the cycle. It is not that I want this deal to fail — I want Hormuz to stay open and I want Iran not to acquire nuclear weapons. But premature diplomatic optimism is a form of naivety that the facts have punished too often.*

## The Islamabad memorandum: 14 points to rebuild the world

### An ambitious text with revealing details

The **Islamabad memorandum of understanding**, according to sources cited by **Ground News** on **June 23, 2026**, reportedly comprises **14 points** covering an extraordinarily broad scope. Key highlights: Iranian reconstruction financed at **$300 billion** — a colossal sum whose modalities and guarantors remain vague — the **official reopening of the Strait of Hormuz** to free navigation, the **lifting of the Iranian maritime blockade** on certain routes, and formal mediation by **Pakistan** and **Qatar** to guarantee implementation.

These 14 points raise as many questions as they resolve. Who finances the **$300 billion**? The United States? The **European Union**? Gulf sovereign wealth funds? On what timeline? Under what verification conditions? And above all: would **Iran** agree to limit its nuclear programme sufficiently for the **United States** and its allies to consider the inspections real rather than cosmetic? On these fundamental questions, the memorandum remains ambiguous — and it is precisely in these ambiguities that deals die. **A 14-point text is not a deal — it is a list of intentions in which every word can become a diplomatic battlefield.**

### Pakistan-Qatar mediation: sufficient guarantees?

The choice of **Pakistan** and **Qatar** as mediators is revealing. **Pakistan** maintains complex relations with **Iran** — neighbours, regional rivals in certain contexts, but also economic partners. Its role as mediator confers a valuable diplomatic role but also an ambiguity: its own national interests may not perfectly coincide with the need to maintain pressure on **Iran** to honour its nuclear commitments. **Qatar**, for its part, has a tradition of mediation in regional conflicts — its diplomacy has played a role in agreements with **Hamas**, with the Afghan **Taliban**, and in several hostage crises.

But credible mediators in regional conflicts do not necessarily make good guarantors of complex nuclear agreements. Verifying **Iran**'s compliance with its nuclear commitments requires technical expertise that neither **Pakistan** nor **Qatar** possesses — that is the role of the **IAEA**. The question of whether the **International Atomic Energy Agency** will be fully involved in verification is one of the major friction points between the American and Iranian positions. **Without the IAEA as the verification arm, a nuclear deal remains a promise without control.**

*Qatar as mediator always fascinates me. This small Gulf country, no larger than Corsica, has become the indispensable go-between in the world's most complex conflicts. It hosts the American Al Udeid air base, maintains relations with Hamas, dialogues with Iran, and sustains a foreign policy of remarkable sophistication for a state of fewer than 3 million inhabitants. Qatar may be the most skilful diplomat the Middle East has produced in decades. But "skilful" and "reliable guarantor of a nuclear deal" are not the same thing.*

## Disagreements on nuclear inspections: the heart of the problem

### Two incompatible accounts of what was agreed

The most alarming contradiction in the aftermath of the Swiss talks involves **nuclear inspections**. According to the **Washington Times** on **June 23, 2026** and **Al Jazeera** on **June 24**, the **United States** and **Iran** offered **radically different accounts** of what was agreed on this point. The American delegation maintains that **Iran** accepted robust inspections giving the **IAEA** access to sensitive nuclear sites. The Iranian delegation contests this interpretation and maintains that inspections remain subject to sovereign conditions that **Tehran** will define unilaterally.

This contradiction is not a detail — it is the detail. The question of nuclear inspections is precisely where the **JCPOA** (the **2015** nuclear deal) progressively failed, with accumulated disputes over **IAEA** access to certain sites. If **Iran** accepts facade inspections that do not permit genuine verification of its compliance, a signed deal is worth no more than the paper it is printed on. **And Iran has a long history of creative definitions of what "accepting inspections" means in practice.**

### Uranium enrichment: the fundamental technical issue

At the heart of the dispute over inspections lies the question of **uranium enrichment**. By **2026**, **Iran** had enriched uranium to levels dangerously close to the threshold needed for a nuclear weapon — **IAEA** reports noted enrichment levels at **60%**, approaching the **90%** needed for a bomb. If the 60-day deal does not provide for a verifiable dismantlement or freeze of these enrichment capabilities, it is not a non-proliferation deal — it is an economic concession to a near-nuclear power.

