# ANALYSIS: Gaza, 64% Under Occupation — Morocco and the Arab Security Architecture Taking Shape

> In April 2026, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) shared with humanitarian aid groups a map that sent shockwaves through the international diplomatic community. That map showed a new "orange line", extending beyond the initial "yellow line" defined by the October 10, 2025 ceasefire, now placing approximately 64% of Gaza's territory under direct Israeli military control. Expert Ja

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Analysis
- Published: 2026-06-27
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/analyse-gaza-64-sous-occupation-le-maroc-et-l-architecture-securitaire-arabe-qui

## Key takeaways

- In April 2026 an IDF map showed a new "orange line" placing about 64% of Gaza under direct Israeli military control, up from roughly 53% under the yellow line.
- The October 10, 2025 ceasefire's second phase, which called for Hamas disarmament, Israeli withdrawal and an International Stabilization Force, was never implemented.
- Morocco was among the first five countries to commit troops to the ISF, and Moroccan planning officers reportedly arrived in Israel in late June 2026.
- The ISF's goal of 20,000 soldiers and 12,000 police was far from reached, with Hamas disarmament remaining the central deadlock.
- The author argues that reconstruction, estimated at $70 billion, and Western consistency on international law are essential, and that the orange line's advance threatens future stability.

## Introduction: The Map That Changes Everything

### A map shared with humanitarian organizations

In **April 2026**, the Israeli Defense Forces (**IDF**) shared with humanitarian aid groups a map that sent shockwaves through the international diplomatic community. That map showed a **new "orange line"**, extending beyond the initial "yellow line" defined by the **October 10, 2025** ceasefire, now placing approximately **64% of Gaza's territory** under direct Israeli military control. Expert **Jad Isaac**, director of the Applied Research Institute Jerusalem, was unambiguous: *"Approximately 65 to 64 percent of Gaza is today excluded and entirely under direct Israeli military occupation."*

That figure of **64%** is all the more striking given how sharply it contrasts with the terms of the initial ceasefire. In **October 2025**, the Israeli military had pulled back behind the yellow line, retaining control over roughly **53%** of the territory — the sparsely populated eastern zone. The westward shift of that line, which Gaza residents described as a continuous movement "from one day to the next," had added more than **10 percentage points** in a matter of months.

### The UN raises the alarm, Netanyahu stakes his claim

The **UN** responded swiftly. **Deputy Secretary-General Stefan Dujarric** stated: "**100% of Gaza should belong to the Palestinian people**. That is our position, and we call on Israel to withdraw behind the yellow line." At the same time, **Prime Minister Netanyahu**, at a public event in **May 2026**, acknowledged having ordered the army to advance from **50%** to **60%**, then toward **70% control** — on a deliberately vague timeline. International law, according to **French Foreign Minister Jean-Noël Barrot**, was being plainly violated: "It is contrary to international law to declare that **70%** of the Gaza Strip will be retaken."

In this context of ongoing Israeli territorial expansion inside Gaza — which the **Palestinian Centre for Human Rights** describes as "progressive and silent" annexation — a new security architecture is beginning to take shape. And at its center stands an unusual actor: **Morocco**.

*I look at this map — 64% of Gaza under Israeli military control — and I ask the question every honest columnist must ask: is this a ceasefire, or is it an occupation disguised as a ceasefire? The answer matters enormously for understanding what the deployment of the International Stabilization Force can realistically accomplish.*

## The October 2025 Ceasefire: Peace on Paper

### The terms of the "comprehensive plan to end the Gaza conflict"

To understand the current situation, one must briefly return to the framework that produced it. The ceasefire of **October 10, 2025**, negotiated under American, Israeli, Egyptian, and Qatari mediation, and endorsed by **UN Security Council Resolution 2803** on **November 17, 2025**, had several phases. The first phase involved an Israeli withdrawal to the "yellow line," leaving **53 to 58% of the territory** under IDF control. The second phase called for **Hamas** disarmament, full Israeli military withdrawal, and the deployment of an **International Stabilization Force (ISF)**.

That second phase was never implemented. **Hamas** refused to disarm — a precondition imposed by **Israel** before any further withdrawal. **Israel** continued pushing its control line westward. The **UN Security Council** recorded **more than 3,000 ceasefire violations** by Israel between **October 10, 2025** and **May 31, 2026**. According to Gaza's Ministry of Health, by **June 22, 2026**, the death toll since the ceasefire began had surpassed **1,024 Palestinians killed**.

