# ANALYSIS: The 21st Sanctions Package — oil at $44, cod, and Kirill at the heart of the friction

> Since 2022, the European Union has adopted twenty sanctions packages against Russia. Each one has generated internal friction — Hungary blocking, Italy negotiating exemptions for its industries, the Baltic states pushing for harder measures. The 21st package, currently under negotiation with a deadline of July 15, 2026, is no exception — but the fault lines are different and, i

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Analysis
- Published: 2026-06-29
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/analyse-21e-paquet-de-sanctions-petrole-a-44-dollars-morue-et-kirill-au-c-ur-des

## Introduction: The 21st package and its fault lines

### Why this package is different from its predecessors

Since **2022**, the **European Union** has adopted **twenty sanctions packages** against **Russia**. Each one has generated internal friction — **Hungary** blocking, **Italy** negotiating exemptions for its industries, the Baltic states pushing for harder measures. The **21st package**, currently under negotiation with a deadline of **July 15, 2026**, is no exception — but the fault lines are different and, in some ways, more revealing.

This package proposes particularly ambitious measures on four fronts: lowering the **oil price cap** to **$44 per barrel**, banning Russian **LNG tankers**, imposing sanctions on the **Russian fishing sector**, and personal designations including **Patriarch Kirill** of the **Russian Orthodox Church**.

*Every sanctions package is a negotiation over what Europe is willing to sacrifice economically to keep pressure on Russia. The 21st package says: we are ready to hit oil harder, hit LNG, hit fishing, and even hit the head of the Russian Church. That takes political courage. It also has a cost.*

## The $44 cap: the most ambitious proposal

### How the current oil price cap works

The current oil price cap on Russian oil is set at **$60 per barrel** — a level established in **December 2022** by the G7 and the **EU**. It stipulates that Western service providers — insurers, shippers, freight carriers — cannot facilitate the transport of Russian oil sold above that threshold. In theory, it limits Russian oil revenues. In practice, the **shadow fleet** and Asian markets have circumvented the mechanism at scale.

Lowering the cap to **$44** would theoretically tighten the stranglehold. But effectiveness depends on enforcement — precisely what is lacking in the current system. Several **EU** members point out that proposing a lower cap without simultaneously strengthening enforcement mechanisms amounts to changing the text of the rule without changing its reality.

### The internal resistance

European countries whose industries still depend on Russian energy — indirectly, through intermediaries — are cautious about a lower cap. They fear blowback effects on domestic energy prices if the reduction provoked tension on global oil markets. This fear is not entirely unfounded — but it is often used as a pretext to avoid difficult decisions.

The debate within the **EU** on this point illustrates a permanent tension: effective sanctions require real economic costs for the sanctioners. The ambition of sanctions is inversely proportional to the willingness to pay that cost.

*$44 per barrel. That is below the production cost of most Russian oil fields according to some estimates. If this cap were rigorously enforced, it would become economically rational for Russia to stop certain production lines. That is precisely the objective. That is also why the resistance is so fierce.*

## The LNG tanker ban

### Russian liquefied natural gas in Europe

Despite sanctions imposed since **2022**, **Russia** continues to export **liquefied natural gas (LNG)** to **Europe**. Terminals in **Spain**, **Belgium**, and **France** still receive Russian shipments. This exception to the sanctions regime is an anomaly that the **21st package** seeks to correct by targeting the tankers that transport this LNG.

Banning Russian **LNG tankers** from European ports would not end these exports — the tankers would pivot to **Asia**. But it would force **Europe** to find alternative sources, at a short-term cost, and reduce Russian revenues from the premium European market.

### French and Italian objections

**France** and **Italy** have expressed reservations about this measure — not out of sympathy for **Russia**, but because of ongoing supply contracts and energy security concerns. These reservations are legitimate in their practical dimension. They are less so when they become a permanent veto on a measure that would clearly serve the objectives of the sanctions regime.

The likely compromise in the **21st package** negotiations will be a phased ban with transition periods allowing member states to secure alternative supplies. That is not ideal — but it is the logic of European unanimity.

*France and Italy are still importing Russian LNG while sanctioning Russia. This contradiction is real and uncomfortable. It is not unique in the history of sanctions — but it deserves to be named clearly rather than buried in the footnotes of Brussels negotiations.*

## Sanctions on Russian fishing

### Cod and blue whiting as pressure tools

The proposal to restrict European imports of Russian fishing products — notably **cod** and **blue whiting** caught in subarctic waters — is a new element in the sanctions regime. These products represent a source of foreign currency for **Russia** that has attracted relatively little attention until now.

