# ANALYSIS: CARNEY PLEDGES 5% OF GDP FOR DEFENCE — WHAT IT REALLY COSTS CANADA

> On June 25, 2025, at the NATO Summit in The Hague, Prime Minister Mark Carney announced that Canada was committing to raising its defence spending to 5% of GDP by 2035. A number delivered almost soberly. Yet translated into concrete Canadian dollars, it is staggering: in a CNN in

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Analysis
- Published: 2026-06-24
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/analyse-carney-promet-5-du-pib-en-defense-ce-que-ca-coute-vraiment-au-canada

## Key takeaways

- Carney announced the 5% target at The Hague, which the CNN interview put at about $150 billion a year, including roughly $107 billion for direct military spending.
- The target splits into 3.5% for core military spending and 1.5% for defence-related infrastructure, a structure the columnist calls politically clever but open to criticism.
- Budget 2025 proposed $81.8 billion over five years, and the Parliamentary Budget Officer estimated the 5% target would add $63 billion to the deficit by 2035.
- The columnist sees the submarine fleet, the Saab GlobalEye purchase, SAFE market access and the Ontario ODIS as key elements, while warning of recruitment shortfalls and procurement delays.
- The columnist argues the 2029 review could serve as a political off-ramp, and that public support will depend on concrete returns.

## Introduction: $150 billion a year — the number that changes everything

### A historic commitment at The Hague

On **June 25, 2025**, at the **NATO Summit in The Hague**, Prime Minister **Mark Carney** announced that **Canada** was committing to raising its **defence spending** to **5% of GDP by 2035**. A number delivered almost soberly. Yet translated into concrete Canadian dollars, it is staggering: in a **CNN** interview the same day, Carney clarified that this objective would represent approximately **$150 billion per year** — of which roughly **$107 billion** for direct military spending and the rest for defence infrastructure. That is more than the combined total annual budgets for health and education that some Canadian provinces spend in a given year. It is a revolution. And it is far from won.

The structure of this commitment follows the new **NATO** formula: **3.5% of GDP** for core military spending — equipment, troops, weapons — and an **additional 1.5%** for defence-related investments: infrastructure, ports, bases, aerodromes, **cybersecurity**, **critical minerals**. This division is not inconsequential. It allows spending that would normally be counted as civilian investment — northern road construction, port development — to be integrated into the defence effort calculation. It is smart budgetary engineering. But it is also a way to dilute the real figure of what **Canada** actually devotes to its armed forces proper.

### From 1.37% to 5%: a dizzying trajectory

When **Carney** made this commitment, **Canada** was spending approximately **1.37% of GDP** on **defence** — chronically below the **NATO** target of 2%, despite years of allied pressure. It was not until **March 26, 2026**, in an official announcement, that Carney declared Canada had finally reached the **2%** threshold. Nine months after the 5% commitment. In other words: the foundations have barely been laid for the first step. The 2035 horizon is not science fiction, but it will require budgetary discipline and political will that survive multiple governments, potential recessions, and several elections.

*1.37% to 5% of GDP in ten years. On paper, it is a leap. In the reality of procurement processes, defence unions, international tenders, and delivery timelines — it is an obstacle marathon that Canada has never run at this speed. I am not saying it is impossible. I am saying that those who think money alone solves the equation have never ordered a submarine.*

## What $150 billion a year means concretely

### Budget 2025: the first step at $81.8 billion over five years

Even before the formal 5% commitment, **Budget 2025** proposed an investment of **$81.8 billion over five years** starting in 2025-2026, of which more than **$9 billion in 2025-2026 alone**, to "rebuild, rearm, and reinvest" in the Canadian Armed Forces. These amounts include creating a new **submarine fleet**, acquiring **Saab GlobalEye** surveillance aircraft, modernizing the **Halifax-class frigates**, massive investments in Arctic defence and over-the-horizon radar. **Carney** insisted these **$81.8 billion** should "generate long-term benefits for the Canadian economy rather than simply filling a pre-set wish list."

This economic framing is deliberate. By presenting **rearmament** as an investment in jobs, innovation, and industrial **sovereignty** rather than as pure military spending, **Carney** is seeking to build political consensus around a policy that would otherwise be unpopular in a Canadian public historically reluctant to large military outlays. It is shrewd politics. It is also, it must be said, an honest presentation: in a context where defence supply chains generate highly skilled jobs and cutting-edge R&D, military spending and economic development are not antagonists.

