# To those who still doubt Libya can ever vote > Introduction: a letter to a people tired of waiting - Author: Maxime Marquette - Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co) - Section: Open letter - Published: 2026-07-04 - Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/a-ceux-qui-doutent-encore-que-la-libye-puisse-voter-un-jour ## Introduction: a letter to a people tired of waiting ### Why I'm writing to you today Dear readers who have followed, often with weariness, the **Libyan** file for years, I address this piece to you as an open letter rather than a simple analysis. Because **Libya** deserves better than a diplomatic footnote drowned between two other crises. This country has been waiting for national elections since the bitter failure of the vote planned for **December 2021**, and every new announcement of progress is met, among the most seasoned observers, with legitimate skepticism. And yet, something moved in late **June 2026**. The small **4+4** committee, meeting in **Tunis** under the auspices of the **United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL)**, reached consensus on the presidential election law during its fourth round of talks. This is a concrete, documented, verifiable step — not just one more statement of intent. ### What this letter aims to accomplish I do not claim here to convince you that **Libya** will vote for certain in **February 2027**, the date now put forward by the country's three main political institutions. I simply want to show you, piece by piece, why this file deserves renewed attention, without sliding into a naive optimism this country has too often punished. *I'll admit it upfront: I've learned to be wary of every "breakthrough" announced about Libya, given how many missed appointments this country has racked up since 2011, but this one has a different texture this time.* ## The fourth-round consensus: what actually happened in Tunis ### A technical agreement, not yet a political one On **June 24, 2026**, **UNSMIL** announced that participants in the fourth round of consultations of the **4+4** committee — four representatives from eastern Libya, four from the west — had reached consensus on the presidential election law. This committee was created by the **United Nations** as an alternative mechanism to overcome the persistent political deadlock, after the **House of Representatives** and the **High Council of State** failed to agree on amending the electoral laws and appointing a new board for the **High National Elections Commission (HNEC)**. According to **UNSMIL**, this fourth session, held in an atmosphere described as **"positive and constructive,"** resolved most of the issues linked to the electoral process in the first two phases of the UN-facilitated roadmap. A fifth round is planned for the first half of July, to continue discussions and consolidate the progress made. ### A necessary clarification: the 4+4 is not the Structured Dialogue Precision matters here, because confusion often reigns in media coverage of this file: the **4+4** committee is not a replacement for the **Structured Dialogue**, which concluded its own final report on **June 7, 2026** with more than **525 recommendations**. The **United Nations** insists that the **4+4** is a complementary mechanism, targeted at specific obstacles to organizing the vote. This technical distinction matters: it shows that UN diplomacy in **Libya** is advancing on several parallel fronts, with precise mandates, rather than in a vague fog of structureless negotiations. *This clarification about respective mandates may sound dry, but I find it reassuring: a process that clearly distinguishes its bodies has a better chance of going the distance than a diplomatic catch-all.* ## The June 18 roadmap: a calendar finally set ### Three leaders, one historic agreement A few days before the **4+4** committee's agreement, an equally significant event took place in **Tripoli**: on **June 18, 2026**, the heads of Libya's three main political institutions — **Aguila Saleh**, president of the **House of Representatives**, **Mohammed Takala**, president of the **High Council of State**, and **Mohamed al-Menfi**, president of the **Presidential Council** — jointly announced a roadmap setting simultaneous presidential and legislative elections for **February 17, 2027**. This is a rare convergence between institutions that have historically distinguished themselves mainly through mutual gridlock. The agreement also calls for creating a high-level oversight body, including the governor of the **Central Bank of Libya**, the president of the **HNEC**, and representatives of the **Joint Military Commission (5+5)**. ### A calendar grounded in the 13th constitutional amendment The roadmap calls for amendments to electoral legislation consistent with the **thirteenth constitutional amendment**, and requires the future elected president to launch a broad national dialogue to finalize a permanent constitution. This is a detail that matters: it shows this round of elections is not conceived as an end in itself, but as the starting point of a broader constitutional process meant to durably stabilize the country's institutions. Respect for the **Constitutional Declaration**, the **Libyan Political Agreement** and the conclusions of previous **Cairo** talks was also reaffirmed by the three leaders, a welcome signal of legal continuity in a country where every actor has, in the past, sought to rewrite the rules to their own advantage. *Watching three men who have long neutralized one another sign the same document makes me cautious rather than enthusiastic: in Libya, signing an agreement has often just been the prelude to breaking it.