# ANALYSIS: Anchorage, Istanbul, MFA: the Kremlin's three maximalist mantras

> There is a constant in Vladimir Putin's diplomacy since the start of the full-scale war: the objectives have never changed, only the vocabulary adapts to the audience. In June 2026, three recurring references resurface in Kremlin declarations — the Istanbul 2022 agreements, the alleged "Anchorage modalities," and the official positions of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Analysis
- Published: 2026-06-28
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/analyse-anchorage-istanbul-mfa-les-trois-mantras-maximalistes-du-kremlin

## Introduction: A Kremlin that repeats its demands while changing the packaging

### The strategy of disguised maximalism

There is a constant in **Vladimir Putin's** diplomacy since the start of the full-scale war: the objectives have never changed, only the vocabulary adapts to the audience. In **June 2026**, three recurring references resurface in **Kremlin** declarations — the **Istanbul 2022** agreements, the alleged "**Anchorage modalities**," and the official positions of the **Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)** under **Sergei Lavrov**. Together they form a triptych of Russian maximalism that **ISW** analysts decoded on **June 23, 2026**.

These three references are not starting points for negotiation. They constitute a prefabricated framework within which **Moscow** intends to confine any future discussion. Accepting them as a basis for dialogue already means accepting the terms of Ukrainian surrender. That is why understanding them in detail is an analytical necessity before any serious mediation attempt.

### Why the ISW is sounding the alarm

The **ISW**, in its report of **June 23, 2026**, insists that recent declarations by **Putin** and **Lavrov** represent "no evolution" from Russia's **2022** positions. This point deserves strong emphasis, as it runs counter to numerous analyses that have presented these declarations as a sign of openness. There is no opening. There is a reiteration.

**Meduza**, the independent Russian exile media, also reported on **June 23, 2026** **Putin's** declarations of readiness to negotiate "on the basis of the **Istanbul** agreements." And **Pravda Ukraine**, the same day, analyzes how this position amounts to demanding total Ukrainian capitulation. The convergence of these analyses is revealing: what **Putin** calls "negotiation," the world used to call a "diktat."

*I feel a weariness watching these Russian diplomatic cycles. Putin says "I want to negotiate," Western chancelleries stir, experts debate, and in the end we discover that the Russian conditions are exactly the same as two years ago. It is the same shell game, replayed with slightly different words. And some people are still falling for it.*

## Istanbul 2022 revisited: point-by-point deconstruction

### Forced neutrality: banning Ukraine from defending itself

The first core demand of the **Istanbul 2022** draft agreements was **"permanent neutrality"** for **Ukraine** — a constitutionally inscribed neutrality implying a ban on joining military alliances, notably **NATO**. This demand, presented as a regional security guarantee, is in reality exactly the opposite: it is a guarantee of insecurity for **Ukraine**.

A constitutionally neutralized **Ukraine** cannot collectively defend itself with its allies. It cannot benefit from Article **5** of the **North Atlantic Treaty**. It remains alone facing a **Russia** that has demonstrated its willingness to use force. This "neutrality" would protect **Ukraine** from nothing. It would make it an easier target for the next invasion — scheduled as soon as the **Kremlin** judges its forces sufficiently rebuilt.

### Limitations on armed forces: a paper army

The **Istanbul** drafts also included **drastic caps on Ukrainian armed forces** — in terms of troop numbers, heavy equipment, and the range of weapons systems. In practice, this would have meant dismantling the military capabilities that **Ukraine** has developed, at immense sacrifice, since **2014**. It is a demand for unilateral disarmament, presented as a "confidence-building measure."

The precedent of the **Budapest Memorandum** of **1994** is starkly clear here. **Ukraine** had then renounced its inherited Soviet nuclear arsenal in exchange for security guarantees from the great powers. Those guarantees proved empty when **Russia** annexed **Crimea** in **2014**. To repeat the experiment of disarmament under Russian promises would not merely be naive — it would be irresponsible.

*Asking Ukraine to limit its armed forces after Russia has invaded twice in eight years is like asking a victim of repeated violence to disarm on the promise that the aggressor has changed. It is a logic no one would accept in their own life. Why would it be accepted at the geopolitical level?*

## The "Anchorage modalities": a vague construction serving maximalism

### Anchorage: what exactly is Russia claiming?

The reference to the "**Anchorage modalities**" is more opaque and more difficult to document than the **Istanbul** agreements. This term apparently refers to discussions that allegedly took place on the sidelines of diplomatic meetings between American and Russian representatives, potentially linked to discussions on the **Arctic** or other bilateral matters. **Russia** claims these discussions included elements relating to **Ukraine**.