### The Parliamentary Budget Officer sounds the alarm

In **February 2026**, the **Parliamentary Budget Officer** published a stern warning: reaching the **5% of GDP target by 2035** would add **$63 billion to the cumulative deficit** over the period. This stingingly precise figure reveals the brutal mechanics of the commitment. **Canada** cannot double, triple, then quadruple its **defence spending** in ten years by simply drawing on its existing budget margins — it will have to borrow. Massively. In a context where interest rates, while lower than the 2023 peaks, remain substantially higher than the near-zero rates during which governments had grown accustomed to borrowing painlessly.

$63 billion in additional deficit. This is not a marginal warning. It is the real fiscal cost of a geopolitical ambition. And this cost will be paid by Canadians one way or another — either in future taxes, in cuts to public services, or in debt passed on to the next generation. The central political question of the coming decade is therefore not "should we reach 5%?" — the answer is yes, the commitments are made — but "who pays, how, and by giving up what?"

*$63 billion in additional deficit. That is the price of thirty years of underinvestment in defence. We deferred the bill until it became unavoidable. I do not fault Carney for paying it — he had little choice after The Hague. I fault his predecessors for letting it accumulate while telling themselves the United States would always pay in our place. That time is over.*

## The architecture of investment: submarines, radars, fighters

### The submarine fleet: the great void to fill

One of the most important lines in Canada's **rearmament** concerns the **submarine fleet**. **Canada** currently operates four **Victoria-class submarines** — vessels purchased second-hand from the **United Kingdom** in the 1990s, chronically unreliable, rarely operationally available. Acquiring a new submarine fleet — conventional or nuclear-powered, the question is not yet settled — represents an extraordinarily complex, lengthy, and costly procurement programme. No precise figure had been officially confirmed for this programme at the time of writing. What **Carney** announced was the intention. The timeline and cost remain to be defined — a capability allies consider a priority for the defence of Canada's Arctic and Atlantic approaches.

The urgency is real. In an **Arctic** increasingly accessible as ice melts, in an Atlantic where **Russian submarines** regularly test allied responses, the absence of a modern submarine fleet leaves **Canada** with a major strategic vulnerability. The **Royal Canadian Navy** cannot credibly surveil its own waters without a sufficient number of operational **submarines**. And allies — the **United States**, the **United Kingdom**, **Australia** — are beginning to notice the gap between public commitments and actual capabilities.

### The GlobalEye and maritime air patrols

**Carney**'s decision to acquire **GlobalEye** surveillance aircraft from Swedish company **Saab** is strategically interesting on several levels. First, it marks a deliberate diversification of defence suppliers beyond the **United States** — the same gesture reflected in the **F-35** contract review. Second, the GlobalEye is an advanced maritime and aerial surveillance system based on a modified Canadian **Bombardier Global 6000** business jet — which creates direct industrial spinoffs in **Canada**. Finally, in the context of Arctic surveillance and **NORAD** modernization, aircraft capable of detecting submarine, surface, and aerial threats over vast expanses are exactly what Canada needs to meet its commitments to its allies.

But here again, procurement timelines are real. Between the decision to buy and the delivery of fully operational aircraft lie years of negotiation, contracting, crew training, and integration into existing systems. In **2026**, **Canada** is still in the early phases of this process. The threats, for their part, do not wait for procurement schedules.

*The GlobalEye on a Bombardier base — that is what I call a strategically smart purchase. Canadian at its foundation, Swedish in its weapons system, NATO-compatible in its capabilities. That is precisely how a middle power should diversify its defence spending: maximizing local spinoffs while acquiring front-line capabilities. Too bad it took Trump imposing tariffs for Ottawa to come around to it.*

## The question of industrial sovereignty: who makes what?

### The February 2026 federal Defence Industrial Strategy

Alongside the spending commitments, the **Carney** government published in **February 2026** a federal **Defence Industrial Strategy (DIS)** whose central objective is to ensure that a substantial share of Canadian military spending remains in **Canada**. The stakes are twofold: creating high-quality jobs in the defence sectors and structurally reducing dependency on the **United States** for parts, software upgrades, and weapons systems. This dependency has become politically untenable in a context where **Washington** imposed tariffs on Canadian goods and an American president repeatedly suggested that Canada would be better off absorbed as the 51st state.