* ## The weight of the Structured Dialogue: 525 recommendations to rebuild the state ### Six months of consultations, one hundred twenty Libyan voices On **June 7, 2026**, at its final plenary session in **Tripoli**, the **Structured Dialogue** presented its final recommendations for holding national elections, unifying and strengthening state institutions, and addressing the deep, persistent root causes of the conflict. This process brought together roughly **120 Libyans** from diverse backgrounds over six months, producing more than **525 recommendations** spanning governance, the economy, security and national reconciliation. While some disagreements emerged, notably on the governance track, the report was broadly well received by stakeholders, according to the **United Nations**, which now calls for translating it into a structured, sequenced implementation led by Libyans themselves. ### What this report says about popular exhaustion This volume of recommendations, impressive as it is on paper, mainly reflects one thing: the scale of institutional rebuilding still needed in a country fragmented since the fall of **Muammar Gaddafi** in 2011. Holding a vote will not be enough: the elected institutions will also need real authority across the entire territory, including in the east controlled by forces loyal to Field Marshal **Khalifa Haftar**. It's this structural dimension, often overlooked in media coverage fixated on election dates, that will determine whether the February 2027 vote, if it happens, leads to lasting stability or to a fresh legitimacy crisis. *Five hundred and twenty-five recommendations is a number that inspires as much respect for the work done as concern about Libyans' actual ability to implement them all in time.* ## The National Elections Commission: the decisive technical link ### A reconstituted commission, an approved budget An often-underestimated technical development concerns the reconstitution of the board of the **High National Elections Commission (HNEC)**, an effort launched in late **2025** and continued through the **4+4** mechanism. The **House of Representatives** had already approved, on **December 30**, a proposed budget of **210 million Libyan dinars** to cover the estimated costs of organizing national elections in **2026**. The **HNEC** itself has repeatedly reaffirmed its operational readiness, subject to three cumulative conditions: adequate funding, sufficient security guarantees, and a final agreement on electoral laws. It is this last condition that the **4+4** committee has just moved closer to resolving. ### The judiciary's quiet but essential role One technical detail deserves attention: the recommendation that the future president of the reconstituted **HNEC** be chosen from among magistrates recognized for their impartiality and competence, a decision entrusted to Attorney General **Siddiq al-Sour**. This choice to hand a key role to the judiciary, rather than to rival political blocs, is specifically aimed at limiting suspicions of manipulation of the electoral process. It's an institutional detail that seems minor on paper but actually shapes the very credibility of the vote in the eyes of a Libyan population burned by years of broken promises. *I find it reassuring that the question of the election commission's impartiality is finally being taken seriously, because a vote run by referees suspected of bias would be worse than no vote at all.* ## The security obstacles that remain ### A country still split into two armed camps No roadmap, however well drafted, can erase the security reality of **Libya** in **2026**: the country remains divided between the **Government of National Unity** based in **Tripoli** and the general command of the **Libyan National Army**, loyal to Field Marshal **Khalifa Haftar**, based in the east. **UNSMIL** continues to facilitate what it calls the **"Smaller Convening,"** a discussion format bringing together representatives of both camps. According to the most recent briefings to the **Security Council**, these discussions have produced an agreement in principle on reconstituting the **HNEC**, but further progress is still needed on the electoral laws themselves and on the security guarantees surrounding the vote. ### The sensitive issue of administrative-number holders One specific point of friction concerns the status of people holding **"administrative numbers,"** a file linked to populations whose civil identity has been affected by years of conflict and displacement. The advisory committee recommended that voter registration and candidacy be reserved for holders of a national identity number, while acknowledging the urgency of resolving this issue outside of any electoral or political pressure. It's the kind of technical, almost bureaucratic detail that could nonetheless derail an entire electoral process if future authorities fail to handle it with the necessary rigor. *I always worry about these bureaucratic details overlooked in the big announcements, because it's precisely there, in contested voter rolls, that the most violent post-election crises are often born.