The strategy is visible: by invoking conversations whose exact content is not publicly documented, **Moscow** claims to have obtained "implicit concessions" or "informal recognitions" from American interlocutors. It is a classic technique of multi-track diplomacy: using the ambiguity of informal discussions to anchor positions that official interlocutors have never explicitly endorsed.

### Why this reference is dangerous for the West

For Western governments, and particularly the American administration, Russia's reference to the "**Anchorage modalities**" creates a dilemma. Either they categorically deny that these discussions took place or that they touched on **Ukraine** — which requires a diplomatic transparency that some services prefer to avoid. Or they let the ambiguity subsist — and **Russia** exploits this silence to build a legitimizing narrative for its positions.

The solution is simple but politically sensitive: total clarity about what was said and what was not said during all American–Russian diplomatic interactions. The **Trump** administration, which multiplied informal channels with **Moscow**, must ensure that these discussions are not reinterpreted by the **Kremlin** as implicit concessions on issues vital to **Ukraine**.

*Informal diplomatic channels have their uses. But when Russia uses them to build a narrative of unverifiable American concessions, secret diplomacy becomes a problem. Trump must publicly clarify what Anchorage meant or did not mean. Silence here is a form of involuntary collaboration with Kremlin propaganda.*

## Lavrov's MFA: the institution of bureaucratic maximalism

### Lavrov as an instrument of capitulation rhetoric

**Sergei Lavrov**, Russia's Foreign Minister since **2004**, is one of the world's most experienced diplomats. His expertise must not be confused with his good faith. **Lavrov** is an instrument of **Putin's** policy, not a moderator. His declarations, carefully formulated to sound diplomatically reasonable to uninitiated Western ears, invariably translate the same maximalist **Kremlin** positions.

In **June 2026**, **Lavrov's** declarations reaffirmed Russia's **2022** war aims in different formulations — according to **ISW** analysis. This is no surprise to anyone closely following Russian diplomatic developments. But for less specialized observers, **Lavrov's** polished tone may seem different from **Putin's** inflammatory declarations. That is exactly the role he plays: offering a facade of moderation in the service of an uncompromising imperial project.

### Lavrov's art of the infinite clause

**Lavrov** has perfected a particular diplomatic technique: formulating conditions that seem reasonable on the surface but contain infinitely extensible clauses. "Russia is ready to negotiate if Ukraine takes into account the realities on the ground" — this phrase sounds moderate. But "realities on the ground" is an unlimited concept that **Russia** can expand at will with the military situation. It is a condition that can never be satisfied, except by total capitulation.

Similarly, "taking into account Russia's security interests" is an open formulation that has historically meant "Ukraine cannot join NATO," then "Ukraine cannot have a significant army," then "Ukraine must recognize the annexations" — the list extends as far as **Moscow** finds useful. Decoding this Russian diplomatic language is an indispensable skill for any Western actor involved in this conflict.

*Lavrov is perhaps the most talented diplomat at making the capitulation demanded of others compatible with the grammar of international diplomacy. It is a talent I almost admire intellectually, if I set aside the service it renders to an illegal military aggression. In another context, it would be fascinating. In this one, it is dangerous.*

## The Western diplomatic response: between discernment and naivety

### The temptations of precipitate mediation

Faced with this Russian maximalist framework, certain Western governments yield to the temptation of "precipitate mediation" — finding an agreement at any cost to end a conflict whose domestic political costs they can barely stomach. This temptation is understandable. It is also profoundly dangerous.

Precipitate mediation that accepted Russian terms — even under a more palatable rhetorical wrapping — would produce a "peace" that rewards aggression, demoralizes democracies, and sends **China**, **Iran**, and **North Korea** the message that territorial conquest works provided you hold on long enough. It is a precedent the international order cannot afford.

### Sound diplomacy: clarity on minimum conditions

The correct diplomatic response to Russian maximalism is not total deadlock. It is clarity on non-negotiable conditions. The **West**, as a whole, must articulate common clear positions: **Russian withdrawal** from sovereign Ukrainian territories, **genuine security mechanisms** for **Ukraine**, **accountability for war crimes**. These conditions must be non-negotiable, and they must be communicated to **Moscow** without ambiguity.