The DIS explicitly aims to "create a military-industrial sector under **Ottawa**'s control, less dependent on the **United States**." It designates universities and colleges as **military R&D engines** and allocates **$1.6 billion** to "attract and equip world-class researchers" in this sector. These figures, taken together, sketch the outlines of a nascent Canadian military-industrial complex — less dominant than its American equivalent, but markedly more ambitious than what existed five years ago.

### SAFE and European markets: concrete diversification

A concrete indicator of this diversification: **Canada** became in **February 2026** the **first non-European member** of the EU's **Security Action for Europe (SAFE)** programme. In June, **Marconi Technologies** of **Montreal** won the first Canadian contract under SAFE — more than **$10 million** in **ORION** tactical radios for the **Polish Cyber Command**. Small amount, large symbol. For the first time, a Canadian defence company was accessing European procurement markets directly through an institutional mechanism. **Carney** explicitly presented the SAFE membership as a means of enabling Canadian firms to "compete for contracts in Europe," generating jobs at home.

The long-term ambition is clear: build a Canadian defence industry that exports, innovates, employs — and structurally reduces dependency on an American neighbour that has become unpredictable under President **Trump**. It is a legitimate objective. It is also a difficult one to achieve. Defence industries are built over decades, not years. And **Canada** is starting from far behind.

*The SAFE membership may be Carney's most strategically significant defence decision — more than the spending figures. It opens a 27-country market to the Canadian industry that will invest hundreds of billions in its defence over the next decade. Marconi and its $10 million is a starting point. In ten years, if this programme works, it will be a real economic weight in the Canadian industrial balance.*

## Human resources: the forgotten nerve of war

### A recruitment crisis threatening everything else

Budgets can be voted, contracts signed, acquisitions announced. But without the men and women to operate the systems, all of that remains metal and code. And the **Canadian Armed Forces** have been suffering from a documented recruitment and retention crisis for several years. Military personnel figures struggle to meet their objectives. Application processing times remain excessively long. Competition with the private sector for technological talent — essential in a modern military — is unequal on the compensation front.

**Budget 2025** allocates funds to strengthen personnel, but transforming an institutional culture cannot be mandated with a budget line. Bill C-11 on military justice — which transfers jurisdiction over sexual offences committed in **Canada** to civilian authorities — is a step in the right direction toward making the institution more attractive to women and to those who hesitated to enlist due to the toxic culture documented by the Arbour and Fish inquiries. But it is only one step. Systemic problems — insufficient military housing, frequent relocations, administrative rigidities — remain.

### Training talent for a 21st-century military

The 21st-century Canadian military no longer needs only infantry soldiers and pilots. It needs specialists in **cybersecurity**, **artificial intelligence**, **electronic warfare**, **data analysis**, and **secure communications**. These profiles are precisely the ones the private sector — particularly tech companies — is recruiting with compensation packages the military cannot currently match. The federal DIS provides mechanisms to "better connect universities and colleges to defence priorities," but materializing those mechanisms will take years. And all the while, talent competition continues, and the military often loses.

The **$1.7 billion** investment planned in Ontario for expanding STEM programmes and skilled trades — presented as an integral part of the provincial **ODIS** — is a partial answer. But it also raises a structural question: if engineers are trained for defence, are we ensuring they have reasons to stay in the public sector rather than being immediately captured by the private sector? This tension is unresolved.

*We talk about $150 billion a year by 2035. We talk about frigates, submarines, over-the-horizon radars. Nobody talks about the 20,000 vacancies in the Armed Forces, recruits waiting months for a response, families leaving bases because military housing is in ruins. Money without people is cardboard defence. I would like Carney to talk about the recruitment problem with the same fervour he talks about the GDP figures.*

## The geopolitical equation: why 5% now

### Trump's pressure and the structural reality

Let us be honest about the drivers behind this historic commitment. The pressure from **Donald Trump** — who publicly and repeatedly demanded that **NATO** allies reach **5% of GDP** — played an obvious catalysing role. But reducing Canada's commitment to a capitulation before Trump would be an analytical error. The structural reality runs deeper: **Russia** invaded **Ukraine** in **2022**, proving that large-scale conventional war in **Europe** was back. **China** has reached **620 nuclear warheads** according to **SIPRI** in 2026 and is accelerating its military modernization. North Korea continues its ballistic programmes. The **Taiwan Strait** remains a potential powder keg. In this context, the question is no longer "should we spend more on defence?" — the answer is yes, unambiguously. The question is "is 5% of GDP the right number?"