### The humanitarian situation: a documented catastrophe

The humanitarian situation in the remaining areas under Palestinian control — less than **40%** of the territory, where the vast majority of Gaza's **2.2 million residents** are packed — is catastrophic by every available measure. **UNRWA** reported severe shortages of fuel, spare parts, and engine oil that are compromising vital humanitarian operations. More than **520 endoscopic surgical procedures** were at risk due to lack of disinfectant. UN relief chief **Fletcher** declared that no hospital in Gaza was fully operational. Humanitarian aid was funded at only **24%** of needs.

These realities led **Al Jazeera** to describe a "silent annexation" unfolding in parallel with diplomatic processes. While diplomats negotiated in **Doha**, **Cairo**, and **Washington**, the orange line kept advancing westward on the ground, compressing hundreds of thousands of people into an ever-shrinking space.

*The term "silent annexation" that some analysts use to describe the movement of the orange line deserves to be paused over. This is not propaganda — it is an empirical description. The maps show it. The numbers confirm it. It is important to name realities with precision, even when they are uncomfortable.*

## The Board of Peace and the International Stabilization Force

### The institutional architecture of the Trump administration

One of the most unexpected initiatives of the **Trump** administration on this file was the creation of the **Board of Peace** — a transitional governance body for Gaza, established by **Security Council Resolution 2803** in **November 2025**, with abstentions from **Russia** and **China**. The **Board of Peace**, whose director-general is **Nickolay Mladenov**, is meant to oversee the post-Hamas governance transition in Gaza, with a mandate running through **2027**.

Alongside the **Board of Peace**, the **International Stabilization Force (ISF)** was supposed to handle security functions: border security, humanitarian assistance, and training of a new Palestinian police force. ISF commander **Jasper Jeffers** was designated, and troop contributions from five founding nations were announced at the inaugural summit in **February 2026**: **Albania**, **Indonesia**, **Kazakhstan**, **Kosovo**, and **Morocco**.

### The ISF between theory and operational reality

The reality of the **ISF** in **June 2026** is more complex than its launch announcement suggested. According to multiple diplomatic sources and media reports, the force faces considerable challenges: vague rules of engagement, contributing countries reluctant to expose their soldiers to ill-defined risks, and above all, the unresolved fundamental question — **Hamas** disarmament. **Hamas** continued to dodge disarmament demands while insisting that Israel implement its military withdrawals. Without resolving this Gordian knot, the **ISF** cannot deploy its forces under the anticipated conditions.

The ultimate goal of **20,000 soldiers** and **12,000 police officers** was still far from being reached in **June 2026**. **Indonesia**, which was expected to contribute the largest contingent — up to **8,000 soldiers** by some estimates — had seen its deployments delayed due to uncertainty about conditions on the ground. According to **Arab News** from **June 24, 2026**, Moroccan planning officers had arrived in Israel to join the nascent ISF.

*The ISF is a good idea confronting a difficult reality. An international contingent only makes sense if it has something to secure under acceptable conditions. Today, the conditions are not acceptable. The question is not the goodwill of the contributing nations — it is the impossible definition of the mission for as long as Hamas and Israel have not resolved their fundamental dispute.*

## Morocco: The Arab Actor at the Center of the Equation

### The Moroccan decision: between pragmatism and symbolism

Morocco's decision to engage in the **ISF** for Gaza is one of the most diplomatically remarkable of the first half of **2026**. **Morocco** became the **first Arab country** to publicly announce its troop contribution to the stabilization force, at the inaugural **Board of Peace** summit in Washington in **February 2026**. **Moroccan Foreign Minister Nasser Bourita** stated that **Rabat** was among the first five nations to formally commit.

To understand this decision, one must recall Morocco's geopolitical context. **Morocco** normalized its relations with **Israel** under the **2020 Abraham Accords**, in exchange for American recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over **Western Sahara**. This normalization created a particular relationship with **Tel Aviv** — **Morocco** is one of the few Arab countries to maintain open diplomatic ties with **Israel** while retaining a position as defender of the Palestinian cause in international forums. Joining the **ISF** fits this difficult but coherent dual posture.