The American delegation, under pressure from **Israel** and Gulf allies, must demonstrate that the deal genuinely limits Iranian nuclear capabilities. The **Trump** administration, which abandoned the **JCPOA** in **2018** by calling it too permissive, must now defend a potentially even more permissive deal — at the risk of political contradiction. **This contradiction between tough political rhetoric and the diplomatic reality of necessary compromises is precisely what could torpedo the deal before it is even signed.**

*The question of Iran's enrichment at 60% keeps me awake — metaphorically speaking. At 60%, you are technically weeks away from a bomb if you decide to go to 90%. Iran denies wanting nuclear weapons, but its enrichment actions tell a different story. A deal that does not dismantle these capabilities is not a non-proliferation deal — it is an implicit recognition of a de facto nuclear capability. Israel will not be fooled. And neither will the region.*

## Rubio and Hormuz: "no tolls in the strait"

### An American red line on freedom of navigation

Secretary of State **Marco Rubio** laid down an unequivocal public condition during negotiations: there can be no **"tolls"** in the **Strait of Hormuz**. This formulation, reported by **Al Jazeera** on **June 24, 2026**, is both a position of international law — the Strait of Hormuz is a transit passage under international maritime law — and a strong political signal to **Iran**: the commercial and military freedom of navigation through the strait is non-negotiable.

The Iranian position is more nuanced and deliberately ambiguous. **Tehran** has never formally claimed a right to "tax" ships passing through the strait. But it has exercised a form of de facto control through intimidation actions, vessel seizures, military manoeuvres that disrupt commercial shipping, and intermittent threats to close it. The distinction between a formal toll — illegal — and a de facto toll exercised through threat and intimidation is precisely the grey zone **Tehran** cultivates. **Rubio is right on principle; the question is how the principle is enforced on a power that does not recognise the usual constraints of international law.**

### The military dimension of the American presence in the Gulf

Behind **Rubio**'s diplomatic formulation lies a concrete military reality. The **United States** maintains a permanent naval presence in the **Persian Gulf** through the **5th Fleet**, based in **Bahrain**. Aircraft carriers, destroyers, submarines — a device designed precisely to guarantee freedom of navigation in **Hormuz** and its approaches. This presence has historically deterred **Iran** from going beyond provocations and individual seizures toward an effective closure of the strait.

The 60-day deal creates unprecedented tension with this military posture. If negotiations are underway, a naval incident in the **Gulf** — a tanker seizure, a confrontation between Iranian coast guards and an American naval escort — could torpedo the negotiations instantly. The militaries of both sides are navigating the same waters under contradictory diplomatic instructions: maintain freedom of navigation while negotiating a deal ostensibly designed to guarantee it formally. **This is a dangerously unstable operational equation.**

*The presence of the US 5th Fleet in the Gulf is one of those geopolitical facts that everyone takes for granted but no one questions. These ships have been guaranteeing freedom of navigation for decades — and consequently, global economic stability. If a deal with Iran were to lead to a reduction of this presence as a goodwill gesture, that would represent a considerable risk. Trust in Iran in this domain is earned over years of behaviour, not on a 14-point memorandum.*

## The $300 billion: who pays, and why this figure disturbs

### A reconstruction that looks like a ransom

The figure of **$300 billion** for Iranian reconstruction, included in the Islamabad memorandum according to **Ground News** on **June 23, 2026**, is political as much as economic. **Iran** presents this amount as compensation for the damage inflicted by decades of economic sanctions — a position with internal logic, but one that, framed this way, resembles a ransom for the freedom of navigation through an international strait.

The question of **frozen Iranian assets** is at the heart of this discussion. Estimates suggest that **Iran** holds between **$6 and $12 billion** in frozen assets in foreign banks — some of which have been partially unfrozen in previous agreements. The **$300 billion** in the memorandum go far beyond frozen assets — they imply new investments, potentially public fund transfers, long-term infrastructure projects. **This is no longer an asset release — it is a Marshall Plan for a regime that finances Hezbollah, the Houthis and other regional armed groups.**

### Israeli and Saudi objections

The reactions of **America**'s regional allies to this deal are predictable: **Israel** and **Saudi Arabia** — for different reasons — watch American-Iranian negotiations with visceral mistrust. **Israel** is particularly alarmed by any deal prospect that does not irreversibly dismantle Iranian nuclear capabilities, and by the idea that hundreds of billions of dollars would flow into an economy part of which would fund military proxy operations against the Jewish state.

