# ANALYSIS: Ankara July 7-8: the NATO summit where the West stakes its credibility against Putin

> On July 7 and 8, 2026, the leaders of 32 allied nations plus partners from the Indo-Pacific and the Middle East will gather at the presidential palace of Beştepe in Ankara for the annual NATO summit. According to Secretary General Mark Rutte, a total of 41 to 42 countries will be represented, including the European Union, for a combined economic output of 70 trillion dollars. T

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Analysis
- Published: 2026-06-28
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/analyse-ankara-7-8-juillet-le-sommet-de-l-otan-ou-l-occident-joue-sa-credibilite

## Key takeaways

- Rutte says 41 to 42 countries will attend, and that Ankara must deliver commitments, including "tens of billions of dollars" in new defense contracts.
- The 5 percent of GDP target agreed at The Hague (3.5 percent defense, 1.5 percent related spending) by 2035 is the central test.
- Uncertainty about American reliability, including Hegseth's six-month review of US presence in Europe, shapes allied anxieties.
- Russia is reportedly preparing possible provocations in the Baltics or Poland, and Kaliningrad is described as a strategic threat.
- Zelensky's requests include lifting restrictions on Western weapons, more air defense and support for an oil embargo.

## Introduction: The most decisive meeting since The Hague

### A summit held in the shadow of war and American uncertainty

On **July 7 and 8, 2026**, the leaders of **32 allied nations** plus partners from the **Indo-Pacific** and the **Middle East** will gather at the presidential palace of **Beştepe** in **Ankara** for the annual **NATO** summit. According to Secretary General **Mark Rutte**, a total of **41 to 42 countries** will be represented, including the **European Union**, for a combined economic output of **70 trillion dollars**. This is the most important meeting of the **Atlantic Alliance** since the **The Hague** summit the previous year — perhaps more so, according to **Rutte** himself, "because Ankara is about delivering commitments, not just making them."

The context is particularly charged. The war in Ukraine is entering its fifth year. **Russia** maintains maximalist positions in any attempted dialogue. Ukrainian drones are striking at **1,300 km** depth in Russian territory. The **Trump** administration is conducting a six-month review of American presence in **Europe**. Eastern flank countries fear they can no longer count on the American security guarantee. And the **Alliance** must demonstrate that it has kept its **The Hague** promises — notably the commitment to **5 percent of GDP** in defense spending by **2035**.

### The weight of expectations: a world watching Ankara with existential questions

The world is watching **Ankara** with a series of fundamental questions. Is **NATO** still a credible alliance against the Russian threat? Are the **United States** still the anchor of European security, or will their gradual disengagement accelerate? Will the **5 percent of GDP** commitment promised at **The Hague** translate into credible budget trajectories and concrete industrial contracts, or will it remain a fine declaration? And above all: can **Ukraine** count on its allies for the long haul?

These questions are not rhetorical. They have direct consequences on **Putin's** calculations — who watches every crack in the Alliance with the attention of a predator waiting for the right moment — on Ukraine's determination to hold on, and on the security of eastern flank countries living a few hundred kilometers from a Russian army that has demonstrated its brutality. **Ankara** must deliver concrete answers, not diplomatic communiqués.

*I have covered enough diplomatic summits to know that expectations are often disappointed. Final communiqués are usually laborious compromises that satisfy everyone and bind no one. But Ankara has one particular characteristic: the context is so pressing — ongoing war, American uncertainty, Russian threat on the eastern flank — that inaction or diplomatic emptiness would have visible and rapid consequences. There is a cost to Ankara's failure. That is a stronger-than-usual incentive to deliver real results.*

## The 5 percent commitment: from promise to budgetary reality

### The Hague decided, Ankara must deliver

Last year at the **The Hague** summit, **NATO** allies made a historic decision: committing to spend **5 percent of GDP on defense by 2035**. More precisely, **3.5 percent in direct defense spending** and **1.5 percent in related spending** — security, resilience, strategic infrastructure. Secretary General **Rutte** described this target as "historic" and "ambitious, but essential." By comparison, many allies were still struggling to reach **2 percent of GDP** until recently.

At **Ankara**, the test is to verify whether this commitment translates into credible budget trajectories and concrete industrial contracts. **Rutte** announced that the summit should see the announcement of **"tens of billions of dollars" in new defense contracts** at a major defense industry day on the first day. This is the passage from word to action that the Alliance was waiting for — and a concrete answer to those who feared that **The Hague** promises would remain mere statements of intent.