### Israeli trust in Morocco

A **Ynetnews** article from **June 24, 2026** carried a revealing headline: "The only army in Gaza Israel actually trusts isn't Egypt's. It's Morocco's." That formulation — whatever its simplifications — captures something important. **Israel** trusts **Morocco** in a way it does not trust other potentially contributing Arab countries, owing to the ties established through the **Abraham Accords**, bilateral security cooperation, and the reputation of Moroccan military forces for reliability.

The Moroccan planning officers who had begun arriving in **Israel** in late **June 2026** marked "an early operational step" toward the multinational force, according to the **Board of Peace**. **Rabat** appeared positioned to be the first Arab country to actually deploy operational personnel — even if the final modalities remained to be defined.

*Morocco's position in this file is fascinating: participating in a stabilization force inside a territory where the country you normalized relations with occupies 64% of the land. This is not a contradiction — it is complex geopolitics in its purest form. Rabat plays a role that no one else can play in this space. And that is precisely what makes it valuable.*

## The Arab Security Architecture: A New Regional Reality

### Arab countries facing a historic dilemma

Arab participation in the **Gaza Stabilization Force** represents a historic moment for the Arab world. For the first time in decades, Arab countries are engaging in an international security management mechanism for Gaza — not in opposition to Israel, but within a framework that coexists with Israeli military presence and aims ultimately to prepare for its succession. This is a considerable paradigm shift.

The contributing countries — **Morocco**, **Indonesia**, **Albania**, **Kazakhstan**, **Kosovo** — were carefully selected. None of them share a border with **Gaza**. None are engaged in direct regional rivalries that would create immediate conflicts of interest. These are countries that can claim international credibility and that, for various reasons, have an interest in maintaining good relations with both the **United States** and the regional parties involved.

### The post-Hamas governance model: what Arabs want

The Arab countries involved in the process — notably the Gulf monarchies — have clear preferences regarding the future governance of Gaza. They want a **reformed Palestinian Authority** or a similar structure to manage Gaza stably, without **Hamas** returning to power. They want to avoid a model that creates a security vacuum filled by radical groups or increased Iranian dominance. And they want to demonstrate to their own populations that they have not abandoned the Palestinian cause while maintaining their strategic interests in regional stability.

**Jordan** and **Egypt** have a particular role in this framework — training the Palestinian police officers destined for the new Gaza security force. This is less visible than troop deployment, but potentially more decisive in the long run: the quality of local security forces will largely determine the viability of any political agreement.

*What is taking shape in Gaza is an Arab security architecture that no one would have predicted five years ago. Arab countries that, while verbally defending Palestinian rights, are placing themselves within a security management framework compatible with Israeli presence. This is not a betrayal of the Palestinian cause — it is an adaptation to a reality that no one can ignore.*

## The Central Question: Hamas Disarmament

### The obstacle blocking everything

The Gordian knot of the entire Gaza stabilization process is **Hamas disarmament**. Resolution **2803** and the American ceasefire plan both stipulate that the second phase of the process involves disarming Palestinian armed groups — a prerequisite for **Israel** to carry out any more substantial military withdrawal. **Hamas**, for its part, has refused any engagement on this question, conditioning it on a prior Israeli withdrawal.

The circularity of this deadlock was illustrated by the negotiations in **Cairo** in **June 2026**: **Hamas** "continued to dodge disarmament demands" while insisting Israel begin its withdrawal. **Israel** refused to withdraw its troops before disarmament. The **ISF** could not deploy under satisfactory conditions as long as this question remained unresolved. The **Board of Peace** could not exercise its governance functions without minimal security. The loop is closed.

### Options on the table to break the deadlock

Negotiators have explored several approaches to escape this impasse. One involves allowing the **ISF** to deploy progressively in stabilized zones under the agreement, independently of a full resolution of the disarmament question — an approach some call realistic, others irresponsible because it would allow **Hamas** to retain its capabilities in the remaining zones. Another approach involves conditioning ISF deployment on "measurable progress" toward disarmament without requiring its full completion.

The **United Arab Emirates** distinguished itself by supporting the firmest position: no deployment before full disarmament. **Saudi Arabia** adopted a more nuanced stance, conditional on progress on both disarmament and the pathway to a Palestinian state. These divergences among Arab countries contribute to the slowness of the process — but they also reflect different readings of what is actually achievable in the current context.