**Riyadh**, for its part, has undergone a certain rapprochement with **Tehran** since the Chinese-brokered mediation of **2023**. But the Saudi-Iranian reconciliation remains superficial — tensions over **Yemen**, over **Iraq**, over **Lebanon** persist. An **Iran** enriched by **$300 billion** and partially absolved of sanctions represents a regional imbalance that **Riyadh** cannot ignore. Gulf allies have their own levers with **Washington** — and they will use them to weigh on the final formulation of the deal. **Gulf geopolitics is a multi-variable equation that the Swiss negotiators cannot solve alone.**

*The $300 billion for Iran poses a moral problem I cannot sidestep: how do you politically justify massive financial transfers to a regime that violently represses its own population, funds militias destabilizing several regional countries, and whose leaders regularly repeat calls for Israel's destruction? I understand the pragmatism — sometimes you have to pay for peace. But "paying" a regime of this type without guarantees of behavioural change is financing the authoritarian status quo, not transforming it.*

## Iran after the deal: continuity or transformation?

### The Revolutionary Guards in the equation

Any analysis of the US-Iran deal must integrate a key actor often absent from diplomatic communiqués: the **Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps** (**IRGC**). This parallel armed force, whose budget exceeds that of Iran's regular military, controls entire swaths of the economy, regional proxy operations, and part of the nuclear programme. A deal negotiated with diplomats from the foreign ministry does not necessarily bind the **Guards** — who have their own agenda, their own resources, and their own vision of Iranian national interest.

The history of deals with **Iran** shows that hard-line factions within the regime can sabotage agreements concluded by moderate factions. The **Guards** have structural reasons to resist a deal that would strengthen civilian government power at their expense. A **$300 billion** inflow channelled through transparent civilian channels — assuming that is even possible — would reduce their role in the economy and their political power. **The forces of resistance to the deal may be as powerful as the forces that made it possible.**

### Sanctions against the IRGC: a non-negotiable condition

For the deal to be credible in the eyes of America's **Middle East** allies and **Israel** in particular, it must maintain targeted sanctions on the **IRGC** and its regional proxy activities. The general lifting of economic sanctions can be justified if the nuclear programme is effectively limited and verifiable. But lifting sanctions against **IRGC** entities that fund **Hezbollah**, the **Houthis** and Iraqi militias would be a red line for **Israel** and a large portion of the US **Congress**.

If the final deal includes lifting sanctions on the **IRGC** — in any form whatsoever — it would become politically unsellable in **Washington** and would likely trigger a Congressional intervention to block it. The **Trump** administration, whose political base includes unconditional supporters of **Israel**, cannot afford to be perceived as having enriched the declared enemies of the Jewish state. **American domestic politics is sometimes the greatest obstacle to American diplomacy.**

*The IRGC is the elephant in the room of any negotiation with Iran. We negotiate with the diplomats of the Iranian foreign ministry, but it is the IRGC that holds the keys to the nuclear programme, proxy operations, and the ability to close Hormuz. A deal that the Revolutionary Guards have not ratified — even implicitly — is worthless. And so far, I have seen no clear indication that the IRGC has signed off on this roadmap.*

## The market and global economic impact

### Oil and natural gas through the lens of the deal

The announcement of the US-Iran roadmap had immediate effects on energy markets. The mere prospect of de-escalation in the **Persian Gulf** and a reduced risk of **Hormuz** disruption helped stabilize oil prices that had risen in the preceding weeks in anticipation of a worsening situation. But markets are also aware of the deal's fragility — every new contradictory statement from **Tehran** or **Washington** causes fluctuations.

