# COMMENTARY: €28.3 Billion for Weapons — Europe Has Finally Understood What Supporting Ukraine Means

> On June 25, 2026, at the Ukraine Reconstruction Conference in Gdańsk, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced the first disbursement of €3.2 billion under the new Ukraine Support Loan (USL), a total loan of €90 billion over two years. The commissioner's formu

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Commentary
- Published: 2026-06-27
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/28-3-milliards-pour-les-armes-l-europe-a-enfin-compris-ce-que-veut-dire-soutenir

## Key takeaways

- On June 25, 2026, in Gdańsk, Ursula von der Leyen announced the first disbursement of €3.2 billion under the €90 billion, two-year Ukraine Support Loan.
- Of the €45 billion earmarked for 2026, €28.3 billion (63%) goes to Ukraine's defense, with €16.7 billion for macro-financial budget support.
- The first defense program funded drones from Ukrainian suppliers, with a first reimbursement covering about 255 contracts submitted on June 18.
- Repayment is conditional on Ukraine receiving reparations from Russia, and about €260 billion in frozen Russian assets remain immobilized as a "double lock."
- The budget support is tied to 32 reform measures, and the EU opened its first accession negotiation cluster with Ukraine on June 15, 2026.

## Introduction: A Loan That Is a Weapon, Not a Financial Instrument

### June 25, 2026 in Gdańsk: A Historic Announcement

On **June 25, 2026**, at the **Ukraine Reconstruction Conference** in **Gdańsk**, European Commission President **Ursula von der Leyen** announced the first disbursement of **€3.2 billion** under the new **Ukraine Support Loan (USL)**, a total loan of **€90 billion** over two years. The commissioner's formula, cited by **EU Perspectives**, deserves to be set in stone: **"The USL is not, according to the Commission, a financial instrument. It is a weapon."**

That sentence says it all. After years of ambiguity, hesitation, and philosophical debates about the difference between defensive and offensive support, the **European Union** has finally articulated what many knew but few dared say: supporting **Ukraine** militarily is an investment in the security of **Europe** as a whole. And the very structure of this loan confirms it eloquently.

### The Breakdown That Says It All: 28.3 vs. 16.7

Of the **€45 billion** earmarked for **2026**, the breakdown is unambiguous: **€28.3 billion** — or **63%** of the total — is dedicated to supporting **Ukraine's defense and defense industrial capacity**. The remaining **€16.7 billion** is devoted to macro-financial budgetary support — maintaining the state, essential public services, financial stability. **Europe** is not merely keeping a country alive. It is funding its capacity to fight.

*I remember the debates of 2022, when some European governments refused to send tanks to Ukraine in the name of "non-escalation." Three years later, Europe is directly funding the production of Ukrainian drones. The shift in posture is radical — and infinitely more intellectually honest.*

## What €28.3 Billion for Defense Means in Practice

### Drones First: The First Delivery in March

The first **"product program"** funded under the USL's defense component focused on drones. According to Commissioner **Ruijters**, this program was received in **March 2026** — and it could only be executed with Ukrainian suppliers, since European production was not available in sufficient volume. A first reimbursement covering approximately **255 contracts** was submitted on **June 18**. Payment was expected before the end of **June 2026**.

This detail is telling: **Ukraine** produces drones that **Europe** funds, and in doing so, **Europe** is simultaneously funding Ukrainian defense and the development of a Ukrainian defense industry that will be a pillar of continental security for decades to come. This is a strategic investment, not merely a humanitarian one.

### Documented Needs, Acknowledged Gap

The Commission was transparent about the limits of this effort: there is **"a significant gap between what Ukraine needs and what industry can deliver in the short term."** The needs are clear — drones, counter-drones, missiles, air defense, long-range munitions, deep-strike capabilities. European producers cannot provide everything immediately. The Commission reserved the right to source products outside the **EU**, via **NATO** and **"like-minded countries,"** if **Ukraine** does not receive the necessary offers in time and at scale.

Ukrainian President **Volodymyr Zelensky** signed a law amending the **2026** state budget to incorporate this loan, increasing security and defense spending by **1.56 trillion hryvnias**. Total defense spending for **2026** will reach a record level of **4.4 trillion hryvnias** — including **2.3 trillion** for the purchase of weapons and military equipment.