* ## What Washington is watching from a distance ### Discreet but present American diplomacy According to information reported by specialized diplomatic intelligence services, the **Trump** administration's Africa adviser is reportedly examining an alternative option allowing the two rival Libyan factions to remain in place, recognized as legitimate, as part of a power-sharing arrangement within a reunified government whose mandate would not require a vote. This possibility, if confirmed, would contrast with the electoral approach favored by the **United Nations**. I report this with the caution it demands: this is an option under consideration reported by a specialized source, not a settled decision. But it illustrates the ongoing tension between the democratic goal championed by **UNSMIL** and the short-term stability calculations that some outside powers may prefer. ### Should the West push harder for real elections? I'll say it plainly: favoring mere power-sharing without going through the ballot box would be a strategic mistake for the **West**, even if it seems simpler in the short term. Stability bought at the price of democratic legitimacy always costs more later, in countries like **Libya** where every facade agreement has ended up exploding into a new armed crisis. Firmly backing the electoral process led by **UNSMIL**, rather than backroom arrangements between armed factions, should remain the priority of any serious Western diplomacy on this file. *I firmly oppose any temptation to sacrifice the Libyan electoral process on the altar of surface-level stability, because this country's recent history is full of examples where that choice came at a steep price, in human lives as much as in international credibility.* ## China's position and Russia's relative silence ### Beijing applauds, but stays in the background It is telling that China's official press agency extensively covered the **4+4** committee's agreement, with **China** also praising the joint committee's work on electoral laws at the **Security Council**. This surface-level diplomatic support, however, masks concrete economic interests: **Beijing** is seeking to secure its presence in Libyan reconstruction and infrastructure, regardless of which camp ultimately holds power. For its part, **Russia** maintains a discreet but real presence through mercenaries and logistical support to certain eastern Libyan factions, in an influence game that goes far beyond the electoral file alone and should raise more alarm in Western foreign ministries. ### Why this rivalry for influence matters to us **Libya** is not just an isolated regional file: it is also a battleground for influence between the **West**, **China** and **Russia**, in an oil-rich country strategically located facing southern Europe. Every election delay, every new institutional crisis, offers these rival powers additional room to consolidate their influence at the expense of stability aligned with Western interests. That is, in my view, one more reason for **Europe** and the **United States** to invest more actively, not just rhetorically, in the success of this fragile electoral process. *I believe the West dangerously underestimates the Libyan stakes in the face of growing Chinese and Russian influence, so focused is it on other theaters deemed more urgent.* ## What ordinary Libyans actually want ### A weariness that transcends political divides Beyond the diplomatic maneuvering, it's worth recalling what ordinary Libyans concretely want: an end to chronic power outages, a stable currency, functioning public services and the ability to travel from one region to another without fearing checkpoints run by rival militias. According to consultations conducted by **UNSMIL** itself, a majority of Libyans agree on the need to unify the government even before elections are held, given how much current divisions affect their daily lives. This popular demand, documented by the UN mission's own polling and consultations, should weigh more heavily in diplomatic calculations than election-calendar considerations alone. ### The risk of a fresh disillusionment The country has already experienced the cancellation of the vote planned for **December 2021**, a disappointment that durably eroded popular trust in any newly announced timeline. Should the **February 17, 2027** date also end up postponed, the risk of massive popular disengagement from any future democratic process would be real, with potentially explosive consequences for the country's stability. It is this pressure of time, as much as the maneuvering among political elites, that should guide the international community's urgency on this file. *I sincerely believe the patience of the Libyan people, already tested hard since 2011, is nearing its limit, and that the world would do well to worry about this more than it currently does.