Over the long term, if the deal holds and Iranian oil exports normalize completely — **Iran** has considerable reserves and a production capacity that could increase rapidly if sanctions are lifted — that would represent an increase in global supply that would weigh on prices. **OPEC+** producing countries, including **Saudi Arabia** and **Russia**, would see their oil revenues potentially impacted. This economic consideration partly explains Saudi reluctance to welcome a deal that would strengthen Iran's position in the oil market. **Geopolitics is also readable in commodity market curves.**

### Asian economies and their dependence on Gulf oil

The economies most directly concerned by **Hormuz** stability are not American or European — they are Asian. **China**, **Japan**, **South Korea** and **India** depend massively on hydrocarbon imports from the **Persian Gulf**. A **Hormuz** disruption — even temporary, even partial — would trigger considerable economic shocks in these economies, with cascading effects on their industrial supply chains and consumers.

That is why these nations, despite their political differences with the **United States** and **Iran**, have a vital interest in the roadmap's success. **China** — which maintains significant economic relations with **Iran** and participated in brokering the Saudi-Iranian reconciliation of **2023** — is following these negotiations with particular attention. Its interests are complex: an economically normalized **Iran** would be a more robust commercial partner, but also a less dependent one with less need for the Chinese diplomatic umbrella. **The interests of all major powers converge toward Hormuz stability — but diverge on the price to pay for it.**

*There is a cruel irony in the fact that Asian economies — China, Japan, South Korea — are the most exposed to the risks of a Hormuz closure, while their ability to influence the Iranian behaviour that creates these risks is limited. It is the United States that holds the keys to sanctions and military presence in the Gulf — but it is the Asians who would pay the most immediate price of a disruption. This asymmetry between risk exposure and leverage is one of the fundamental injustices of the current global security system.*

## The deal seen from Tehran: opportunism or real change?

### Iran's economic motivations

To understand why **Iran** agreed to negotiate a roadmap, one must look at the state of its economy. Economic sanctions have inflicted considerable damage: **massive devaluation of the Iranian rial**, inflation at triple-digit levels at certain periods, high unemployment, brain drain, and popular discontent that produced waves of protests — including the **"Woman, Life, Freedom"** movement of **2022-2023**. The Iranian economy has reconstruction and investment needs that can only be met if sanctions are lifted.

The prospect of **$300 billion** in reconstruction is therefore, for the Iranian regime, a genuine economic motivation. But it is also a political opportunity: the new resources could be used to consolidate domestic support, fund social programmes, and reduce the pressure that sanctions exert on the regime's legitimacy. This is not a change in the regime's nature — it is a recapitalization of its governing capacity. **You do not transform an authoritarian regime with money — you give it the means to endure longer.**

### Iranian domestic politics and factional struggles

Iranian domestic politics is a permanent struggle between factions. The **"pragmatists"** — historically associated with figures like former President **Rohani** or former foreign minister **Zarif** — see nuclear negotiations as an opportunity to lift sanctions and normalize international relations. The **"hardliners"** — anchored in the **Revolutionary Guards** and conservative religious institutions — view concessions as betrayals of the Islamic revolution.

Under **Supreme Leader Khamenei** — whose health is a subject of permanent speculation — the dominant line has oscillated between these two poles depending on context. Participation in the Swiss negotiations suggests that the "pragmatist" faction temporarily obtained the green light to explore a deal. But this green light can be withdrawn — and the public contradictions over nuclear inspections in the hours following the talks suggest that hard-line factions are already seeking to redefine the text in a less binding direction. **Negotiating with Iran always means negotiating with multiple interlocutors who do not necessarily speak with one voice.**

*Khamenei is the fundamental unknown in all these negotiations. Elderly, in uncertain health according to some reports, he is the only final arbiter of any major Iranian strategic decision. What does he really want for his legacy — a normalization of Iran with the Western world, or the maintenance of a pure and hard Islamic revolution? His answer to that question will determine whether the 60-day roadmap becomes a historic deal or one more episode in the endless cycle of dashed hopes.*

## The 60 days: a realistic deadline?

### What 60 days can and cannot produce

The roadmap sets out to conclude a final deal within **60 days** from **June 21, 2026** — around **August 20, 2026**. This deadline is ambitious in the extreme. For reference, the negotiations that produced the **JCPOA** of **2015** lasted more than two years, involved six world powers, and produced a text that nevertheless remained subject to intense debate and persistent challenges. Claiming to resolve even more complex questions — since they now include a significantly higher Iranian enrichment level — in 60 days is diplomatic wishful thinking rather than realistic planning.