**Germany**, **France**, **Poland**, and the **Netherlands** are among the main European importers of Russian fish. This measure would therefore hit real economic interests in those countries — which explains why it is meeting resistance in the negotiations even though its total impact on the Russian economy would be limited.

### Symbolic importance beyond economic impact

The direct economic impact of fishing sanctions against **Russia** is modest compared to the oil sanctions. But the symbolic value is significant: it tells **Moscow** that **Brussels** is willing to identify and sanction new sectors not yet touched, and to impose even modest economic costs on revenue sources that might seem untouchable.

This is the logic of progression — each package must show it goes further than the previous one, even when the marginal gains are reduced. Otherwise, the signal sent is one of exhaustion in the available sanctions menu.

*Sanctioning Russian fishing might seem trivial compared to the stakes of the war. But this is the principle of graduated pressure: never leave a Russian revenue source untouched. Every penny counted is a penny less for missiles. The logic is simple. The implementation is anything but.*

## Patriarch Kirill: the religious sanction and its obstacles

### Kirill and the theological legitimation of the war

**Patriarch Kirill** of the **Russian Orthodox Church** has publicly and theologically backed the Russian war against **Ukraine** from day one. His sermons have framed the conflict as a holy war against **"Western values"**, a defense of the Russian people against an existential threat. This active support for a war of conquest and destruction has led the **European Parliament** to call repeatedly for his designation on the sanctions list.

The proposal to sanction him in the **21st package** — asset freeze, travel ban — would mark the first time a major religious figure has been sanctioned by the **EU** in this context. The previous reluctance to cross this line was linked to concerns about religious freedom and relations with the **Orthodox Church** more broadly.

### Bulgarian resistance and its motivations

**Bulgaria** is the main opponent of sanctioning **Patriarch Kirill** in the **21st package** negotiations. The reasons are multiple: a strong Orthodox tradition in Bulgarian society, historical ties between the **Bulgarian Orthodox Church** and the **Moscow Patriarchate**, and domestic political calculations in a country whose government under **Rossen Radev** has held more ambivalent positions on the Ukrainian conflict than its **NATO** partners.

This Bulgarian resistance illustrates that even within an officially united **EU**, cultural and religious traditions create fault lines that can block symbolically important measures.

*Kirill turned a church into a propaganda instrument for a war of aggression. Sanctioning that is not an attack on religion — it is recognizing that a religious figure can commit political acts that deserve political consequences. The distinction is not complicated to make. Bulgaria chooses not to make it.*

## Hungary: the notable absentee

### Why Hungary is no longer systematically blocking

The absence of **Hungary** from the most visible resistance in the **21st package** is notable. Since **2022**, **Budapest** had systematically used sanctions cycles as political bargaining terrain. The extension to **12 months** of existing sanctions — approved without a Hungarian veto — signals a shift in calculation in **Budapest**.

The reasons may be multiple: compensations negotiated behind the scenes, increased pressure from European partners, or an assessment that the political cost of an isolated veto had become too high in the context of **June 2026**. Whatever the reason, the effect is real: **Orbán** is no longer the systematic last obstacle to the sanctions regime.

### The new actors in the resistance

With **Hungary** less obstructive, the resistance has shifted to other actors: **France** and **Italy** on LNG, **Bulgaria** on **Kirill**, some Nordic countries on fishing. This dispersion of resistance is actually a sign of health in the process: rather than a single actor capable of blocking everything, there are partial resistances on specific points that get resolved in negotiation.

The final result will likely be a **21st package** slightly watered down from its initial ambition — but substantive enough to maintain the pressure on **Moscow**.

*Hungary stepping back, France resisting on LNG, Bulgaria on Kirill — the geography of European obstructions has diversified. That is paradoxically good news: the solo obstruction Orbán-style was more dangerous than an internal debate on specific technical points. Democracy works better when it negotiates than when it surrenders to a single veto.*

## What these frictions reveal about European cohesion

### The limits of unanimity as a decision-making mechanism

The frictions surrounding the **21st package** illustrate once more the structural limitation of unanimity as a decision rule on sanctions. Any state can block any measure — which gives disproportionate bargaining power to the countries least convinced of the necessity of sanctions.

Proposals have existed for a long time to shift to **qualified majority** voting in foreign policy and sanctions matters. They face precisely the resistance of countries that benefit from the unanimity system as a negotiating lever. It is an institutional vicious circle that is difficult to break.