*Zelensky deserves recognition not only for his military courage, but also his administrative courage. Maintaining a functioning state, credible public finances, and ongoing reforms — all while at war — is a feat that many governments in peacetime would be incapable of achieving.*

## The Double Lock on Frozen Russian Assets

### An Unprecedented Legal Mechanism

One of the most innovative aspects of the USL is its repayment mechanism. Under a **European Council decision** from **December 2025** and a new regulation adopted under **Article 122.1**, repayment by **Ukraine** is conditional: **Ukraine will only repay the loan after receiving reparations from Russia**. In the meantime, the approximately **€260 billion** in frozen Russian assets held in European deposits remain immobilized — and the **EU** reserves the right to use them to repay the loan.

This is what the Commission calls a **"double lock."** This formulation is important legally and politically: it anchors the immobilization of assets in the damage caused by **Russia** to the **EU** itself — not only to **Ukraine** — which strengthens the legal basis of the measure against potential challenges.

### What This Means for Moscow

For **Russia**, this mechanism sends a clear message: every euro spent by **Europe** to fund Ukrainian defense will ultimately come from Russian assets. The cost of the war is therefore doubly charged to **Moscow**: the destruction inflicted on **Ukraine** on one side, and the frozen assets mobilizable to fund reconstruction on the other. **Putin** built a war he expected to win in a matter of days — and now finds himself involuntarily funding the resistance of the adversary he intended to crush.

It is true that **Moscow** has categorically ruled out paying reparations. But the rhetorical exclusion does not eliminate the financial mechanics. If Russian assets are effectively mobilized to repay the loan, **Russia** will have no say — the accounts are in European jurisdictions.

*There is something deeply just in this mechanism: Putin is funding, against his will, Ukrainian resistance. This is not revenge — it is responsibility. Russia caused colossal damage. It is right that it bears part of the bill.*

## Reform Conditionality: Ukraine Transforming Itself as It Fights

### 32 Reform Measures to Unlock Budget Tranches

The USL's budgetary support component is not a blank check. It is conditioned on **32 reform measures** that **Ukraine** must implement, focused on public finances: broadening the tax base, improving spending quality, strengthening financial management systems. **Ukraine** has already demonstrated good faith: it extended its **military tax**, developed legislation on digital platform revenues, and committed to eliminating VAT exemptions on low-value imported parcels.

These reforms carry double value: they improve Ukrainian governance for the post-war period, and they demonstrate to often-skeptical European public opinion that the money is not disappearing into a black hole, but is subject to rigorous verification mechanisms, with specialized audit teams within the Commission's **DG DEFIS**.

### EU Accession: The Carrot and the Condition

On **June 15, 2026**, the **EU** opened the first accession negotiation **cluster** with **Ukraine**, covering the **"fundamentals"** — rule of law, democracy, fundamental rights. This is a powerful signal: **Europe** is not only supporting **Ukraine** in its defensive war. It is welcoming it into its political and institutional family. This process creates additional incentives for reform and irrevocably anchors Ukraine's destiny in the European project.

For **Putin**, this is the most feared scenario: not only is **Ukraine** resisting militarily, but it is integrating legally, economically, and politically into the **West**. The Russian imperial project — reabsorbing **Ukraine** into Moscow's sphere of influence — is being definitively buried, stone by stone, in Brussels regulations.

*I say it clearly: Ukraine's accession to the EU is a cause I defend without ambiguity. Not because it is simple — it will be long, costly, politically difficult. But because Ukraine has earned its place in the European family at the price of blood. To refuse to open the door would be a betrayal.*

## What This Loan Says About Political Europe

### The Deep Mutation of a Long-Hesitant Institution

Just three years ago, the idea that the **European Union** would directly fund combat drones and long-range munitions would have seemed outlandish to many observers. The European treaties were not designed for this. The institutional culture of **Brussels** was that of normative power, not military power. The war in **Ukraine** shattered this model.

What the USL represents, beyond the figures, is a deep mutation of European identity. **Europe** now accepts that it is a security actor — not merely a market, not merely a set of rules and standards, but a power that must be capable of projecting its will and defending its interests and values. This is a cultural shift as significant as it is political.

### The Cost Per Citizen: A Politically Explosive Statistic

The loan represents approximately **€200 per European citizen**. This is the most politically sensitive figure in the entire operation. In a context of inflation, budgetary pressure, and war fatigue in some European societies, this figure can be exploited by populist opposition to fuel skepticism toward Ukrainian support.

The Commission anticipated this criticism: **"The funding gap for 2026 is covered, the first disbursements are underway, and the regulation offers the flexibility Ukraine needs."** But transparency alone is not enough to persuade. European citizens will also need to be shown that this investment yields a return — in security, in regional stability, in a **Ukraine** that will one day be a solid economic partner and strategic ally.