This **60-day** deadline likely has a political function more than an operational value. It creates time pressure on negotiators, forces a dynamic of progress, and allows both parties to communicate to their domestic audiences that a deal is "imminent" — generating political momentum favourable to continuing the talks. But if the deadline arrives without a deal, the risk of rupture — and a return to even more hardened positions — is real. **Diplomatic deadlines are gambles — you bet that the finish line will be reached before the pressure reverses.**

### Possible scenarios at the end of 60 days

Three main scenarios emerge on the horizon of **August 20, 2026**. The first — most favourable — is the conclusion of a framework deal robust enough to justify a partial and conditional lifting of sanctions, with a credible verification mechanism. This scenario requires both parties to overcome their current contradictions on inspections and enrichment. The second scenario is a negotiating extension — an agreement on an additional deadline, partial progress, continued talks. This scenario maintains the current fragile status quo without resolution.

The third scenario — most dangerous — is a collapse of negotiations amid mutual provocations. An Iranian tanker seizure, an Israeli strike on Iranian nuclear facilities, an intemperate **Trump** social media post — any of these events could trigger a downward spiral the roadmap would not survive. **In high-stakes negotiations, unforeseen events often carry more weight than roadmaps.**

*I'll take the bet — with all the uncertainties that entails — that the 60 days will not produce a final deal but rather a negotiating extension. Not out of pessimism, but because the contradictions on nuclear inspections are fundamental and cannot be resolved in a few weeks. What is possible in 60 days is a partial framework deal that provides the basis for a longer negotiation. That would still be a positive outcome — but calling it a "victory" would be premature.*

## The Israel dimension: the absent actor who matters most

### Israel and the tacit veto

**Israel** was not at the Swiss negotiating table. Yet it is the actor with the most to lose if a deal effectively granted **Iran** a de facto nuclear bomb. The **Netanyahu** government has clear red lines on the Iranian nuclear programme — red lines that the **United States** knows and that genuinely constrain American diplomatic margins. If the final deal is perceived in **Jerusalem** as insufficiently protective against the Iranian nuclear threat, **Israel** might act unilaterally — a military strike on Iranian nuclear facilities, as it has long threatened.

An Israeli strike on **Iran** during an active negotiation phase would be catastrophic for the roadmap — but it is real in the Israeli strategic calculus. **Jerusalem** will never delegate its existential security to **Washington**. If the American-Iranian negotiations appear to produce a deal that leaves **Iran** weeks away from a nuclear bomb, **Israel** will act. That is one of the most powerful constraints bearing on American diplomacy in this file. **The absent actor is sometimes the most determining one.**

### US-Israel coordination: how far?

The relationship between the **Trump** administration and the **Netanyahu** government is intense but complex. **Trump** has demonstrated strong support for **Israel** — moving the American embassy to **Jerusalem**, recognizing Israeli sovereignty over the **Golan**. But **Trump** is also a negotiator who loves to conclude deals — and the prospect of a historic US-Iran deal, with **Trump** as its architect, is a real political temptation.

This tension between traditional support for **Israel** and **Trump**'s personal diplomatic ambition creates uncertainty in US-Israeli relations. If the deal goes too far in concessions to **Iran**, **Netanyahu** will use his considerable channels of influence in the US **Congress** to sink it. **American domestic politics** — and **Trump**'s alignment with Israeli positions — is one of the most unpredictable factors in this diplomatic equation. **In nuclear negotiations with Iran, Jerusalem is the ghost haunting every text.**

*I am uncomfortable with the Israel question in this context — not because its nuclear concerns are not legitimate, they absolutely are — but because American domestic politics on Israel sometimes creates constraints that make any imperfect but workable deal impossible. An imperfect deal that limits Iranian nuclear capacity is better than no deal. The question is whether the American political coalition can accept the imperfect. Historically, the answer has been no — and Iran kept on enriching.*

## The strategic impact on regional allies: Israel, Saudi Arabia, UAE

### Israel facing the deal: constrained pragmatism versus fundamental opposition

**Israel** is the actor most directly affected by the **US-Iran** deal, yet the one most absent from its negotiation. **Jerusalem** has opposed the deal's prospect from the outset, judging that **$300 billion** released would allow **Tehran** to amplify its regional destabilization programmes via **Hezbollah**, **Hamas**, the **Houthis** and Iraqi militias. This position is not irrational: the history of the **2015 deal** (JCPOA) showed that unfrozen funds had partially fed Iranian proxies, even if the exact figures remain disputed.