### Who is spending what: the map of allied commitments

The evolution of allied defense spending since **2022** is spectacular. In **2025**, European and Canadian allies increased their defense spending by **nearly 20 percent** according to **Rutte**, representing **139 billion dollars in additional spending**. Over the decade **2016-2026**, European and Canadian allies spent **1.2 trillion dollars more** on defense. These figures are significant — even if they reflect as much the catching-up from chronic underinvestment as the response to an acute crisis.

Eastern flank countries — **Estonia**, **Latvia**, **Lithuania**, **Poland** — are already spending well above **NATO** targets. They were the first to reach and exceed the **2 percent of GDP** threshold, and they are on a trajectory that will quickly bring them toward **5 percent**. For these countries, **The Hague** commitment is not a constraint — it is recognition of what they are already doing. The challenge lies elsewhere: in Western European countries with larger GDPs but deeper traditions of defense underinvestment.

*The fact that Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland already spend proportionately more on their defense than many major NATO powers should give pause. These small countries, which have the most to lose from Russian aggression, are fully fulfilling their responsibilities. The larger powers dragging their feet on budget commitments should feel a certain shame in the face of this example. Geography creates moral clarity, and moral clarity creates the will to spend.*

## Rutte's role: diplomat, negotiator, and Trump manager

### The Secretary General who held the Alliance together

**Mark Rutte**, **NATO** Secretary General, has become one of the most important figures in Western security policy since taking office. His role in managing tensions between the **Trump** administration and European allies has been decisive — and often uncomfortable. **Rutte** chose a strategy of pragmatic engagement: valorizing **Trump**, attributing Alliance successes to him, flattering his ego while maintaining Alliance cohesion. He even called **Trump** "daddy" at the **The Hague** summit — a reference that many allies accepted "as long as it keeps Trump on board," according to diplomatic sources cited by **The Guardian**.

This approach has worked, at least partially. **Trump** has remained engaged in **NATO**. The most serious crises — his support for annexing **Greenland**, his threats to reduce American commitments — have been managed without formal rupture. But unpredictability remains. As the Secretary General said before the **Atlantic Council** on **June 25, 2026**: "Don't be frightened by tensions and debates — that's how democracies work." That is an elegant way of saying that managing **Trump** will remain a constant beyond **Ankara**.

### The Rutte doctrine: NATO 3.0 and the transatlantic balance

At the **Ankara** summit, **Rutte** wants to concretize what he calls "**NATO 3.0**": "a stronger Europe in a stronger NATO." This means **Europe** assumes greater responsibility in conventional defense — notably the leadership of land, air, and maritime commands that the Americans could transfer in the next 12 to 18 months. This does not mean a reduction in American engagement, but a more equitable sharing of burdens.

This transformation is already under way. **Germany** is deploying a full brigade in **Lithuania** — its first permanent overseas base since World War II. The **United Kingdom**, **France**, and the **Netherlands** are reinforcing their contributions to the eastern flank's multinational battle groups. **France** has even offered to extend its nuclear umbrella to more European nations. These concrete gestures precede and accompany the formal commitments that **Ankara** should entrench.

*NATO 3.0 is a concept that seems to me both necessary and risky. Necessary because Europe must indeed take more responsibility for its own defense — the model of a Europe protected by the United States is no longer guaranteed. Risky because a transition that moves too fast, without a clearly maintained American safety net, could send the wrong signal to Moscow. Rutte is walking a tightrope between two precipices, and I respect him for doing it with such skill.*

## The Hegseth review: six months to assess, not to decide to leave

### The withdrawal threat and its psychological effect on allies

US Defense Secretary **Pete Hegseth** announced a six-month review of American military presence in **Europe**. This announcement sent shockwaves through allied capitals — and particularly through eastern flank countries. According to **The Guardian** on **June 27, 2026**, this review feeds the fear that the United States may no longer be a reliable ally in the event of a Russian attack on a NATO state.

**Hegseth's** six-month review accompanies rhetoric that has shaken allies. At **Brussels** in February **2025**, he said that European security would no longer be **Washington's** priority given the rise of **China**. More recently, he criticized European countries that refused overflight rights and bases for American operations against **Iran**, calling them "shameful." This accumulation of negative signals creates a structural uncertainty about American reliability that the **Ankara** summit must work to dispel.