The honest answer is: perhaps. The 5% figure is as much a negotiated target as an objective analysis of Canadian capability needs. What is certain is that **Canada** can no longer function with **1.37% of GDP** in a security environment radically more demanding than that of the 2000s or 2010s. The spending increase is legitimate. The exact magnitude and timeline remain to be refined in the planned reviews — notably the review of the commitment scheduled for **2029** "to ensure commitments match the global security landscape."

### The 3.5% + 1.5% allocation model: an architectural innovation

The **NATO** division into **3.5% + 1.5%** is a political invention that serves both the **United States** — which wants to see allies truly spend more — and member countries that want more flexibility in defining their expenditures. For **Canada**, the **1.5% devoted to infrastructure and related security** is particularly useful: it allows the NATO calculation to incorporate investments in Arctic ports, strategic roads in the North, territory surveillance systems, and **critical minerals**. These expenditures would have occurred anyway for economic development reasons — counting them in the **defence budget** is a way of meeting NATO targets without necessarily creating all-new pure military spending.

This architecture has its defenders — who see it as a smart way to align infrastructure and defence investments — and its critics — who see it as a way to inflate the figures without actually increasing core military capabilities. Both are partly right. The essential is that the **3.5% of core military spending** be real, credible, and followed by verifiable capabilities. That is where Canada's credibility with its allies is at stake.

*The 3.5 + 1.5 formula is politically clever. It lets countries building Arctic roads count them as defence. Fine. But if a Russian submarine enters Canadian waters, it is not an Arctic road that deters it. Military credibility is measured in real operational capabilities, not creative budget architectures. I hope NATO does not forget this in its future audits.*

## Ontario ODIS: the provincial dimension of rearmament

### Doug Ford and the "generational opportunity"

In **late May 2026**, at the CANSEC trade show in **Ottawa**, Ontario Premier **Doug Ford** unveiled the framework for the first **Ontario Defence Industrial Strategy (ODIS)** — a decade-long strategy aimed at transforming the province into a "critical hub in North American and European military supply chains." Ford described the increase in Canadian and **NATO** military spending as a "generational opportunity." The figures he advanced are ambitious: tripling Ontario's defence workforce from **13,000 to 43,000 jobs by 2035**, adding **$6 billion** to the provincial GDP, mobilizing some **300 firms** in the sector.

Ontario's approach explicitly aligns with **Carney**'s federal DIS. Ford and Carney — who come from opposing parties but have "systematically deepened their cooperation" according to the WSWS article of **June 24, 2026** — form on this file a politically unprecedented tandem. Ford sits on Carney's Canada-United States advisory council. The two men have made **rearmament** a "**Team Canada**" project that transcends traditional partisan divisions. In a country accustomed to federal-provincial warfare, this harmony is notable — and fragile.

### Ring of Fire, STEM, and the militarization of education

The Ontario **ODIS** targets the **Ring of Fire** in the province's North — a mining region rich in the **critical minerals** needed for the production of high-tech armaments. It includes a **STEM and skilled trades** budget of **$1.7 billion** to train the workforce needed for the defence industrial base's expansion. And it envisages close integration of post-secondary institutions into defence priorities, with "workforce planning mechanisms" embedded in the educational system. A military liaison officer — the **Ontario Military Defence Representative (OMDR)** — will be stationed within the provincial government to identify "defence-related training gaps."

This evolution raises legitimate questions about the boundary between independent academic research and research steered by military priorities. It also raises practical questions: can Ontario universities absorb such a rapid transformation of their relationship with the defence industry without compromising their academic autonomy and diversity? These questions deserve a public debate that Ford's enthusiastic announcements tend to eclipse.