But **Israel**, diplomatically weakened after the events in **Gaza**, no longer has the political levers needed to block a deal supported by the **Trump** administration. The relationship between **Netanyahu** and **Trump** remains personally strong, but **Washington** has this time clearly signalled that the decision was made. **Jerusalem** will have to navigate a regional environment where **Iran** has more resources — hoping that the deal's monitoring mechanisms genuinely constrain the Iranian nuclear programme more than they did in the past. **That is a forced bet, not a chosen one.**

### Saudi Arabia and the UAE: between economic interest and security mistrust

**Riyadh** and **Abu Dhabi** view the deal with calculated ambivalence. On one hand, an **Iran** reintegrated into the global economy is less prone to regional destabilization through proxies — the argument of economic normalization reducing appetite for military adventurism. On the other, an **Iran** with **$300 billion** in fresh funding has additional resources to feed its proxies should it choose to do so. The difference lies in Iranian political will — and neither **Riyadh** nor **Abu Dhabi** fully trusts **Tehran**'s behavioural change.

For the **Gulf** monarchies, the deal also represents an economic opportunity: an **Iran** re-entering global commercial circuits is a potential trading partner, and the **UAE** already has substantial economic ties with the Iranian diaspora and businesses. The Gulf's commercial pragmatism could facilitate economic coexistence even in the absence of full political trust. **Business thrives where weapons fall silent — at least temporarily.**

*The absence of Israel from the deal table is, for me, one of the most troubling elements. Not because Israel should have had a veto — it does not have one in American sovereign affairs — but because the deal creates a security asymmetry that Jerusalem will have to manage alone. If Iran uses some of the released funds to reinforce Hezbollah or rebuild Hamas capabilities, Israel pays the price. The deal may be reasonable from an American standpoint and unreasonable from an Israeli standpoint — both can be true simultaneously.*

## Nuclear verification: the devil in the memorandum's details

### What the 14 points say — and do not say — on inspections

The heart of any nuclear deal is its verification mechanism. The **Islamabad** memorandum mentions **"enhanced IAEA inspections"**, but the published details remain deliberately vague on several crucial points: do military so-called "sensitive" sites remain accessible? What are the access conditions to underground facilities like **Fordow**? What is the notice period for inspections — and if it is too long, it gives **Iran** time to conceal problematic activities?

These questions are not technical — they are political. **Iran** has always resisted the most intrusive inspections, citing national sovereignty. The **IAEA's Additional Protocols** regime provides broader access than standard inspections, but their effective implementation depends on Iranian cooperation. If the **Islamabad** memorandum does not explicitly impose the **Additional Protocol** and the most recent **"early detection"** measures, its verification value will be limited. **A deal without effective verification is not a deal — it is a statement of intent.**

### The JCPOA precedent and lessons not learned

The **2015** nuclear deal (JCPOA) had provided verification mechanisms that **Iran** respected selectively — access to declared nuclear facilities, but resistance to attempts to inspect military sites where suspicious activities had been identified. When the **United States** withdrew from the JCPOA in **2018**, **Iran** quickly accelerated its uranium enrichment to reach levels close to weapons-grade. This sequence proved that the deal had constrained the Iranian nuclear programme — but that the absence of a deal immediately lifted those constraints.