*The Hamas disarmament question is the real test of seriousness behind any agreement on Gaza. You can build stabilization forces, create governance bodies, announce reconstruction conferences. But as long as Hamas remains armed and present in the portion of Gaza it still controls, the underlying question is not resolved. And the international community, in its collective wisdom, has not yet found how to resolve it.*

## Reconstruction: A $70 Billion Challenge

### The scale of the task

Rebuilding Gaza represents one of the most colossal humanitarian and economic challenges of the contemporary era. **United Nations** development experts estimate that **$70 billion** is needed to reconstruct what has been destroyed. The financial commitments made at the **Board of Peace** summit in **February 2026** — **$7 billion** from an Arab-country consortium, **$10 billion** from the **United States**, **$2 billion** from **OCHA**, and additional contributions — still total a fraction of the identified needs.

On the ground, the reality is even grimmer. According to **UNRWA** and **OCHA**, shortages of fuel, medicines, and construction materials are undermining even emergency humanitarian operations. Long-term reconstruction requires a minimum of political and security stability — precisely what is lacking in the current context of partial Israeli military occupation and the deadlock over **Hamas** disarmament.

### The Warsaw reconstruction conference

In late **June 2026**, a conference on post-conflict reconstruction of **Ukraine** was being held in Warsaw — but the parallels with Gaza were on everyone's mind. If **Ukraine** can benefit from a European loan of **90 billion euros** and substantial international community commitments, why are the standards of international mobilization so different for **Gaza**? The question is politically delicate, but it is being posed by many observers in the Arab world and among **Global South** nations — and the asymmetry in treatment feeds the perception of a two-speed Western foreign policy.

This perception is not politically neutral. It fuels Chinese and Russian influence in international forums, where both countries regularly denounce Western "double standards" to build their own legitimacy among non-aligned nations. The international community's incoherence on Gaza carries a geopolitical cost that too few Western analysts take sufficiently into account.

*I believe the different standard applied to Gaza and Ukraine reflects the domestic political realities inside Western countries — it would be naïve to deny it. But this asymmetry, perceived as such by billions of people around the world, weakens the moral credibility of the West on human rights and international law. It is a real cost that cannot keep being ignored.*

## The Gaza Strip as a Contested Territory: Legal Implications

### What international law says about occupation

The **Fourth Geneva Convention** defines the obligations of an occupying power toward the civilian population under its control. Assuming that Israeli military control of **64% of Gaza** constitutes an occupation in the legal sense — which **the UN** and most international law experts conclude — this implies substantial obligations: ensuring the supply of food and medicines, maintaining public order, and prohibiting the transfer of the occupying power's population into the occupied territory.

The **documented violations** of these obligations are considerable. Limited access to humanitarian aid, ongoing strikes in areas inhabited by civilians, and — according to **UN** reports — preparations for the installation of Israeli settlements in parts of Gaza create a situation in which the obligations of international occupation law are manifestly not being upheld. The **International Court of Justice (ICJ)** has already issued provisional measures on Gaza, ordering **Israel** to prevent acts of destruction and to allow humanitarian access.

### The debate over the applicability of legal qualifications

The debate over the legal characterization of the situation in Gaza is intense and politically charged. Organizations using terms like "annexation" or the most severe qualifications under international law are contested by **Israel** and its supporters, who argue that the current military situation is an unavoidable consequence of **Hamas**'s refusal to disarm and relinquish control. This article takes no position on these extreme qualifications — that is not its role. It notes that the expansion of Israeli control beyond ceasefire boundaries is documented, that its humanitarian effects are severe, and that the international community is divided on the appropriate responses.

What can be stated with certainty: the current trajectory — **64%** in March **2026**, a **Netanyahu** directive to reach **70%** in May **2026** — is not compatible with the terms of the ceasefire that was supposed to protect the rights of the civilian population. What the international community can or wishes to do about it remains an open question.

*I want to be clear about my position: I am pro-Western, which means I believe in the standards of international law that the West helped build. Those standards apply to everyone — to Russia in Ukraine, to Iran in the region, and to Israel in Gaza. Consistency in the application of international law is a condition of its legitimacy. Without consistency, it is the law of the strongest that prevails — and that is exactly what our adversaries want.*

## Israel Between Security and International Law

### Israel's legitimate security concerns

**Israel** has legitimate security reasons for maintaining a military presence in Gaza. The **October 7, 2023** attack claimed more than **1,200 lives** and saw more than **250 hostages** taken — a deep national trauma that radically transformed Israeli security policy. The IDF assesses that **Hamas** retains significant military capabilities in the areas it still controls, and that any premature withdrawal without disarmament risks creating the conditions for a resurgence.