*€200 per European citizen. That is less than what many Europeans have spent on additional energy since Russia invaded Ukraine and caused gas prices to explode. The real economic calculus of this support is strongly positive — but no one frames it that way, and that is a political failure.*

## The Gdańsk Conference: Symbol and Substance

### Gdańsk, City of Resistance, City of Choice

The choice of **Gdańsk** for the **2026 Ukraine Reconstruction Conference** was not accidental. It is the city where the **Solidarity** trade union was born, where the beginning of the end of Soviet communism in **Europe** was played out. Holding a Ukraine support conference in this city inscribes that support in a historical continuity: free **Europe** resisting **Moscow's** imperialism, today as forty years ago.

In **Gdańsk**, Commission President **Ursula von der Leyen** announced the first disbursement of **€3.2 billion** — the first concrete act of a **€90 billion** support mechanism. She also co-signed agreements under the **Ukraine Investment Framework** representing more than **€1.1 billion**, bringing total commitments under this framework to **€8.5 billion**, expected to mobilize nearly **€26 billion** in public and private investments. This is not merely symbolic — it is concrete budgetary reality.

### Zelensky and His Reforms: The Condition of Trust

**Volodymyr Zelensky** signed on **June 22, 2026** a law amending the **2026** Ukrainian state budget to incorporate the European loan. Defense spending rises by **1.56 trillion hryvnias** — including **1.397 trillion** for weapons and military equipment purchases funded by the European loan. This budgetary transparency — publicly disclosing how the money will be used — is part of the conditions the Commission requires to maintain the disbursement flow.

**Ukraine** also opened its first **EU** accession negotiations in **June 2026**, covering the **"fundamentals"** cluster — rule of law, governance. This accession process is itself a reform — it compels **Ukraine** to transform its institutions, combat corruption, modernize its judiciary. It is a dual investment: in the present war and in the future peace.

*Zelensky is simultaneously managing a war, institutional reforms, EU accession negotiations, and a system of public finances under pressure. I do not know if I would have his composure. What I know is that his leadership — imperfect, contested, but present — is one of the reasons Ukraine is still standing.*

## Member States and the Debt Debate: Who Really Pays?

### Common European Borrowing: A Precedent That Frightens Some

The **Ukraine Support Loan** is built on a common borrowing mechanism: **24 EU member states** guarantee the European borrowing, which is then on-lent to **Ukraine** as a loan. The annual interest cost for these member states amounts to roughly **€3 billion per year**. This sets a precedent: it is only the second time after **Next Generation EU** that the **European Union** has borrowed collectively on this scale.

This precedent worries some member states, notably those with stricter public finances — **Germany**, the **Netherlands**, **Austria**, **Finland**. These countries accepted the mechanism for **Ukraine** in the context of geopolitical emergency. But they are watching closely to ensure this mechanism does not become the norm for funding other European budgetary priorities. The tension between risk mutualization and fiscal discipline remains one of the fundamental fault lines in the European construction.

### Funding Beyond 2026: The Real Uncertainty

The Commission was frank on one point: **"there is enormous uncertainty about needs beyond 2026 because they depend very heavily on the war."** The **€45 billion** for **2026** are covered. The **€45 billion** for **2027** depend on a political decision not yet made in detail. If the war continues at the same intensity, if defense needs remain as high, if European industrial capacities do not develop fast enough to supply what **Ukraine** needs — all these variables make the future uncertain.

This is not a reason to refrain from acting now — it is a reason to act now while planning for what comes after. A **Europe** that learned to think long-term on climate must learn to think long-term on security. These two challenges have in common the need for massive investments today for benefits that will partly materialize in a decade.

*The uncertainty beyond 2026 is real and I will not minimize it. But I am tired of those who use this uncertainty as an argument for doing nothing now. Future uncertainty does not neutralize present urgency. Ukraine is at war today. It needs support today. Tomorrow, we will see.*

## Russia Facing Its Frozen Assets: The Weight of Responsibility

### €260 Billion in Sequester: Russia Funds Its Own Defeat

One of the boldest innovations of the **Ukraine Support Loan** is its repayment mechanism backed by frozen Russian assets. Some **€260 billion** in **Russian Central Bank** assets are immobilized in European deposits, primarily in **Belgium** (via **Euroclear**). The revenues generated by these assets have already been used under the **G7's ERA** (**Extraordinary Revenues Acceleration**) mechanism. According to **RIA Novosti**, the **G7** has already transferred **$45.5 billion** in loans guaranteed by these revenues.