The **Islamabad** memorandum must learn from this experience. Either it imposes more robust verification mechanisms than the **JCPOA** — with automatic and predefined consequences in case of violation — or it will reproduce the same flaws. The **60 days** of negotiation to finalize the deal must serve to anchor these mechanisms in legally binding texts, not defer them to future discussions. **A deal's credibility is measured by the robustness of its enforcement mechanisms, not by the quality of the smiles at the signing.**

*Nuclear verification is for me the absolute test of this deal. If the Islamabad memorandum does not allow more intrusive inspections than the JCPOA — including at military sites — then it is not worth the diplomatic and security risks it creates. Iran has a long history of concealment and gradual violation of its nuclear commitments. A deal that does not provide rapid-response mechanisms to violations is an invitation to repeat them. Trust in nuclear diplomacy must always be accompanied by verification — and verification must be independent, immediate and consequential.*

## The Iranian economy under sanctions: what lifting restrictions could unleash

### Thirty years of sanctions and their effects on Iranian society

Sanctions against **Iran** have accumulated since the 1990s, culminating in the most severe sanctions regime ever imposed on a country — after the American withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018. These measures reduced **Iran's GDP**, fuelled inflation, impoverished the middle classes, and accelerated brain drain. The **Iranian rial** has lost more than **90% of its value** since 2018. Access to medicines, medical equipment and industrial technologies has been severely restricted. This economic deterioration fuelled popular protests — including the **"Woman, Life, Freedom"** movement of 2022 — without nonetheless modifying the regime's strategic behaviour.

This reality raises a fundamental question about the effectiveness of sanctions as a tool of strategic pressure. They clearly impoverished **Iran** and created real constraints on military development. But they did not change the nuclear or regional behaviour of the regime — which paradoxically accelerated its missile programme and its support for proxies during the years of maximum sanctions. **Sanctions punish a population without necessarily constraining a determined regime — that is the fundamental limit of this tool.**

### The beneficiaries and risks of lifting sanctions

A partial or total lifting of sanctions would release complex economic forces. The **$300 billion** mentioned in the memorandum — split between frozen assets and new investments — do not represent money "given" to **Iran**: they partly consist of Iranian funds blocked in foreign banks, and partly of foreign investments made possible by normalization. The immediate beneficiaries would be Iran's oil and gas industries, the banking sector, and transport infrastructure. European companies — especially French, German and Italian — had expressed keen interest after the JCPOA of 2015; they will wait to see if this deal is more durable.

The risk, clearly identified by critics of the deal, is that freed funds also feed the **Revolutionary Guards**, who control a substantial portion of the Iranian economy and manage proxy support programmes. Financial flow surveillance mechanisms existed under the JCPOA framework — their strengthening in the Islamabad memorandum will be a key indicator of the deal's seriousness. **A deal that enriches a regime without constraining its aggressive behaviours is a subsidy to instability.**

*The question of what Iran will do with the freed funds is real and legitimate. I do not want to minimize it. But I also think we cannot indefinitely maintain sanctions without positive strategic results and expect a different outcome. Sanctions have not stopped the Iranian nuclear programme — they have slowed it while impoverishing a population that is not responsible for its regime's choices. If a deal with robust verification mechanisms can constrain the nuclear programme more effectively than sanctions without dialogue, it is an option worth pursuing. Pure cynicism is not a foreign policy.*

## Trump and the diplomacy of unpredictability: a method with its costs

### Trump's transactional approach and its real results

The **Trump** administration approached negotiations with **Iran** with the same transactional method it applies to all foreign policy files: maximum pressure, victory announcement, and presentation of the result as a personal triumph. This approach has genuine concrete merits — it effectively brought **Tehran** to the negotiating table after years of refusal, by combining economically devastating sanctions and credible military signals (notably the elimination of General **Soleimani** in 2020).

But the diplomacy of unpredictability also carries real costs. **Washington**'s allies — **Israel**, Gulf monarchies, **Europe** — were negotiated with in parallel rather than in partnership. American positions changed several times during the negotiations, creating uncertainty that complicated building coordinated positions. And the often contradictory declarations of administration members on the deal's details — notably on nuclear inspections — sowed confusion about what had actually been agreed. **Unpredictability deters adversaries — and it distresses allies.**

### What the deal says about Trump's long-term foreign policy

The deal with **Iran**, if it holds, will represent one of the most significant diplomatic achievements of the second **Trump** administration. It would demonstrate that maximum economic pressure, combined with a willingness to negotiate without rigid preconditions, can produce results that conventional diplomacy had not achieved. That is precisely the argument **Trump** makes — that his disruptive method works where institutional approaches have failed.