### Eastern flank countries between two strategies: appeasement or candor

Facing American unpredictability, eastern flank countries — whose security strategies have long been built on the American guarantee — find themselves facing a difficult dilemma. Apply the **Rutte** doctrine of appeasing **Trump** — not publicly expressing concerns to avoid accelerating the feared American disengagement — or tell the truth about their fears at the risk of angering **Washington**?

**Poland** chose a more direct path than most. Foreign Minister **Sikorski** said publicly in parliament: "We have been and will remain a loyal ally of America, and we cannot be taken for idiots." That is a tone that many European allies cannot afford with their respective publics. But it is also a signal that patience has its limits — and that even the most committed allies need clear answers on American reliability before betting everything on the NATO guarantee.

*The question of American reliability against Putin seems to me to be the central question at Ankara. Everything else — the 5 percent of GDP, the defense contracts, the eastern flank reinforcement — only makes sense if deterrence is credible. And deterrence is only credible if the adversary believes the United States will intervene in the event of an attack. With a president whose positions change via Truth Social, that credibility is precarious. Ankara must restore it, one way or another.*

## The eastern flank in danger: what intelligence data shows

### Russia is preparing provocations in the Baltics, intelligence sources warn

As allies prepare for **Ankara**, intelligence alerts published in the days before the summit add an additional layer of urgency. According to **The Guardian** on **June 26, 2026**, Western intelligence sources believe **Russia** is preparing a possible "provocation" in the **Baltic states** or in **Poland**. **Latvia** issued its own alert, according to **Fox News** on **June 22**, about hybrid attacks being prepared against **NATO's** eastern flank.

These provocations would not necessarily be a frontal invasion. Russia's "hybrid warfare" doctrine prefers actions with plausible deniability: drones, infrastructure sabotage, cyber operations, disinformation, border incidents. Last September, according to the same **Guardian** article, roughly **20 Russian drones violated Polish airspace** — a deliberate incursion that allies described as testing NATO's limits. This type of calculated provocation seeks to divide allies on the appropriate response and to exploit uncertainties about how to interpret Article 5.

### Kaliningrad: Russia's bridgehead at the heart of NATO

The **Kaliningrad** exclave — Russian territory isolated between **Poland** and **Lithuania** — is a strategic node in the Russian threat against the eastern flank. Data published by **Army Recognition** on **June 21, 2026** reveals that **Russia** regularly conducts Baltic strike exercises from there with **Su-24M** bombers and **Su-30SM2** fighters. These exercises simulate strikes on targets in **Poland**, **Lithuania**, and the **Baltic Sea** — a deliberate intimidation signal in the run-up to the Ankara summit.

**Kaliningrad** also houses **Iskander** missiles capable of striking targets several hundred kilometers away, covering much of NATO's eastern flank. This is a permanent threat that Alliance military planners must factor into their defense calculations. And it is an additional argument for the **Ankara** summit to concretely reinforce **NATO** military presence in the Baltic states and in **Poland**.

*Kaliningrad is one of the blind spots in media coverage of European security. This small Russian territory of 15,000 square kilometers between Poland and Lithuania is a geographical time bomb — an advanced base of Russian missiles and aircraft in the heart of NATO territory. Its demilitarization should have been on the diplomatic agenda for years. It has not been. And in the meantime, Su-24M bombers train to strike Warsaw and Vilnius from this outpost.*

## Zelensky at Ankara: the Ukrainian presence and what it means

### The Ukrainian president at the summit: a symbol and an argument

**Volodymyr Zelensky** will participate in the **Ankara** summit. This presence carries a dual significance. Symbolically, it affirms that **Ukraine** is not merely a subject of discussion at **NATO** — it is a present actor, a partner participating in the decisions that concern it. Politically, it gives **Zelensky** the opportunity to argue directly before the 41 or 42 leaders present for increased support, unrestricted weapons deliveries, and a path toward **NATO** membership.

The question of Ukrainian **NATO** membership remains one of the most sensitive on **Ankara's** agenda. The United States and some European allies have so far resisted a formal invitation, fearing it would be interpreted by **Russia** as escalation. But the counter-argument is gaining ground: refusing Ukraine's **NATO** membership is refusing it the only credible long-term security guarantee — and it encourages **Putin** to believe the door remains open for a future aggression.