*Ford talks about 13,000 to 43,000 defence jobs in Ontario in ten years. It sounds good. But those 30,000 jobs have to come from somewhere — and in an already tight Canadian labour market, "from somewhere" often means from other sectors. Who will lose these workers? Healthcare? Education? The civilian tech sector? These questions do not appear in CANSEC press releases. They should.*

## Allied pressure: what Washington, Paris, and Berlin expect

### The NATO context: a long-underperforming Canada

For decades, **Canada** was one of **NATO**'s least disciplined members in terms of spending. Geographically protected by the **United States**, comfortable in its role as a "good multilateral citizen" that preferred peacekeeping missions to armament spending, **Ottawa** systematically deferred investments while hoping the geopolitical situation would never force it to account for itself. **2022 changed that**. Russia's invasion of **Ukraine** made the question unavoidable. And **Trump made the pressure immediate**.

By committing to **5% by 2035** — double even the new minimum **NATO** target of 2% — **Carney** made a spectacular choice. He chose to align not only with the **alliance**, but with the states that contribute the most. This positioning gives him real diplomatic capital within NATO: he can now speak as an equal with the Europeans who have raised their budgets, and he can respond to **Trump**'s demands with concrete figures rather than vague promises. It is a far more comfortable posture than that of his predecessors who arrived at NATO summits with PowerPoints and excuses.

### But allies look at capabilities, not just numbers

**NATO** evaluates its members not only on their spending but on their **real operational capabilities**: how many deployable soldiers? How many available **fighters**? How many operational ships? On this count, **Canada** still has work to do. The **88 F-35s** under review since March 2025, the chronically unavailable **Victoria-class submarine fleet**, the gaps in **command and control capability** — these are all points that allies note, even politely. The **$81.8 billion over five years** will progressively close these gaps. But "progressively" is not the same as "immediately."

In the 2026-2030 window — before the major procurement programmes mature — **Canada** remains, despite its ambitions, a modestly sized military power that depends heavily on its allies for its own defence. This reality will not disappear with speeches. It will fade, slowly, with deliveries — of **submarines**, **fighters**, radars, surveillance aircraft. In the meantime, Canada's credibility rests as much on its political sincerity as on its real capabilities.

*Allies look at capabilities, not communiqués. A Canada that promises 5% of GDP in 2035 but operates four submarines that break down and aging CF-18s is not yet the credible partner it aspires to become. I am not saying this to discourage — the effort is real and necessary. I say it because honesty about the gap between ambitions and capabilities is the sine qua non of a real transformation.*

## The domestic political risk: who can undo this commitment?

### Conservative opposition and the budget arithmetic

Will this historic commitment survive a change of government? The question is not academic. The **Conservative Party of Canada**, currently in opposition, generally supports higher **defence spending** — but its fiscal priorities — deficit reduction, tax cuts — could come into direct conflict with the cost of the **rearmament** programme. The **NDP**, for its part, more fundamentally opposes the militarization of the economy and could exert downward pressure on defence budgets in a future coalition or minority government context.

The political reality is that the commitment to **5% of GDP by 2035** will survive if it is anchored in irreversible procurement contracts, jobs created in targeted ridings, and a public that concretely sees the returns on these investments. This is precisely why **Carney**'s rhetoric insists on the economic dimension — the jobs, the innovation, the industrial **sovereignty** — rather than the purely military one. It is the political survival of the budget strategy embedded in the defence strategy. Not cynical — necessary.

### Public opinion: a consensus still to be built

Canadian polls on **defence spending** reveal a persistent ambivalence. The majority of Canadians support strong defence in principle — especially since the invasion of **Ukraine** — but hesitates before the concrete costs this implies. The **additional $63 billion deficit** identified by the Parliamentary Budget Officer is the kind of figure that can shift public opinion, especially in periods of economic difficulty. **Carney** therefore needs to win not only the budgetary battle, but the narrative battle: convincing Canadians that this investment serves their direct interest — for their security, for their jobs, for their place in the world.

This is a battle governments have historically lost in **Canada**. Canadians tend to prefer hospitals to **frigates**, daycare to **fighters**. This is not irrational — it is a legitimate values hierarchy. But in a world where security is no longer guaranteed, this hierarchy must be revisited. **Carney** knows it. The question is whether he will be capable of carrying this message beyond the politico-military elite, to the ordinary families who will pay the bill.