These concerns are real and cannot be dismissed out of hand. But they do not justify, under international law, territorial expansion beyond the lines agreed to in the ceasefire agreement, nor ongoing strikes against civilian areas. Security and respect for international law are not options between which one must choose — they are simultaneous obligations that every democratic state must honor, even under extraordinarily difficult circumstances.

### International pressure and its limits

International pressure on **Israel** to comply with the terms of the ceasefire is real, but limited. **Trump's United States** — which remains the principal guarantor of Israeli security and the central mediator of the peace process — has adopted a position that de facto accepts the progression of the orange line while verbally maintaining the goal of a "two-state solution." This tension between American statements and realities on the ground is noted by all regional observers.

**Europe**, the **United Nations**, and a broad international coalition continue to demand respect for international law. But without active American cooperation in conditioning support for **Israel** on compliance with its commitments, international pressure remains essentially symbolic.

*I support Israel's right to exist and to defend itself. I also support the Palestinian people's right to a viable state and to dignified living conditions. These two positions are not contradictory — but they require Israel to respect the international legal framework it has itself accepted. The silent advance of the orange line does not serve peace — it creates the conditions for the next explosion.*

## The Broader Regional Dimension: Iran, Egypt, Saudi Arabia

### Iran: the structurally present great absentee

Despite the American-Iranian ceasefire of **June 2026**, **Iran** remains structurally present in the Gaza equation through its ties to **Hamas** and **Palestinian Islamic Jihad**. The **Hamas** disarmament program implies, in the background, the question of whether **Tehran** would accept cutting its relations with the movement — something it has shown no sign of wanting to do. The Iranian logic is clear: an armed **Hamas** in Gaza is a strategic lever against **Israel**, regardless of other diplomatic developments.

The fact that the June **2026** American-Iranian deal does not cover Iranian **proxies** in the region — including **Hamas** — is precisely one of the points criticized by Gulf countries and by **Israel**. As long as this question is not addressed within a broader diplomatic framework, progress on Gaza will remain fragile.

### Egypt as an indispensable pivot

**Egypt** plays a central role in any Gaza equation, for obvious geographical and historical reasons. It shares the **Rafah** border with Gaza, and it is traditionally through its diplomatic channels that indirect negotiations between **Israel** and **Hamas** take place. Within the **ISF** framework, **Egypt** is tasked with contributing to the training of Palestinian police forces — a less visible role than troop deployment, but potentially decisive.

**Cairo** is in a delicate position: it does not want a massive influx of Gazan refugees into the **Sinai** (an explicit red line of the Egyptian government), nor does it want **Iran** to strengthen its influence along its eastern border, and it seeks to maintain good relations with the **United States**, with **Israel**, and with the Gulf Arab countries that finance its economy. These multiple constraints make **Egypt** an indispensable but unpredictable partner in this process.

*Egypt may be the country that best understands the reality on the ground in Gaza — not because it is more virtuous, but because it lives with the consequences immediately. Its role in training Palestinian security forces may be the most important long-term investment that can be made in Gaza's stability. It is also the most invisible.*

## The Human Toll: More Than 73,000 Dead

### A conflict that keeps killing

Behind the geopolitical equations and security architectures are human lives. Since the start of the conflict in **October 2023**, the total documented death toll has exceeded **73,000 people killed**, according to Gaza's Ministry of Health — whose figures are considered reliable by the United Nations. More than **1,027 Palestinians** have been killed since the start of the **October 10, 2025** ceasefire. **270 journalists and media workers**, **120 academics**, and more than **560 humanitarian workers** are among the victims.

These figures are people with names, families, and life plans. The risk of international politics is to transform them into statistics and adjustment variables in geopolitical equations. This analytical piece must not cause that to be forgotten. Every security architecture, every diplomatic process, every stabilization mechanism finds its ultimate justification in its capacity to end these deaths — and everything that fails at this objective is, whatever its conceptual elegance, a moral failure.