### The PURL program and weapons deliveries: the mechanics of support

The **PURL** program (whose modalities are determined by the United States), launched by **Trump** and **Rutte** at the previous summit, has enabled **Ukraine** to receive the bulk of its air defense systems — **nearly 90 percent of its air defenses** according to **Rutte**, including **PAC-3 Patriot** interceptors financed by Europeans and Canadians and supplied by the United States. This mechanism has been crucial in protecting Ukrainian cities against Russian missiles.

At **Ankara**, the challenge is to maintain and amplify these deliveries. Ukraine has a continuing need for Patriot interceptors — whose production **Rutte** describes as "extremely complex." European and American factories are accelerating production, including a new factory in Bavaria for interceptors. But demand still exceeds available supply. **Ankara** must produce additional commitments on delivery timelines and volumes — measurable commitments, not statements of principle.

*The PURL program is one of the most important mechanisms of this war — and it is almost unknown to the general public. The idea of buying American weapons with European money and delivering them to Ukraine is an elegant compromise that allows the United States to maintain its role as strategic weapons supplier without directly financing military aid. That is ingenious geopolitics. But it depends on Trump's continued willingness to participate — and that is where the fragility lies.*

## European defense industry: the industrial revolution Rutte is calling for

### Rheinmetall, ASELSAN, and the new capabilities

**Rutte** wants **Ankara** to be the summit of the "transatlantic defense industrial revolution." Concretely, this means contracts between governments and industry that go beyond statements of intent to create durable production chains. The new **Rheinmetall** munitions factory in **Germany**, which went from plans to production in just over a year and will soon produce **350,000 155mm artillery shells per year**, is the concrete example **Rutte** cites regularly.

In Turkey — the summit's host country — **Rutte** visited engineers at **ASELSAN**, the country's largest defense electronics company. **Turkey** houses roughly **3,000 companies** in the defense sector. This Turkish industrial fabric is an asset for **NATO** — provided that the political tensions between **Ankara** and its allies (particularly over the **F-35s** and relations with **Russia**) do not compromise industrial cooperation. **Rutte's** diplomacy in Ankara also includes managing these bilateral tensions.

### Quadrupling 155mm shell production

**NATO's** Deputy Supreme Allied Commander (General **Stringer**), cited by the **Post-Gazette** and **AP** on **June 26, 2026**, indicated that the summit should push for a **quadrupling of 155mm shell production** — the Alliance's standard artillery caliber, used massively in Ukraine. This quadrupling reflects an understanding that the artillery war in Ukraine consumed stocks in weeks that allies thought would last months. Industrial production of ammunition must align with the realities of modern combat.

This industrial scale-up is both a measure to support Ukraine — which has an urgent need for artillery ammunition — and a preparation measure for **NATO** itself for possible future conflicts. Ukrainian lessons on ammunition consumption in high-intensity warfare have forced a radical revision of Alliance stockpiles — and an acceleration of industrial production that was clearly insufficient.

*The quadrupling of 155mm shell production is one of those figures that says everything about NATO's state of readiness before this war. We had stockpiles calculated for short wars or peacekeeping operations — not for a high-intensity war consuming thousands of shells per day. Ukraine forced us to look our own unpreparedness in the face. That is painful, but necessary. And quadrupling is the right response.*

## Turkey as host: the stakes of choosing Ankara

### Erdoğan, ambivalent mediator and indispensable ally

**Recep Tayyip Erdoğan**, president of **Turkey** and host of the summit at the **Beştepe** palace, plays a complex role in the Alliance's dynamics. **Turkey** is both an indispensable **NATO** ally — by its size, geographic location, and defense industry — and a difficult partner that has maintained commercial relations with **Russia** despite the war, blocked **Sweden's** and **Finland's** accession for months to extract political concessions, and maintained ambiguities over the **F-35s** and previously purchased Russian **S-400** systems.

Choosing **Ankara** as the summit venue is both a mark of confidence in **Erdoğan** and an implicit incentive to align with the **Alliance's** positions. A host does not sabotage the summit it is organizing. And **Rutte**, strategist of diplomatic flattery, knows that giving **Turkey** the prestige of hosting the summit is an investment in its engagement. According to diplomatic sources cited by **The Guardian**, the decoration of the **Beştepe** palace could put **Trump** in a good mood — a factor, as strange as it may seem, that enters into current diplomatic calculations.