As long as **Moscow** maintains its maximalist demands, there is no basis for a fair negotiation. It is not **Ukraine** or the **West** that is blocking peace. It is **Putin** who refuses to retreat from his imperial ambitions. This reality must be named clearly, relentlessly, in every diplomatic forum.

*Clarity is the best weapon against Russian rhetorical maximalism. When the West says clearly "here are our non-negotiable conditions, and they are grounded in international law," it deprives Putin of the misunderstood victim posture he favors. Clarity is diplomacy that works. Accommodating vagueness is camouflaged capitulation.*

## Prisoner exchanges: the only channel that actually works

### The 76th exchange: 160 for 160, Emirati mediation

While major peace negotiations are deadlocked, a modest but crucial humanitarian channel is functioning: **prisoner of war exchanges**. On **June 26, 2026**, the **76th exchange** was completed on the principle of **160 for 160**, with mediation by the **United Arab Emirates**, according to the **Kyiv Independent**. **Zelensky** confirmed that **1,596 Ukrainians** have returned since the start of **2026**, and more than **9,500** since **2022**.

These figures represent human lives — soldiers who were tortured, civilians illegally detained, families reunited. These exchanges are possible precisely because they operate in a distinct register from political negotiations. The **UAE** can play this role because they have relations with both sides and because the humanitarian register partly escapes the political calculations that paralyze peace negotiations.

### The limit of exchanges: a humanitarian channel without political translation

But we must be lucid about what these exchanges are not. They do not signal that **Moscow** and **Kyiv** are moving toward agreement on fundamental political questions. They do not represent a "normalization" of relations. And they must not be used by **Moscow** to claim it is acting in "good faith" in peace negotiations.

Each humanitarian exchange is a victory for the families concerned. It is also, for **Zelensky**, a demonstration of his government's priority for its soldiers and citizens. But these humanitarian victories coexist with total diplomatic deadlock on the fundamental questions. They must be celebrated for what they are, without being made to be more than they are.

*These 160 Ukrainian soldiers returning home on June 26, 2026 — that is a human victory I salute without reservation. And simultaneously, it is the demonstration that you can conduct punctual deals with Moscow on specific humanitarian questions without it implying the slightest evolution on the core issues. These two realities coexist. We must hold both at once.*

## Western crisis communication facing Russian maximalism

### Naming things clearly: a political responsibility

Faced with the **Kremlin's** carefully calibrated formulations, Western governments and media have a particular responsibility: name things precisely. When **Putin** speaks of "negotiation," it must be specified "on terms equivalent to Ukrainian capitulation." When **Lavrov** speaks of "realities on the ground," it must be specified "illegal territorial conquests maintained by force." This clarification work is not partisanship — it is analytical precision.

Media editors, government spokespersons, academics, and experts commenting on the conflict all share a responsibility for maintaining this lexical clarity. Allowing **Russia's** vocabulary to progressively impose itself in Western discourse means offering **Moscow** a rhetorical victory that prepares political capitulations. The care taken with words is not pedantry — it is resistance.

### Information as a theater of war: lessons to draw

The information war that **Russia** wages against the **West** is documented, permanent, and sophisticated. Networks of fake accounts amplify Russian narratives on social media. **Kremlin**-aligned media distribute translations of their content in European languages. Opaque funding channels support European politicians favorable to **Moscow**. This information war is not won only with counter-narratives — it is won with institutional clarity on facts.

Investing in factual clarity, training journalists to decode Russian diplomatic rhetoric, equipping fact-checking institutions with adequate resources — these are priorities that Western governments must treat with the same urgency as physical defense spending. The war is being fought on Ukrainian battlefields, yes. But it is also being fought in the minds of European voters who will form the political majorities of tomorrow.

*Lexical clarity in discourse about the Ukrainian war is not an intellectual luxury. It is a strategic necessity. When words lose their meaning — when "negotiation" can mean "ultimatum" and "peace" can mean "capitulation" — collective resistance erodes. Defending the precision of language is defending democracy. I believe that deeply.*

## The future of Ukrainian diplomacy: beyond the current deadlock

### Building a durable support coalition

Ukrainian diplomacy must inscribe itself in the long term. Beyond managing immediate crises — Russian strikes, weapons shortages, diplomatic blockages — **Kyiv** must build a durable support coalition that will survive changes of government in allied capitals. This coalition must be institutionally anchored, not solely dependent on personal relationships between leaders.