* ## Why this letter is also addressed to Western diplomats ### A call for consistency rather than cyclical indifference Dear decision-makers in **Washington**, in **Brussels**, and in European capitals who follow this file only intermittently, I address this part of my letter directly to you: **Libya** does not deserve fitful attention, reactivated only during migration-crisis spikes or flare-ups of violence in **Tripoli**. It deserves steady support for the process led by **UNSMIL**, including when negotiations seem technical and unspectacular. The **4+4** committee and the **Structured Dialogue** are moving forward precisely because international attention, even quiet attention, keeps constructive pressure on Libyan actors. Reducing that attention just as real progress is taking shape would be a major strategic mistake. ### What I am concretely asking for I am not asking for a diplomatic miracle, only for consistency: clear financial and logistical support for the reconstituted **HNEC**, continued diplomatic pressure to ensure the fifth round of the **4+4** committee planned for July produces concrete results, and a categorical refusal of any easy solution that would bypass the popular vote in favor of mere power-sharing between armed factions. That is, in my view, the only path that honors both the memory of the Libyans who have died since 2011 and the legitimate hope of those who finally want to vote freely for their future. *I address Western diplomats here without mincing words: your inconsistency has already cost this file dearly, and history will judge you harshly if you let this window of opportunity slip away.* ## Lessons from a decade of failures not to repeat ### 2021, the precedent that still haunts minds It is impossible to discuss the **2027** timeline without revisiting the failure of the **December 2021** vote, canceled at the last minute for lack of agreement on candidate eligibility criteria, notably the contested candidacy of the son of former leader **Muammar Gaddafi**. That failure left deep scars in popular trust and fueled additional years of institutional fragmentation. The difference this time may lie in the method: unlike 2021, when electoral laws were cobbled together in a rush, the current process rests on more methodical work, sequenced over several months, with dedicated mechanisms like the **4+4** committee and the **Structured Dialogue**. ### Caution remains warranted despite the progress I nonetheless refuse to give in to blind optimism: **Libya** has repeatedly shown, since 2011, its capacity to derail processes that seemed well underway. The coming weeks, with the fifth round of the **4+4** committee planned for early July, will be a decisive test of whether this positive momentum holds or collapses, like so many before it. It is this constant tension between cautious hope and informed skepticism that should, I believe, guide our collective reading of this file in the months ahead. *I refuse to give in to naive optimism about Libya, but I equally refuse to give in to the comfortable cynicism of saying nothing will ever change in this country.* ## Libya's economy, a silent hostage of the political crisis ### An oil-rich country paralyzed by division **Libya** holds **Africa**'s largest oil reserves, but that wealth remains largely trapped by the institutional divide between the country's east and west. The **Central Bank of Libya**, whose governor will now sit on the electoral oversight body called for by the **June 18** roadmap, plays a pivotal role in distributing oil revenue among the country's various factions. This direct involvement of the **Central Bank** in the electoral process is no small thing: it reflects the need to ensure that public funds, particularly revenue from oil exports, are not diverted to finance unfair election campaigns or armed militias hostile to the democratic process. ### The currency, a thermometer of popular trust The **Libyan dinar** remains highly volatile, reflecting persistent political uncertainty. Every new announcement of diplomatic progress, like the **4+4** committee's in late June, sends positive but fragile signals to the informal currency markets that dominate ordinary Libyans' daily economy. Lasting political stabilization would be the best possible lever to restore a monetary trust eroded long ago. It is this concrete economic reality, more than abstract diplomatic maneuvering, that will determine whether the population keeps supporting the electoral process or gradually turns away from institutions unable to improve their daily lives. *I believe we always underestimate the power of a stable dinar to convince a skeptical population of the real value of a political agreement signed hundreds of kilometers from home.* ## Mediterranean Europe's role in this file ### Italy and France, directly concerned neighbors Among Western powers, **Italy** and **France** remain particularly attentive to the Libyan file, given their geographic proximity and the migration stakes directly tied to the country's instability. A stabilized **Libya** with legitimate institutions would be a far more reliable partner for managing migration flows across the **Mediterranean** than a country fractured among rival militias. These two European countries have, in the past, adopted sometimes diverging positions on **Libya**, backing opposing camps to varying degrees. This historic European division has itself helped weaken the credibility of Western mediation in the country, a point few Western analysts like to acknowledge publicly. ### An opportunity to mend European policy The current moment, with tangible progress driven by **UNSMIL**, offers a rare opportunity for the **European Union** to finally speak with one voice on the Libyan file, rather than letting each capital pursue its own interests separately. A unified European position would considerably strengthen the **West**'s diplomatic weight against the competing ambitions of **China** and **Russia** in the region. It is a test of diplomatic maturity for a **Europe** that has too often let its internal divisions serve the interests of outside powers hostile to its own strategic priorities. *I continue to believe that Europe's inability to speak with one voice on Libya will go down in the history of diplomacy as one of the costliest and most avoidable failures of the past decade.