*Convincing Canadians that frigates and submarines are worth the budget sacrifices they imply — that may be the most difficult challenge in Carney's programme. Not the procurement contracts, not the NATO partnerships. The conversation with a Quebecer from Saint-Hyacinthe who would rather that money went to his hospital. I have no simple answer to this tension. But I know that failing to confront it honestly will lead to the abandonment of the commitment at the first electoral pressure.*

## Critical minerals: the deep industrial sovereignty

### The Ring of Fire and the defence value chain

One of the most profound innovations in Canada's 2026 defence strategy is the explicit connection between **natural resources** and the **military value chain**. The **Ring of Fire** in Northern Ontario contains significant reserves of **nickel, cobalt, chromite**, and other **critical minerals** needed for manufacturing electronic components, batteries, and advanced materials used in modern weaponry. By integrating the exploitation of these resources into the provincial **ODIS** and the federal DIS, **Ottawa** and Queen's Park are making the connection between mining and defence **sovereignty** more explicitly than ever before.

This connection is strategically grounded. Military supply chains are highly dependent on minerals whose production is largely concentrated in **China**. The **Pentagon** has classified this dependency as a first-order strategic vulnerability. By developing its own sources of **critical minerals**, **Canada** can not only supply its national defence industry but also position itself as a preferred supplier for its **NATO** allies — which the establishment of the **Critical Minerals Resilience and Production Alliance** at the **2025 G7**, expanded at **Évian** in **2026**, seeks precisely to achieve.

### The $5 billion investment in critical minerals

**Carney**'s delegation at the **Évian G7** in June 2026 announced **13 partnerships and initiatives** in **critical minerals** with more than **8 countries**, expecting "**more than $5 billion** in capital investments in the Canadian critical minerals value chain." **France**, **Germany**, Italy, and the Republic of Korea expressed intent to work with **Canada** to build up stockpiles. These partnerships make Canada a central actor in the geopolitics of strategic resources — a position that reinforces its negotiating leverage with both **Washington** and **Brussels**.

Here again, timing is critical. Mines do not open overnight. The development of the **Ring of Fire** faces infrastructure obstacles (roads, energy), consultations with First Nations whose territories are involved, and the inherent complexity of large-scale extraction projects in remote environments. The strategy is sound on paper. Execution will be long, costly, and politically sensitive.

*The critical minerals of the Ring of Fire in the Canadian defence strategy — here is a connection that should have been made fifteen years ago. Canada sitting on nickel and cobalt reserves while China secured global dominance over mining supply chains for defence technologies — that is the story of a multi-decade strategic distraction. Better late than never, but the catch-up will be hard.*

## The risks of hyper-growth: absorbability and coherence

### The absorbability problem

When a government raises its military spending from **1.37% to 5% of GDP in ten years**, it is not merely tripling its budget. It must find enough viable projects, capable suppliers, and competent managers to absorb this spending effectively. The history of **defence spending** in **Canada** is littered with poorly managed projects, exploding costs, and late deliveries. The **Canadian Surface Combatant (CSC)** project — the navy's largest procurement programme — has accumulated delays and cost overruns that would have embarrassed any private-sector CFO. The influx of **$81.8 billion over five years** into an already-pressured procurement system creates a real risk of massive waste.

**Carney** said he wants to ensure spending "generates long-term benefits" rather than "filling a wish list." That is exactly the right intention. The question is whether the institutional processes — procurement agencies, ministerials, tenders, audits — are capable of keeping pace with such a rapid budget injection without degrading the quality of their decisions. The risk of poorly negotiated contracts, equipment ill-suited to actual needs, or bureaucratic waste absorbing a significant portion of this money is real. And it justifies close scrutiny from the **Auditor General** and the **Parliamentary Budget Officer**.

### Capability coherence: avoiding strategic shopping

Another risk is "**strategic shopping**" — a tendency to buy equipment because it is available, well-marketed, or politically convenient, rather than because it responds to a coherent doctrine. **Canada** has sometimes suffered from this tendency in the past. With massively growing budgets, the temptation will be strong for military officials, industry lobbies, and politicians from various regions to place their favourite projects in the portfolio. Avoiding this requires a clear defence doctrine, rigorous procurement governance, and political resistance to sectoral pressures. These are not naturally strong institutional characteristics in Canada.