### The ongoing humanitarian crisis

According to the **British government's security report** on Gaza from **June 2026**, the **yellow line** continues to shift westward, compressing hundreds of thousands of people into an ever-shrinking space. "The space where people live is continuously narrowing, framed by violence." No hospital in Gaza is fully operational. Humanitarian aid funding stands at **24%** of needs. This ground-level reality is the context in which the Arab security architecture is being negotiated — and it imposes a moral urgency that diplomatic delays struggle to justify.

*There is a real risk that the major powers — the United States, Europe, China, Russia — are so absorbed in their mutual geopolitical competitions that they forget human beings are dying while diplomats negotiate. Gaza has become a geopolitical playing field in which every actor seeks to maximize its influence. And the Palestinian victims are the losers of that competition.*

## Outlook: What This Architecture Can and Cannot Accomplish

### The conditions for success

The emerging Arab security architecture around Gaza can succeed if several conditions are met. First, a political agreement on **Hamas** disarmament — without which any international force remains without a clear operational mandate. Second, a progressive and verifiable Israeli withdrawal to the initial ceasefire lines, creating the space necessary for **ISF** deployment. Third, sustained reconstruction funding — not promises, but actual disbursements. Fourth, credible Palestinian governance — reformed, inclusive, and not associated with **Hamas** — capable of exercising civil authority in stabilized areas.

All of these conditions are necessary and none is guaranteed. Their simultaneous realization within the **Board of Peace**'s mandate through **2027** represents an extraordinary challenge. That is not a reason to abandon the effort — it is a reason to be realistic about the time it will take and the resources it will require.

### The risk of the failure scenario

The failure scenario — if the conditions for success are not met — is as important to analyze as the success scenario. If the **ISF** fails to deploy credibly, if the orange line keeps advancing, if reconstruction never starts, and if **Hamas** continues governing part of Gaza — the likely outcome is an increasingly unstable status quo, with endemic low-level violence, a persistent humanitarian catastrophe, and growing radicalization among a population that feels abandoned.

This scenario feeds regional instability, strengthens Iranian influence, weakens the moderate Arab regimes that took the risk of engaging in the **ISF**, and gives anti-Western actors — **China**, **Russia**, **Iran** — a permanent rhetorical platform against American and European foreign policy.

*I have no miracle solution for Gaza. No one does. But I note that the most successful security architectures in recent history — the Balkans, Lebanon from 1990 to 2006, East Timor — all required sustained political will, massive resources, and agreement on the broad political lines before the deployment of forces. In Gaza, the attempt is being made to deploy a force without having resolved the prior political questions. That is the central problem.*

## The US Position in This New Architecture: Conditional Support and Silent Pressure

### The American administration and the Gaza file: between engagement and reservations

Behind the scenes of this **new security architecture** in the Middle East, the American position is decisive. **Washington** officially supports the stabilization process while maintaining its reservations about the modalities of a full Israeli withdrawal. The presence of American officials in the negotiations on the **Board of Peace** signals that the United States remains a central actor, even in a configuration where Arab countries are playing a new role.

**Donald Trump**'s statements on Gaza have been particularly ambiguous: simultaneously enthusiastic about the idea of a "historic deal" and vague on the details of residual Israeli control. This American ambiguity is not purely tactical: it reflects the internal pressures of an American governing coalition in which unconditional supporters of Israel and advocates of a negotiated settlement are in permanent conflict.

### Pressure on Israel: how far will Washington go?

The real question for the future of this architecture is whether **Washington** will exert sufficient pressure on **Israel** for the withdrawal from the 64% of territory currently occupied to become a reality rather than an indefinitely deferred promise. Historical examples — from the Oslo Accords to the Camp David negotiations — show that American pressure is the most decisive variable in any peace process involving Israel.

Without a firm commitment from the **White House** on clear timelines, regional actors — including **Morocco** — risk finding themselves managing a residual Israeli presence without the means to challenge it. That would be a stabilization architecture built on sand: elegant in theory, fragile in practice.

*The American diplomatic posture on this file reminds me of a phrase I read somewhere: "A foreign policy without a deadline is not a policy. It is a wish." Washington must choose between supporting a concrete peace architecture or preserving an ambiguity that suits Israel in the short term but sabotages the region in the long term.*

## Humanitarian Aid and Reconstruction: A Test of Consistency for the International Community

### The $70 billion promised and the reality of disbursements

International financial commitments for the reconstruction of **Gaza** theoretically total nearly **$70 billion**. But between the promise and the disbursement, the history of conflicts teaches brutal skepticism: donor conferences are oversubscribed, transfers arrive at a trickle. The reconstruction of **Iraq** after 2003, of **Libya** after 2011, or of **Mali** remain sobering examples of the distance between announced commitments and concrete achievements.