* ## The Tunisian precedent: why Tunis matters so much in this story ### A choice of neutral ground that has proven itself The choice of **Tunis** as the venue for **4+4** committee negotiations is no accident. The Tunisian capital has for several years hosted the main inter-Libyan talks, offering neutral, secure and logistically accessible ground for delegations from both eastern and western **Libya**. This recurring diplomatic choice reflects the relative trust both camps place in **Tunisia** as a discreet facilitator. **Tunisia**'s relative stability itself, despite its own internal political tensions, makes it a valuable partner for UN diplomacy in the region, a role **Tunis** appears to embrace with calculated discretion since the start of the **UNSMIL** process. ### An example for other regional mediations The Tunisian facilitation model, combining geographic proximity with a deliberate political neutrality, could inspire other mediation processes in similar regional conflicts, where the choice of negotiation venue often influences, in underestimated ways, the parties' willingness to engage seriously in dialogue. For **Libya**, this geographic continuity of negotiations in **Tunis** also offers a welcome form of **institutional predictability** in a process otherwise marked by numerous twists and calendar changes. *I find it remarkable that Tunisia, itself in political convalescence for years, manages to offer a stable framework to its Libyan neighbor, a lesson in diplomatic humility few great powers could teach.* ## Conclusion: a letter ending on a cautious glimmer of hope ### What I take from this pivotal moment At the end of this letter, what I take away is that **Libya**, in late **June 2026**, is living through a rare pivotal moment: a technical consensus on the presidential election law, a calendar roadmap endorsed by the country's three main institutions, and foundational work carried out by the **Structured Dialogue** to rebuild solid institutional groundwork. These are not guarantees, but they are verifiable progress, documented by the **United Nations** itself. The **February 17, 2027** date remains fragile, hanging on the goodwill of actors who have historically often favored their short-term interests over Libya's national interest. But for the first time in years, this date rests on an institutional architecture sturdier than mere statements of intent. ### A final word to those who have lost hope To you, Libyan citizens worn down by a decade of broken promises, I can offer no certainty. But I can tell you that this process, this time, is being built with more method, more verification mechanisms and more documented international attention than before. It will be up to you, and to your institutions, to turn this window of opportunity into concrete electoral reality. *I close this letter with deliberate caution: I hope I'm wrong about my doubts, and above all I hope that the next time I write about Libya, it will be to describe open ballot boxes rather than another postponement.* **By Maxime Marquette, columnist** ## Columnist's transparency note ### Editorial stance I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies. I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events. ### Method and sources This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here. **Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies. **Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations. When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**. ### Nature of the analysis The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted. My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors. This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text. ## Sources ### Primary sources - [China.org.cn (Xinhua) — Libyan rival factions agree on presidential election law in UN-brokered dialogue, June 25, 2026](http://www.china.org.cn/world/Off_the_Wire/2026-06/25/content_118565897.shtml) - [UNSMIL — Structured Dialogue concludes, presents final recommendations for Libya's political process, June 7, 2026](https://unsmil.unmissions.org/en/news/structured-dialogue-concludes-presents-final-recommendations-for-libyas-political) - [United Nations — Speakers in Security Council Urge Concrete Progress on Elections in Libya, June 18, 2026](https://press.un.org/en/2026/sc16389.doc.htm) ### Secondary sources - [LibyaReview — UN facilitates new round of Libya political talks in Tunis](https://libyareview.com/65476/un-facilitates-new-round-of-libya-political-talks-in-tunis/) - [Africanews — Libya's main governing bodies agree to hold elections, June 18, 2026](https://www.africanews.com/2026/06/18/libyas-main-governing-bodies-agree-to-hold-elections/) - [Council on Foreign Relations — Global Conflict Tracker: Civil War in Libya](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/civil-war-libya) - [Africa Intelligence — Internal rivalries resurface in Dbeibeh and Haftar election talks, June 4, 2026](https://www.africaintelligence.com/north-africa/2026/06/04/internal-rivalries-resurface-in-dbeibeh-and-haftar-election-talks,110781266-gra) --- Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. 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