The **2029** review will be a moment of truth. If by then acquisitions follow a coherent capability logic, if the announced jobs materialize, if the international partnerships generate tangible spinoffs — then the **5%** commitment will be on the right track. Otherwise, **2029** will be the opportunity for a downward revision that nobody will name directly, but that everyone will understand.

*Strategic shopping — buying submarines because Australia is doing it, drones because Ukraine is talking about them, radars because Carney wants a historic deal with Canberra. There is a logic in each isolated decision. The danger is never seeing whether the whole forms a coherent doctrine. I hope that someone, somewhere in the Canadian Armed Forces, is drawing the complete map of what all this must produce in 2035.*

## The nuclear submarine programme: the AUKUS commitment that changes everything

### The AUKUS deal and the historic 2025 decision

Among the most structuring investments of the **Canadian defence budget of $150 billion per year**, the question of **nuclear submarines** occupies a distinct place. **Canada**, in the context of its potential participation in the B-pillar of the **AUKUS agreement**, must decide in the coming years whether its ambition as a **first-rank naval power** includes nuclear submarine capabilities — a decision that would cost between **$25 and $40 billion Canadian** over two decades. The context is that of a **Royal Canadian Navy** whose **four Victoria-class submarines**, purchased second-hand from the **United Kingdom** in the late 1990s, are approaching the end of their operational lives.

The decision on **submarines** is emblematic of the choices the **$150 billion defence budget** imposes on **Ottawa**. A **5% of GDP commitment** can buy many things — but not everything simultaneously. Every dollar invested in **submarines** is a dollar not invested in recruitment, in Arctic radars, in replacement **fighters**, or in **precision munitions**. This logic of tradeoffs is at the heart of the execution challenge awaiting the **Carney** government. The ambition is set. The difficult choices remain to be made.

*Submarines. I understand the strategic fascination with these invisible, deterrent weapons capable of holding any adversary in check. But every time I read a figure of 30 or 40 billion for a submarine fleet, I think of the nurses, the teachers, the roads that will not be built. That is not an argument against defence. It is a reminder that budget choices have human faces that strategic documents never show.*

## The industrial acceleration: when defence becomes economic policy again

### From dependency to sovereignty: transforming supply chains

The **$150 billion per year** commitment is not just a military decision. It is an **industrial policy**. **Canada** has systematically disinvested from its military production capabilities since the end of the **Cold War** — outsourced ammunition manufacturing, reduced defence R&D, allowed industrial skills to atrophy. **Mark Carney** has sent a clear signal: the era of complete subcontracting to foreign suppliers is over. The new doctrine imposes **minimum Canadian content** in all major defence contracts, with technology transfer commitments, local job creation, and development of **sovereign production capabilities**.

This industrial transformation takes shape in concrete projects: the **Marconi Technologies** contract for **ORION** tactical radios in **Poland**, the **Saab GlobalEye** aerial surveillance programme, investments in **precision munitions** with **Rheinmetall Canada** in **Montreal**. These projects are not merely defence markets — they are the building blocks of a defence industrial ecosystem that no longer existed in **Canada** for decades. Rebuilding this ecosystem in five years, with the recruitment and training challenges this implies, is one of the most complex challenges in the entire **$150 billion programme**.

*Defence industrial policy. These are the words I would have wanted to hear as early as 2014, when Russia annexed Crimea and nobody really reacted in terms of industrial production. We let ten years pass. We are catching up now at a steep price. Today's urgency is the cost of yesterday's denial.*

## The 2029 review: the real test of the commitment

### A disguised exit clause?

**Carney** himself mentioned that a review of the commitment was planned for **2029** "to ensure commitments match the global security landscape." This review clause cuts both ways. On one hand, it is wise: defence needs can evolve, threats can change, technologies can transform doctrines. On the other, it can serve as a political off-ramp for a future government wanting to reduce the ambition without openly taking responsibility for doing so. The phrase "global security landscape" is vague enough to justify almost any upward or downward revision.

What will give this commitment solidity is less the review clause itself than the procurement contracts signed before then, the jobs created in factories and shipyards, the military capabilities actually delivered. These practical irreversibilities will be harder to undo than a political promise — and that may be **Carney**'s real strategy: making the defence commitment so deeply embedded in the real economy that no successor can ignore it without major political cost.