### The solidarity that holds despite the friction

Despite these frictions, European cohesion on Russian sanctions remains remarkably solid for an alliance of **27 democracies** with divergent economic interests. Twenty packages in four years, the **12-month** extension obtained without a veto — this track record is impressive compared to what pessimists predicted in **2022** about the durability of European unity.

The frictions of the **21st package** are proof that the process works — imperfectly, with compromises, through friction rather than perfect consensus. But it works.

*20 packages adopted in 4 years by 27 countries that do not always agree on what to order for lunch — that is remarkable. You can criticize the insufficiency of the measures. You cannot deny the consistency of the process. Europe has held together on this file far beyond what its critics predicted. That is not nothing.*

## Conclusion: A 21st package below its ambition, but above nothing

### What the final result will likely look like

The **21st package**, when finalized before **July 15, 2026**, will likely include: an oil cap lowered to somewhere between **$44 and $55** — a compromise between maximum ambition and internal resistance; LNG tanker measures with a transition period; partial fishing restrictions; and personal designations probably including **Kirill** with wording that allows **Bulgaria** to save face.

This result will be criticized as insufficient by sanctions hawks — and they will be partially right. But "insufficient" and "useless" are not synonyms. A slightly watered-down package remains a real political signal sent to **Moscow**, an additional economic cost even if lower than optimal, and a demonstration that the European sanctions machine keeps turning.

### Ukraine at the end of this negotiation

For **Zelensky** and the Ukrainian negotiating team in **Brussels**, every package adopted is a diplomatic victory — even an imperfect one. It demonstrates that European support holds through domestic political cycles, national elections, economic pressures. After **four years**, this relative cohesion is itself a strategic asset that neither **Putin** nor his allies had factored into their initial calculations.

The war does not end with the **21st package**. But the **21st package** tells **Moscow**: we have not finished inventing ways to make you pay more.

*21 packages. And Europe is still looking for new targets to sanction. For Putin who thought Europeans would tire after 6 months, this is proof of a fundamentally miscalculated bet. The fatigue is real — but it has not killed the will to continue. Not yet.*

## The July 15 deadline and its stakes

### Why the timeline matters

The **July 15, 2026** deadline for the **21st package** is not arbitrary. It is tied to the budgetary and legislative calendars of several member states, to the cycle of **Council** meetings, and to the need to maintain continuity in the sanctions regime without leaving a period of legal ambiguity.

European negotiators are working under this time constraint — and deadline pressure is often the best catalyst for forcing compromises that would otherwise remain blocked indefinitely. **July 15** will play this role: a mandatory checkpoint that forces each party to choose between the imperfect compromise and no result at all.

### The moment of truth for each resistance

Between now and **July 15**, every actor holding out will have to decide how far it is willing to go. Will **Bulgaria** block on **Kirill** to the point of delaying the entire package? Will **France** yield on LNG in exchange for supply guarantees? The answers to these questions will determine the final content of the **21st package** — and its value as a signal of European cohesion.

What we already know: the result will be a compromise. The question is whether that compromise will be ambitious enough to maintain the credibility of the overall sanctions framework.

*July 15 is approaching. European negotiators have two weeks to prove that political will outweighs national economic interests. The recent history of sanctions tells us it does — imperfectly, with compromises, but it does. That is enough to hold hope.*

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

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When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

## Sources

### Primary sources

- [Euronews — Oil, cod, Kirill: friction points in new EU sanctions — June 26, 2026](https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2026/06/26/oil-cod-kirill-friction-points-emerge-in-new-eu-sanctions-against-russia)

- [Finnish Government — 21st EU sanctions package discussion — June 2026](https://valtioneuvosto.fi/en/-/ministerial-committee-on-european-union-affairs-discusses-21st-eu-sanctions-package)

### Secondary sources

- [News Ukraine RBC — EU extends sanctions for another year — June 2026](https://newsukraine.rbc.ua/news/eu-extends-anti-russia-sanctions-for-another-1782418457.html)

- [EEAS — Council extends economic sanctions — June 2026](https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/ukraine/russia%E2%80%99s-war-aggression-against-ukraine-council-extends-economic-sanctions-another-year_en)

- [Kyiv Independent — Ukraine war latest — June 2026](https://kyivindependent.com/ukraine-war-latest-ukraine-brings-home-160-pows-in-new-exchange-with-russia/)

- [Hill Dickinson — Sanctions update June 2026](https://www.hilldickinson.com/our-view/articles/sanctions-update-june-2026/)

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Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/analyse-21e-paquet-de-sanctions-petrole-a-44-dollars-morue-et-kirill-au-c-ur-des