### Tensions over F-35s and S-400s: the unspoken of Ankara

**Turkey** was excluded from the **F-35** program after purchasing Russian anti-aircraft missile systems **S-400**. This bilateral tension with the **United States** creates an anomaly within the **Alliance**: a member that possesses systems incompatible with the NATO defense infrastructure and that aspires to rejoin the program for the West's most advanced combat aircraft. **Rutte**, asked about this before the **Atlantic Council**, chose not to publicly comment on "essentially bilateral questions."

This prudent discretion says something about managing tensions within the Alliance. Some subjects — Turkey and the F-35s, Turkish-Russian relations — are too sensitive to be handled publicly at the summit. They are resolved behind the scenes, in bilateral discussions that the summit facilitates but does not replace. This is the reality of an alliance of **32 nations** with different histories, interests, and geopolitical constraints — cohesion is never guaranteed; it is permanently negotiated.

*Turkey is the perfect example of the complexity of multilateral alliances. An indispensable ally that poses real problems — the S-400s, the F-35s, relations with Moscow. Some would like to exclude Turkey for these reasons. I understand that frustration, but I do not share it. A NATO without Turkey would be weaker, not more coherent. The art of the Alliance is precisely to manage these tensions without letting them become ruptures.*

## Indo-Pacific and Middle Eastern allies: Ankara's global dimension

### Japan, South Korea, Australia: NATO steps beyond its space

The **Ankara** summit will host partners from the **Indo-Pacific** — notably **Japan**, **South Korea**, and **Australia** — and from the **Middle East**. This expanded participation reflects a new geopolitical reality: the threats facing **NATO** — and notably **China's** military rise, **North Korea's** nuclear activities, and instability in the **Middle East** — go beyond the Euro-Atlantic space alone.

**North Korea** is supplying munitions and soldiers to **Russia** in Ukraine. **China** is supplying electronic components and dual-use technologies to Russia's arms industry. These connections between the Ukrainian conflict and security dynamics in the **Asia-Pacific** justify the broadened summit format. **Japan** and **South Korea**, who see in Ukrainian resistance a model and in a Russian victory a threat to their own situation vis-à-vis **China** and **North Korea**, are natural partners in this expanded dynamic.

### The China threat on Ankara's agenda: between recognition and caution

**China** will be in the room without being present. Its support for **Russia**, its accelerated military modernization, its ambitions regarding **Taiwan** — all these elements will figure indirectly in **Ankara's** discussions. **Rutte** was explicit before the **Atlantic Council**: **China** "continues to modernize its forces and expand its nuclear capabilities without transparency, investing massively in military technology." This formulation is harder than typical official NATO statements about China.

But naming **China** as a threat creates tensions with Alliance members that have important economic ties with **Beijing**. **Germany**, **France**, **Italy** — all these countries have significant commercial relationships with **China** they do not want to jeopardize. The challenge at Ankara is to find language on **China** firm enough to signal genuine vigilance, without triggering diplomatic tensions that would weaken Alliance cohesion.

*China is the great absent-present at the Ankara summit. Absent physically, but present in nearly every discussion — on defense spending (that is also why we are increasing it), on dual-use technologies (China supplies them to Russia), on the eastern flank (if Russia wins, China will grow bolder on Taiwan). NATO's inability to clearly name China as a strategic threat, out of fear of economic consequences, is one of the Alliance's most politically dangerous weaknesses.*

## The Gdansk Declaration and the pre-summit commitments context

### Gdansk, June 25: a dress rehearsal before Ankara

A few days before the **Ankara** summit, a joint declaration was published by leaders gathered in **Gdansk** on **June 25, 2026**: reaffirmation of the **5 percent of GDP** defense spending commitment and a call to strengthen the eastern flank. This declaration, published by the Swedish government (**Regeringskansliet**), is one of many preliminary positions feeding into and prefiguring the decisions at **Ankara**.

The **Gdansk** meeting illustrates the preparation mechanics of a major **NATO** summit: restricted-format consultations, national and bilateral declarations, defense and foreign ministers' meetings — an entire diplomatic process that intensifies in the weeks before the main summit. The **Ankara** summit does not arrive as a bolt from the blue — it is the culmination of a months-long process of preparation and negotiation.