But the deal's durability also depends on factors that the **Trump** method does not control: political stability in **Iran**, the willingness of the US **Congress** not to sabotage the deal with unilateral sanctions, and the reaction of regional actors. A deal that the next administration could overturn — as Obama built the JCPOA that Trump destroyed — is no guarantee of long-term stability. **Durable diplomacy requires institutional foundations that presidential personal successes cannot replace.**

*Trump as peacemaker with Iran — the phrase itself would have seemed absurd to most observers a few years ago. Yet here we are. I do not applaud the method — the unpredictability, the disregard for allies, the rhetoric of personal victory are real flaws. But the result, if the deal holds and inspections are robust, could be a genuine security gain. That is what a "necessary evil" means: you do not like the method, but you cannot ignore the potential result. History will judge — and for now, the verdict is pending.*

## Conclusion: A roadmap on mined terrain

### Between hope and history repeating itself

The US-Iran deal of **June 21, 2026** — the 60-day roadmap, the Islamabad memorandum, the promised **$300 billion** — is a first-rate diplomatic development that deserves to be taken seriously. The **Strait of Hormuz** is too important to the global economy not to explore all avenues of de-escalation. And if **Iran** truly accepts robust nuclear inspections and a cap on enrichment, that would represent genuine progress on nuclear non-proliferation.

But the history of American-Iranian negotiations demands caution. The immediate disagreements on inspections, the contradictory accounts from each side in the hours following the talks, the Iranian hard-line factions that will resist any binding agreement, the American political constraints tied to **Israel** and **Congress** — all of this creates particularly mined terrain for progress toward a final deal.

### What the world must demand from this deal

If the roadmap is to produce a credible deal, it must meet three non-negotiable conditions: unrestricted **IAEA** inspections of all Iranian nuclear facilities, a verifiable dismantlement or freeze of enrichment capabilities close to the military threshold, and automatic "snapback" sanctions mechanisms in the event of an Iranian violation. Without these three conditions, a deal that releases **$300 billion** and normalizes the Iranian economy without reducing its nuclear capability is not a non-proliferation victory — it is a capitulation dressed as diplomacy. **The Strait of Hormuz deserves genuine peace, not a facade peace.**

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

*A roadmap on mined terrain — that is exactly what this deal is. Sixty days to finalize the details, and behind every detail lurks a fundamental dispute over trust, intentions and enforcement mechanisms. I have no certainty it will hold. But I know the status quo — sanctions without results, growing Iranian nuclear capacity, region in permanent instability — was unsustainable. Sometimes an imperfect roadmap is better than no road at all. The question is whether we have the political will to walk it all the way to the end.*

## Sources

### Primary sources

- [WWNO/NPR — The US and Iran agree to a roadmap for a final deal, mediators say — June 21, 2026](https://www.wwno.org/npr-news/2026-06-21/the-u-s-and-iran-agree-to-a-road-map-for-a-final-deal-mediators-say)

- [Al Jazeera — Live: US and Iran at odds over nuclear inspections and Hormuz — June 24, 2026](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/liveblog/2026/6/24/iran-war-live-trump-tehran-at-odds-over-nuclear-inspections-hormuz)

- [Al Jazeera — What the US and Iran agreed and disagreed on on the first day — June 23, 2026](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/6/23/what-the-us-and-iran-agreed-and-disagreed-on-first-day-of-talks)

- [Washington Times — US and Iran offer different stories on nuclear inspections — June 23, 2026](https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2026/jun/23/us-iran-offer-different-stories-nuclear-inspections-negotiations/)

### Secondary sources

- [Ground News — Islamabad memorandum details: 14 points, $300 billion — June 23, 2026](https://ground.news/article/b656df9e-fc5e-46f1-a8e0-3254c5ac107a)

- [The Guardian — Global geopolitical context: NATO, defence, Middle East — June 27, 2026](https://www.theguardian.com/world/ng-interactive/2026/jun/27/nato-leaders-fear-they-can-no-longer-rely-on-us-help-if-russia-attacks-trump-eastern-europe)

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Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/analyse-hormuz-le-detroit-qui-fait-trembler-le-monde-decryptage-de-l-accord-us-i