The **peace conferences** organized by **Ukraine**, bilateral security agreements, candidacy for the **EU** and **NATO** — all these initiatives contribute to institutionalizing international support. The more commitments are codified in treaties and permanent mechanisms, the less vulnerable they are to political reversals.

### Reconstruction as a diplomatic tool

The reconstruction of **Ukraine** after the war is as much a diplomatic challenge as a humanitarian one. International reconstruction conferences have already laid the foundations for a long-term commitment from many states and institutions. This commitment creates economic interests in Ukrainian success that reinforce political support. Countries investing in Ukrainian reconstruction have a financial interest in seeing **Ukraine** prosperous and stable.

This mechanism of converging economic and political interests is one of **Ukraine's** most durable diplomatic resources. It transforms support for **Ukraine** from a moral position into a concrete economic interest for dozens of countries. This transformation is one that Ukrainian diplomacy must continue to cultivate actively, alongside the management of short-term crises.

*Reconstruction of Ukraine as a diplomatic tool — I find this idea intellectually elegant and strategically sound. We transform Russian destruction into an opportunity to create bonds of interest with dozens of countries. Every reconstruction contract is a vote for Ukraine. Every foreign investor is one more lobbyist for its security. Putin has created, without meaning to, a mechanism of lasting solidarity.*

## Conclusion: Decoding Putin to avoid being trapped

### Three mantras, one single objective: Ukrainian capitulation

**Istanbul**, **Anchorage**, **MFA** — these three references form a rhetorical triptych in service of one constant objective: obtaining **Ukraine's** capitulation without it looking like capitulation. The form varies, the substance remains immutable. **Russia** wants a **Ukraine** neutralized, disarmed, territorially amputated, and incapable of resisting the next Russian pressure.

Understanding this, expressing it clearly, and refusing to be trapped by the **Kremlin's** diplomatic vocabulary — that is the most urgent analytical and political task for Western governments. The **ISW** did it on **June 23, 2026**. It is time for the chancelleries to follow suit with the same clarity.

### Ukraine deserves a just peace, not a hasty one

**Zelensky** has said and repeated that he wants peace — but a peace grounded in justice, international law, and genuine security guarantees. This is a reasonable position, legitimately founded and strategically coherent. The **West** must uphold it against pressure for a hasty deal that would sacrifice **Ukraine** on the altar of Western political convenience.

The **Kremlin's** three mantras are traps. Recognizing them as such, naming them, refusing them — that is the minimum dignity the **West** owes to a country that has been fighting for more than four years for its values and for ours.

*Anchorage, Istanbul, MFA — three labels for the same immutable demand: that Ukraine submit. A West that understands this and says it clearly intellectually arms its own populations against Russian disinformation. A West that hesitates to say it, for fear of "closing doors," is in reality opening the door to progressive capitulation. There is no third path here.*

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

## Sources

### Primary sources

- [ISW — Putin/Lavrov positions = reaffirmation of 2022 war aims — June 23, 2026](https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-23-2026/)

- [Pravda Ukraine — Putin ready to negotiate on basis of Istanbul 2022 agreements — June 23, 2026](https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2026/06/23/8040766/)

- [Meduza — Putin says Russia is ready to negotiate on the basis of Istanbul — June 23, 2026](https://meduza.io/en/news/2026/06/23/putin-says-russia-ready-to-negotiate-with-ukraine-on-the-basis-of-the-istanbul-agreements-of-2022)

- [Kyiv Independent — 160 Ukrainian prisoners released in the 76th exchange — June 26, 2026](https://kyivindependent.com/160-ukrainian-pows-released-from-russian-captivity-in-latest-exchange-zelensky-says/)

### Secondary sources

- [Interfax-Ukraine — Zelensky: 1,596 Ukrainians returned since the start of 2026 — June 26, 2026](https://en.interfax.com.ua/news/general/1180132.html)

- [RBC-Ukraine — Details of the 160/160 exchange, 76th cycle — June 26, 2026](https://newsukraine.rbc.ua/news/ukraine-and-russia-complete-third-phase-of-1782478036.html)

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Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/analyse-anchorage-istanbul-mfa-les-trois-mantras-maximalistes-du-kremlin