### What Ankara must decide that The Hague had not yet settled

The **The Hague** summit set objectives — the **5 percent of GDP**, support for Ukraine, eastern flank reinforcement. It left the modalities open: who commands what in the responsibility-sharing between **Europe** and the **United States**, what precise deadlines for the command transfers, how to measure progress toward **5 percent**, what conditions for a possible Ukrainian invitation. **Ankara** must fill these blanks with concrete decisions — plans, timelines, verification mechanisms.

That is Ankara's true difficulty: turning political commitments into operational decisions. Political commitments are easy — you sign them, announce them, and photographers immortalize the handshakes. Operational decisions involve budgets, national trade-offs, difficult industrial choices. And that is where alliances tend to fracture between the ambitions displayed and the reality of constraints.

*I am cautious about what Ankara will concretely deliver. NATO summits have a systemic tendency to produce ambitious declarations followed by partial implementation. That is the reality of an alliance of 32 democracies with national budget processes, elections, and different industrial constraints. I want Ankara to be different. I will know in six months by looking at actual defense budgets and effective deliveries to Ukraine.*

## NATO's credibility against Putin: what the summit must preserve

### Deterrence as the central issue of every summit

The primary purpose of a **NATO** summit — before contracts, before figures, before speeches — is to maintain **credible deterrence** against any potential adversary. Deterrence works on perception: if **Putin** believes the **Alliance** is united, resolved, and capable of responding to aggression, he will not attack. If he perceives cracks — divided allies, uncertain commitments, insufficient resources — he may be tempted to exploit them.

As a security official cited by **The Guardian** said: "In these discussions, what people believe is often more crucial than the actual reality." This truth applies to **Putin** as well. It is not only **NATO's** actual military capacity that deters — it is the perception of that capacity and the will to use it. The **Ankara** summit must project that will with a clarity that the recent months of American unpredictability have undermined.

### The scenario NATO must avoid: letting Putin believe in a window of opportunity

The most dangerous scenario the **Ankara** summit must prevent is one where **Putin** interprets transatlantic ambiguity as a window of opportunity. If the Russian president calculates that the **Alliance** is divided enough not to respond collectively to a hybrid aggression against a Baltic state — sabotages, drones, provocations with plausible deniability — he might decide to test that hypothesis. That is exactly the scenario that eastern flank security experts describe with concern.

A successful **Ankara** summit sends the opposite signal: the **Alliance** is united, its commitments are real, and its will to respond is certain. **Rutte** has said he wants Ankara to send "a message to **Moscow** that **NATO** is ready to defend itself." That message is not transmitted through words — it is transmitted through actions. Signed contracts, deployed brigades, increased budgets, weapons systems delivered to Ukraine. That is the language **Putin** understands.

*Putin does not read press releases. He reads military budgets, troop deployments, weapons deliveries. That is why the "tens of billions in contracts" that Ankara must announce matter more than any diplomatic formulation. A signed contract for additional Patriot interceptors, one more brigade in Lithuania, a quadrupled shell-production commitment — those are the signals Moscow takes seriously. Not communiqués.*

## Ukraine at Ankara: what its presence changes in the summit's dynamic

### A president who arrives with proof, not promises

**Volodymyr Zelensky** will participate in the **Ankara** summit from an unusually strong political position for a non-**NATO** member country. He arrives with the refinery strikes still smoking in the news — **Kapotnya** paralyzed until **2027**, **Ufa** struck at **1,300 km** — and with the **40-day operation** in progress. This is not a president asking for help from a position of desperation. This is a war leader bringing concrete results and asking his allies for consistency.

This position of relative strength changes the dynamic of negotiations. **Zelensky** can point to tangible facts: Russian refining production has fallen by one third, the Russian budget is in deficit by **80 billion dollars**, and all of this with Ukraine's own means. If allies still doubted the effectiveness of their support for Ukraine, the deep strikes of June **2026** provide an eloquent answer. **Ankara** will be, for **Zelensky**, the opportunity to convert military results into lasting political commitments.

### Kyiv's concrete requests and what it is reasonable to expect

At **Ankara**, **Ukraine** will seek several concrete advances. First, a complete lifting of restrictions on the use of Western weapons against Russian territory — a question that has long divided allies and that deprives Ukraine of the full effectiveness of the systems they supplied it. Second, an acceleration of heavy weapons deliveries, notably air defense systems to protect Ukrainian cities from massive Russian strikes.