The **EU's** legal **"double lock"** — which anchors the immobilization of assets in the damage caused to the **EU** itself, not only to **Ukraine** — is designed to withstand Russian legal challenges. It is a legally robust measure, though never entirely immune from international arbitration proceedings.

### What Putin Can Still Do

**Russia** has categorically refused to pay reparations and has denounced the asset freeze as **"illegal confiscation."** It has attempted, without success, to obtain court decisions in third countries invalidating these measures. It has also used its political relays in **Europe** — certain populist and Eurosceptic parties — to sow doubt about the legality and advisability of the mechanism.

These maneuvers have not succeeded in blocking the loan — which was approved by the **European Parliament** and the **Council**, and whose first disbursement took place on **June 25**. But they demonstrate that **Putin** has not abandoned his search for weaknesses in the mechanism. European vigilance over the integrity of this mechanism — protection of assets, response to legal challenges, internal political solidarity — must be sustained over the long term.

*There is something deeply satisfying, intellectually, in the fact that Russia is involuntarily funding Ukrainian resistance through its frozen assets. Putin launched a war to subjugate Ukraine. He finds himself paying for its military equipment. The logic of responsibility has its own forms of justice.*

## Conclusion: Europe Has Chosen Its Side — and It Is the Right One

### Peace Is Not Negotiated From a Position of Weakness

What the **€45 billion** loan says, fundamentally, is that **Europe** has drawn the conclusion many analysts have been repeating since the conflict began: a durable peace in **Ukraine** will not be built through capitulation or **"diplomacy"** that demands **Ukraine** cede its territory. It will be built from a position of Ukrainian strength — a position that **Europe** is actively helping to create.

**Moscow's** rhetoric that **"the West is funding war, not peace"** is as false as it is cynical. The **West** is funding the **resistance** of an invaded country. If **Russia** wants peace, it only needs to withdraw its forces from Ukrainian territory. It is as simple and as difficult as that.

### A Signal to Other Democracies: Solidarity Has a Price, and It Is Worth Paying

Beyond **Ukraine**, this historic loan sends a signal to all the world's democracies: **Europe** is a reliable partner. When it makes a commitment, it keeps it. When a democracy is attacked, it fights alongside it — financially, politically, and if necessary, militarily. That is the message **Zelensky** has been defending from the very first day. It is also the message that **Beijing**, **Moscow**, and **Pyongyang** are hearing, and which concerns them.

*This commentary ends with a certainty and a prayer. The certainty: Europe made the right choice in supporting Ukraine militarily, financially, and politically. The prayer: that this support lasts long enough for Ukraine to build the peace it deserves — a peace of victory, not of capitulation.*

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

## Sources

### Primary sources

- [EU Perspectives — A loan alone? Brussels steadfast on Ukraine commitment, MEPs hear — June 23, 2026](https://euperspectives.eu/2026/06/brussels-steadfast-on-ukraine-commitment-meps-hear/)

- [European Commission — Commission disburses the first €3.2 billion instalment to Ukraine — June 25, 2026](https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/news/commission-disburses-first-eur32-billion-instalment-ukraine-under-eur90-billion-ukraine-support-loan-2026-06-25_en)

- [Ukrainska Pravda — Ukraine receives €3.2bn from EU — June 25, 2026](https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2026/06/25/8041057/)

### Secondary sources

- [CommonSpace — EU releases first tranche of €90 billion loan package to Ukraine — June 26, 2026](https://www.commonspace.eu/news/eu-releases-first-tranche-eu90-billion-loan-package-ukraine)

- [Interfax Ukraine — Zelenskyy signs law amending 2026 state budget — June 22, 2026](https://en.interfax.com.ua/news/general/1178641-amp.html)

- [Euronews — Ukraine gets €3.2 billion from EU support loan, von der Leyen says — June 25, 2026](https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2026/06/25/von-der-leyen-announces-first-payment-to-ukraine-under-90-billion-loan)

- [Babel.ua — EU allocates first tranche of aid to Ukraine in the amount of €3.2 billion — June 25, 2026](https://babel.ua/en/news/128024-eu-allocates-first-tranche-of-aid-to-ukraine-in-the-amount-of-3-2-billion)

-

---

Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/28-3-milliards-pour-les-armes-l-europe-a-enfin-compris-ce-que-veut-dire-soutenir