The additional complexity in Gaza is that reconstruction cannot begin in earnest as long as part of the territory remains under military occupation. The infrastructure to be rebuilt can be destroyed again if security conditions are not stabilized. This is the vicious cycle that the **Board of Peace** must break, but for which it still lacks concrete mechanisms.

### Palestinian civil society as a forgotten actor

All these architectures — security, financial, diplomatic — share a common blind spot: **Palestinian civil society**. Churches, women's organizations, educators' networks, professional associations: these structures that sustain a society from within are rarely invited to the negotiating table. Yet they are the ones who will have to, in practice, rebuild a social fabric torn apart by years of conflict, blockade, and loss.

The successful post-conflict reconstruction experiences — in **Bosnia**, in **Mozambique**, in **Rwanda** — all included a substantial component of support for local civil society. Without that component, peace agreements remain fragile institutional constructions that collapse at the first shock. Gaza will not be an exception to this historical rule.

*What concerns me about all these carefully constructed architectures is the absence of ordinary Palestinians from the narrative. Not spokespersons, not negotiators, not leaders. The people. Those who have lost their homes, their loved ones, their future. Any peace that ignores them as active subjects of their own future is doomed to fail.*

## Conclusion: A New Architecture, Uncertain Foundations

### What Morocco in the ISF represents

Morocco's decision to engage in the **ISF** represents something real and important: an Arab country that accepts responsibility for security in Gaza within a multilateral institutional framework. It is a wager on the possibility of a different future for Palestinians — a future that neither **Hamas** domination nor prolonged Israeli occupation can offer. This wager deserves to be supported, even if its institutional foundations remain fragile.

But that support must be demanding. The emerging Arab security architecture cannot be a substitute for resolving the fundamental political questions — **Hamas** disarmament, Israeli withdrawal, and the pathway to a viable Palestinian state. If it becomes a way of indefinitely managing an occupation without addressing its causes, it will serve neither the Palestinians nor regional stability.

### What the West must do now

For the **West**, the lesson of the Gaza analysis is the same as the one we draw from the war in **Ukraine**: unresolved conflicts become influence terrain for our adversaries. **China** and **Russia** are not interested in Gaza's stability — they are interested in the instability that its non-resolution sustains, and the anti-Western rhetoric it fuels. The honest and equitable resolution of the Palestinian question is not only a moral imperative — it is a strategic imperative.

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

## Sources

### Primary sources

- [UN Security Council briefing on Gaza humanitarian situation — Security Council Report — June 17, 2026](https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2026/06/the-middle-east-including-the-palestinian-question-briefing-on-the-humanitarian-situation-in-gaza-3.php)

- [Palestine weekly wrap: Israel's 'quiet annexation' grows louder — Al Jazeera — June 23, 2026](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/6/23/palestine-weekly-wrap-israels-quiet-annexation-grows-louder)

- [Moroccan contingent arrives in Israel to join international Gaza force — Arab News Japan — June 24, 2026](https://www.arabnews.jp/en/middle-east/article_172805/)

- [Morocco, Albania, and Greece join Gaza International Stabilization Force — Jerusalem Post — June 24, 2026](https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/article-900275)

### Secondary sources

- [Morocco is officially among the first five countries to commit troops to Gaza's ISF — Morocco World News — February 19, 2026](https://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2026/02/279539/morocco-is-officially-among-the-first-five-countries-to-commit-troops-to-gazas-isf/)

- [Country bulletin: security situation in Gaza, June 2026 — GOV.UK — June 22, 2026](https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/palestine-country-policy-and-information-notes/country-bulletin-security-situation-in-gaza-palestine-june-2026-accessible)

- [The only army in Gaza Israel actually trusts isn't Egypt's. It's Morocco's — Ynetnews — June 24, 2026](https://www.ynetnews.com/opinions-analysis/article/rkbvrpffml)

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Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/analyse-gaza-64-sous-occupation-le-maroc-et-l-architecture-securitaire-arabe-qui