**Ukraine** will also request reinforced support for the European oil embargo that the **Baltic states** and **Poland** are demanding, according to the **Kyiv Post** on **June 27, 2026**. By combining refinery strikes and an embargo on oil exports, Ukraine and its allies could create a structural economic pressure on Russia that would be far harder to circumvent than either instrument alone. This is the double-scissors strategy — and **Ankara** can be its catalyst.

*I look at Ukrainian requests at Ankara with realism tinged with hope. The requests are reasonable, the justifications are solid, the results are proven. But allied politics has its own constraints — domestic elections, public opinions, short-term economic calculations. What deserves to be granted is not always what will be granted. What I can say with certainty is that Zelensky's arguments have never been stronger. The ball is now in his allies' court.*

## The Russian threat on the eastern flank: what intelligence data shows

### An army reconstituting its capabilities despite losses

Despite considerable human and material losses in Ukraine — estimated in the hundreds of thousands of soldiers according to various Western sources — **Russia** continues to reconstitute its forces. It has increased arms production, recruited massively through significant financial incentives, and restructured its brigades to compensate for losses of experienced officers. This reconstitution capacity is one of the most worrying characteristics of the Russian military system: its resilience in the face of losses.

For eastern flank countries, this reconstitution means that the Russian threat is not eliminated by the losses incurred in Ukraine — it is potentially transformed. An army that has accumulated years of combat experience, even at the price of enormous losses, is more formidable than an army that has never fought. The **Baltic states** and **Poland** take this reality seriously in their defensive planning. That is why they are already spending well above **NATO** targets.

### The threat timeline: what the Hegseth review implies for Europe

The strategic review conducted by US Defense Secretary **Pete Hegseth** — covering six months of evaluating American presence in **Europe** — adds a layer of uncertainty to eastern flank defensive planning. If this review were to result in a significant reduction in American presence, eastern flank countries would need to fill a substantial capacity gap, notably in air defense and heavy armored forces.

In this context, the **5 percent of GDP** commitment that **Ankara** is pushing its members toward takes on existential significance for some allies. This is not just a question of fair burden-sharing within the Alliance — it is a question of strategic survival for countries that know they cannot indefinitely count on American presence as the ultimate insurance. **Ankara** must turn this collective awareness into irrevocable budget commitments.

*The Hegseth review is the elephant in the room at the Ankara summit. Everyone knows it is underway. Everyone hopes it does not lead to massive disengagement. But nobody can be certain. And this uncertainty is itself a strategic problem — it prevents allies from planning with the necessary precision. One useful thing Ankara could do would be to force Trump to clarify his intentions. I am not certain that will happen.*

## The transatlantic defense industry: the industrial revolution Rutte wants to trigger

### Produce more, faster, on both sides of the Atlantic

One of **Rutte's** central ambitions for **Ankara** is what he calls the "**transatlantic defense industrial revolution**." This means structurally transforming arms production capacity on both sides of the Atlantic — increasing volumes, reducing production lead times, standardizing munitions and equipment to facilitate interoperability. This transformation is urgent: the war in Ukraine has demonstrated that Western arsenals, designed for deterrence rather than high-intensity warfare, are insufficient to sustain a prolonged conflict.

The "tens of billions of dollars" in new defense contracts announced for **Ankara's** industrial day are the first concrete signal of this transformation. But contracts alone are not enough — regulatory barriers to technology transfers must also be removed, cross-investment between allied defense industries must be facilitated, and common financing mechanisms for multinational programs must be created. This is an ambitious agenda that **Rutte** is pushing with the same energy he brings to managing tensions with **Trump**.

### Ukrainian lessons for NATO industry

Ukraine has demonstrated that 21st-century high-intensity warfare consumes munitions, drones, and equipment at rates that pre-war industrial planning did not anticipate. Early Western estimates — which projected stocks sufficient for a few weeks of intense combat — proved dramatically insufficient. **Russia**, for its part, accelerated its arms production with a speed that Western analysts sometimes underestimated.

The defense industrial revolution that **Rutte** is calling for must therefore incorporate these Ukrainian lessons: produce drones at scale, maintain ammunition stocks for prolonged conflicts, develop rapid field maintenance and repair capabilities. Ukraine has been both the laboratory and the demonstrator of these necessities. **NATO** would be well advised to make this the core of its post-**Ankara** industrial doctrine.