### Canada after The Hague: never the same again?

The **The Hague commitment of June 2025** changed something in Canadian defence policy. Not irreversibly — nothing in politics is. But substantially. For the first time since the Cold War, **Canada** finds itself with a numbered, public, credible commitment before its allies, obliging it to a systemic transformation of its military capabilities. This transformation will disrupt industries, create jobs in regions where there were none, train engineers and technicians in new specialties, modernize institutions that had aged in budgetary stagnation. That is not nothing. It may even be, if execution follows, the most important transformation project Canada has undertaken since the 1950s. But between commitment and reality, there are ten years of work. That work begins now. And it will not wait for those who are watching from the sidelines.

*The 2029 review commitment is the real test of this doctrine. Not because the threats will disappear by then — they have no reason to. But because it is the moment when political will is tested by competing priorities, new fiscal pressures, elections. Coherence between 2025 and 2029 will say more about Canada's reliability as an ally than all the speeches at The Hague combined.*

## Conclusion: a transformative commitment, an execution still to be proven

### What history will say about June 2026

In ten years, if **Canada** has kept its spending commitments, if its **submarines** are patrolling the Arctic deep, if its **fighters** are providing credible continental defence, if its defence industry is exporting to **Europe** and Asia, if its Armed Forces have enough personnel to fulfill their missions — then June 2025 at The Hague and the budgets of 2025-2026 will appear as the historic turning point they claimed to be. If, on the other hand, acquisitions are delayed, budgets are trimmed by **Carney**'s successors, personnel remains insufficient, and promised equipment is never delivered — then this commitment will join the long list of Canadian defence ambitions that shone in speeches and vanished in execution.

History is open. And its next chapters will unfold not in **Carney**'s press releases or Ford's press conferences, but in the shipyards, the air bases, the university laboratories, and the military recruiting offices. That is where the **Canada** of 2035 is being built — or not.

### The number that really matters

After all the analyses, budget architectures, industrial ambitions, and diplomatic commitments, the number that really matters is not the **$150 billion per year by 2035**. It is the number of Canadian soldiers, sailors, and aviators who, in ten years, will be ready to defend the country's interests and those of its allies when the situation demands it. Everything else — the **frigates**, the **submarines**, the radars, the tactical radios — has value only if there are competent and motivated human beings to operate them. This simple truth should govern every procurement decision, every institutional reform, and every dollar spent in this historic programme.

*$150 billion per year in 2035. I have written that figure several times in this article. And every time, I think of the same thing: it is not a budget. It is a wager on the future. A wager that the threat will be real, that the effort will be sustained, that the execution will be disciplined. Three simultaneous bets, each uncertain. That is the risk Carney accepted at The Hague. And now, it is all of Canada playing that hand.*

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

## Sources

### Primary sources

- [Prime Minister's Office — Canada joins new NATO Defence Investment Pledge — June 25, 2025](https://www.pm.gc.ca/en/news/news-releases/2025/06/25/canada-joins-new-nato-defence-investment-pledg)

- [Prime Minister's Office — Canada achieves NATO 2% target — March 26, 2026](https://www.pm.gc.ca/en/news/news-releases/2026/03/26/prime-minister-carney-announces-canada-has-achieved-nato-2-defence)

- [World Socialist Web Site — Ontario unveils plans to boost military production — June 24, 2026](https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2026/06/24/dtle-j24.html)

### Secondary sources

- [CBC News — Canada promises to spend 5% of GDP on defence by 2035 — June 25, 2025](https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/canada-agrees-five-percent-gdp-defence-spending-1.7570191)

- [Financial Post — Ottawa on track to achieve NATO's 5% spending target — May 28, 2026](https://ca.finance.yahoo.com/news/ottawa-track-achieve-natos-5-154442949.html)

- [CityNews Ottawa — NATO 5% pledge to add $63B to deficit by 2035 — February 5, 2026](https://ottawa.citynews.ca/2026/02/05/defence-spending-nato-deficit-canada/)

- [Ontario.ca — Ontario Unveils Framework for Defence Industrial Strategy — May 28, 2026](https://news.ontario.ca/en/release/1007513/ontario-unveils-framework-for-defence-industrial-strategy)

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Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/analyse-carney-promet-5-du-pib-en-defense-ce-que-ca-coute-vraiment-au-canada