*The transatlantic defense industrial revolution may be Ankara's most durable contribution to long-term security. Not the declarations, not the 5 percent promises — but the concrete production chains, the real industrial contracts, the investments that transform abstract military capabilities into tangible equipment. It is slow, complex, and bureaucratic. But it is the only way to build lasting security. And I hope Ankara finally lays solid foundations for it.*

## Conclusion: Ankara, the moment of truth for an Alliance under pressure

### What success looks like and what failure would cost

A successful **Ankara** summit looks like this: precise and measurable budget commitments toward **5 percent of GDP**, with credible trajectories for each ally. Tens of billions in real defense contracts, not letters of intent. Operational decisions on the division of commands between the **United States** and **Europe**. Clear and unrestricted support for **Ukraine**, with weapons delivery commitments. And a unified message to **Moscow** that the **Alliance** is ready to defend every centimeter of its territory.

A failed **Ankara** summit looks like this: general declarations without precise commitments, promises of trajectories "on the right track" without verifiable milestones, unresolved tensions between allies that leak into the media, and **Putin** returning from vacation convinced that the **Alliance** is too divided to represent a real threat. The cost of that failure would be immediate for eastern flank countries — and potentially catastrophic for European security in the medium term.

### Western credibility as an existential issue

Beyond figures and contracts, it is the **credibility** of the **West** that is at stake at **Ankara**. Credibility as a reliable partner for **Ukraine**. Credibility as a security ally for eastern flank countries. And credibility as a power capable of deterring a **Putin** who constantly probes the limits of what he can do without triggering a determined response. That credibility is not proclaimed — it is demonstrated through actions.

Ukrainian drones burn Russian refineries at **1,300 km** of depth. Ukrainian soldiers hold positions in the Donbas despite constant Russian pressure. **Zelensky** arrives at **Ankara** with proof of his strategy's effectiveness. He deserves allies equal to this fight — not allies who admire Ukraine's courage from a distance, but allies who put resources, weapons, and political decisions on the table. **Ankara** is the moment of truth.

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

*The Ankara summit will produce communiqué language about "ironclad commitments" and "historic decisions." Some of that language will be earned. Some will be diplomatic furniture, reassuring in design and empty in practice. My honest assessment: this summit is genuinely important, not because it will solve the fundamental questions about American reliability and European self-sufficiency, but because the political conditions for making progress on those questions have rarely been better aligned. Whether the people in the room use those conditions wisely is the question that only the next decade can answer.*

## Sources

### Primary sources

- [NATO / Atlantic Council — Full Rutte transcript on Ankara summit, 5% GDP, Ukraine — June 25, 2026](https://www.nato.int/en/news-and-events/events/transcripts/2026/06/25/atlantic-council-front-page-conversation-with-nato-secretary-general-mark-rutte)

- [The Guardian — NATO leaders fear they can no longer rely on US help against Russia, eastern flank — June 27, 2026](https://www.theguardian.com/world/ng-interactive/2026/jun/27/nato-leaders-fear-they-can-no-longer-rely-on-us-help-if-russia-attacks-trump-eastern-europe)

- [Post-Gazette / AP — General Stringer wants summit to push for more spending, quadruple 155mm shells — June 26, 2026](https://www.post-gazette.com/news/world/2026/06/26/nato-summit-turkey-defense-spending/stories/202606260037)

### Secondary sources

- [The Guardian — Russia preparing a possible provocation in the Baltics or Poland — June 26, 2026](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/jun/26/russia-provocation-baltic-states-poland)

- [Army Recognition — Russia rehearses Baltic strike operations from Kaliningrad — June 21, 2026](https://www.armyrecognition.com/news/aerospace-news/2026/russia-rehearses-baltic-strike-operations-from-kaliningrad-with-su-24m-bombers-and-su-30sm2-fighters)

- [Regeringskansliet — Gdansk Declaration: 5% GDP reaffirmation, eastern flank — June 25, 2026](https://regeringen.se/rattsliga-dokument/sveriges-internationella-overenskommelser/2026/06/joint-declaration-from-leaders-meeting-in-Gdansk/)

- [US News / Reuters — Rutte: billions in new defense contracts to be announced at summit — June 25, 2026](https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2026-06-25/natos-rutte-says-billions-in-new-defense-contracts-will-be-announced-at-summit)

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Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/analyse-ankara-7-8-juillet-le-sommet-de-l-otan-ou-l-occident-joue-sa-credibilite